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ABSTRACT
In the Platonic exegesis, the topic of 'hypothesis and dialectic' has b e e n  
covered by the works o f many scholars, although, compared to some o th e r  
topics, it has not been overinterpreted. To the best of my know ledge, h o w e v e r ,  
there is only one  book that deals exten sively  and system atically  with it —  
Richard R obinson’s P la to ’s Earlier D ia l ec t i c  (Oxford, 1953). This one book o f  
Robinson has remained, according to many Plato scholars, unsurpassed as to 
the pun ctiliou sness with which its author describes the f o r m a l  structure o f  
Plato's hypothetical m ethodology; that is why most of those who have d ea lt  
with this topic tended to take Robinson's book as the ultimate authority on t h e  
matter. Yet there is an a s p e c t  o f this topic that Robinson (and, as far as I k n o w ,  
all the other scholars that wrote on it) explored less: the relation b e tw e e n  
Plato's hypothetical m ethodology and the Platonic m etaphysics. This relation is 
the actual subject of my research.
Now my research has two main claims (which are actually e x e g e t i c a l  
c la im s ) .
(1) W hether with disappointm ent or with relief (to use Ryle's 1966, 17 
phrase), we have to recognize that Plato's dialogues unfold a p h i l o s o p h i c a l  
search  rather than a metaphysi cal  system.  My attempt to determ ine w h a t  
Plato's hypothetical dialectic is, follow s in a way the logical ro u te  of h i s  
philosophical search. In the Introduction, I argue that this route started, v e r y  
likely, from the results o f Socrates' philosophy; and, in the seven chapters that 
follow , I analyze the two main 'areas' covered by it: first, that o f t h e  
metaph ys ica l  n a t u r e  of the objects that can be known (Chapters One, Two, 
Three, Four and Five); and, once the theory of e iS t) is established (w hich  is  
Plato's answer to the question of the m etaphysical nature of the objects th a t  
can be known), that o f how a particular eiTSoC  can be known (Chapters Six a n d  
Seven). My first m ain  claim (stated in the first part of the C onclusions — s e e
8 .1 .) is that the p.e0 o S o i which introduce and develop the theory of e i 8 r|, as 
w ell as the p eO oSoi which aim at determ ining the € i 8 t| them selves, are ( i )  
dialectical,  in the sense that they are supposed to be undertaken through S ia — 
K e y e i v , dialectic  (because for Plato the locus of certainty is the c o m m u n i o n  o f  
minds, and such a c o m m u n i o n  is possible only through the medium of XoyoC, 
language);  and (ii) hypothet ical,  in the sense that their results remain n o t  
fu lly  justified .
(2) In Chapters Four and Five I argue that Plato made an. attempt to  
prove that reality  (i.e. the 'world of € i 8 t]', and, to some extent, its s e n s ib le  
cop y) is a à p |J .o v ia  (for the e iS r i  form not a chaos, but a K oapoC) (although th e  
very notion of app-OVia remains actually not fully determ ined); and, at t h e  
beginning of the second part o f the Conclusions (8.2.1.), I argue that for P la to  
the human mind can know this d p p o v i a  only insofar it is itself harmonic.  M y  
second m ain  claim (stated in the middle section of 8 .2 . 1.) is that the peG oSoi 
which aim at determ ining the abstract e i 8 'p, as well as the (jl€0 o 8 o l  w h ic h  
introduce and develop the theory of e i 8r|, are suitable  (to use R o b in so n 's  
expression) because the c r i t e r i o n  on which they are grounded, i.e. th e  
cru}JL<|)(jJVia TÙJV XEYOpevcüV, corresponds  to the p r i n c i p l e s  o f both 'the r e a li t y  
sought to be known' (d p p o v ia  TWy £ i 8 üjv) and 'the human mind that seeks to  
know it' ( d p p o v ia  rfjC  \|/tJXTiC). In short: I claim that Plato's p .£ 0 o 8 o i  in g e n e r a l  
are 'suitable' because their criterion is coherence, and coherence is  
'immanent' in both reality and thinking.
There remains, however, two things that need to be clarified. One is t h e  
difference between the 'levels' at which the two groups of |JL£0o8ol f u n c t io n  
(i.e. the 'level of £ i 8 'q' and the 'm e ta -£ i8 T) level’); and the other is the r e la t io n
• -
betw een the m ethodological criterion of coherence and the m e ta p h y s ic a l  
principle of coherence in the case of the peG oSoi that introduce and d e v e lo p  
the theory of e i 8 r|. The first one, I think, can be clarified rather easily and I 
shall discuss it at the end of 8.2.1.. The second one, how ever, raises a v e r y  
difficult question; if  Plato achieved his m etaphysics — i.e. his theory of e i 8 q —  
through a [J.€0o8oC grounded on CTU|JL(j)tnyia Tuay X e^ op eyo ïy , then he used t h e  
m ethodological criterion of coherence b e f o r e  reaching a ju stifica tion  of it ,  
nam ely the beliefs that both reality an thinking are coherent. So, one m a y  
ask, what did justify, for Plato, this m ethodological criterion of c o h e r e n c e  
when it was f i r s t  applied? To attempt to answer this question is, I am very w e ll  
aware of it, to open a philosophica l 'can of worms' (w hich would b e ,  
noneth eless, a fascinating thing to do; as Plato said in R. 435 c 8 , t o .
KaXd), As far as I am concerned, I shall propose at the end of 8.2.2. —  
tentatively,  however —  the sketch o f a possible answer to this question.
To go back to Robinson. P h i l o s o p h i c a l l y ,  I share his view s, that "if a 
method is suitable, that must surely be because the reality sought to be k n o w n  
is such and such, and the human mind that seeks to know it is such and such"  
(p. 178). (And, like him, I do not discuss, p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y ,  this v ie w .)
Exegetically,  how ever, my position differs from his, for I do not c o n s tr u e  
Plato's hypothetical methodology as he does, and I argue that this m e th o d o lo g y  
(as I construe it) is linked with the Platonic m etaphysics. Yet, I regard m y 
research more like a possible complet ion  of Robinson's work on this to p ic ,  
rather than a contention  of it; for, even if my a n s w e r s  differ from his, t h e y  
were 'called for' by q u e s t i o n s  that he first raised, in unfold ing so b r i l l ia n t ly  
the topic o f Plato's dialectic.
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PREFACE
According to Cherniss' and Brisson's bibliographies (see  
Lustrum  — 1959, 1960 and 1977, 1983, 1994 respectively), b e tw e e n  
1930 and 1985 alone there were published over 8127 titles on Plato. 
Any scholar then, who decides to increase this inflationary, 'endem ic ' 
exegesis and write yet another book, article or doctoral thesis on  
Plato, needs a good excuse.
The most honourable excuse, that at stake is something still 
unexplored, is, now, completely out of question. For every single line  
of the Platonic corpus was taken into account; each relevant term h as 
been analysed with fastidious pedantry; every significant p a ssag e  
has been overinterpreted; and every topic, from eîSoC to c^appaKov, 
has been discussed with ultimate d k p ip e ia  (and in connection with all 
imaginable subjects (1)). Confronted with this situation, any P lato  
scholar of today must feel like a passionate explorer who was b o rn  
'too late', that is, long after everything was discovered, explored a n d  
classified. And yet, a few aspects of some otherwise well s tu d ie d  
topics have remained less explored. So, one can still invoke a fa ir ly  
good excuse for writing yet another Platonic study, namely that a t  
stake is the examination of an aspect which has been less d iscu ssed  
and analysed. This is also my excuse (2).
a. The subject i
In the Platonic exegesis, the topic of 'hypothesis and d ialec tic ' 
has been covered by the works of many scholars (see the se lec t 
bibliography), although, compared to some other topics, it has n o t 
been overinterpreted (cf. Skemp 1976, 35: "one may hope that m o re  
will be said on this issue"). (The expression 'Plato’s method of 
hypothesis' is sometimes used in the scholarly circles; yet very few  
scholars have attempted to impose it through their writings, b ecau se  
this expression implies m ore  than Plato actually said; as far as I am  
concerned, I have avoided it, for this reason, and have used instead a 
less hazardous, yet more ambiguous one, namely 'Plato's h y p o th e tica l 
dialectic', which I shall justify in the Conclusions — see 8.1.3.)
To the best of my knowledge there is only one  book that deals 
extensively and system atically with this topic — Richard R obinson 's 
Plato's Earlier Dialectic (Oxford, 1953). This one book of Robinson, 
however, has remained, in the eyes of many Plato scholars, 
unsurpassed as to the punctiliousness with which its a u th o r  
describes the fo rm a l  structure of Plato's hypothetical m ethodology , 
and it has often been taken as the ultimate authority on the m a tte r . 
Yet there is an aspect  of this topic that Robinson (and, as far as I
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Iknow, all the other scholars who have written on it) explored less: 
the relation between Plato’s hypothetical methodology and th e  
Platonic metaphysics. This relation is the actual subject of m y  
resea rch .
In a lecture W ittgenstein gave in Cambridge (known now as ’’A 
Lecture on Ethics"), he told his auditors that the hearer of a len g th y  
philosophical discourse is "incapable of seeing both the road he is led  
and the goal which it leads to" (1965, 4). That is to say, con tinues 
W ittgenstein, that the hearer "either thinks: 'I understand all he says, 
but what on earth is he driving at’, or else he thinks I see what h e 's  
driving at, but how on earth is he going to get there'" (p. 4).
At the beginning of his lecture, W ittgenstein asked his au d ito rs  
to be patient, promising them that in the end they will see both 'th e  
way and the goal’. As far as I am concerned, I shall state, in w h a t 
follows (yet very briefly), my goals, i.e. the main claims of m y  
research ; but, as regarding my way toward them , I also have to a sk  
the reader to be patient; for, being a paKpa koX rp a y eT a  oSoC, its  
summarizing would turn this preface into too lengthy a piece.
b. The claims
Since Robinson's book became a reference book in this su b jec t 
of Plato's hypothetical methodology, I cannot state my claims without 
contrasting them with his.
About Plato's hypothetical methodology Robinson has th re e  
main claims (which are actually exegetical claims). He argues, to p u t  
it more or less roughly, that:
(1) there are two main m ethodological stages  in Plato: (i) that o f  
the Socratic elenchus (prominent in the early dialogues); and ( i i )  
that of the Platonic dialectic, which contains two d is t in c t  
m ethodological devices: hypothesis (prom inent in the M e n o ,
Phaedo, Republ ic  and Parmenides),  and synthesis and d iv is io n  
(prominent in the Phaedrus,  Sophis t ,  Politicus  and Philebus)  ( s e e  
p. v); that
(2) the explicit accounts of the use of hypothesis from the M e n o ,
Phaedo, Republic  and P a r m e n i d e s ,  in spite of their d if f e r e n c e s ,  
allow us to speak of a 'certain procedure that may be called h is  
[Plato's] hypothetical method' (p. 105); and that
(3) the Platonic h ypothetical method (as he, Robinson, c o n s tr u e s  
it) is not linked with the Platonic m etaphysics. Here, R o b in so n 's  
argument is not very clear (or so I find); the way I understand it  
is, however, this.
(i) "If a method is suitable," —  claims Robinson —  "that must surely 
be because the reality sought to be known is such and such, a n d  
the human mind that seeks to know it is such and such. That a 
method is good ought to be derivable from the situation to w h ic h  
it applies" (p. 178). But he does not actually d isc u ss ,
12
p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y ,  this view; he only im plies that its truth ought to  
be endorsed by any rational person, and claims that "Plato's 
insight did not go as far as that" (p. 178); he claims, that is, th a t  
Plato was not aware of this obvious idea, that a good method o u g h t  
to be derivable from the situation to which it applies. For he, sa y s  
Robinson, although strongly recom m ended his h y p o t h e t ic a l  
method, '[did] not give us a reasoned derivation [of it]' (p. 178); i n 
other words, although Plato believed that his h y p o t h e t ic a l  
method is a 'good method', he did not asked, claim s R o b in so n ,
"what it is in the nature of things and the nature of men th a t  
makes [...it] desirable" (p. 178).
(ii) As regarding the use of the hypothetical method, R o b in s o n  
claims that this method is actually very little used (pp. 202-4); a n d  
that Plato, at least in the R ep u b l ic ,  uses m ostly some m e th o d s  
which he considers to be fully inferior to the method o f  
hypothesis and to dialectic in general, namely 'the methods o f  
analogy and imagery' (p. 222). So, concludes Robinson, "We te n d  
to assume that a successful man must know the causes o f h is  
success; but the spectacle which we have just contem plated [i.e .
Plato's using 'the methods o f analogy and imagery', instead of t h e  
recom m ended hypothetical method] suggests that a man m ig h t  
discover important new truths and yet be widely m istaken a b o u t  
the method by which he did so" (p. 22 2 ).
(iii) To sum up: regarding the topic of the relation between t h e  
Platonic hypothetical method and the Platonic m etaphysics w e  
may, Robinson seems to imply (see pp. 178, 202-4, 222.), ask tw o  
questions; either: 'Did Plato derive this method from h is  
m etaphysics?' or: Did he achieve his m etaphysics through th is  
method?' Now Robinson answers n egatively  to both o f th e m ,  
im plying thus very clearly that for him the P la to n ic  
hypothetical m ethodology is not linked with the P la to n ic  
metaphysics. In other words: Robinson does not deny that there is 
a m etaphysical 'construction' in Plato (i.e. a way o f c o n c e iv in g  
'the nature o f things and the nature o f man'); but he thinks th a t  
the Platonic h ypothetical m ethodology is not linked with it, f o r  
he neither derived this m ethodology from his m etaphysics, n o r  
he achieved his m etaphysics through this m ethodology.
Robinson would not admit then that he explored less fu l l y  th e  
question regarding the relation between the Platonic h y p o th e tica l 
methodology and the Platonic metaphysics; the way he puts th ings 
suggests rather that he believed there is not much to explore ab o u t 
it, for the Platonic hypothetical methodology and the P latonic 
metaphysics are obviously not linked.
In my view he was wrong; and, I believe, he was w rong  
because he explored less Plato's metaphysics and its relation with the 
Platonic methodology in general. As I said, this is precisely what m y  
research deals with. But my research has not been done within a 
Robinsonian framework; that is, I do not operate with the d is tin c tio n  
he makes between the two methodological stages, and I do n o t 
construe the hypothetical methodology as he does.
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Now my research has two main claims (which are ac tu a lly  
exegetical claim s).
(1) W hether with d isappointm ent or with relief (to use R y le 's
1966, 17 phrase), we have to recognize that Plato's d ia lo g u e s
unfold a ph i losophical  search  rather than a m etaphys ica l  s y s t e m .
My attempt to determ ine what Plato's h ypothetical dialectic is , 
follows in a way the logical route of his philosophical search (3 ) .
In the Introduction I argue that this route started, very l ik e ly ,  
from the results of Socrates' philosophy; and, in the s e v e n
chapters that follow , I analyze the two main 'areas' covered by it: 
first, that of the meta ph ysi ca l  n a t u r e  of the objects that can b e  
known (Chapters One, Two, Three, Four and Five); and, once t h e  
theory o f e iS r i  is established (which is his answer to the q u e s t io n  
of the m etaphysical nature of the objects that can be k n o w n ) ,  
that o f the e iS q  them selves (Chapters Six and Seven). My f ir s t  
m ain  claim (stated in the first part of the Conclusions —  see 8.1.) is 
that the |jLe0 o 8 o i  which introduce and develop the theory of £ i 8 r|, 
as well as the |JL£0o 8 o i  which aim at determ ining the £ i 8 t] 
them selves, are (i) dialect ical ,  in the sense that they are su p p o sed  
to be undertaken through 8 ia ~ \£ 'y £ iv ,  dialect ic  (because f o r  
Plato the locus o f certainty is the c o m m u n i o n  of minds, and s u c h  
a c o m m u n i o n  is possible only through the medium of XoyoC, 
language);  and (ii) hypothetical ,  in the sense that their r e s u lts  
remain not fully justified .
(2) In Chapters Four and Five I argue that Plato made an a ttem p t  
to prove that reali ty  (i.e. the 'world of £ i 8 t]' and, to some e x te n t ,  
its sensible copy) is a apfjL ovia (for the £ i  8 T| form not a chaos, b u t  
a KoafJLoC); and, at the beginn ing  o f the second part of t h e  
Conclusions (8.2.1.), I argue that for Plato the human mind c a n  
know this àpjJiovLa only insofar it is itself harmonic  ( a l t h o u g h  
the very notion of a p p o v ia  remains actually not f u l ly  
d eterm in ed ). My second m ain  claim (stated in the middle s e c t io n
of 8 .2 .1.) is that the p.£0 o 8 o i  which aim at determ ining t h e  
abstract £ i 8 T|, as well as the jjL£0 o S o i that introduce and d e v e lo p  
the theory of e i 8 'T|, are s u i t a b l e  (to use Robinson's e x p r e s s io n )  
because the c r i t e r i o n  on which they are grounded, i.e. t h e
crujjLcjütjüVia TüJV X £ y 6|J.€Vül)V, corresponds  to the p r i n c i p l e s  o f b o th  
'the reality sought to be known' (d p p o v ia  tüjv  £ i 8 üjv) and 'th e  
human mind that seeks to know it' (apiJLOVia t t |C ij/uxTiC). I n 
short: I claim that Plato's [JL£0o8oi in g e n e r a l are 'su ita b le '
because their criterion is coherence, and coherence is  
'immanent' in both reality and thinking.
There remains, however, two things that need to be clarified . 
One is the difference between the 'levels' at which the two groups of 
lJL£0o8oi function (i.e. the 'level of £t8T]' and the 'meta-£i8T| level'); an d  
the other is the relation between the methodological criterion of
coherence and the metaphysical principle of coherence in the case of 
the ijl£ 0 o 8 o i  that introduce and develop the theory of £ i 8 i n .  The f ir s t
one, I think, can be clarified rather easily and I shall discuss it at th e
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end of 8.2.1. The second one, however, raises a very d ifficu lt
question: if Plato achieved his metaphysics — i.e. his theory of ei8r| — 
through a p£0o8oC grounded on cnjp({)wvia tujv  Xeyopevcov, then he u se d  
the m ethodological criterion of coherence before  reaching a 
justification of it, namely the beliefs that both reality and th in k in g  
are coherent. So, one may ask, what did justify, for Plato, th is  
methodological criterion of coherence when it was f i r s t  applied? To 
attem pt to answer this question is, I am very well aware of it, to 
open a philosophical 'can of worms' (which would be, nonetheless, a 
fascinating thing to do; as Plato said in R. 435 c 8, yaXeira tœ kœXœ). As 
far as I am concerned, I shall propose at the end of 8.2.2. —-
tentatively, however — the sketch of a possible answer to th is  
question .
To go back to Robinson. Philosophically, I share his views, th a t  
"if a method is suitable, that must surely be because the re a lity  
sought to be known is such and such, and the human mind that seek s 
to know it is such and such" (p. 178). (And, like him, I do not discuss, 
philosophically, this view.) Exegetically, however, my position d iffe rs  
from his, for I do not construe Plato's hypothetical methodology as he 
does, and I argue that this methodology (as I construe it) is l in k e d  
with the Platonic metaphysics. Yet, I regard my research more like a 
possible completion of Robinson's work on this topic, rather than a 
contention of it; for, even if my answers differ from his, they w e re
'called for' by questions that he first raised, in unfolding so brilliantly
the topic of Plato's dialectic.
c. The approach
A  great deal of intellectual energy might have been saved, h a d  
the comm entators of philosophical texts stated what their a p p ro ach  
is and how faithful they believe their interpretations are.
What follows is a rather long (for a preface) discussion of th is  
matter: what my approach is and how I see my results. Initially, th is  
was the end of the Conclusions section; on second thoughts, h o w ev er, 
I decided to clear the whole thing up right here, in the Preface; a t 
least as far as philosophy is concerned, I think, it is preferable to  
irritate your reader with the way you see something he has not y e t  
read, rather than convince him, at the end, that his objections a re  
due to the way he read your text.
The author of a philosophical text cannot write down all that h e  
actually has in mind, though he usually says more than he is a w a re  
of; thus, an interpreter of a philosophical text may focus on th re e  
different things: on what its author  had in his mind and wanted to
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say; on what the tex t  itself might say (regardless of whether its  
author was aware of it or not); and on what he, the in terpre ter ,  
through his own virtuosity, can make the text say; to put it in th e  
jargon of some contem porary theories of criticism, the in terpreter of 
a philosophical text may focus on intentio auctoris, on intentio operis  
or on intentio lectoris. Now, those comm entators on ph ilosoph ical 
texts who make exegetical  claims would hardly admit that th e y  
regard a text as a 'picnic where the author brings the words and th e  
readers bring the sense' (to use Todorov's expression (4)); most of 
them, on the contrary, would argue that they aim exclusively a t  
reconstructing what a philosopher wanted to say in his texts. This 
happens also in the Platonic exegesis.
A text, a Y€Ypap|jL£voC, says Plato Phdr. 275 e, may be 'ill- 
treated and unfairly abused, for it is not able to defend or help itself, 
always needing its parent to come to its help' (my paraphrase). The 
vast majority of his exegetes, however, who claim that their only  
concern regards Plato's 'intentions', would kindly deny that th e  
Platonic texts, once they are in their hands, might need the p re se n c e  
of their 'parent' to defend them. But, quite often, their Plato is not a t  
all Platonic. There are, for instance, a Christian (Ivanka 1964), a 
Hegelian (Bosanquet 1895), a Neokantian (Natorp 1902), a H usserlian  
(Ritter 1910-1923), a phenom enologist (Gadamer 1931), an  
existentialist (Friedlander 1964), an analytic (Gosling 1973), a n d  
even a Freudian Plato (Brès 1968) (cf. also Lafrance 1986, 2 8 5 -6 ); 
and each time, we are told that we deal with an in terpretation  th a t  
reveals Plato's thoughts as they were construed by him. (To 
praphrase one of Flaubert's famous mots — Madame Bovary c'est m o i  
— we may say that, very often, the modern exeget of Plato's w o rk  
should have had Flaubert's courage and admit, openly, that M on sieur  
Platon c'est moi.)
These are, one may say, extreme positions; but, to some ex ten t,
I believe, any  in terpretation of Plato's 'orphaned' work will be a 
'mixture' of his thoughts and ours. And this is so for three m ain  
reasons.
(1) "The greatest danger in speaking about a thinker is that w e 
will translate his language back into a language familiar to us in  
order to make it understandable. But what we really do is to mutilate 
what is proper to a thinker, because he is present and functions a n d  
lives in his language. His language is his thought, and if we give u p  
his language, we give up his thought." This sentence — which belongs 
to Walter Biemel (1981, 168) — expresses a much too often fo rg o tten  
truth; but it also promotes an illusion; for we cannot com plete ly  
avoid putting things in our terms.
(2) In the spiritual history of mankind, a beginning  is a u n iq u e  
moment, a moment which is, necessarily, tinged with confusion, 
hesitation, and perplexities. If you happen not to be part of it, you
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will never be able to imagine its full flavour, mostly because, in  
retrospect, its confusion, hesitation, and perplexities cannot ac tu a lly  
be experienced. How was it like to discover  writing? How was it lik e  
to be among the men who saw Jesus Christ for the f irs t  t im e?  W e 
simply cannot operate an Eiroxij and elude the sediments of o u r 
h is to ry .
Leibniz, in a letter to Nicolas Remond, dated February 11, 1715, 
says that "if someone were to reduce Plato to a system, he w ould  
render a great service to mankind [...]" (1956, 1072). We do not know  
if Leibniz was or not ironic; we do not know, that is, if he believed o r 
not that Plato's philosophy could be reduced to a system. We feel, 
however, that he was right in his assuming that 'a Plato reduced to a 
system' is more 'useful' than 'the actual Plato', for our mind can n o t 
adapt any more to a spiritual space so full of obscurities a n d  
unresolved issues as the Platonic thought was.
Plato belongs to the aurora  of what we now call W es te rn  
philosophy; he was among the f i r s t  men that spoke about the m a in  
philosophical questions: the ultimate causes of existence, the meaning 
of the verb 'to be', the nature of mind, language and time. How was i t  
like to speak fo r  the first time about these questions? How was it like 
to speak fo r  the first time about the fact that we can know only th a t  
which remains the same and which is present in many in d iv id u a ls?  
We will never know; we, unlike Plato, live in a spiritual KoapoC in  
which Platonism is a fixed star. But it is not only that we are not ab le  
to live  the beginning that Plato represents in the W este rn  
philosophy, because the 25 centuries of our history led us to a 
paradigm, as Kuhn would put it, which is very different from his; w e  
are also unable to handle all the confusions, hesitations, p e rp le x itie s  
and unsolved problems inherent in his philosophy, because we h a v e  
become addicted to clarity. And so we cannot but attem pt to 're d u ce  
Plato to a system'; we cannot, that is, but get rid of his obscurities, 
hesitations and perplexities and introduce in his thoughts an artificial 
order and clarity.
(3) For most of the Western philosophers, and for Plato as w ell, 
the use of m etaphorical language has only one aim: to lead one 's
'sight' towards the abstract matter which is embodied in it. As Marias
1967, 46 put it: "The role of metaphor is like my finger when I p o in t
to something. When I point to something, I am suggesting that you  
look in this direction in order to discover what I am seeing. I am n o t 
suggesting you look at my finger. Some people do. And this is v e ry  
surprising. Unfortunately this also happens in philosophy." W ith  
Plato, however, things were not that simple.
The view according to which the m etaphorical language has 
im portant heuristic resources has survived until today (see fo r 
instance Ricoeur 1975, 10-1). But for most of the W este rn
philosophers (from Aristotle to Hegel) the use of m e tap h o rica l
language is not a mark of ’serious philosophy'; for Plato this is h a rd ly  
so. For him, man, unlike gods, cannot too often say eiJ oïSa k œ ï  o v k  
eiKdCcn (like Apollodorus says in Smp. 173 d 2-3); moreover, for h im  
man is not even able, sometimes, to speak aKpipwC about that v e ry  
little he knows (cf. Ti. 29 c-d, Phd. 85 c-d, Sph. 233 a, etc.), in w hich  
case man has to resort to a m etaphorical language. Plato, that is (no t 
only unlike us, but also unlike most of the W estern ph ilo sophers), 
believed that, very often, 'metaphorical thinking' is the only kind of 
rigour that we can achieve in our attem pt to u n d e rs ta n d  
philosophical matters (5); so, besides the inevitable obscurities of h is 
thought, due to his being a pioneer of W estern philosophy, there a re  
also the obscurities brought forward by the exuberance of h is  
m etaphorical language, i.e. by the plethora of his m etap hors  a n d  
metaphorical devices (whose philosophical use I shall discuss in  
8.3.2.).
Given the enormous amount of metaphors and m e tap h o ric a l 
devices he used, as well as their refinem ent and b a ro q u e  
interweaving, the abstract matters he expounded m etap h o rica lly  
became hardly visible. In other words, his manner of writing th ro w s 
the reader of his texts into confusion. Faced with the p a ra s itic a l 
meanings and the clandestine ideas introduced by the in h ib ite d  
resources of Plato's m etaphorical language, the reader of his tex ts  
will find himself at a loss about that towards which 'Plato's f in g er 
points', i.e. about that abstract dWoC implied by his àXX^yopeTv. Yet 
the reader (especially the one interested in the Platonic p h ilo so p h y)  
cannot handle Plato's metaphors and m etaphorical devices as th e y  
are; he has, eventually, to in terfere  and retrieve from them what h e  
thinks they embody.
To conclude: we cannot, in our attempt to understand Plato, b u t  
interfere in — to use Aristotle's expression (Metaph. 987 a 31) — i8 ia
nXCCTQJVOC.
As far as I am concerned, I did not approach Plato from a 
particular non-Platonic philosophical perspective. I focussed m y  
research on Plato's intentio, and I attem pted to understand the w ay  
he thought; and yet my Plato too is not entirely eiXiKpivf(C.
(!') I tried, as much as I could, to understand him in his o w n  
terms; yet, at some points, I failed, and I had to translate his claim s 
in modern terms (as I did, for instance, in the Conclusions, where I 
put Plato's idea about the 'composition' of the soul in terms of th e  
transcendental level o f  mind).
(2') As I said, my attempt to determ ine what P la to 's  
hypothetical dialectic is, followed in a way his philosophical search , 
which, I believe, is a coheren t  search, in the sense that it, given its  
premisses, has a logical route; yet this search has its hesita tions .
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perplexities, confusions and unresolved problems. As I  construed it, I 
am very well aware of it, this search is more clear cut than it actually 
was; and it is I  who introduced in it an overdose of clarity and o rd er, 
for I — like most of the modern scholars — have lost the grace of 
dealing with contingencies and fallibilities. I believe, however, th a t  
the 'exaggerated coherence' of Plato's philosophical search which I 
propose may help us to understand this search as it was.
(3') As regarding Plato's m etaphors and m etaphorical dev ices 
that I came across, I tried to separate what I believed is th e ir  
'essential' matter from their 'accidental' form .  I do not totally re jec t, 
however, the possibility of interpreting these m etaphors an d  
m etaphorical devices, occasionally, in a way favourable to th a t  
artificial order I introduced myself in my reading of Plato.
d. Miscellaneous
(i) The term 'Platonism' has become rather ambiguous, for — 
being used by so many 'philosophical schools' — it may re fe r  
nowadays not only to the original core of Plato's thought but also to  
various forms of Vulgatae Platonicae; whenever I used it, I m e a n t 
by it 'Plato's Platonism'.
(ii) I hold, as the majority of scholars, that the Meno p rec ed e s  
the Phaedo, the Phaedo precedes the Republic, the Republic p rec ed e s  
the Parmenides, and the Parmenides precedes the Sophist. As 
Robinson (1953, v), I use the expressions m iddle  and late d ialogues  
with reference to the Meno, Cratylus, Symposium, Phaedo, Republic, 
Parmenides, Theaetetus, and the Phaedrus, Sophist, Politicus, 
Philebus, Timaeus-Critias, Laws respectively. Sometimes, however, I 
move rather freely between dialogues, on the assum ption that th e y  
contain views which complement one another.
(iii) I take the Seventh Letter and the Greater Hippias to b e
genuine, although their authenticity is still debated; I have also m ad e
several references to the First Alcibiades, which I think was w r it te n  
by a pupil in Plato's lifetime (probably revised, or even completed by 
Plato himself) (for details regarding the authenticity of these w orks 
see Skemp 1976, 10-11 and Lafrance 1986, 276-77).
(iv) The text of the Platonic corpus used for citations is that of 
the Oxford Classical Text, edited by J. Burnet. Departures fro m  
Burnet's readings are noted. Citations from Aristotle', E pictetus', 
Sextus Empiricus', Plotinus' and Porphyry's Greek texts were ta k e n  
from the Loeb edition. The text of the Presocratic corpus used fo r 
citations is that of the Diels-Kranz edition.
(v) Unless otherwise noted, translations of Plato’s texts a re  
from The Collected Dialogues o f Plato (Princeton University P ress, 
1989), and those of Aristotle's, Plotinus' and Sextus' from the Loeb
19
edition respectively — with occasional variants, sometimes critical, of 
my own.
(vi) As regarding references, I have adopted the name and date 
system (also known as the 'Harvard system'). In the text, re fe re n c e s  
are made by indicating the author's name, followed by the year in  
which the work cited was published and the page(s) which is (a re ) 
referred to. No punctuation is used between the author's name a n d  
the date of citation; but the page(s) is (are) preceded by a com m a,
e.g. "Robinson 1953, 93". (The abbreviation for page or pages  is 
omitted, apart from the cases in which confusion may result.) If tw o  
or more works of the same author have the same year, they a re  
distinguished by lower-case letters given after the year.) R eferences
are given in the list of references (see Literature Cited), set out in
alphabetical order of authors' surnames; each surname is followed b y  
the year and the lower-case letter, if any.
(vii) Greek words are written in the Greek alphabet.
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ABBREVIATIONS
For the abbreviations I have followed the convention of 
employing a Latin title, although sometimes I offer an English 
version of it. Plato and Aristotle are taken separately (for th e ir  
works I have used the abbreviations of Liddell-Scott-Jones's G reek-  
English Lexicon); then, listed in alphabetical order, are the o th e r  
authors whom I have quoted.
(1) PLATO;
Ale. 1 = Alcibiades 1 
Ap. -  Apologia 
Chrm. = Charmides 
Cra. = Cratylos 
Cri. = Crito 
Criti. = Critias 
Euthd. = Euthydemus 
Euthphr. -  Euthyphro 
Grg. = Gorgias
Hp. Ma., Mi. = Hippias Major, Minor 
Io n
La. = Laches 
Lg. = Leges 
Ly. = Lysis 
Men. = Meno 
Mx. = Menexenus 
Phd. = Phaedo 
Phdr = Phaedrus 
Phlb. = Philebus 
Pit. = Politicus 
Prm. = Parmenides 
Prt. -  Protagoras 
R. = Respublica 
Smp. = Symposium 
Sph. = Sophista 
Tht. = Theaetetus 
Ti. = Timaeus 
VII = The Seventh Letter
I
i
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(2) ARISTOTLE;
APo. -  Analytica Posteriora 
APr. — Analytica Priora 
Ath. = AOrjuamu floXireia 
Cael. = de Caelo 
Cat. -  Categoriae 
de An. = de Anima 
EE — Ethica Eudemia 
EN = Ethica Nicomachea 
GC = de Generatione et Corruptione 
Int. = de Interpretatione 
Metaph. — Metaphysica 
Ph. = Physica 
Po. = Poetica 
Rh. = Rhetorica 
SE = Sophistici Elenchi 
Top. = Topica
(3) OTHER AUTHORS CITED 
AESCHYLUS
Pr. = Prometheus Vinctus 
ALEXANDER of Aphrodisias;
in AP = Commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics 
AMMONIUS:
in Int = Commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation A
IEPICTETUS:diss ”  Discourses
GALEN:
sect ingred -  On the Schools, fo r  beginners 
PHILOPONUS:
in APr  = Commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics
PORPHYRY:
Plot. = Vita Plotini
PROCLUS:
in Eucl = Commentary on the First Book o f  Euclid’s Elements
in Tim  =  Commentary on Plato's Timaeus
SEXTUS EMPIRICUS:
M = Against the Mathematicians 
PH  = Outlines o f  Pyrrhonism
SIMPLICIUS
in Ph. = Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics
STOBAEUS 
Eel. = Eclogues
XENOPHON:
Smp. = Symposium 
Cyr. -  Cyropaedia
(4) OTHER WORKS CITED
OED = Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford, 1971.
LSI = H.G. Liddell, R. Scott, H.J. Jones, A Greek-English Lexicon, 
Oxford, 1961
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INTRODUCTION 
Socratism and Platonism
does the 'Socratic matter' consist of?
O.LL The Socratic TrapaSeiypa: the escape from  p se u d o -ce r ta in  
k n o w led g e
One of our Oxford colleagues once remarked to me that his a b l e r  
undergraduates could generally  be relied upon to observe i n
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As I said in the Preface, my attempt to determ ine what P la to 's 
hypothetical dialectic is, follows in a way the logical route of h is 
philosophical search. This route, in my view, covers two main areas: 
first, that of the m etaphysical nature of the things that can b e 
known; and then — once the theory of eiSri is established (which is 
Plato's answer to the question of the m etaphysical nature of th e  
things that can be known) — that of how a particular eîSoC can b e  
know n.
As I shall argue, within the first area Plato (i) starts from th e
question of the given way in which our knowledge works (C hap ter
One); and then continues with offering (ii) a possible péeoSoC to w a rd s  
the solution of the 'puzzle' brought forward by the given way in  
which our knowledge works (a puzzle' that concerns mainly th e  
'nature' of that which is the object of certain knowledge) (C hap ter 
Two); and (iii) a possible solution to this 'puzzle' — the so -called  
theory of forms (Chapter Three). Why, however, did P lato 's 
philosophical search — his 'intellectual odyssey', as Ryle 1966 ,17 
calls it — begin like this?
The most plausible answer (which I shall defend in w h a t
follows) is that Plato's philosophical search began as it did because of
Socrates influence, i.e. because it started somehow from the results of 
Socrates' philosophy.
0,1. The Socratic matter
No one can deny the fact that Plato's first dialogues a re  
dom inated by the 'Socratic m atter' and its 'elements' (the e lenchus, 
the 'What is X?' question, etc.). In other words, one cannot d e n y  
Socrates' influence on Plato: one can only approximate its degree; th is  
approximation, however, is a very delicate business. But first, w h a t
-
I
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'
their second week of study of the R ep u b l ic :  It seems to b e
assumed that what Socrates says represents what Plato thinks; b u t  
isn't that a questionable assumption?' To which he would r e p l y
that the point is an excellen t one, but not som ething to b e
pursued if  the student is to get the appropriate benefit f r o m
reading the R e p u b l i c :  viz. to learn some philosophy.
This is the first paragraph of the "Editor's Note" of the XXXIVth 
volume (1989, 352) of Phronesis. Though more and more q u e s tio n e d  
nowadays, this approach has the appealing advantage of avoiding th e  
endless discussion about the historical and the Platonic Socrates. I do 
not think, however, that we should succumb entirely to th is
seductive, for convenient, position.
It is true that some testimonies suggest that one should n o t
rely very much on Plato's accounts about historical c h a rac te rs
(Diogene Laertius 3.35 and the Anonymous Prolegomena 3 .2 8 -3 1  
give direct quotes of Socrates' protest after he had read the Lysis,
and Athenaeus mentions that Gorgias disclaimed Gorgias and P haedo  
the Phaedo — cf. Riginos, 1976, 55, 93, 108). I agree that, at least in
Socrates' case, there are no reliable  means to determ ine the fid e lity  
and completeness of Plato's accounts about him. But this s itu a tio n  
should not prevent us from distinguishing between the 'Socratic '
Socrates of the earlier dialogues and the Platonic Socrates of th e
middle and late ones — even if we leave aside the endless d e b a te
about their 'boundary'. So, what does the 'Socratic m atter' consists
of?
One thing that every student in Ancient philosophy know s 
about Socrates is that he (unlike his predecessors, the Pre-socratics)  
focussed entirely on the question of man. . What then is m an  fo r 
Socrates?
The First Alcibiades, it seems, was written by a pupil in P la to ’s 
lifetime, but, some scholars have argued, it was probably revised, o r 
even completed by Plato himself (see Preface, d). One cannot re ly  
then too much on this dialogue. Yet Socrates says  in it so m eth ing  
which was im p lied  in many of Plato's Socratic dialogues: first, th a t  
man is, essentially, his soul, ijruxfj (130 d); and secondly, that soul is, 
essentially, that divine (Geiov) part of it in which aocj i^a may occur 
(133 b). What then is aocj)ia for Socrates?
In A pology  Socrates speaks about three kinds of aoc}>ia: ■I
(i) the real, or authentic (of. tcü o v t i  — 23 a 5) CTOc[)ia, which 'is
the property of 0 € d C  (a 5-6);
(ii) the real, or authentic (cf. tc5 o v t i  — 20 a 8) h u m a n  
(dvGpüüTTivq) ao<j)ia, which, as the Delphic god said, is the CTOc})ia 
that belongs to Socrates (but, adds Socrates, when the Delphic god
uttered this oracle, he "is not referring literally to Socrates; h e
has merely taken my name as a TrapdSei'yiJLa" —  23 a 8-b 4); and
-"'-"I
To sum up so far: for Socrates m an  is, essentially, the re a l 
àv0pcjüTTivp ao(|>ia, i.e. the Socratic napaSeiyiia. W hat then is at the core  
of this TTapaSeiypa?
According to the Apology (cf. 21 a; see also 22 a, 30 a and Phd,
85 b) the Delphic god, asked by Chaerephon, a friend of Socrates,
whether there is anyone wiser than Socrates, answered that there is 
no such man. "He [the Delphic god] cannot be telling a lie; that w ou ld  
not be right for him" — says Socrates (21 b). And yet he, Socrates, 
starts to question  the oracle's answer. In my view, this very g e s tu re  
of Socrates, to question even a god's statement, reveals the Socratic  
aperfj par excellence, that which is at the core of the Socratic  
TTapdSeiypa, namely the act of questioning. (When he says, in th e  
Hippias Minor 372 b 1-2, c 2-5: "the only good thing I have is m y 
persisting questioning", he points out, I think, precisely th a t  
questioning  is his main dp erf}.)
Socrates' persisting questioning, however, stems from his be ing  
aware that he 'knows that he does not know' (cf., inter alia, Ap. 21 d, 
Euthphr. 2 c, Ly. 223 b, Hp. Ma. 286 c, 304 d f., Hp. Mi. 372 f.).
There has been a complex debate about whether Socrates is or n o t
sincere when he claims his ignorance. It is obvious, I agree, that he is 
not so ignorant as he pretends he is; that he does not suffer fro m  
poor memory as he claims he does (see for instance Prt. 334 c-d, o r 
Men. 71 c); that his invitations to reciprocity in questioning are n o t 
always sincere; and that sometimes he is ironic and behaves like a 
mere epiariKoC (cf. R. 348 a). But this whole discussion may o bscu re  
the philosophical  point of the Socratic ignorance. For Socrates' claim  
of ignorance ('I know that I do not know') (from which his p ers is t in g  
questioning stems) was not aimed exclusively at himself;  he, 
Socrates, is only a wapdSerypa (23 b 1), and his claim of ignorance w as 
aimed at pointing out the very first step of the escape  from a 
situation in which man, in his A lltag lichke it  (as Heidegger would p u t  
it), is caught — namely his acting on the ground of a stock of be lie fs  
taken as certain, without his realizing that they are not actually so.
To conclude: for Socrates man is, essentially, the po ss ib il i ty  of 
this escape  from a non-authentic, everyday condition, which is 
caused by pseudo certain knowledge.
Now, it is only in such a context that the issue of a reliable oSoC 
toward certain know ledge  may arise. That is: the very issue of 'th e  
right way towards sure knowledge' implies that 'sure knowledge' is 
not (completely) at hand  for man, although the poss ib il i ty  of 
(partially) achieving it exists. So, did Socrates find such a 6 8dc?
27
(iii) the inauthentic human a o c f ) i a ,  which Socrates does not k n o w  
how to name (20 e 1-2 ), and which belongs to all those w h o  
believe to know som ething without actually know ing it (i.e. to  
politicians, poets and skilled craftsmen —  21 b-22  e).
I:
0.1.2. ayuovcria as the Socratic locus o f certainty. The dialogue as th e  
condition fo r  achieving certain knowledge
This way of putting things — that for Socrates man is, 
essentially, an escape  from pseudo certain know led ge  which beg in s 
by assuming his own ignorance — can make one think of D escartes, 
for whom the very first step toward the reaching of certainty, le 
doute, stems also from an assumed ignorance.
Descartes, at the beginning of his Discours de la méthode, says: 
"[...] la puissance de bien juger et distinguer le vrai d'avec le faux, q u i 
est proprem ent ce qu'on nomme le bon sens ou la raison, e s t  
naturellem ent égale en tous les hommes" ("[et elle] est la chose d u  
monde la mieux partagée"). For him then, 'la puissance de bien ju g e r  
et distinguer le vrai d'avec le faux' (i.e. the human capacity to 
achieve certain knowledge), is the same in everyone. And for h im , 
one does not need, in order to achieve certain knowledge, a n o th er  
one's 'puissance de bien juger': he sim ply has to use his own  an d  
follow some sure, simple and easy rules. In short: for Descartes th e  
locus  of certainty is the individual mind (1).
For Socrates things are not exactly the same. For him 'la  
puissance de bien ju g er ' is, one may claim, also 'naturellem ent égale  
en tous les hommes' (and this can be supported by, say, the ep isode  
with the slave boy from the M eno  82 a ff.). Yet for Socrates, u n lik e  
for Descartes, the locus of certainty is not the individual mind.
Socrates was a KoiycnyiKoC di/epüjnoC, a man of communion; h e  
lived all his life in his noAiC, speaking with anyone  who happened to  
be around. C om m union,  however, is not an 'accidental element' of th e  
Socratic TrapdSeLypa.
In the First Alcibiades, again, Socrates says  something w hich  
was im plied  in many of Plato's Socratic dialogues: that that d iv in e  
part of our soul in which may occur (and which can provide th e
escape from pseudo certain know ledge)  needs, in order to re v e a l 
itself, other  souls (for, argues Socrates, this part of the soul is like an  
eye that can see itself only in another  eye — 132 d ff.). And that is 
because, as Socrates claims many times, the quest for know ledge in  
general should be done koivojC, in communion (Koivq aKerrréov — as he  
says in Chrm. 158 d 8) (2).
I [says Socrates to Polus], who am but one, do not agree with y o u , 
for you cannot compel me to; you are merely producing m a n y  
false w itnesses against me in your endeavour to drive me out o f  
my property [oiicria], the truth. But if I cannot produce in y o u  
yourself a single witness in agreement with my view s, I c o n s id e r  
that I have accom plished nothing worth speaking of in t h e
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matter under debate; and the same, I think, is true for you also, i f  
I, one solitary witness, do not testify for you and if  you do n o t  
leave all these others out o f account.
(Grg. 472 b-c)
We may say then that for Socrates one does need, in order to 
achieve certainty, another one's 'puissance de bien juger'; w hich  
means that for him the locus of certainty is not the individual m ind,  
but the avvovaia (3), i.e. the communion of individual minds (th e  
Koivq pouXfi — cf. Ale. 1, 124 b 10). Such a communion, however, is 
possible only through the medium of xdyoC, language, and that is why 
the 8ia-x6yoC, the dialogue, is so im portant for Socrates; for th e  
SidXoyoC plays the role of the means through which the auvovaia of 
individual minds can be achieved. (Socrates' refusal to write, I 
believe, may be due, to some extent, to the fact that writing, u n lik e  
speaking, is essentially an individual  process, which cannot be done
KOLVtioC.)
For Socrates then, the necessary condition for obtaining c e rta in  
knowledge is to secure for yourself the participation in a a y y o v a ia .
0.1.3. How can certain knowledge be achieved. opoX oyia  and eAeyyoC
Now, how does a ayyoyma, in its quest for certain know ledge, 
function? Roughly speaking: by the procedure of the Socratic eXeyyoQ.
The word eXeyyo^ seems to be used for the first time in a
philosophical context by Parm enides (see 7 B, 5). It would be, of
course, very tempting to make Parmenides a predecessor of th e  
Socratic éXeyyoç. (The title of D. Furley's 1989 article — "Truth as 
what survives the elenchos: an idea in Parmenides" — seems v e ry  
appealing indeed .) But, I think, we cannot claim, counting only on 
this single occurrence of the word eXeyyoC, that we have in  
Parm enides a real predecessor  of the Socratic elenchus (a v iew  
which I argued for in 1993, 191-5).
What then is the Socratic IXeyyoQl Roughly put, it is a 'logical 
device' whose aim is to establish the falsity or truth of one's op in ions 
(cf. for instance Euthd. 287 e 4-5, Grg. 472 c, 473 b, 508 b, 508 e -5 0 9  
a, etc.; cf. also Robinson 1953, 7, Vlastos 1983, 71 and W ate rfie ld  
1989, 43) (4); and its 'standard' version (to use Vlastos's 1983, 3 8 
expression) is this:
(1) An 'answerer' (6 auoKpivopevoC) (usually an interlocutor o f  
Socrates) asserts a 'thesis', say p, which is his own belief. (T h is
'thesis' is a Xeyopevov, whose form is either 'a has t h e
characteristic of b' or 'a is b' —  cf. also Robinson 1953, 49).
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(ii) A questioner (6 èpuJTtüV) (usually Socrates), through a c h a i n  
of questions whose answers appear as being evident, attempts to  
make the answerer accept further 'theses', say q and r. T h e n ,  
from these evidently true 'theses' (q and r) it is entailed non-p.
(iii) So, it follow s that the original thesis (p) is false.
Or, to put it in a formal way (cf. Vlastos 1983, 29 an d
W aterfield 1989, 44):
(i) P
(ii) q r
(iii) (q-r) non p (5).
The most difficult question that the Socratic elenchus raises is, 
obviously, that of truth. Before considering it, however, I would like
to say a few things about what knowledge is according to th is
p ro ced u re .
In the elenchus, the piece of knowledge whose certainty is to  
be checked, as well as those pieces of knowledge that are taken as 
evidently certain, are all Xeyopeva, statements, whose form is e ith e r  
'a has the characteristic of b' or 'a is b'. Their forms are not, how ever, 
very important. What is im portant is that know ledge  appears in th is  
procedure as a statement about a /col vojvl'a between two 'things' — e.g. 
between 'tem perance' (aw ^^oanvq)and 'good' {kclXov) (Chrm. 159 c l ,  
d 8, 160 e 9); 'tem perance' (om^poauvq)and 'modesty' (aiStuC) (Chrm.
160 e 5); 'modesty' (aiScüC) and 'good' ( k œ X o v )  (Chrm. 161 a 6);
'beautiful' ( t o  kœX o v )  and 'useful' ( t o  x p f j O -L p o v )  (Hi. Ma. 294 c ff.);
'good' ( t o  ayaeov) and 'beautiful' ( t o  KaXov) (Hi. Ma. 297 c); 'benefic ia l' 
( t o  üjfféXipov) and 'beautiful' ( t o  kœX o v )  (Hi. Ma. 296 e), etc. The 'object' 
of knowledge is then, to put it very roughly, the Koivcni^iai of 'things'.
One may object to this claim by saying that Socrates is 
concerned not only with elenchus (i.e. with the 'Koivmviai of th ings '), 
but with the so-called 'What is X?' questions (i.e. with 'things' in  
themselves) (see La. 189 e, Euthphr. 6 e, Prt. 360 e, etc.).
What happens with those asked by Socrates 'What som eth ing  
is?' reminds us of what Augustine says in Confessions, XI, 14, 17 
about time ("quid est ergo tempus? si nemo ex me quaerat scio; si 
quaerenti explicare velim, nescio"). For they know what X is, only as 
long as nobody questions them: the moment Socrates asks them, th e y  
cease to know it (cf. also Robinson 1953, 53-4). Socrates, how ever, 
cannot be blamed for this, because he stated very clearly h is 
questions and the type of the expected answers.
Most of his 'What is X?' questions seem to be construed as 
requests for an identity , i.e. as requests for an answer of the type 'X 
is Y', where Y is taken to be the same thing as X. In my view, this is 
hardly the case. That which Socrates is actually expecting when h e  
raises this kind of question is, obviously, a definition of X, and a
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definition is more than a mere identity . If we rely on the M eno  
(although this dialogue is more Platonic than Socratic), a good 
definition is a statem ent which, roughly speaking, should have a 
form of this type: 'X is the y of z' (see for instance 76 a, w h e re  
Socrates says that if he asked 'What is figure?', a good answer w ould  
be 'figure is the limit of a solid'; cf. also Robinson 1953, 50). And if so, 
then that which Socrates is seeking when he raises his 'What is X?' 
question is also a koi^wi/ lœ of 'things'.
Now, to go back to the issue of truth and elenchus'. Irwin 1977  
b, 41 claims that "whatever Socrates may think, the formal s tru c tu re  
of the elenchus allows him to test consistency, not to discover tru th . 
If I survive an elenchus with my original beliefs intact, I have som e 
reason to believe they are consistent; but they may be co n sis ten tly  
crazy." In other words: all that an elenchus can do is to affirm th e  
consistency of a set o f 'th eses ' (non p q -r) and the inconsistency of 
another (p-q-r). If so, we have to consider Socrates either a not v e ry  
sophisticated logician, who thought that consistency is a criterion of 
truth, or a very sophisticated one, who, in modern terms, held a 
coherence theory of truth.
Vlastos 1985, W aterfield 1989 and W oodruff 1990 p ro p o se  
(each in his own way) a solution which is extremely ingenious and, 1 
must say, very persuasive. I shall refer in what follows, very b rie fly ,
to W aterfield's version of this solution.
W aterfield 1989 claims that in the Socratic dialogues we h a v e  
to distinguish between two different fields of knowledge, (i) One is 
the field of 'experience', which belongs to the so-called 'experts' in  
various Teyvai; in this field, when an 'expert' has to establish if a
certain opinion is true or false, he uses correspondence  as th e
criterion of truth (that is, he 'confronts' that opinion with the 're a lity '
to which it refers) (for in this field of 'experience', the co n fro n ta tio n
is possible), (ii) The other field is 'beyond experience', and this is th e  
field of 'values' (beautiful, virtue, etc.), which Socrates is in te re s te d  
in. Here, in this field, the 'experim ent' is not possible, and so, w h e n  
one wants to establish whether a certain opinion is true or false, th e  
only criterion of truth that he has is coherence. And W aterfie ld  
conclusion is that for Socrates "truth as consistency is second best to 
truth as correspondence" (p. 48). (W aterfield relies, inter alia, u p o n  
Ap. 21 d and Euthd. 293 b ff., where Socrates' knowledge, th e
elenctic knowledge par excellence, being contrasted with the e x p e r t
know ledge, is described as 'small' and 'unim portant' respectively — 
see p. 48).
As far as I am concerned, I do believe that the Socratic 
elenchus is a procedure whose aim is to establish the truth value of a 
statement, and so I must accept that consistency serves, for Socrates, 
as a sort of criterion of truth. And I accept W aterfield's d is tin c tio n  
described above; I accept, in other words, that Socrates was faced
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with the fact that there are two fields of knowledge — one in w hich  
the 'experim ent' is possible and where correspondence ap p ea rs , 
accordingly, as the best  criterion of truth; and another one in w hich  
the 'experiment' is not possible and where coherence appears as th e  
only  criterion of truth.
So, how does a avi'ovaia, in its quest for certain know ledge, 
practice the eXEyyoC? In my view, in two steps: first, it seeks to 
establish a body of beliefs that are evidently true (which are u su a lly  
marked by the word 'agreement', opoXoyia (6)); and then it assesses a 
belief that is not evidently true against this body of evidently t ru e  
beliefs (that is: reject it as false if it is not consistent with it, or accept 
it as true if it is consistent with it). (To put it in terms of Plato's la te r  
philosophy: first there are established a set of evidently t ru e
Koivcuviai between several things; and then, a Koivwvia that is n o t 
evidently true is assessed against this set of evidently true KoivtDviai; 
in short: if an alleged Koivoovia between two 'th ings' 'fits' within a 
particular 'network' of Koivwviai whose truth is commonly accep ted , 
then this indicates that that the alleged Koivœvia is also true.)
0.1.4. Conclusions: the Socratic problem ('How can certain k n o w le d g e  
be achieved?'}, péeoSoÇ (SiaXeyeiv and ekeyyoC) and u n so lv e d  
difficulty ('What is the nature o f  that one in the many which is the  
object o f  certain knowledge?')
To sum up so far: the Socratic matter consists of a p ro b lem  
('How can certain knowledge can be achieved?') and a poss ib le  
peGoSoC (whose main 'elements' are: the assumed ignorance, th e  
dialogue and the eXeyyoC). But this is not all; there is something e lse  
that belongs to Socratism: the unsolved difficulty regarding th e
object  of certain knowledge.
According to Socrates, the object of certain know ledge is 'th e  
one in the many' (which in the jargon of modern scholarship is called  
'the Socratic universal'). Socrates explains what he means by that in  
several places: if we want to achieve certain knowledge about v irtu e , 
for instance, we should aim at finding out not what a p a r tic u la r  
virtue is, but what is that virtue which is present in all p a rtic u la r  
virtues (see Men. 73 e; cf. also Euthphr. 6 d, Prt. 360 e, La. 189 e - 
190 a, etc.) It is not my purpose here to enter into the issue of th e  
'Socratic universal' (Robinson 1953, 49-60 offers an exce llen t
analysis of it). All I want to point out is that (i) the Socratic p ro b lem  
of 'how can certain knowledge be achieved' raises an en o rm ous 
difficulty — namely 'what is the nature of that which is the object of 
certain knowledge'? And that (ii) Socrates does not actually solve th is
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difficulty — although he somehow determ ines it (cf. for in s tan c e  
Euthphr. 6 d: "[...] that what I asked of you was not to tell me one o r
two out of all the numerous actions that are holy. I wanted you to
tell me what is the elSoC of holiness which makes all holy actions 
holy. I believe you held that there is a pia iSea by which u n h o ly  
things are all unholy, and by which all holy things are holy").
That is why, I claim, the Socratic matter consists of both a
problem ('How can certain knowledge be achieved?'), a p oss ib le
p€0o8oC (whose main 'elements' the dialogue and the ekeyyo^)  and an  
enormous, unsolved difficulty ('W hat is the nature  of that one in th e  
many which is the object of certain knowledge?').
Now, let us go back to the issue of Socrates' influence  on Plato.
0.2. The Socratic matter as the starting-point 
o f  Platonism
As I said, Plato's philosophical search begins with: (i) p u ttin g  
the problem of the way in which our knowledge works; with (ii) 
offering a possible péeo8oC (grounded on the criterion of coherence) 
towards the solution of the 'puzzle' brought forward by the g iven  
way in which our knowledge works (a 'puzzle' that concerns m ain ly  
the 'nature' of that which is the object of certain knowledge); an d  
with (iii) laying down a possible solution to this 'puzzle' — the so- 
called theory of forms .
Why, however, did it begin like this? The most p lau s ib le  
answer is, I believe, this: because of Socrates influence, i.e. b ecau se  
these three 'elements' of the beginning  of Platonism (his way o f  
putting the question o f  knowledge, péOoSoC and solution) stem fro m  
Socrates' pro b le m  ('How can certain knowledge be ach ieved? '),
péeoSoC  (whose main 'elements' are the dialogue and the eXeyxoC) and
d iff icu lty  ('What is the nature of that one in the many which is th e
object of certain knowledge?'). (As I said at the end of 0.1.1., fo r
Socrates man is, essentially, the possib ility  of escaping  from a n o n -  
authentic, everyday condition, which is caused by pseudo certain  
knowledge. And, I claimed, it is only in such a context that the issu e  
of a reliable oSoC toward certain know ledge  may arise. Now, th is  
issue occurs also in Plato, and he points out too, in one form o r 
another, its context — namely that 'sure knowledge is not com p le te ly  
at hand  for man, although the possib ility  of partially achieving it  
exists'; cf. for instance Smp. 204 b 5, where he says that th e  
philosopher is the one who is actually pera^ij aocJjoij Kai apaOoiiC.) (As I 
shall argue, some other 'elements' of Socratism are to be found in  
Platonism: the distinction between the two main fields of know ledge, 
the belief that the locus of certainty is the 'communion of minds', a n d  
the view according to which the 'object' of knowledge is the  Koiywi/iat 
of 'things'.)
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CHAPTER ONE
Plato's way of putting the question of knowledge
Most of Plato's dialogues have, at their core, a human m atter — 
that of knowledge, of politics, or of ethics. Plato, that is, like Socrates, 
focussed mainly on the question of man  (an idea which, to som e 
extent, is also suggested by the fact that all his dialogues, with a few  
exceptions, have as title men's names). What is then m an  for Plato?
For Plato man is a awpa ep^nxov (cf. Sph. 246 e-247 d and 24  8 
a-249 a), i.e. a Koivcovia between a ij/uxT (which is 'man's m o st
precious possession' — Lg. 731 c, and, so to say, his 'essence') and a 
Qüjpa (cf. also Ti. 69 c ff.). Now, the human i|nixh has, for Plato, se v e ra l 
'parts' (see for instance R. 580 d-583 a). 1 shall not, however, e n te r  
here the complicated details of Plato's psychology; what 1 would like  
to point out is that for Plato the 'essential' part of the human ^uxB is 
the part with which we 'learn' (pavedvopev — R. 436 a 9), i.e. t o  
XoyiaTiKov (441 e 4, 550 b 1, 571 c 4), not the parts with which w e  
'feel anger' (0vpoijpe0a) or 'desire [èwiOupoüpev] the pleasures o f 
nutrition and generation and their kind' (436 a 10-11) — i.e. o GupoC 
(436 e 4, 439 e 3, 550 b 3, 581 a 9) and t o  e T r iG u p r iT iK o v  (550 b 2) 
respectively (see also TL 69 c ff.) (1).
To sum up: for Plato every  soul is tripartite, and every soul has 
a part ( t o  XoyioTiKov) which aims at achieving knowledge. And since 
knowledge is 'the only good that man may have' (Euthd. 292 b 1-2), 
man is, for him, essentially, that part through which knowledge is 
ach ieved .
As I argued (see 0.1.1.), for Socrates man is, essentially, 'th e  
possibility of achieving sure knowledge'; and his philosophy s ta r te d  
from a given situation, which hinders this possibility and w h ich  
concerns (in one way or another) every man, namely one's acting on  
the ground of a stock of beliefs taken as certain, without his rea liz ing  
that they are not actually so. For Plato man is also, essentially, 'th e  
possibility of achieving sure knowledge'; but he does not start fro m  
what hinders this possibility; he starts from the given way in w hich  
every XoyiŒTiKÔv pavGctvei, in other words: from the given way in  
which knowledge in general  works (for, as I shall argue in C hap ter 
Three, his main philosophical doctrine, the so-called theory of form s, 
was aimed primarily at solving the puzzling way in which know ledge  
seems to be working).
3 4
L L  'To know' as 'to know what remains the same'
eTTiaTppq seems to signify  that the soul is stopping [ic7TT|aiv] at  
things, rather than going round with them. [...] p é p a ï o v  [which is 
a common attribute for eTTiaTppri in Plato] is clearly th e  
expression of station [ a r d a ï C ]  and position [pdcriC], not of m o t i o n  
[<j)Opd]. Again, the word iCTTOpCa bears upon the face of it th e  
stopping [ la rd v a i ]  of the stream, and the word TTiaTOV c e r t a i n l y  
indicates cessation of motion [ia jdv]; then, again, pvfjprj, as 
anyone may see, expresses rest [povïf] in the soul, and not m o t i o n  
[cj)opd].
This is w hat Plato says in the Cratylus 437 a-b. A pparently , th e s e  
etym ologies are correct (èiTLo-Tripri, for instance, comes from  the v e r b  
GTrioTapai, which is made out of the preposition €iri-, 'on', 'upon', a n d  
the verb la ra p a i ,  a passive form of lo-rppi, which means to m ake to  
stand stiir, in its transitive form, and 'to rem ain fixed', in its  
in tran sitiv e  form). Yet earlier on, at 412 a-b, he said so m e th in g  
d ifferent, which suggests that know ledge is linked with motion, n o t 
w ith rest  ("eTTiaTfjpri indicates that the soul follows [eiropevTiC] th e  
m otion of things"; "advrja iC  is derived from a u v ie v a i ['to understand' —  
the infinitive of au v ir ip i]  and, like eTTioTaaOai, im plies the p ro g re s s io n  
[auvievai — which is also the infin itive of auveipi, 'to come to g e th e r ']  
of the soul in com pany with the nature of things"; "c70(j)ia m e a n s  
'touching [e4)dTrTea0 ai] the m otion [4>opd] or stream  of things"). Now, 
how are we to take all this?
In the Sophist  Plato claims that know ledge (7 1 7 vojoKeiv) is 
actually  a Koivcovia  betw een som ething that is know n and the sou l 
that knows it (248 a ff.). That which is known, he argues, cannot b e  
separated  from  rest (249 b, c), while soul cannot be separated  f ro m  
m otion  (249 a, b); so, we may say, know ledge is som ew how  l in k e d  
with both m otion and rest. But here in the Cratylus this point is n o t 
at stake.
In the Cratylus 440 a-b Plato says that "know ledge [yvwcrtC] 
cannot continue to be know ledge unless continuing always to a b id e  
and exist". W hy? "[Because] if know ledge changes in its form, at th e  
tim e when the change occurs there will be no know ledge; and if th e  
transition  is always going on, there will always be no k n o w led g e , 
and, acording to this view, there will be no one to know [oiire to  
yvcoaojjLovGv] and nothing to be known [ouTe to  yvmo-Griaopevov]" (2 ). 
That is: to really know som ething (or: to have a sure k n o w le d g e )  
means, first of all, 'to know today and tom orrow ' (cf. also Grg. 482 a: 
'philosophy [i.e. the sure know ledge par excellence] holds alw ays to  
the same, being not at the m ercy now of one argum ent, now o f 
another' — my paraphrase); in other words, if a know ledge is r e a l ly  
know ledge, if it is sure, it has to remain as it is. If tom orrow  m y
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know ledge is not like today, then this, claims Plato, is not re a l 
knowledge, (And this is, we have to admit, a feature of the given way 
in which our knowledge works, not Plato's 'invention'. Why is th a t  
so? Why knowledge is sure only if it remains the same? The an sw er, 
obviously, must be linked with the way man, and so h u m a n  
knowledge, is determ ined by time. Plato, however, as far as I know , 
does not give an explicit answer to this question; he only takes in to  
account this 'feature' of the given way in which our kn o w led g e  
w orks.)
So, since knowledge is sure only if it is in rest, i.e. only if i t  
remains the same (440 b), those words that refer to it and con ta in  
this idea (e.g. p e p a ï o v ,  i o T o p i a ,  tticttov  or p v q p q  —  cf. 437 a-b) were well 
'construed' by the name-giver; whereas those that refer to it and do 
not contain this idea (e.g. ouvpoiC or aoc|)ia cf. 412 a-b) were (acord ing  
to Plato's view) badly chosen (this claim is missing from the text of 
the Cratylus, but it would suggest itself readily enough as a co ro lla ry  
of the end of the dialogue). (And, we may complete his though t,
words in which both ideas are present — as it is the case w ith  
€TTiaTfjpq, cf. 437 a and 412 a — are ambiguous, dpc|)i(3oXoi, cf. 437 a 3.) 
(That is why, he concludes, we should not trust the names, for th e y  
may be misleading — cf. 440 c.)
Now, if knowledge is knowledge only insofar as it remains th e  
same, then its object  has also to remain the same; that is: m y
knowledge can remain the same, today and tomorrow, only if th a t  
which is known, t o  yvwoGqabpcvov, remains, today and tomorrow, th e  
same. This idea, that knowledge is always knowledge of som eth ing
that pev€i KŒTà TaiiTa, occurs in Plato many times (cf. Cra. 440 a-b:
"[...] you cannot know that which has no state. [... And] we can n o t 
reasonably say that there is knowledge [yvwoiC] at all, if e v e ry th in g  
is in a state of transition and there is nothing abiding [priSev pevei]"; 
cf. also R. 585 c f., Sph. 249 b, Phlb. 58 a, 61 e (3)). This way of 
putting things, however, leaves us with a difficult question, n am e ly  
What is actually that which remains the same?
(In his Ethica Nicomachea Aristotle says the same thing, th a t  
we can have knowledge only about those ovTa that are the diSia, cf. 
1139 b 23 f., i.e. only about that which cannot be otherwise — cf. 
1139 b 20 ff.: o eTriaTcc|j.e9a, pf) ÊvSëxEoeai dXXmC exeiv. Heidegger 1 992  
b, 33 argues that this claim — that 'we can know only that w hich  
rem ains the same' — is not in fe rre d  by Aristotle from some of h is 
philosophical views, but from the given way in which h u m an  
knowledge works. As far as I am concerned, I endorse H eidegger's 
comment, and I think that it also applies to Plato. That is: P la to 's  
claim, that 'we can know only that which remains the same' is n o t 
ded u ced  by him from anything related with his doctrines;  it is, I 
believe, a claim based on the observation  that our knowledge is re a l
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know ledge only if it remains the same and that the object of such  
unchanging knowledge must itself remain the same.)
1.2. Perceiving and speaking
Now, how can we know that which remains the same? As I 
said, for Plato man is a owpa (cf. Sph. cf. 246 e-247 d and 24  8
a-249 a), i.e. a anvapcj^oTepov (cf. Ti. 87 e 6) made out of a awpa and a 
ij/uyfi- Does this mean that man, for Plato, can know that w h ich  
remains the same with both his bodily senses and his soul?
In the Theaetetus 184 d Plato claims explicitly that that w ith  
which we perceive is the soul:
It would surely be strange" — says there Socrates — "that t h e r e  
should be a number of senses [aicrGfiaeiC] ensconced inside u s,
like the warriors in the Trojan horse, and all these things s h o u l d
not converge and meet in some single nature — a soul [tl/nxp], o r 
whatever it is to be called — with which we perceive all t h e  
objects o f perception through the senses as instruments" [cf. also 
184 b-c, e; 185 a ff.]. [For instance:] the hardness of s o m e t h i n g  
hard and the softness o f som ething soft will be p e r c e i v e d  [ai cT0fi CT£Tai] by the soul through touch [186 b].
(Cf. also Phd. 73 c ff., or Ti. 67 b: "sound is a blow which p asse s  
through the ears, and is transm itted by means of the air, the b ra in , 
and the blood, to the [whole] soul; and hearing is the vibration of th is  
blow which begins in the head [i.e. in the learning part of the soul — 
TO XoyiCTTiKov] and ends in the region of the liver [i.e. it affects also 
the other two parts of the soul — ô  0 \ j p 6 c  and t o  e T r i G u p p T i K o v ] " ,  In the 
Philebus  33 d, however, Plato attem pts to put things in a m o re  
refined way: "[...] among the iraGfjpaTa that are constantly a ffecting  
our bodies some are exhausted in the body before passing through to 
the soul, thus leaving the latter unaffected, while others p e n e tra te  
both body and soul and set up a sort of disturbance which is b o th
peculiar to each and common to both.") Thus, for Plato, it is only th e
soul that can know — either through the senses or through itself (Tht. 
185 e 6-7; cf. also e 1-2); which is to say that man, for Plato, can  
know that which remains the same only with his soul.
Now, in the Timaeus, Plato claims that the £k t o u  voii ^£pop£vp 
SvvapiC (i.e., roughly speaking, the SuvapiC of the learning part of th e  
soul) is a SévapiC of SiavofjpaTa, of thoughts (71 b 3-4); which im plies 
that th ink ing  (SLavo£'io0ai) is soul's (main) 'activity'. But, the v e ry  
process of thinking (SiavooiaGai, and sometimes cj>pov£'iv) is, he says 
in the Theaetetus 189 e-190 a, \£ Y £ iv .
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S ia v o e 1 [a 0 a i is a XoyoC that the soul carries out with h e r s e l f
about any subject she is considering [...; and] when the soul is
thinking [8iavooLijJLevr|] she is simply talking to h e r s e l f  
[ 8 i a X € y e a 0 a i ]  asking questions and answering them, and s a y i n g  
yes or no.
(Cf. also Sph. 263 e: "Well, Sidvoia and XoyoC are the same thing,
except that what we call 8idvoia is, precisely, the inward 8idXoyoC
carried out by the soul with herself without spoken sound"; see also
Sph. 264 a and Ti. 37 a-b.) In short: for Plato soul (i.e. the lea rn in g
part of the soul) is, as he says in the Theaete tus  185 c, a 8id Trjc 
yXcüTTpC 8TjvapiC (a 'faculty that works through the tongue' as 
Cornford translates); that is: soul is primarily related with speaking . 
So, if that which remains the same can be known only with the soul, 
and if soul knows, primarily, through speaking, it follows that th a t  
which remains the same must be known primarily through speaking , 
xéyeiv (cf. Tht. 183 a-b: "for those who hold that all things are in  
change, [says Socrates,] some new dialect will have to be in s titu te d , 
since, as it is, they have no phrases to fit their fu n d a m e n ta l 
proposition — unless indeed it were 'not even nohow'"; w h ich  
suggests that for Plato speaking is about that which remains th e  
same).
Plato, however, claims that 'to know through the aicj0fiaeiC toij 
c7üj|jLccToC' and 'to know only  through soul' (through speaking) "have a
distinct origin and are of a different nature" (Ti. 51 e 1-2); but th is
way of putting things leaves us with another difficult question , 
namely Why knowing through senses and knowing through spea kin g  
have a distinct origin and are o f  a different nature?
1.3. Knowledge and causality
Burnet 1908, 10-11 claims that "the great principle w hich  
underlies all their [the Ionian cosmologists's] thinking, though it is 
first put into words by Pamenides, is that Nothing comes into being  
out o f  nothing, and nothing passes away into nothing". The G reek 
notion of 'origin' raises some major difficulties, mainly because of th e  
'problem atic' terms by which it was rendered, such as dpyp, ^uaiC o r 
aiT ia. Yet, in spite of this terminological variety, the idea that e v e ry  
thing in our w orld  (as well as the world itself) must have an 'o rig in ' 
(an idea which was rejected in the Old Testament) is, in one form o r 
another, to be found not only in the Ionian cosmologists, but in all 
im portant Greek thinkers. This idea (which in the Middle Ages w as 
reform ulated as nihil est sine ratione and labelled as p r in c ip iu m  
rationis sufficientis) was explicitly discussed and justified  by m an y  
m ediaeval, modern and contemporary philosophers (as, for in stance .
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Leibniz in his treatise Primae veritates, or Heidegger in his V o m  
Wesen des Grundes). But, strangely enough, the Greek thinkers, fro m  
whom, one may claim, this idea has emerged, did not make an y  
attem pt to ju s t i fy  it. And so, all we can do is to take their belief in  
the existence of 'origins' as a given postulate of their thinking; w e 
have, that is, to accept that for them, unlike for many m ed iaeval, 
modern and contem porary philosophers, this belief was, in itself, 
non-problem atic. For them, nevertheless, philosophy  — although i t  
does not justify this principle — is aimed prim arily at finding th e  
'origins' of our world and of everything that is in it (cf. for in s tan ce  
Aristotle, Metaph. 993 b 20-4: "philosophy is rightly called a
knowledge of truth. [...] But we cannot know the truth apart from th e  
cause").
This is also the case with Plato. First, he believes th a t  
everything in our world (which is in a process of change) must h a v e  
a cause (or, arguably, causes) (cf. TL 28 a 4-5: irav Be afi t o  yiyvopevov  
tjtt’ aiTioTi TivoC eg àvdyKTiC yiyveaecci; or Phlb. 26 e 3-4: dvayKdiov eTvai 
TfdvTa Td yiyvopeva  Sid Tiva aiTiav yiyveo-eai). Secondly, he left th is  
principle unjustified. And thirdly, he claims that philosophy shou ld  
be concerned with finding the causes  of things; that is: to know w h a t 
something is — be it a simple couch (R. 597 a) or the universe itse lf  
(Ti. 28 c ff.) — implies to know its cause (cf. Ti. 28 a 4-5, c ff., 29 d -e , 
31 b; Phlb. 26 e 3-4.). (And —- as the discussion of t o  dyaeov from th e  
Republic  and that of the peyioTa yevT] from the Sophist  and th e  
Philebus  suggest — philosophy should raise not only the q u e s tio n  
about the causes of things that exist in our world, but also the one 
about the ultimate  causes of existence.)
1.4. The puzzle brought forward by the given way in which our
knowledge works
As I said, Plato starts his philosophical search from what h e  
thinks is the given way in which every X o y i o r i K o v  pav0dvei; in o th e r  
words: from the given way in which |j.d0T|OiC in general  works. A nd  
his way of putting the question of pd0qorC in general is this:
( i )  m a n  c a n  k n o w  o n ly  th a t  w h i c h  r e m a in s  th e  sa m e ;
( i i )  that w h i c h  r e m a i n s  th e  s a m e ,  h o w e v e r ,  c a n  b e  k n o w n  o n l y  
b y  th e  ( l e a r n i n g  part o f  th e )  so u l ,  a l t h o u g h  m a n  is b o th  a  i|/uxTj 
and a  a w  p a ;
( i i i )  'to k n o w  t h r o u g h  th e  aia0qaeiC T ou  a c u p a T o C  and  'to k n o w  
o n ly  t h r o u g h  s o u l ’ ( t h r o u g h  s p e a k i n g )  'h a v e  a d i s t in c t  o r i g i n  
an d  are  o f  a  d i f f e r e n t  n a tu r e ’; y e t  that w h ic h  r e m a in s  th e  s a m e  i s  
k n o w n  p r im a r i l y  t h r o u g h  s p e a k i n g ;  an d
( i v )  o u r  k n o w l e d g e  s e e m s  to  b e  c o n c e r n e d  w i th  k n o w i n g  c a u s e s .
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(Thus, by putting the question of knowledge in these terms, Plato  
turned the Socratic matter into a Platonic matter.)
These four de term inations of the given way in which o u r  
knowledge, at a first sight, works — namely (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) — 
raise many difficult questions, the most im portant ones being th e se  
three: What is actually that which remains the same? Why kn o w in g  
through senses and knowing through speaking have a distinct origin  
and are o f  a different nature? And: What is the relation between th a t  
which remains the same and the causes o f  things?
These questions are not explic itly  formulated by Plato; but they 
are, I think, latent  in his way of putting the question of knowledge. If 
so, however (i.e. if we accept that these three questions, though n o t 
explicitly formulated, are latent in his way of putting the question of 
knowledge), then the given way in which, for Plato, pderiaiC in  
general works appears like a ndvv  eaupaaTov puzzle. Now, what w ou ld  
be, according to him, the right way o f  reasoning, the right péeoSoC, 
that we should follow, if we want to solve this puzzle?
The eXeyxoC , the main 'element' of Socrates' péeoSoC, occurs in  
Plato in many middle and late dialogues, and he regarded it as a 
valuable device (cf. for instance Sph. 230 d 7-8, where it is called  
the peyiaTTj Kal KupiwrdTTi twv Kaedpocwv) (4). But the Socratic eXeyyoC 
is not at the core of Plato's peGoSoC. What then does Plato's pe0o8oC 
toward the solving of this puzzle consist of? The answer to th is  
question is to be found in the Phaedo.
4 0
CHAPTER TWO 
The jjiéeoSoç toward theories
The Phaedo  is the dialogue in which Socrates dies; but, it is also 
the dialogue in which the Platonism is born; because here, for th e
first time in an explicit manner, Plato refers to his own solution to his
way of putting the Socratic matter.
In this dialogue, at 100 a-101 e (1), he also describes th e  
p €0oS oC  toward his solution (which, it seems, was intended as be in g  
of general application (cf. the expression èKaoTore, 'on each occasion', 
at 100 a 3; cf. also Bostock 1986, 157). In what follows I shall
describe its main steps and then show the way it was applied b y
Plato. Before that, however, I would like to say a few things ab o u t 
Plato's notion of pé0o5oC.
Usually, a definition of the notion of method begins with its  
etymology. 'Method', it is said, comes from the Greek péeoSoC which is 
derived from o 8 6 c ,  'path' or 'way' or 'journey' (for an opposite, y e t  
unconvincing view see Robinson 1953, 67). Hence, it is com m only
argued, 'method' is 'a path towards something'. The word p e0 o 8 o C ,
however, occurs for the first time in Plato's writings (where it re fe rs , 
roughly speaking, to 'the way toward knowledge') and, it seems, i t  
was coined by him (2). Yet, as Lutoslawski 1897, 418-9 put it,
many translators of Plato refrained from the identification  o f  
p e0o8oC  with the modern term m ethod ,  as if  they were afraid to  
credit an ancient Greek philosopher with a con sciou sness o f  
regulated proceeding which seems to be a priv ilege of r e c e n t  
s c i e n c e .
But, concludes Lutoslawski, "this is really a wrong cautiousness, a n d  
Jowett and Campbell were perfectly right in translating peGoSoC h e re  
[i.e. in Plato] by 'method'" (p. 419). One way to deal with this problem 
(p e 0 o 8 o C  qua 'way of reasoning' va:. p e0 o 8 o C  qua 'method') is 
suggested by Lutoslawski himself: in the earlier dialogues this w o rd  
is used rather loosely, and here it is better rendered by 'way of
reasoning' (3); whereas in the later ones, it refers to what we m ay
call a 'logical method' (4).
As far as I am concerned, I am rather reluctant to tra n s la te  
Plato's p e0 o 8 o C  by the modern term 'method'; for the modern no tion  
of 'method' is of Cartesian descent, and the Cartesian notion of 
method is not exactly Plato's notion of p e G o S o C .
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2.L  Finding and hypothesizing the most plausible theory
When we face a difficult question, then, according to th e  
péeoSoC introduced in the Phaedo, we should first 'h y p o th es ize  
[ijTToeépevoC] the XoyoC which we judge to be the s tro n g e s t 
[êppüjpevéo-TaToC]' (see 100 a) (7). Now, what do XoyoC, woeepevoC an d  
€ppcüpev€CTTaToC mean here?
In their comments on the Phaedo 100 a ff., some scholars c laim  
that XoyoC should be understood as 'definition' (e.g. Bluck 1955, 
Appendix 6; Guthrie 1975, 325), or as 'statem ent', or 'p roposition ' 
(e.g. Ross 1951, 27; Robinson 1953, 124, 126; Hackforth 1955, ad  
locum; Sayre 1969, 5; Bostock 1986, 160). But we cannot ignore th e  
context in which Plato brought forward this péeoSoC (i.e. 'Socrates ' 
intellectual history'); and so, we cannot narrow down XoyoC either as
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First, Plato's pe0o8oC in general is, first of all, dialectic, in th e  
sense that it supposed to be undertaken through 8 ia -X e y e iv , dialectic; 
for Plato (unlike Descartes — see 0.1.2.) believed that the locus o f 
certainty is the com m union  of minds, and such a com m un io n  is 
possible only through the medium of XoyoC, language (a point w hich  
I shall develop in 8.1.2.). And this belief of Plato, I think, is echoed  
by the very word pe0o8oC.
peGoSoC comes from the preposition perd and the noun o8oC, 
which means, as I said, 'path', 'way', 'journey'. In compounds, th e  
preposition p£Td carries out, inter alia, two ideas: the idea of
"following/going towards  something", as in p£Ta-8iujKCü ("to p u rsu e  
closely") or pET-oiyopai ("to be gone after"); and the idea of 
community  or participation, as in p£Ta-8i8wpi ("to give a share") (cf. 
LSI). So, given this ambiguity that pcrd has in compounds, p£0o8oC 
implies both 'a path that goes towards something' and 'a path that is 
covered together' (i.e. with, p£rd, others). Now, if Plato did coin th e  
word p£0o8oC, he managed to find a word which suits rather well h is 
views regarding 'the process of achieving knowledge': that m an ,
being p£ToLu ao(|)oii Kal dpaGoDc (cf. Smp. 204 b 5), has to find a p a th  
tow ards  sure knowledge, and that this path should be covered w ith  
other men.
Secondly, Plato's 8taX£KTiKp p£0o8oC, is a rather long (cf. fo r 
instance Phdr. 274 a or Pit. 265 a) and difficult (5) way o f  reasoning  
which can be followed only by b. f e w  (having, thus, an aristocratic, 
no t a democratic character, as has the Cartesian method (6)).
That is why, I think (although this seems to be just a m atter of 
negotiating terms), we will move away from Plato's thought if w e  
take his SiaXEKTiKp p£0o8oC as 'dialectical method'.
'definition' or as 's ta tem ent'/'p roposition ', for what is at stake in th e  
context is a theory  of causation (i.e. a 'body  of statem ents') (8). Thus, 
we should construe the phrase 'to lay down the eppcjopevearaToC 
XoyoC' as 'to lay down the eppcopevearaTov theory' (as Gallop 1975, 
178 does) — even if 'theory' may be too strong a word for what P la to  
has in view here.
One may object to this reading by saying that XoyoC should b e  
construed here as 'statem ent' because in Plato woGeaiC does a lw ays 
mean 'statem ent' (9). Yet this is hardly the case. In Plato the w o rd  
inroGecjiC has various meanings: (i) a 'statem ent adopted to su p p o r t 
(or reject) another statement' (Chrm. 160 d, Prt. 339 d, Men, passim ,  
R. 437 a.); (ii) a 'starting point for discussion' (Hp. Ma. 302 e, Chrm. 
171 d, Prt. 361 b, Grg. 454 c, R. 550 c, Prm. 136 a-b, Tht. 165 d, 183 
b, Sph. 237 a, 244 c); (iii) a 'starting point for practical action' (Lg. 
743 c, 812 a); (iv) a 'proposed subject for discussion' (Prm. 127 d) (o r 
generally, 'the subject matter of a discussion' — cf. Lg. 812 a); and, as 
I believe (relying on the context of Phd. 99 b ff.), a 'theory'.
If so, however, what does the expression 'to hypothesize th e  
êppcüpevéaraToC theory' mean? But first, what is a woSecriC qua
th e o ry ?
A theory is usually taken as an explanation. To be an  
explanation, "the proffered information", as van Fraassen 1989, 8 7 
put it, "must provide the missing piece in the puzzle that p reoccup ies  
the questioner [...; and this] presupposes that he has already pieces in  
place, which the newly offered piece fits into". (This idea, that to
know something means to place that something into the context o f
known pieces of knowledge, occurs many times in Plato — see fo r
instance Phd. 73 a: "[...] when people are asked questions, if th e  
question is put in the right way they can give a perfectly co rre c t 
answer, which they could not possible do unless they had som e 
knowledge and a proper grasp of the subject.") Thus, in order to 
hypothesize a theory, the theory must be first found;  in other w ords, 
the questioner has first to f in d  'a piece' which can fit into the 'p ieces ' 
that he already had in place, and only then may he hypothesize it. 
Hypothesizing a theory is, thus, a heuristic process (10).
In Plato, however, a woGeaiC (qua  statement or qua  theory) is, 
generally speaking, a Xeyopevov whose truth value is not yet b e y o n d  
any doubt (cf. R. 388 e, 437 a, Phd. 107 b, Cra. 428 d, Tht. 165 d, etc.; 
cf. also Robinson 1953, 94-5 and Barnes 1990, 93) (11). If so, th e n  
how can a theory judged to be the strongest (epptupevecjTaToC) b e  
hypothesized, i.e. laid down tentatively?  But, what does ac tu a lly  
eppojpeveoTaToC mean here?
eppcupevearaToC is the superlative degree of the ad jec tiv e  
èppwpévoC ('vigorous', 'stout', 'sound'), which comes from the v e rb  
pojvvupi (’to strengthen', 'make strong'). Now, what does d e te rm in e
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the strongness of a theory? First, one may claim, a theory is 
èppœpévov if its opppeevTa aX\f|\oiC anp(})(jüveT or if it is supported b y  
another one (as Socrates says explicitly at 101 d); but there, at 101 d, 
Socrates speaks about testing an already hypothesized th eo ry , 
whereas here, at 100 a, he speaks about f in d in g  and hypo thes iz ing  a 
theory. If so, one may argue, a theory is èppüjpévov when it re s is ts  
refutations (as it is suggested at 85 c-d (12). I agree that it is v e ry  
tem pting to connect this péeoSoC with the elenctic procedure (as 
Robinson 1953, 140 does); but this will make things v e ry
complicated, for what is at stake here is a theory, not a s ta te m e n t  (as 
in the Socratic elenchus). As I argued, the Socratic elenchus functions 
in two steps: one is to establish a body of statem ents that a re  
evidently true, and the other is to assess a statem ent that is n o t 
evidently true against that body of evidently true statem ents (and if  
the statem ent in question is not consistent with that body of 
statements, it is rejected as false; if it is consistent — it is accepted as 
true). Now, if we construe eppmpevearaToC as Sucre^eXeyKTOTaToC (to  
use this expression from 85 c 9), then 'to find and hypothesize th e  
èppüjpevéaTaToC theory' should mean 'to establish a body of th eo rie s  
that are evidently true, assess the theory in question against th is  
body of evidently true theories, and show that they are all co n sis ten t 
with each other; but Socrates does not say anything here, at 100 a (or 
later, at 101 a ff.) about such a procedure. (That is: there is no 
evidence that this péeoSoç described here, at 100 a, deals with a 
theory in the way the Socratic elenchus deals with a statement.)
If so, what does then determ ine the strongness of a theory? In  
my view, it is its capacity to fit into the 'pieces that the q u e s tio n e r  
has already in place' (13). Now, if this theory does not belong to th a t  
field of knowledge in which the 'experim ent' is possible, we can n o t 
'm anipulate' it and prove its truth in a strong way; in this case, its
capacity to fit into a given puzzle remains so far the only source of its 
credibility. But for Plato, it seems, this 'capacity to fit into a g iven
puzzle' does not prove, beyond any doubt, the truth of a theory, in  
which case that theory remains only plausib le .
To conclude: the way I construe the first step of the peGoSoC 
brought forward by Plato in the Phaedo (namely: 'to hypothesize th e  
XoyoC which we judge to be the strongest’ — 100 a) is this: if 'w e 
cannot make our journey with greater confidence and security by the 
surer means of a divine XoyoC' and we cannot 'ascertain the fac ts 
(whether by paGciv or by eijpelv)'; and if we decide not to 'leave off 
before we have come to the end of our resources' (if I may use th e se
phrases from 85 c), then we do not have any other choice apart fro m
f in d in g  the most plausible theory (i.e. the theory that fits better th a n  
any other theory into our puzzle) and hypothesizing  it.
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2.2. Hypothesizing as true what avpfcoyei with the most plausible
th eo ry
Now, what does Socrates do after he has found an d  
hypothesized the most plausible theory for a given puzzle? Then, h e  
claims, "1 put down [Tieppi] as true [œC dXpGp ovra] w hatever th ings 
seems to me to accord [aupc^ujveiv] with it [...,] and w hatever seem s 
not to, I put down as not true [œC oîjk a X r ier j ]"  (100 a). This p assag e  
raises difficult problems of interpretation, mainly because of th e  
ambiguity of the verb ovp^mveTv. What then does Plato mean here b y  
by 'reaching an accord'?
2.2.L  Robinson's interpretation
Robinson 1953 believes that "we have to choose b e tw e e n  
consistency and deducibility as the meaning of 'accord'" ("[for] it is 
very hard to think of anything else that he could possibly h a v e  
meant by [this] metaphor" — p. 126). (We have to rem e m b e r, 
however, that Robinson believes that this method is a b o u t 
s ta tem ents ,  not theories — cf. inter alia p. 124, where he tra n s la te s  
the expression XoyoC Èppüjpevéo-TaToC as 'the strongest p roposition '; 
see also p. 126).
(a) The 'consistency/inconsistency ' interpretation, he argues, is 
better supported than the 'deducible from /not deducible from' one 
(14). But the main objection against this interpretation, namely w h y  
do we have to adopt every proposition that is consistent with o u r 
hypothesis, is very difficult to dismiss (if the proposition p: 'I h a v e  
one brother' is true, the proposition q: 'I have a dog' is co n sis ten t 
with p, but q may be false).
(b) In favour of the 'deducible from /not deducible from '
in terpretation  there is little that may be invoked (see p. 127).
Besides, a strong objection may be raised against it, namely why do 
we have to consider as false any proposition that is not d ed u c ib le
from a hypothesis? (To take the example m entioned above: if th e
proposition p: 'I have one brother’ is true, the proposition q: I have a 
dog' is not deducible from consistent with p, but q may be true).
Thus, each interpretation has to face a serious objection. In th e  
case of consistency/inconsistency in terpretation (i) the instruction to  
posit as true whatever proposition is consistent with a hypothesis is 
unacceptable (since false propositions might be consistent with a true 
hypothesis), whereas (ii) the instruction to posit as false w h a te v e r  
proposition is inconsistent with a hypothesis is acceptable. In th e  
case of 'deducib ility /non-deducib ility ' in terpretation we have th e
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opposite situation: (i) the instruction to posit as true w h a te v e r
proposition is deducible from a hypothesis is acceptable, whereas (ii) 
the instruction to posit as false whatever proposition is not d ed u c ib le  
from that hypothesis is not (cf. Robonson 1953, 126 ff.). So, w h a t
in terpretation  should we choose? Robinson agrees that the better is
consistency (p. 127), mainly because the instruction to posit as fa lse  
w hatever proposition is not deducible from a hypothesis is less 
acceptable than the instruction to posit as true w hatever p ro p o sitio n  
is consistent with that hypothesis. Nevertheless, he claims, even if 
'accord' means consistency and deducibility, Plato's h y p o th e tica l 
method, "in the Phaedo as elsewhere, was surely a deduction o f 
consequences from the hypothesis and not merely a f u r th e r
hypothesizing of propositions consistent with the first hypothesis" (p. 
128). Robinson's own solution is extremely ingenious (15), but in m y  
view regrettably unsound, because of his assumption that what is a t 
stake here are propositions, not theories (although, oddly enough, h e  
admits at p. 202 that "[in the P haedo  the] hypothesis is the theory o f 
form s").
How should we take then this second step of the p é0 o 8 o C , 
namely the hypothesizing as true whatever with a th e o ry
that we judged to be the most plausible? anpcj^ coveTv is, as I said, an  
ambiguous verb; but it is hard to believe that Plato used th is  
ambiguous verb (in such an im portant context) because he ju s t
happened to expressed himself carelessly; I am more inclined to 
believe the contrary: that he used such ambiguous a verb p rec ise ly  
because he wanted to.
2.2.2. Plato's notion o f  avp fo ju ia
Literally, means a 'togetherness (aup-) of (j)wvaC; cj)ajvfj,
however, means both sound (cf. Lg. 665 a 1) (usually the sound of 
musical in stru m en ts), voice and language (cf. Sph. 262 d 9), and so 
a\j[j.(j)üjvia belongs, etymologically, to two 'fields': that of making m u s ic  
and that of speaking. When Plato makes Eryximachus say in th e  
Symposium  187 b 4 that v\ âppopia aupct)ajvia eariv, aupcfjcuvia 8e 
ôpoXoyiaTiç (my italics), he points out, in a way, precisely these tw o  
'fields' to which oup^wvia (etymologically at least) belongs (cf. also Ti. 
47 c-d: (|)mvf} and aKofj refer, in man's case, to Xo y o C  and pouaiKfj) (16).
(a) Let us take the first 'field' first. Burnet 1908, 24 claims th a t  
an elem entary knowledge of the Greek lyre is essential for th e  
understanding of Greek philosophy. As far as I am concerned, I 
would not go as far as Burnet; but the knowledge of lyre may help us 
to trace the history of some Greek words which have a place of th e ir  
own in Greek philosophy — such as aDpc|)(juvia. The Greek lyre had f irs t
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seven (then eight) strings (and eventually it ended up with m o re  
than fifteen). At the beginning, the attuning of the strings was v e ry
diverse; but, around the end of VI century B.C. four strings of th e
lyre (the first one, the most bass one, and the last three ones) b e g an  
to be attuned in the same way by more and more players, w ho 
started to adopt three particular intervals between the first s trin g  
and the other three, namely the fourth, the fifth and the octave. 
These three intervals were called o-u|j.cj>(jüVLai, and the octave w as
called dpjjLovia (cf. Philolaos B 6). To the best of my knowledge, th e se
are the first technical usages of the terms au|j.(()wvia and appovia. In  
time, however, in the field of music, these technical meanings fa d e d  
away; and, by the time of Plato, the terms au|ji(|)ujvia and ctppovia w e re  
mostly used as synonyms (cf. inter alia Cra. 405 d 1: 'in singing [tv tt] 
dppovia is called denoting a rd^iC that exists b e tw e e n
sounds qua  pitches (17) (cf. Lg. 665 a 1 f.: rq Se [rd lei] uS rfjc (fojvrjc, 
TO\j T£ ô^éoç dpa KŒL papEoC QuyKepavvupevcov, dppovia dvopa 
TTpoaaYopeijoiTo) — viz. an interval, a mode (Ionian, Phrygian, Dorian, 
etc., cf. La. 188 d) or a melody (18). In other words: in the field of
music, we may say, dppovia/cjupclajvia tend to refer to a avvOerov
TTpdypa (to use an expression from Phd. 92 a 8) (i.e. to an interval, a
melody or a mode), which is determ ined as a succession (rd^iC) of
sounds qua pitches that produces p8ovq or edclpoadviri in a hearer (cf. 
Ti. 80 b; although the mere pSovfj is not the actual end of h e a rin g
symphonic sounds — see 47 d; I shall come back to this point in
8 .2 . 1 .).
(b) Now, let us turn to the other field of namely that of
speaking. When one's Xeyopeva were 'well said', Socrates seemed to  
suggest in the Protagoras, they were said poucjiKwC, for th e y  
auvp8ovaiv (333 a 6-7). If so, Plato compares then the excellence in  
the field of speaking with the excellence in field of making music; 
and that indicates th a t the proper sense of aupc^üjvia and dppovia
belongs to the field of music. In other words: if so, then Plato — w h en
he speaks about the appovia  and crupcf)cjüvia of those 'elem ents' p ro p e r  
to the field of speaking (i.e. letters, words, statements and accounts)  
— speaks metaphorically.
(a) In the case of letters that auvappoTToucnv àXXfjXoïC (cf. Sph. 
253 a 1-2), the appovia/aupclajvia that results refers to a gvvQetov 
TTpaypa (i.e. to a word), which is determined as a succession (rd^iC) of 
letters that has (qua  word) a meaning (this point is not actually made 
in the texts, but, I believe, the idea of a àppovia/aupcj)ajv{a of le t te rs  
cannot suggest any other one).
(p) In the case of words that auvappoTTouaiv aXXpXoiC (cf. Sph. 
261 d), the appovia/aupct)a}via that results refers to a ovvQerov irpdypa 
(i.e. to a statem ent — cf. 262 e 1: rd  [Xeyopeva] dppoTTovra Xoyov
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1àirppYdaaTo), which is de term ined as a succession (rd^iC ) of w o rd s  
( rd  èc})€^ T]C X eyopeva— 261 d 8) that has (qua  statem ent) a m e a n in g  
(rd  Xeyopeva SriXovvTa/appaivovTa — e 1-2). (The orginal reads: rd  \xev 
Xeyopeva Kal SriXodvTd t l  auvappdrrei, rd  8e rrj cruvexeiQc pqScv 
crripaivovTa dvappoarel; the m ajority  of its translations — see th o se  
m ade by Fowler 1928, Cornford 1951 or Dies 1925 — render th e  
expressions rd  Xeyopeva SqXolivTa/aripaivovTa by 'w ords that h a v e  
m eaning'; cf. Cornford's translation: "words which, when spoken in
succession, signify som ething, do fit together, while those w h ic h  
m ean nothing when they are strung together, do not".)
(y) In the case of s ta tem en ts  and accounts (or theories)  th a t  
QTjvappoTTouaiv dXXfjXoïC, how ever, things are not that sim ple, a n d  
here the metaphor of dpp o v la /au p cp w v ia  becomes obscure.
W hen two or m ore s ta te m e n ts  awappoTTouaiv dXXpXoiC (cf. Prt.
333 a 7-8), to w hat does the dppovia that results refer? W e m ay b e  
tem pted to say: to 'a rd^ic qua succession of statem ents which has a 
m eaning qua  account'; but, in the case of statements, the m etaphor o f 
dppovia/avpcpcuvia does not refer primarily to m eaning  (as in the ca ses  
of letters and words), but to what we may call 'c o h e re n ce '. 
'Coherence', however, is an ambiguous word; usually, it is u n d e r s to o d  
either as 'consistency', or as 'implication', or as 'explanation '. In P la to , 
the aiîpc|)üL3via of statem ents refers som etim es to coherence qua  
consistency (cf. for instance Prt. 333 a; cf. also Grg. 457 e, 461 a, 4 8  2 
b-c); and sometimes to coherence qua deducibility  (cf. Cra. 436; h e r e  
the expression is opoXoyeiv dXXfjXoiC, not aupcj)üüvelv; but we k n o w , 
from  the Smp. 187 b 4 that p avp<j)ajvia ôpoXoyia e a r iv )  (19). Yet, I 
believe, we cannot reduce it to either consistency or deducibility.
It is clear that the aupcpwvla of statem ents requ ires c o n s is te n c y  
(i.e. the lack of explicit contradictions). But the consistency in v o lv e d  
here is not among any statem ents, and Plato, when he speaks a b o u t 
sta tem ents that avpcptuvelv dXXpXoiC, refers to statem ents that a re  
consisten t and  hang together in a significant way (cf. Prt. 333 a, Grg.
482 b-c, etc.). Now, consisten t statem ents may 'hang together' in  
various ways: p may hang together with q, if p im plies (or it is 
im plied by) q; or if p explains (or it is explained by) q; or if both p 
and q imply (or explains) another proposition r —  and so on.
And so it is in the case of accounts (or theories)  that CTupc^ ujveTv 
àxXf|Xoiç (20): they m ust be consistent, but they m ust also 'h a n g  
together' in an significant way —  either by im plying, or explaining o r  
com pleting somehow one another. W hat is im portan t is that th e  
sta tem ents (or the theories) that aupclüüvelv àxxpXoïC are not o n ly  
consistent, but they form, one way or another, not a m ere gvvQetov,  
but a Koapiov TTpccypa (21). Now, in the case of s ta te m e n ts  a n d  
accounts  (or theories)  the m etaphor of appovla/aijp<l>cjovla becom es, as
‘à
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I said, obscure; and that is so precisely because here it ceases to 
determine the Koapiov irpaypa to which it refers. In other words, h e re  
the m etaphor of appovia/avpclwvia says only that the statem ents (o r 
the theories) that aupc^ajveTv aXXfjXoiC form a Koapiov irpaypa (b ecau se  
they 'hang together' in one way or another); but it does n o t 
determ ine the rd^iC that exists among them (as it does, say, in th e  
case of letters, where it determines it as a 'succession of letters w ith  
meaning') — i.e. it does not indicate how should we take th e ir  
'hanging together', as implication, as explanatory relation, etc.
To go back to the second step of the peGoSoC described in th e  
Phaedo  100 a, namely the hypothesizing as true whatever aupcj^cuvel 
with a theory that we judged to be the most plausible. As I said, it is 
very hard to believe that Plato used this m etaphor of oup^wvia (in  
such an im portant context), because he just happened to ex p ress  
him self carelessly. I am more inclined to believe the contrary: if
Plato chose to use it, he chose to use an ambiguous m etaphor; and I 
do not think that we should attribute to it a precision that it lacks (as 
Robinson 1953, 127 does for instance, when he says that 'there is no 
third interpretation [of aupcj)(jovia, so] we have to choose b e tw e e n  
consistency and deducibility').
How should we then construe this second step of the peGoSoC? 
As I said, according to the first step, if 'we cannot make our jo u rn e y  
with greater confidence and security by the surer means of a d iv in e  
XoyoC'and we cannot 'ascertain the facts (whether by paGelv or b y  
elfpeiv)'; and if we decide not to 'leave off before we have come to th e  
end of our resources' (Phd. 85 c), then we do not have any o th e r  
choice apart from f in d in g  the most plausible theory (i.e. the th e o ry  
that fits best into our puzzle). Now, if we found such a theory, th e n  
we should hypo thesize  it, and use it ('as a raft to ride the seas of life ' 
— as Socrates says at 85 d 1-2), for this theory is the only thing w e 
have. In short: regarding some problems we face, we cannot but re ly  
on a plausible theory.
In the second step of the peGoSoC Plato claims that, if we find a 
theory that fits best into our puzzle, we should hypothesize (TiGppi) 
as true (wC aXriGfj ovra) whatever things seems to aupcjjcjoveTv with it, 
and as not true (üjC oiik dXpGp) whatever seems do not (100 a). In m y  
view, what Plato says here is this: if we found a theory that fits b e s t  
into our puzzle, we should hypothesize and use not only that theo ry , 
but also all the theories (and statements) that are consistent an d  
'hang together' with it — be they theories (or statem ents) that im p ly  
(or are implied), explain (or are explained), etc. by it (and, of course, 
we should not use all those theories that do not 'hang together' w ith  
it). In short: regarding some problems we face, we cannot but rely on 
a plausible theory and on everything that may 'hang together' w ith
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it. That is: regarding some problems, we cannot but 'ride the seas of 
life with a raft [axeSia]' (85 d 1-2), i.e. with the eiKwC àxfjeeia 
provided by a plausible theory and everything that 'hangs to g e th e r ' 
with it (22).
Plato, however, was very well aware that the second step o f 
the peGoSoC depends on the first one; for there are many theories that 
may be consistent and 'hang together' with both a plausible and a 
false theory. If one that is faced with a problem begins by lay ing  
down (riGinpeyoC) something that is not true, says Socrates in th e  
Cratylus 436 c-e, he may find many things that oupc^wvovoiv with it; 
but they will all be false, as it happens in geometry when w e 
construe an argument on a false premiss. This situation is n o t 
something unusual (oiiSev oltottov) ,  and so "every man should e x p en d  
his chief thought and attention on the consideration of the apxp a n d  
see whether it is or not rightly [opQcuC] laid down [woKeiTai]". As I 
said, the capacity of a theory to fit into the pieces that the q u e s tio n e r  
has already in place determines its credibility. But, it seems, even if a 
theory fits p e r fec tly  into the puzzle, this does not prove beyond an y  
doubt its truth. We have, therefore, to think of some ways of te s tin g  
the theory.
2.3. Testing the theory
In the Phaedo  Plato speaks, as I shall argue, of two tests: one  
about checking the implications of the theory, and the other ab o u t 
the possibility to include it into a wider theory.
2.3.1. Testing the theory by seeing whether its im plica tions
avpfœvovaiy
First, says Socrates, "if anyone should fasten upon th e  
hypothesis itself, you would disregard him and refuse to a n sw e r 
until you could consider whether its opppGevTa aupc^tuvei àXXfjxoLC o r 
8iacj)ajvei" (101 d).
The key-word of this passage is ôpptjGévTa. oppqGevTa is ta k e n  
by many commentators (such as Ross 1951, 27; Robinson 1953, 129; 
Hackforth 1955, 139-40 or Gallop 1975, ad. loc.) as 'logical
consequences' — although, as Robinson 1953, 129 claims, with th e  
possible exception of the Phaedo 101 d the other occurrences of th is  
word (or of its cognates) (e.g. Smp. 185 e, i?. 510 d, 511 b, Tht. 184  
a) do not support such a reading.
If one, however, takes opprjGevTa as 'logical consequences', th e n  
he will be inclined to take avp^wvia as 'deducibility' (for how could
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the consequences of a single hypothesis be inconsistent with one 
another?), and claim that what Plato appears to say here is this: one  
need not answer a question about the hypothesis itself, until h e 
checks whether its consequences follow from it or not. But th is  
in terpretation  does not make too much sense in the context (23). 
That is: why does one have to check whether the consequences of a 
plausible hypothesis are really its consequences? And so, as Robinson 
1953, 130 put it, "somehow or other it is necessary to get over th e  
apparent logical absurdity and take aijpc))œv'ia as meaning consistency  
here also".
But, if we take as 'consistency', how are to cope w ith
the strong objection that the consequences of a hypothesis can b e  
inconsistent with one another? For, from a formal point of view, it is 
a logical absurdity to pretend that a hypothesis can have tw o  
contradictory consequences or a consequence that is c o n trad ic to ry  
with itself.
Robinson 1953, 131 ff. argues that this formal point of v iew  
refers to an ideal situation, e.g. to a completely axiomatized system . 
But this is hardly the case in Plato’s philosophical inquiries, w hose  
assum ptions form anything but a completely axiomatized system . 
Here in Plato, claims Robinson, a hypothesis does often contain m o re  
than one part (i.e. more than one atomic proposition) and "some of 
them may be latently inconsistent with one another" (p. 132). And,
besides, continues Robinson, in Plato (as well as in any n o n -
m athem atical thinking) a hypothesis is always combined with one 's 
'permanent beliefs', i.e. with the 'standing assumptions' that one does 
never spell out (which are regarded "as merely the 'cond itions ' 
without which the true premiss would not have had the effect i t
does" — p. 133). And he concludes: "This is the sense, the natural an d  
ordinary sense, in which Plato speaks of an hypothesis' h av in g
conflicting consequences. It may have conflicting consequences on 
our standing assumptions, that is, when combined with some of o u r  
permanent beliefs" (p. 133).
I agree that Robinson's in terpretation is very tempting; yet I 
am reluctant to accept it. First, to take the expression rh 
opppeevTa (101 d 4) as 'the consequences  of the hypothesis', is, I 
think, to read too much in it. The verb oppav means 'to begin from  
something and/or set something in motion'; and ra  oppqeevra (w hich  
is a passive aorist participle of oppav) means, literally, 'the th in g s 
which were set in motion by something'. In our context, I believe, the 
expression ra  ôppqeévTa refers simply to 'everything which is set in  
motion by the theory we judged to be the most plausible', i.e. to th e  
im plications  of our theory (not to its consequences, which is too 
strong a word here and for which Plato tends to use the ex p ress io n
51
TOC cnjppaivovra) (24). And secondly, if we take the ex p ress io n  
ai)p(j)üJi/eT àxXqXoïC as meaning 'deducibility' we will read too much in. 
it, whereas if we take it as meaning 'consistency' we will read too
little.
So, how should we construe this way to check a theory b y
considering whether its ôppqeévra aupcj)ajveT àxxfjxoïc or Sia4>o)veT? In  
my view, what Plato says here is this: a theory that we h y p o th es iz ed  
as being the most plausible one may be tested by seeing if its  
implications 'hang together', i.e. by seeing if its implications form a 
Koapioy npctyiJia— 2l structured whole (although, if they do, this does 
not p ro ve  the truth of the theory, for Plato speaks about a n o th e r  
test). Thus, what he seems to say here is not
(i) let us hypothesize the theory T and let us see whether its  
im plications form a 'structured whole'; and if  they do, this e n t a i l s  
that T is true;
but rather
(ii) let us hypothesize the theory T and let us see whether its  
im plications form a 'structured w hole’; and if  they do, t h i s  
c o r r o b o r a t e s  (i.e. gives addi t ional support  to) the theory T.
Now, this test, claims Plato, which regards the implications of th e
theory (tüjv €K€ivqC cjoppqpevwv — 101 e 2-3), should not be m ixed  
with the other test (e 1), which regards the relation between th e  
hypothesized theory and another theory that may be hypothesized.
2.3.2. Including the theory into a wider one
The fourth step of the peGoSoC is very briefly described at 101 
d. There, Socrates says that if we have 'to give a xdyoC ' (8i8dvai Xoyov 
— d 6) about the theory itself, we should "proceed in the same w ay  
[cùaa-UTCüC — d 6], hypothesizing [iJTroGepevoC] another TJuoGcaiC w hich  
seems best of those above [twv avojGev peXTiarq], until we reach one 
which is satisfactory [ t i  Uavov]".
Now, Plato does not tell us here to substitute  the theory th a t  
we judged to be eppojpei^earaTov by a better one (i.e. by a theory th a t  
fits better into the pieces that the questioner has already in place); 
he simply says that, when it comes to the theory we believe fits 
better than any other into our puzzle, we should su ppo r t  it (cf. also 
Robinson 1953, 136) in the same w ay  by a higher  and sa tis fac tory  
hypothesis. But what do support, in the same way, higher, 
satisfactory  and hypothesis mean — he does not explicitly say.
Robinson, as most of the commentators, believes that . P lato  
speaks here in the Phaedo about deducing a hypothesis qua
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proposition from another one. And he takes the expression 'until you  
come to something iKavov' as 'until you come to a least re fu ta b le  
XoyoC [i.e. proposition]' (for he argues that the 'hypothetical m eth o d ' 
is connected with the elenctic procedure — see pp. 140-1; he claim s, 
roughly speaking, that Plato speaks about two ways of testing a
hypothetical statement: an external procedure in which a h y p o th es is  
is deduced from a higher one, designed only to satisfy an objector; |
and an internal procedure, the real test, which consists of d raw in g
consequences from the hypothesis). In my view, however, to take the X
expression 'to hypothesize another woOeaiC which seems best of 
those above' as 'to deduce  the hypothesis we judged to be m o st
plausible from another one' means, again, to read too much in P lato 's 
tex t.
The whole passage of 101 d-e (in which this fourth step of th e  
peGoSoC occurs) is constructed on the contrast between this step a n d  
the third one (which I called the first test of a hypothesized th eo ry ).
The procedure of the third step, it is said here, regards the oppqGevra 
(i.e. implications) of the theory (cf. 101 e 2-3) (from the point of
view of their being capable to aupcj)a)i/€xi^  aWfjXoiC, viz. to form a 
'structured whole'); whereas the procedure of the fourth step re g a rd s  
its apxq (e 2), i.e. a 'higher {jiroGecjiC'. A 'higher' UTToGecnC suggests, in  ::
my view, a 'theory that is (somehow) superior' (as I shall argue in  
the Annex II, 3.1., c, in Plato the superiority  of something is m ark ed , 
inter alia, by its being localized, metaphorically, above). But, w h a t 
could a 'superior urroGeaiC' mean here? A 'superior woGeCTiC qua apyq' 
suggests an apyq tÆv àTroSei^eüüv, i.e. a proposition conven tiona lly  
accepted as true for the sake of our investigations (viz. a p o s tu la te )  
or a proposition for which no proof is required, because its truth is 
self-evident (viz. an axiom). Now, Plato's saying that such a 'su p e rio r  
iJTToQeaiC qua apxq' cannot be more than Uavoi^, does not allow us to 
take this expression as referring to an axiom. One may claim th e n  
that it could refer to a postulate; but Plato's indication that th e  
procedure of the fourth step should be done wcrauTwC implies th a t  
what is at stake here is what was at stake in the preceding steps —
i.e. a hypothetical theory (not proposition). If so, then what does a 
'superior theory' mean?
Let us go back to the question of mcraiJTdjC: what does 'to  
proceed in the same way’ mean? What did we f i r s t  do? First, we h a d  
to find a theory that is eppwpevearaTov, i.e. a theory' that fits b e s t  
into a given puzzle; and then, we have to see if its im p lica tions 
CTLipcj)üJvoijaiv, i.e. if they form a 'structured whole'. Now, when w e 
have to support this theory (say A), by another one (say B), we have,
Plato says, to proceed in the same way. That is: first, we have to fin d  
a theory B that is superior to A, and then see if its implications fo rm  
a 'structured whole'. What then does this mean — to find a theory B
that is su per io r  to the theory A and supports  it? Obviously, it c an n o t 
mean 'to find theory B that fits better than A into the sam e  puzzle'; 
for in this case B would not support, but simply substitu te  A. It could  
only mean, I believe, 'to find a theory B that fits into a puzzle that is 
greater than  and includes the puzzle into which A fits'; it means, in  
other words, 'to find a theory B that has a greater explanatory ra n g e  
than A and includes  it'. (Robinson 1953 137 states that some re a d e rs  
do take 'above' as 'more comprehensive'; and, although he does n o t 
endorse this view, he agrees that one may construe the 'h ig h e r 
hypothesis' as a hypothesis that includes the 'lower hypothesis', in  
the way, say, 'Newton's laws included Kepler’s'.)
If so, what Plato says here, in the the fourth step of th e  
[jieeoSoC, is this: in order to support a theory which we think fits b e s t  
into a given puzzle, we should find another theory, that trcpiexei i t  
e^cjü0ev, viz. that includes  it and fits best into a greater puzzle; an d  
then, we should see if the implications of this wider theory form a 
'structured whole'. But if this wider theory (which is a sort of bXoy 
qua TTEpicxov) needs to be supported itself, we should find a m uch  
wider theory that includes it and fits best into a much greater puzzle; 
and so on, until it is reached a satisfactory  theory, i.e. a theory th a t  
fits into a puzzle which is 'wide enough'.
In the field of contemporary epistemology, it is a common place 
that the plausibility of a theory depends, to a considerable ex ten t, on 
the explanatory range of that theory. In other words: the more a 
theory takes into account and the less it leaves unexplained, th e  
more plausible it is. The same idea, I think, is at stake here in Plato, 
when he says that we should aim at a satisfactory  theory. That is: h e  
tells us to attempt to include a theory which we found very p lau s ib le  
for a particular problem (but which has an 'u n sa tis fac to ry ' 
explanatory range, for it leaves too many other p ro b lem s 
unexplained) into a wider theory, because he believes that th e  
plausibility of a theory depends on its explanatory range.
To conclude: if we can include a plausible theory into an  
equally plausible, yet wider one, this will su ppo r t  our initial theo ry . 
And so, we can regard the assessment of its capacity to be part of an  
equally plausible, yet wider theory as another way of testing  its  
plausibility. If a theory 'passes this test', however, this does n o t 
p ro v e  the truth of the theory, for it will always be supported by a 
theory that is only satisfactory, i.e. only 'wide enough'. W hat coun ts 
as 'wide enough', Plato does not say; but he implies that the th eo rie s  
man 'lays down', no matter how wide they may be, can only b e 
satisfactory,  for they will never explain everyth ing .  Thus, what P lato  
seems to say here is not
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(i) let us hypothesize the theory T and let us see whether we c a n  
include it into another, equally plausible, yet wider theory; and i f
we can, this e n ta i l s  that T is true;
b u t
(ii) let us hypothesize the theory T and let us see whether we c a n  
include it into another, equally plausible, yet wider theory; and i f
we can, this c o r r o b o r a t e s  (i.e. gives additional s u p p o r t  to) th e  
theory T.
To sum up so far: in the Phaedo 100 a -101 e Plato describes a 
p éeo S o C  which is in troduced  as a possible way out of the aT ropiai 
raised by the question of causality  (95 e-96 a, 100 a), but which is 
p resen ted  as a possible way to reach a theory in g en era l. T his
p éeo S o C  regards m ainly that field of know ledge in which th e
'experim ent' is not possible, and it has four steps.
(i) First, we have to f i n d  the most plausible theory, i.e. the th e o r y  
that fits better than any other theory into our puzzle); and if  w e  
found such a theory, then we should h y p o t h e s i z e  it, and use  it.
(ii) If we found a theory that fits best into our puzzle, we sh o u ld  
hypothesize and use not only th ^  theory, but also all the th e o r ie s  
(and statem ents) that crup^cüvoîjaiv with it, i.e. all the th e o r ie s
that are consistent and 'hang together' with it — be they th e o r ie s  
(or statem ents) that imply (or are im plied), explain (or a r e  
explained), etc. by it (and, of course, we should not use all th o s e  
theories that do not 'hang together' with it). In short: r e g a r d in g  
some problems we face, we cannot but rely on the eiKmC aX fjG eia  
provided by a plausible theory and everyth ing that is c o n s is t e n t  
and may 'hang together' with it. But, even if  a theory f it s  
p e r f e c t l y  into the puzzle, this does not prove beyond any doubt its
truth. We have, therefore, to test it.
(iii) The first test is aimed at what comes (lo g ica lly ) after  th e  
theory: ds im plications; according to this test, if th e y  
CTiJ|J.(t>üJlv'ouaiV aXXfjXoiC, i.e. if  they form a 'structured whole', t h e  
theory becom es more plausible.
(iv) The second test is aimed at what comes (log ica lly ) b e f o r e  t h e  
theory in question, namely to another, wider theory; according to 
this test, if  we can find another equally plausible, yet w id e r  
theory, which includes our theory, our theory becom es m o r e
p l a u s i b l e .  (If a theory, however, passes both tests, it will b e c o m e  
only more plausible . )
That which is at the core of each step of the p éeo S o C  is, I 
believe, the notion of anp(j)aji^ia — explicitly in the second and th e  
third, im p l ic i t ly  in the first and the fourth; and we may put th e  
whole |jl€0o6oC in these terms:
(i) First, we have to f i n d  the theory that aupc|)UJve7 hest with o u r  
p u zzle .
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(ii) If we find such a theory, we should hypothesize and use as 
plausible not only that theory, but also all the theories (a n d  
statements) that a u p4>ujv o u a i v with it.
(iii) We have, how ever, to test the theory. First by s e e in g  
whether its implications a u p ^ w v o u a iv  ctXXqXoiC; and then by
(iv) seeing whether the theory aupcj)CJüvelL with another e q u a lly  
plausible, yet wider theory.
To conclude: the c rite rion  of plausibility on which Plato based h is 
p éecS o C  is au|jL(|)wvia. (We may ask, however, w h y  did he believe th a t  
this criterion may lead us to truth? I shall discuss this question la te r, 
in 8.2.1.)
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CHAPTER THREE
The [jie0 o8 oC toward theories and 
the theory of eiSq (I)
The structure of the Phaedo  is not at all obscure; but the chain  
of its arguments is not always easy to follow and the ph ilosoph ical 
application of the péeoSoC in tro d u ced  at 100 a-101 e is not v e ry  
c lear-cu t.
The first step of the peGoSoC is to f in d  and then hypothesize  th e  
theory that fits better than any other theory into a puzzle. Now, P lato  
tells us explicitly that the theory he found and hypothesized is w h a t 
we now usually call the theory of forms, or eiSq (cf. 100 b, 101 c-d, 
etc.; cf. also, inter alios, Robinson 1953, 202, 139, and VI as to s 1973, 
83).
3.1. The theory of  eiSr]
The ancestor of the Greek word pipqcjiC is the noun pipoC, 
which first meant 'actor in a cult or a ritualistic drama' (cf. Roller 
1954) (the evaluations of the ancient usage of the words of th e  
pTpoC-group led to the conclusion that pipqcriC m eant m ain ly  
'enactment', i.e. 'dramatic im personation' — cf. Roller 1954 and Reuls 
1978, 11-14). A pipqaiC is therefore 'a playing of another',  and th e  
perform er of this act, the mimic actor, is somebody who assu m es 
other identity than his own and pretends to be somebody else. 
(yuvaiKopipoC for instance, 'woman-miming' — found once in each of 
the three great tragedians, see Reuls 1979, 16 — is an actor w ho 
impersonates  a woman).
Let us take a clear instance of pipqcriC. Suppose one looks at th e  
dummy of the Queen from Madame Tussaud's and at a portrait of th e  
Queen from the National Gallery. Both replicas 'pretend' to b e  
something which they are not: they pretend to be the Queen, b u t  
they are only an image, an elKOJV of her. (There are, says Plato in th e  
Sophist 235 d ff., 'believable' copies, ciScuXa eiKora, e.g. the Q ueen’s 
dummy from Madame Tussaud’s; and 'unbelievable' copies, eiGwXa 
c^avTaariKd, e.g. a cartoon of the Queen from the Punch.) Yet e v e ry  
copy, p ipoupcvov, is a sort of a pretender, exactly like an actor (pTpoC) 
on stage, i.e. it pretends, more or less convincingly, to be that in th e  
likeness of which it was made.
57
The wax dummy of the Queen (as well as the p o rtra it) , 
however, is an 6v  in which something that this d v  is not (i.e. the 're a l' 
Queen) is somehow present. (As Husserl put it in his V. 
Untersuchung, chapter 2, we have to distinguish between th e  
Bildobjekt, say the marble of a statue, and the Bildsubjekt, th a t  
whom the marble statue represents — apud Heidegger, 1992 b, 400). 
In other words, when we look at the Queen's dummy we do look at a 
pdxa ocTOTTov fact (Sph. 240 c 2 and 3), namely at a qupttXokt) b e tw e e n
an ov (the wax dummy) and a pq ov (taken as that something w hich
this ov is not, i.e. the 'real' Queen). In this case, however, only th e  
model is the real  Queen; that is: only she is an o v T w C  d v ,  whereas one  
of her dummies is only a o v  ttüjC. And if we accept that any x w hich  
looks like y is a copy of y, then we have also to admit that any x 
which looks like y depends ontologically  upon y. For a copy, by its  
very nature, relies on its model, and to say that 'if there is no m odel, 
there is no copy' is a truism.
In the Sophist  (240 a-b) Plato puts all this in the follow ing 
terms. An ei8tüXov is a erepov (a 9), i.e. something which is other th a n  
a 'real thing' (dXqeivov — a 9, b 2 ,3 ,  5), but still similar (toloutov — a 
9; coLKoC — b 2) to it. If so, ai'gues the Stranger, then the eiScoXov is the 
evavT iov of the dXqGivdv (b 5); and if we understand by dXqGivdv 'th a t  
which really is' (dvrcuC dv — b 3), then we have to admit that it is th e  
eiSdjXov which does not have a 'real existence' (oijk dvTwC [ouk] dv dp a 
XeyeiC to  èoiKoC, giirep aùrd ye pq dXqGivdv êpeiC — b 7-8). In o th e r  
words, when Plato claims that the eiScnXov does not have a 're a l
existence', he claims that an image, although it is an dv (cf. b 9,11
and 12), something which exists, is not that other dv which is 
'represented' in the image — this 'represented' dv being, from the tw o 
of them, the only dv dXqGivdv, the only 'real thing': the 'model', th e  
TTapdSciypa (1). An ei8cuXov is therefore an dv ttojC (b 9); and this dv 
TTüüC is actually that in which there is a Koivojvia (or auprrXoKq) b e tw e e n  
dv (that very ei8ojXov) and pq dv (that which the €lSu)Xov looks like — 
i.e. ‘the model’) (c 1-2) (2).
Now, one may accept that some cases things can be d e sc rib e d  
in the terms of a 'theory of copies and models'. But he may object if 
we will attem pt to describe every th ing  in these terms. Yet this is 
exactly what Plato does in his so-called theory of forms, which p u ts  
everything in these terms.
The question regarding the boundary between the Socratic 
'universals' and the Platonic forms is difficult to establish. M any 
scholars, like, for instance, Allen 1970, argues that there is not such a 
boundary (cf. Skemp 1976, 34: "Allen [unlike, say, Ross 1951] show s 
that a sharp line of separation cannot be drawn and that 'the Holy' in  
the Euthyphro  5 c-6 e has already some characteristics of th e  
Platonic Form in the later sense") (cf. Euthphr. 6 d: "[...] that what I
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asked of you was not to tell me one or two out of all the n u m ero u s
actions that are holy. I wanted you to tell me what is the cISoC of
holiness which makes all holy actions holy. I believe you held th a t
there is a pia i8éa by which unholy things are all unholy, and b y
which all holy things are holy."). And this is, I think, a r a th e r  
reasonable position.
As regarding the Platonic forms, however, there is a change in  
his way of referring to them. In a first phase they are called m o stly  
aiJTa Kae’aiJTd (cf. Hp. Ma. 299 c 8-9, Ly. 220 c 5, Smp. 211 b 1, Phd. 
66 a 2, 100 b 6); then they are called mostly eiSq (Cra. 389 b 3, R. 
402 c 2, 476 a 5, 510 b 8, Prm.  129 a 1) or l8eai (Cra. 389 e 3, R. 47  9 
a 1, 596 b 3, 7, 9); and, in some later dialogues, they are som etim es 
called yevq (Prm. 129 c 2, 134 b 7, Sph. 254 b 7).
All these terminological changes and the questions they ra ise  
(e.g. 'Why did Plato use el8oC instead of auro Kae’aÛTo?' and 'Why d id  
he then use yevoC instead of eî8oC?') have been discussed at en d less  
length (by, inter alios, Cornford, Bluck, Ross, Owen and Vlastos — fo r 
references see Skemp 1976, 35-44). Regardless of the way P lato  
referred to forms, however, the theory of forms claims that th e  
forms are eternal models, TTapaSeiypara, which are always the sam e 
(cf. inter alia Smp. 211 a-b, Phd. 78 c 6-8, Cra. 386 a, 440 b, Prm.  135 
b-c, Ti. 48 e 6); that the sensible things are their copies (3); and th a t  
the forms are the 'causes' of their copies (cf. for instance Prm.  132 d), 
be these copies particular objects or acts (Smp. 212 a, R. 382 b, 402 c, 
443 c, etc.). (The word yevoC does not suggest either an eternal m odel 
or a cause; I shall say a few things about its use in the context of th e  
theory of forms in Chapters Five and Six.)
One may object to this view and claim that: (i) the theory of 
forms does offer a 'two-tier' metaphysics, but only in the Phaedo,  th e  
Republic  and the Phaedrus, and that (ii) in his later thinking P lato  
was less enthusiastic about this theory, as the Parmenides, fo r 
instance, seems to suggest. I cannot enter here into this v e ry  
complicated debate; on the whole, however, the view that Plato d id  
not abandon the theory of forms in his late works (which is not at all 
an uncommon view) is, I think, preferable to the one which s ta te s  
that there was such an abandonment and claims strange chronologies 
of Plato's writings. (As Thesleff 1989, 24 put it: "[...] since th e  
references to the theory [of forms] are mostly indirect, defective, o r 
playful, it is advisable to harmonize as far as possible the few sc raps 
of solid evidence to be gathered, primarily, from Phaedo, Republic  
[...], Parmenides,  and Timaeus, and to apply this picture to th e  
in terpretation of relevant passages elsewhere [...,] including th e  
Academic twists of the late works [...].")
Let us go back, however, to the theory itself and ask: does th is  
theory claim that there is an el8oC for everything we see? 'Are you
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doubtful, says Parmenides to Socrates, 'whether or not to assert th a t  
there is a separate cTSoC of every undignified object, such as hair o r 
mud or dirt?' — Prm. 132 c, my paraphrase. 'It would surely be too 
absurd to suppose that they have an eîSoC', replies Socrates. 'All th e  
same’, he continues, I have sometimes been troubled by a d o u b t
whether what is true in one case may not be true in all' — d. It is 
fairly obvious, I think, that Plato is a philosopher who has not only a 
logical relation with things, but also an emotional  one — see fo r 
instance the Phaedo, Phaedrus or Republic.  He was so fond of som e 
'valuable' things — 'rightness, beauty, goodness and of all such
things', Prm. 130 b — that he f e l t  they must have more ontological
dignity  than others; yet he had to accept that there must be an elSoC
of everything there is in our world, and in the late dialogues, h e  
attempted to 'rehabilitate' the 'more humble realm' — cf. the Tim aeus  
or the Philebus 55 b, 66 a.
In the Phaedo,  however, the theory of forms is less developed ; 
here Plato says only that the ei8q are the 'causes' of things (cf. fo r 
instance 100 b-d). This causal relation (which in the Phaedo he refers 
to by the obscure verb peTEyEiv) will be d e te rm in ed  as a m o d e l -c o p y  
relation only in the later dialogues, such as the Republic  or th e  
Parmenides  (see for instance 132 d). Nonetheless, I think, the core o f 
the theory is contained, in nuce, also in the Phaedo.
3.2. The puzzle that the theory o f  eiSr] 
explains best
This discussion about forms, says Socrates (100 b 1 ff.), is n o t 
something Kaivdv, newly introduced; "I said it not only in the e a r lie r  
part of this discussion", he claims, "I have always said it'. But if th e  
theory  is not newly introduced,  the question which it explains (i.e. 
'the puzzle into which it fits') must also be something où Kaivdv. Now, 
what is this puzzle?
As I argued in Chapter One, the given way in which, for Plato, 
pdeqaiC  in general works appears like a ttccvu eaupacrrov puzzle (for i t  
contains, even if only in a latent form, three main u n a n sw e re d  
difficult questions; What is actually that which remains the sam e?  
Why are knowing through the senses and knowing through sp eak ing  
of  a different nature? And What is the relation between that w h ich  
remains the same and the causes o f  things?) In my view, this p u zz le  
of pdeqaiC is the one at which the theory of eiSq was p r im a rily  
aim ed.
As I said, the theory of ei8q claims an ontological d is tin c tio n  
between the eiSq and the individual things qua elKoveç of the ei8q.
and states that the former (which are always the same) are th e  
causes of the latter (which do not remain the same). So, that which is 
to be known are, on the one hand, the eiSq, and, on the other, th e ir  
embodiments. Now, since soul can know either through the aiaefjcjeiC 
TOÙ acüparoC or through itself, through Siavoedaeai qua x lyeiv , th e  
'entities' involved in the 'act' of jadOqaiC in general are: (i) the eiSmXov 
(the seen image, or in a wider sense, 'embodim ent') of an eiSoC (V II 
342 b 2; cf. also T o  C^7 pctcj)oijpevüv, VII 342 c 1); (ii) the dvopa of th a t  
ei8oC (Prm. 142 a, Tht. 202 b 2, Sph. 218 b 1, c 2, Lg. 895 d 5, 964 a 
6, VII 342 b 2, 344 b 4) (4); and (iii) the Xoyoi about that eiSoC 
(Prm. 142 a, Tht. 202 b 9, Sph. 218 c 6, 221 b 2, Lg. 895 d, 964 a 7,
VII 342 b 2, 344 b 4) (5). (Thus, we have to distinguish between f i v e  
different things: the ei8oC itself; its ei8wXov; its dvopa; the Xoyoi ab o u t 
it; and knowledge i t s e l f — see VII 342 a ff.) And, as we know, P lato  
claimed that that which the soul can know through the aiaefjaeiC T o u  
aœpaToC are the embodiments of eiSq, whereas that which the soul 
can know through itself, i.e. through SiavoeiaGai qua Xeyeiv, are th e  
eiSq themselves (cf. inter alia Prm.  135 b-c and Sph. 259 e).
Now, if we accept his way of putting the question of knowledge; 
and if we admit that this way of putting the question of know ledge  
appears like a Trdvu GaupaaTov puzzle (for it contains, even if only in a 
latent form, three main difficult questions), then we should agree, I 
think, that the theory of ei8q seems to solve rather well this puzzle; 
because it has appealing (since clear and articulated) answers to all 
the three questions that form this puzzle: (i) that which remains th e  
same are the ei8q — i.e. the TrapadeiypaTa that sensible ob jects 
embody; (ii) knowing through the aiaeqcreiC T o u  awpaToC and know ing  |
through speaking are of a different nature because their objects a re
so: the bodily senses deal with the sensible embodim ents of the eiSq,
whereas speaking deals with the €i8q themselves (which, as m odels, 
are different than their embodiments); and (iii) that which re m a in s  
the same, viz. the e iS q , are the causes of the sensible things.
In the Phaedo  Plato says explicitly that '6 Trepi TqC dvapvqaecjoC 
Kai paefjaecjüC XoyoC’ is explained by 'a ÙTrdeeaiC worthy of accep tance  
[8i’ TJTToeéaeüüC à^iaC àTTo8é^aaQai]', i.e. by the theory of eiSq (92 d 6 -7 )
(6). Here, however, things are not very clearly stated as to how th e
theory of ei8q explains the question of pdeqaiC; one may, how ever, 
argue that the theory, as it is presented in this dialogue, hints at th e
puzzle brought forth by Plato's way of putting the question of
know ledge.
I would, however, not go as far as to say that this view can b e  
convincingly supported by textual evidence. The first step of th e  
péeoSoC introduced in the Phaedo  consists of f in d in g  and th e n  
hypothesizing the theory that fits better than any other theory into a
■f
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puzzle. The theory that Plato introduces in this dialogue is the th e o ry  
of forms; but the puzzle into which this theory was supposed to fit is 
not clearly stated. Now, all that I am claiming is that the m o st 
plausible puzzle seems to be the one implied by Plato's way of 
putting the question of knowledge.
3.3. Hypothesizing as true what crvpfajyei with the theory o f  eiSrj
As I argued in 2.2., according to the second step of the peGoSoC 
we should hypothesize and use not only that theory that fits b e s t  
into our puzzle, but also all the theories (and statem ents) th a t  
aupc[)CJüvoîJcriv with it, i.e. all the theories that are consistent and 'h ang  
together' with it — be they theories (or statements) that imply (or are 
implied), explain (or are explained), etc. by it (and, of course, w e  
should not use all those theories that do not 'hang together' with it). 
Now, does Plato apply in the Phaedo this second step of the peGoSoC? 
In my view, he does; but there are several things here that call fo r 
com m ent.
3.3.1. The theory o f  recollection
Plato chose the word efSoC (and its cognate Î8éa) to name th e  
unchanging TrapaSeiypaTa of things. eTSoC and i8ea — which seem to 
come from a verb root that originally m ean t 'to see' (and which a re  
cognate with the Latin video)  — mean, in their literal sense, 'look, o r 
'appearance' (and they  belong, primarily, to the field of v is ib le  
perception (cf. for instance Chrm. 154 d 5, e 6, 158 b 1). etSoC
contains then an implicit reference to sight (a reference which we do 
not perceive any more in the modern 'idea'). Now, how are we to  
take this reference?
Plato, as many other Greek philosophers — such as Aristotle (cf. 
Metaph. 980 a 22-4) — believed that sight is the most im p o r ta n t 
sense (cf. for instance R. 507 c: "Have you ever observed, [asks 
Socrates,] how much the greatest expenditure the creator of sen ses 
has lavished on the faculty of seeing and being seen?"; cf. also Phdr.  
250 d 3-4). And in the Phaedo he claims that in seeing, we see (a t 
least sometimes) forms embodied in sensible things (74 d 9 ff.: "we 
must have had some previous knowledge of equality before the tim e  
when we first saw equal things and realized that they were s tr iv in g  
after equality, but fell short of it"; cf. also 75 b 4 ff.: "so before w e  
began to see and hear and use our other senses we must so m ew h ere
have acquired the knowledge that there is such a thing as ab so lu te
equality. Otherwise we could never have realized, by using it as
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standard for comparison, that all equal objects of sense are d esiro u s 
of being like it, but are only imperfect copies") (cf. also Sph. 253 d 5 - 
6, for instance, where he speaks about 'discerning p ia v  iS e a v  8ia 
TToXXSv', i.e. — according to the majority of the com m entators — 
'seeing [with soul through eyes] the same eTSoC in many sensib le  
things'). And here in the Phaedo  Plato introduces in connection w ith  
all this the so-called theory of àvctpvqaïC (73 c 9-d 2, 74 c 13-d 2; cf. 
also 73 d 5 ff.), which states that then, when we see forms em b o d ied  
in sensible things, we actually recollect forms (7).
The theory of recollection raises various difficult questions; th is  
is hardly the occasion, however, for detailing this issue. For m y 
present purpose I need to say only that (at least in the Phaedo) th e  
theory of forms contains in it the theory of recollection.
3.3.2. The theory o f  soul's immortality
If you accept my theory (i.e. the theory of forms), says 
Socrates, then let us look at what comes next to it (100 c 3-4), i.e. le t 
us see what with it. With the theory of forms there a re
many things that crup^wvouaiv; here in the Phaedo, however, Plato is 
concerned only with one: the soul's immortality. His argum ent a b o u t 
soul's immortality can fairly be represented like this.
(i) i f  we (at least som etim es) recollect e iS q  (cf. Phd. 74 d 9 ff., o r  
75 b 4 ff.);
(iii) then, 'we must have learned at some time b e f o r e  our so u ls
entered this human shape [i.e. 'before our birth' — cf. 75 c 4] th a t
which we recollect now (72 e —  my paraphrase, my italics);
(iv) and if  soul existed before our birth, it will continue to e x is t  
after our death (102 b-106 e); and that means that soul is  
d e d v a T o v  K a l  a8idct)0op ov  (106 e 1).
In other words:
(i) the theory o f forms contains the theory o f recollection;
(ii) the theory that soul is immortal aupcj^mveT (cf. the e x p r e s s io n  
auvcü86C at 92 c 5 and 8) with the theory o f forms, for it is  
consistent and 'hangs very well together' with it (being a c tu a lly  
i m p l i e d  by it) (cf. 92 d: "the theory that our soul exists e v e n  
before it enters the body surely stands or falls with the so u l's  
possession" of the e iS q ); (whereas the theory that soul is a k in d  
of d p p o v i a  is not auvcy86C  with the theory of forms —  cf. 92 c 8);
(iii) so, we must also lay down as true the theory that soul is  
immortal (cf. 106 e f.), and as false the theory of soul q u a  d p p o v ia  
(92 cy
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Now, even if a theory fits perfectly into a puzzle, this does not p ro v e  
beyond any doubt its truth. We have, therefore, to test it. As I 
argued in 2.3., Plato speaks about two ways of testing a theory: b y  
seeing whether its implications aup^wvEi dxXqXoiC, and by a tte m p tin g
to include it into a wider one. Plato's theory of eiSq — although i t
(arguably) fits rather well into the puzzle brought forward by th e  
way our knowledge appears to be working — is exposed to se v e ra l 
strong objections (for instance: if an eTSoC is a model of a copy, th e
model and the copies are alike, and so they both must have a second
model, and so on — cf. Prm. 132 d-e; cf. also the earlier Euthd. 300 e). 
The theory, therefore, needs testing. Now, does Plato, in the Phaedo, 
apply to his theory of eiSq the tests he mentioned in this d ia logue?  
Yes, but only tentatively.
3.4. Testing the theory o f  eiSr] by seeing whether its implications
avpfcnvovcny
This is how the story goes. When any man dies, his own g u a r d ia n  
spirit [SaiptJüV], which was given charge over him in his l i f e ,  
tries to bring him to a certain place where all must assem ble, an d
from which, after subm itting their several cases to ju d g e m e n t,
they must set out for the next world, under the guidance o f o n e  
who has the office o f escorting souls from this world to the o th e r .
When they have there undergone the necessary experiences a n d  
remained as long as is required, another guide brings them b a c k  
again after many vast periods of time. Of course this journey is  
not as Aeschylus makes Telephus describe it. He says that the path 
to Hades is straightforw ard, but it seems clear to me that it is  
neither straightforward nor single. If it were, there would be n o  
need for a guide, because surely nobody could lose his w a y  
anyw here if  there were only one road. In fact, it seems l ik e ly  
that it contains many forkings and crossroads, to judge from t h e  
cerem onies and observances of this world [107 d-108 a]. [...] 
Although we live in a hollow of the earth, we assume that we a r e  
liv ing on the surface, and we call the air heaven, as though it  
were the heaven through which the stars move. [... And] i f  
someone could reach to the summit, or put on wings and fly a lo ft , 
when he put up his head he would see the world above, just as 
fishes see our world when they put up their heads out the sea .
And if  his nature were able to bear the sight, he would r e c o g n iz e  
that that is the true heaven and the true light and the true e a r th  
[109 d-e].
These are a few fragments from the myth that Socrates tells h is
audience at the end of the Phaedo  (107 d-108 a). Now, w h y  does 
Plato introduce this myth?
To sum up so far: the puzzle raised by the way our XoyiŒTiKov 
pavedv€i is explained, I hold, by Plato through the theory of form s, 
which claims an ontological distinction between the eiSq and th e
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sindividual things, and states that the former are the causes of th e  
latter. Now, this theory implies (inter alia) that (i) existence is 
divided into two realms: the realm of the individual things qua  
eiKoveC of the eiSq and the realm of the eiSq qua TTapaSeiyiJ-aTa (cf. 
Phd. 79 a; cf. also R. 507 b-509 d; Sph. 247 c-248 a; Pit. 269 d; Phlb. 
15 a-b); and that (ii) soul (at least of its learning part, to  XoyiaTiKov) 
is immortal. Now, do these implications, these ôppqeévTa of th e  
theory of eiSq, dXXqXoiC or Sia^coveiv?
In my view, what Plato does in the myth from the end of th e  
Phaedo  is precisely this: he attempts to see if the ôppqeévTa of th e  
theory of forms aupcjxDveïv dXXqXoiC, i.e. if they 'hang together' w ith in  
a Koapioy rrpdypa; in other words, if these two implications of th e  
theory of forms — the two ontological realms and soul's im m o rta lity  
— may be put together into a coherent whole. I cannot quote here th e  
entire myth, nor consider its 'elements' — they are too com plica ted  
and too many; but anyone who takes the effort to read it will have to  
admit that it is construed on two main topics: a m etaphys ica l
topography (grounded on the existence of the two realms) and an  
account of what happens to souls when they are not embodied.  (The 
myth, if I may use an expression from Ryle 1966, 237, would se rv e  
as topical sugar for  the very untopical pill produced by th e  
implications of the theory of €iSq.)
Of course, no reasonable man ought to insist that the facts a r e  
exactly as I have described them. But that either this o r 
som ething very like it it is a true account of our souls and t h e i r  
future habitations —  since we have clear evidence that the soul is  
immortal — this, I think, is both a reasonable contention  and a 
b elief worth risking, for the risk is a noble one.
This is how Socrates ends his myth (114 d). So, did the theory p ass  
the test? Do its implications form a Koapiov TTpdyiaa? Yes — for th e  
myth offers us a coherent whole  (i.e. it puts together into a c o h e ren t 
account the two main implications of the theory of forms — the tw o  
ontological realms and soul's immortality); although, as the above  
quoted passage seems to suggest, one should not take its details a t 
their face value (8).
3.5. Testing the theory of  eiSr) by including it into
a wider one
As I argued in 2.3.2., the second test is aimed at what com es 
(logically) before  the theory: i.e. at finding another, equally p lausib le , 
yet wider theory, which will include it. Did Plato apply this test in
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the Phaedo?  In my view, he did — but he did it tentat ively ,  and th e  
theory, I believe, did not pass the test.
We have, at this point, to go back to the issue of causality. L et 
us first consider the context on which this issue occurs. Hearing th e  
objection which Cebes formulated against the im m ortality of the soul 
(namely that the soul’s divinity and prior existence do not prove its  
immortality — see 95 b-d), Socrates says that 'a full inquiry into th e  
whole question of the causes [ a t r i a i ]  for coming-to-be [ y e v e a i C ] ,  
existence [ e o T i ]  and destruction [<j}0 o p d ] '  is required (96 a; although a t  
95 e 1 he does not uses the plural a i T i a i ,  but the singular a i r i a ) .  A nd 
this gives Socrates the opening line for summarizing his ow n
'intellectual history' into this issue of causation.
"I thought it would be marvellous to know the causes for w hich  
each thing comes and ceases and continues to be. I was c o n s tan tly  
veering to and from, puzzling primarily over this sort of question"; 
this is how Socrates began his 'intellectual history' (96 a-b). Roughly 
speaking, Socrates went through three 'stages' on his quest fo r
finding the causes of becoming, existence and perishing: he f i r s t
believed in a 'mechanistic' explanation (96 c - 97 b), then in a 
teleological explanation (97 b - 99 d), and, eventually, he in tro d u c e d  
the eiSq as a iT ia i (cf. 99 a ff.). Now, how should we construe all this?
At a first sight, the issue of causality in Plato is far from being  
clear. It is true that he distinguishes explicitly between several k in d s  
of cause (9). But the questions about how many kinds of cause a re  
there in Plato, and and what  are they, did not receive a single
answer. Ancient commentators, for instance, claimed that th e  
Platonic causes are uXq (Aristotle, Dio gene Laertius, T h eo p h rastu s, 
Alexander, Alcinous, Simplicius), G e o c  (Diogenes L aertiu s, 
Theophrastus), TTapctSeiypa (Alexander, Simplicius), and i S e a  
(Alcinous) (10).
Heidegger 1992 b, 10-4 claimed that the easiest way in to
Plato's thought is through Aristotle, for if we attem pt to u n d e rs ta n d  
Plato through Aristotle we are moving vom Hellen ins Dunkle, fro m  
light into dark. It is not my purpose here to discuss this claim; but, I 
believe, in the case of this issue of causality, this is surely so. In  
other words: the easiest way into the Platonic issue of causality is 
through Aristotle, for he, Aristotle, gives a clearer account of th is  
notion.
In M etaphys ics  1032 a 13 ff. Aristotle claims that "of th ings 
which are generated [ra  yiyvojjLeva], some are generated naturally [tù
4)ÙCTei y iyverai], and others artificially [ t ù  reyvq]" (11). And he seem s 
to imply that for all generated things (îravra rd  yiyvopeva) — be th e y  
TÙ 4>iJC7ei dvra or rd  iroioijpeva — there are 'responsible' four aiT iai (12) 
(cf. 1032 a 13 ff. and 1049 b 29 ff.): (i) causa materialis (if I may u se  
the Latin term inology) (uXq, i.e. the matter or 'constituent' out of
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which something, say, a statue is made, e.g. bronze); (ii) causa  
efficiens  (e.g. the sculptor of the statue); (iii) causa f inal is  (reXoC, th e  
goal, e.g. the purpose for the sake of which the sculptor has made th e  
statue); and (iv) causa formalis (eîSoC, or that which is responsible for 
the form of the matter, e.g. the 'model' of the statue; for these fo u r 
a iT ia i see, inter alia, Metaph. 1032 b 1 ff.) (13).
This 'productionist m etaphysical explanation' of the world o f 
y é v e a i ç ,  however, was used, before Aristotle, by Plato.
3.5.1. The failed tentative o f  the Phaedo
To go back to Socrates' intellectual history from the Phaedo. As 
I said (see supra), Socrates went through three 'stages' in his q u e s t  
for finding the causes of becoming, existence and perishing: (i) h e
first believes in a 'mechanistic' explanation (96 c - 97 b), (ii) then in  
a teleological explanation (97 b - 99 d), and, eventually, (iii) h e  
introduces the e i 8 q  as a i T i a i  (cf. 99 a ff.). Let us look at each of th e se  
stages.
(i) First, Socrates says, he thought that the a i r i a  of each th in g  
lies in its material;  for instance: the cause of growth in human beings 
is due to the food and drink which is added to the bulk of the b o d y  
(96 c-97 b). But he soon realized that matter cannot be an a ir ia ;  fo r 
instance: the cause that makes som ething-w hich-is-tw o to come in to  
being as such, he says, is neither the addition of two different th ings, 
nor the division of a single thing into two parts; in other words, a 
thing may be 'one', but its being one is not caused by its matter,  since 
the same matter could be either 'two', or 'one' (96 e ff.).
(ii) Then, he heard that another philosopher, A naxagoras, 
claimed that the v o î j C  is the a i r i a  of all things, and he was v e ry  
pleased with this explanation and assumed that, since voùc is th e  
rational 'agent' par excellence,  it would produce everything in th e  
way that is best for it ( t o  p e X T i c r r o v  — 98 b; cf. also 97 c). (It seem s 
that for Plato — and the Timaeus  provides further evidence, see fo r 
instance 28 b 1 and 29 a — an 'efficient rational agent' always w a n ts  
to achieve in his 'activity' an excellence of some sort). (As to what is 
the aim, the reXoC, of such an 'agent's activity', there is nothing said  
here in the Phaedo.) But, eventually, Socrates realized th a t  
Anaxagoras ended up by explaining each thing by 'water', 'air', a n d  
other elements.
(iii) "I should be delighted to learn about the works of such an  
a i T i a  [i.e. v o î j C ]  from anyone, but since I have been denied know ledge  
of it, and have been unable either to discover it myself or to le a rn  
about from another, I have worked out my own m akeshift ap p ro ach  
to the problem of causation" (99 c); and this 'm akeshift approach' o f
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his, which he calls "my second voyage (SeùrepoC TTXotjC) in the quest o f 
a iT ia "  (99 c 9-d 1) (14), introduces the ei8q  as a t r i a i  (cf. 99 a ff).
I do not intend to read Aristotle back into Plato: Plato does n o t 
explicitly  distinguish, as Aristotle, f o u r  kinds of a ir ia i ;  and, even if  
they recognise similar modes of explanation, they seek to account fo r 
these with m etaphysical frameworks that are significantly d iffe ren t. 
But the easiest way into what Plato has in mind here is A ris to tle 's  
way of putting the issue of causality in terms of four  causes. If I m ay  
use the the jargon of Aristotelian scholarship, what Plato does here in 
the Phaedo  is this:
(i) he classifies 'matter' only as a 'necessary condition' (cf. 99 b ) ,  
claiming that to call matter' an a i T ia  "is too absurd" (99 a);
(ii) he then 'muses' about the possibility o f an e f f i c i en t  a i T i a  ( i .e .
VOÙC) (cf. 98 e 1, 99 b 3); and, unable 'either to discover it or le a r n  
about it from others' (99 c 9 ff.), he, eventually,
(iii) introduces and applies the f o r m a l  a i r i a  (€ Ù 8 o C ).
Of course, this way of putting things is not in Plato; but it helps us to
understand what Plato does have, in a rather obscure form, in m ind.
He does not say, I agree, that a yiyvopevov comes into being as such  
and such because of a 'maker' (voùc) that has an 'aim' and a 'm odel' 
(eî8oC). What he says is that a yiyv6\ievov comes into being as such  
and such because of its ef8oC.
Now, what does all this have to do with testing the theory o f
forms by finding another, equally plausible, yet wider theory, w hich  
will include it? As I said, the issue of causality is introduced as be ing  
required by the issue of soul's imm ortality (96 a). But, in my view , 
Plato introduced this issue because he wanted to include his th e o ry  
of forms into a wider theory.  The Phaedo  does not tell us how th is  
wider theory may look like; it suggests  only that it has to con ta in  
other kinds of cause. Here, however, in this dialogue, Plato could n o t 
make anything i^avov  out of this wider theory. So here, the theory of 
forms does not pass the second test. But, in the Timaeus,  Plato tr ie d  
one more time; and there, in my view, he managed to put together a 
wider, equally plausible theory that includes the theory of e i8 q . Thus, 
we may say that the theory did eventually pass the second test.
3.5.2. The successful attempt o f  the Timaeus
Usually, pipqaiC is held as the ultimate determ ination of
(i.e. the individual things are thought of as copies  of €iSq). 
Yet Plato does further determine the concept of pipqoiC. In th e
Sophist  he says explicitly: pipqaiC iroiqaiC t iC èariv , 'im itation is a
sort of production' (i.e. a production of images, not of 'real th ings ')
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(265 b 1). (In the Sophist  the issue of TroiqaiC is p a rtic u la rly  
stressed out, and the dialogue ends  with i t — cf. 265 d ff.) If so, th e n  
the individual things are thought of as being not mere copies  of eiSq, 
but produced copies.
As I mentioned, Plato claims (especially in the ^o^ i-P haedo  
dialogues) that e very  individual thing (i.e. every yiyv6\xevov) has a 
cause (cf. Ti. 28 a 4-5, and Phlb. 26 e 3-4). And — since he tends (a t  
least) to think that a yiyv6\xevov — from a simple couch (R. 597 a) to 
the universe itself (Ti. 28 c ff.) — is actually a n-oioupevov (cf. also 
Phlb. 27 a 1-2: Kal pf|v t o  ye 'rroioijpevov aù Kal to  yiyv6\i.evov oùSev irXpv 
ovopaTi, Ka0auep to  vuvSq, Sia^Épov eiJpfjaopev) — he often refers to  
7101 q o iC  or to its 'performer' as 'that which is responsible for' (i.e., in a 
broad sense, 'the a i T i a  of) to  Yiyvopevov in general. (For reference to  
TToiqoiC qua a iT ia  see for instance Smp.  197 a 1-3: TrdvTa tcc C<5a 
y iyvera i  Te Kal (j>ijeTai through the oocjjq woiqorC of Eros — m y  
p a rap h rase ; Smp. 205 b 8-9: q yap to i  ÈK Tou pq ovtoC e ic  to  ov Io v t l  
ÔTCiJoùv a iT ia  rrdoa èoTi TroiqcriC (15); Sph. 219 b 4-6: ttccv direp dv pq 
TTpoTepov TiC dv uoTepov e ic  oùoiav dyq, tov  pev dyovTa iroieTv, to  Se 
dydpevov iroie'io'Oai ttou ^apev; Phlb. 26 e 6-8: oÙKouv q tou ttoioùvtoC 
cj)TjaiC 0Tj8ev TTXqv ovopaTi TqC aiTiaC 8ia(|)épei, to  8e ttoioiiv Kal to  aiTiov 
6 p0wC dv eiq Xeydpevov ev; Ti. 29 a; cf. also Hi. Ma. 296 e 8-9: t o  ttoioijv 
8e y' eoTiv oùk dXXo t i  q t I  aiTiov, and 297 a 4: to  aiTiov iroioiiv ecjidvq.)
Now, since rroiqcriC seems to be such an im portant notion in  
Plato's metaphysics, what are its 'determ inations'? And what are th e  
'elements' which 'constitute' the 'act' of TToiqoiC?
For Plato TroiqoiC is 'something manifold' (ttoXtj — cf. Smp. 205 b 
8), and he refers to this notion in many places (e.g. Chrm. 163 a ff.; 
Smp.  197 a, 205 a; R. 597 a ff.; Sph. 219 b, 265 b; Phlb. 26 e ff, 28 d, 
etc.). Now, does this have any metaphysical  relevance? Or it is only a 
banal and 'handy' way of putting things? (Usually the topic of iroiqoiC 
in Plato has been avoided or simply treated as having no 
philosophical implications at all. One of the first philosophers w ho 
pointed out the crucial role that TroiqoiC plays in Plato's ph ilo so p h y  
was Heidegger, and in the last years more and more co m m en ta to rs  
wrote extensively about this topic and recognized the 'p ro d u c tio n is t 
vein' of Platonic metaphysics, cf. for instance Kato 1986 and Thomsen 
1990 (16)). As far as I am concerned, I think that the topic of TroiqoiC 
is not only one of the major philosophical topics of Platonism (for 
TToiqoiC is connected with many of its key issues, such as causation ', 
'participation' or 'truth'); it is, I think, its widest 'framework', w hich  
included even the theory of e iS q .  And the Timaeus  is the proof.
Of all the Platonic texts, however, the Timaeus is, I think, th e  
best place to look for the answers to these questions (17). In th e  
Timaeus the universe is explicitly described as being the 'product' of
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a divine SqpioupyoC (cf. 28 a ff., 29 d-e, 31 b, etc.) (18). Roughly 
speaking, production is the making of something from som eth ing ,
and so it can take place only if some sort of m aterials are given (19).
In the Timaeus that out of which the universe is made is a sort of a 
'prim ordial given matter' (cf. 52 d); and this 'prim ordial g iven  
matter' is 'turned' into a 'product' by the divine Sqpioupyoc, who has 
a 'model' (cf. to voqTov C^ov — 30 c) for everything he does. (As to 
what the aim of the maker may be, he, again, does not say any th ing . 
He says, though, that the Demiurge, being 'good [ayaedc] and w ith o u t 
jealousy [oùSevôC cj^eovoC]', 29 a 3 and e 1-2, wanted to frame th e  
universe as similar as possible with its model — cf. inter alia 38 b -c
and 39 e; so, we may infer, the aim of his framing the universe w as
simply his willingness to create 'something d y a ed v '.)
If so, one may be tempted, I suppose, to claim that according to 
Plato for TTccvTa T d  y i y v o p e v a  there are 'responsible' three a i T i a i :  a 
material, an efficient and a formal a i T i a  (if we may use this jargon of 
Aristotle's comm entators), since (i) he refers (in the Timaeus)  to th e  
a i T i a  of a y i y v d p e v o v  in terms of T r o i q o i C ,  and since (ii) for him in th e  
'act' of T T o i q o iC  involves a maker, a matter and a model. This is a
rather tempting interpretation (or so I find), but it is bound to
rem ain insufficiently supported, for there is little textual ev id en ce  
which might be invoked in its favour (Ti. 28 a and Phlb. 26 e suggest 
that only a 'maker' may be rightly called an a i T i a ,  and Phd. 99 a 
states that it would be too absurd to apply such a name to 'm a tte r '
for instance, cf. also 98 c ff. (20)).
To sum up; Plato, like Aristotle, refers to the aiT ia of a
yiyv6\ievov  in terms of T r o i q o i C ,  and for him there are three 'e le m en ts '
that 'take part' in the 'act' of - r ro i q o i C  (the maker, the m atter and th e  
model); but he, unlike Aristotle, does not take these three 'e le m en ts ' 
which 'constitute' the 'act' of n o i q o i C  as three different kinds o f  cause. 
N evertheless, Plato does use in his explanation of a y i y v o p e v o v  qua
T T o i o ù p e v o v  all these three 'elements' of the 'act' of n o i q o i C  (21); a n d
the best argument in favour of this claim is the Timaeus.
Now, the next question is how should we take his p ro d u c tio n is t
metaphysical explanation? That is: should we take the 'p ro d u c tio n is t' 
framework of Plato's metaphysics literally oï f igura t ive ly?  To answer 
this question is, I think, rather difficult, for each option has its
problems. For Aristotle, "to say that the e i S q  are T i a p a S e i y p a T a ,  a n d  
that other things 'participate' [peT eyeiv] in them, is to use [...] poe tica l 
m etaphors [p € T a c j ) o p a C  X é y e i v  TroiqTiKccC]" (Metaph. 1079 b 25 ff.; m y  
paraphrase; cf. also 991 a 19-22) (see also Prm. 132 c, where the e i S q  
are said to like models, o j a i r e p  u a p a S e i y p a T a ) .  I agree that this v iew  
has appealing advantages (for it allows us to get rid of m an y
difficulties, raised by a literal reading). In my view, we cannot claim
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that Plato regarded his 'productionist' fram ework as a mere 'poetical 
m e tap h o r'.
For him there are two kinds of T T o i q a iC ,  the © e T o v  and th e  
d v e p c ü T T i v o v  kind (cf. Sph. 265 b); and it would be in his spirit to ta k e  
the à v 0 pcüTTivûv production as, so to speak, a 'projection of the 0 e i o v  
production (cf. Lg. 902 e; "we are never, then, to fancy God [ 0 e 6 c ]  th e  
inferior of human workmen" — my italics; and Smp. 197 a: "in e v e ry  
T e y v q ,  the [human] S q p i o n p y d c  who achieves the brightest fame is th e  
one whose 8 i 5 a a K a X d c  is the god, G e o C ,  [i.e. Eros], while those that lack  
his influence grow old in the shadow of oblivion"; cf. also Lg. 907 a 
and R. 597 c-d: when a carpenter makes a couch having in his m in d  
the 'model', e î 8 o C ,  of couch, which was 'made' by God, he is ac tu a lly  
copying what the God did.) So: to take Plato's 'p ro d u c tio n is t 
framework' from the Timaeus metaphorically means actually to ta k e  
the Demiurge's TtoCqcnC as a m etaphorical projection' of the h u m a n  
TTOLqcTLC, and this contradicts Plato's view that it is the h u m a n  
craftsman,  when he produces artefacta, that copies the divinity, in  
whose existence he strongly believed. (Plato calls his cosmology from  
the the Timaeus  a 'likely myth', see 29 d 1; and, I agree, it does 
contain various metaphors and 'mythical episodes'; but they all r e fe r  
to particular details  of this cosmology, not to its 'p ro d u c tio n is t' 
framework.) This is, however, another problem, which I cannot open  
h e re .
What is important, for my line of argument, is that th is  
productionist theory is Plato's wides t  theory (which includes  th e  
theory of e i S q ) ;  and that it, in spite of being only a likely, elKoiç, 
'account' (cf. Ti. 29 b 5-c 2, etc.) is, nevertheless, iKavoy. (This iKavov 
theory, however, raises many difficulties. But, because Plato did n o t 
want to renounce to it, he often avoided  to take into account some of 
its 'elements' — such as the matter, the producer, or the p ro d u c e r 's  
aim .)
"Plato had set this problem to those who were engaged in th e se  
[sc. astronomical] studies: what uniform and orderly motions must b e  
hypothesized [ÙTroTeOeiaûv] to save the phenomenal motions of th e  
wandering stars." This is a quotation from Sosigenes, preserved in  
Simplicius' De caelo (II, 12, 488.21-24, Heiberg; the above tra n s la tio n  
is from Vlastos 1975, 60). In its spirit, Sosigenes' rem ark tells us 
something true about Plato's way of thinking, for he, Plato, did n o t 
attempt to 'coin' a reality that will support his hypotheses; he, on th e  
contrary, attempted to find the hypotheses that can explain best (and 
so 'save') the way things around us — the stars, the ttoXiC, the so p h ist 
— are (22).
Now, the p€0oSoC described in the Phaedo  at 100 a-101 e is a 
p e 0 o 8 o C  that is aimed precisely at finding, using and checking
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{jTToeéaeiC that can explain (and so 'save') the way things around us 
are. The theory of ei8q is, in my view, such a w oeeaiC , for it w as 
aimed at solving (primarily) the i r a v u  e a u p a o T o v  puzzle b ro u g h t 
forward by the given way in which T o  Xo y i c t t i k o v  p a v 0 d v € i .  This 
theory, however, brings forward other puzzle — that of the tw o  
ontological realms. In the Timaeus, Plato attem pted to solve th e  
puzzle of these two realms by including it into another theory. B ut 
that theory too, in spite of being icavov, produces a difficult puzzle — 
that of the creation itself. Now, how sure are all these theories?
"We must not let it enter our minds that nothing in our theories 
[ol Xoyoi] is healthy. On the contrary we should recognize that w e 
ourselves are still ill, but that we must brace ourselves and do o u r 
best to become healthy." This is what Plato says in the Phaedo  (90 e), 
and this is his position throughout the dialogues.
How certain is the theory of eiSq? "This", says Socrates, "is th e  
safest answer for me or for anyone else to give, and I believe th a t  
while I hold fast to this I cannot fall; it is safe for me or for an y o n e  
else to answer that it is by beauty that beautiful things are beautiful" 
(Phd. 100 d-e; cf. also 92 a, d-e, 105 b; cf. also Prm. 134 e-135 c). 
But, at the end of the dialogue, Plato expresses his doubts: "As a 
matter of fact, said Simmias, I have no doubts m yself either now, in  
view of what you have just been saying. All the same, the subject is 
so vast, and I have such a poor opinion of our weak human n a tu re , 
that I can't help still feeling a distrust [ à m o - T i a ] "  (107 b). And th is  
'distrust', it seems, regards not only the details  of the theory (w hich  
no one should insist too much on — cf. 100 d), but also the th e o r y  
itself.
Plato's 'philosophical odyssey', however, does not end with th e  
TTctvu 0 a i ) p a a T d v  puzzle brought forward by the given way in which t o  
XoyiaTiKov pav0dvei, with the pe0o8oC toward its solving, and with a 
very likely solution — the theory of e i 8q ;  it continues, and its n e x t 
stages are explicitly stated in the Republic and the Sophist .
7 2
CHAFFER FOUR
The theory of € l8 t| (II): 
T O  a y a G o v  
as the avuTToeoToC apxq of 
the theory of e i 8 in
What I shall claim in what follows relies on three passag es 
from the Republic: 507 a-509 c (of which there is a very sh o rt 
summary at 534 a 2-5), 509 d-511 e and 514 a-517 a. T hese  
passages were so much discussed, that eventually they received their 
own name: the Sun, the Divided Line and the Cave.
About this 'crux' of Sun, Divided Line and Cave everyone, as 
Skemp 1976, 36 put it, has its own exegesis (and, we must add, many 
have published it). Those who want to 'join the club' used to beg in  
their study by a review of the main interpretations (or of some of 
them); but since this requires so much space, and since there a re  
already so many reviews of these interpretations, one feels v e ry  
tempted to proceed directly to one's own thesis.
"Évidemment je n'oserai pas proposer ici une in te rp ré ta tio n  
définitive de ce texte célèbre de Platon. Je ne veux pas non p lu s 
passer en revue les interprétations, assez nom breuses et assez  
poussées, qu'ont déjà données les philosophes analitique." This is how 
Jonathan Barnes (1991, 81) begins his article about the passage of 
Sun (written in French and entitled "Le soleil de Platon vu avec de  
lunettes analytiques"). I shall adopt, for my interpretation of the Sun, 
Divided Line and Cave, the same position: I shall not review the m ain  
in terpretations of these passages; and I shall not claim that m y
interpretation is definitive. Moreover, I shall focus only on what I 
believe is philosophically essential in these texts.
In the Divided Line Plato puts in very precise terms th e
distinction between the two ontological realms which is b ro u g h t 
forward by the theory of €i8q:
(a ) on  th e  o n e  h a n d , th e  v is ib l e  r e a lm  (TO o p a T O V  — 5 0 9  d 4; c f .  
also: Tcc ôpüjjjL eva  —  5 0 7  b 9 , 5 0 8  a 6 , 5 0 9  b 2; and  r a  o p a r a  — 5 0 7  d  
8 ) (o r  th e  r e a lm  o f  y e v e a i P  — 5 3 4  a  3 ), w h ic h  is  th e  r e a lm  o f  t h e  
o p in a b le  ( t o  8 o ^ a a T o v  — 5 1 0  a  9 , 5 3 4  a 6 ) and  w h ic h  is d i v i d e d  
in t o :
( i)  th a t w h ic h  can  b e  th e  m o d e l o f  a c o p y  ( t o  O) Cü|JLOi(jü0q — 5 1 0  a  
1 0 ), i .e . an im a ls (T Ù  ( l y a  —  5 1 0  a  6 ), p lan ts ( t o  ^ ^ T eu T O V  —  5 1 0  a  6 ) ,  
m a n -m a d e  th in g s  ( t o  O K euaoT O V  — 5 1 0  a  6); and  w h ic h  i s  
a p p reh en d ed  b y  t t ic t t iC (5 1 1  e  1, 5 3 4  a 1); and
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(ii) that which is a copy of a model (TO ôpoiüjG év — 510 a 10), i.e . 
images (eiKOveC — 509 e 1), like shadows (CTKiai — 510 a 1) o r 
reflections (cj>avTda[J.aTa — 510 a 2) (be they in water or on so m e  
other surfaces); and which is apprehended by e lK a a ia  (511 e 2,
534 a 1);
(b) on the other hand, the in te llig ib le  realm (TO l/'oqTOV — 507 b 
9-10, 509 d 4, 511 a 3; cf. also Td i^ o o d p ev a — 508 c 1 and Td v o q T a  
—  508 e 1) (or the realm of où a t  a  —  534 a 3), which is the realm o f  
the knowable (TO yvtüŒTOV —  510 a 9).
(Plato, as many other Greek philosophers, believed that sight is th e  
most im portant sense, and he tended to reduce the question of 
aiaOqaiC  to that of dijjiC — cf. for instance Tht. 151 e ff. and Ti. 47 a-b; 
so, he often phrases the contrast between 'knowing with the soul 
through  the bodily senses' and 'knowing with the soul through i t s e l f  
in terms of seeing  and speaking.)
That which is at the core of the Divided Line is not actually th is  
ontological distinction. In the Republic  Plato is not concerned  w ith  
tes t ing  the theory of e i8 q  (as he was, for instance, in the Phaedo);  
here the theory is regarded with much more confidence, and P lato  
begins to be concerned with what is actually the very basis of it. B ut 
when it comes to describing the procedure  he wants to propose fo r 
this, he, as in the Phaedo, begin to express himself in general  te rm s, 
as if at stake was not his theory of e i 8 q ,  but a general methodological  
point.
Regarding the {jTToeecriC of an ensuing argument, there are, 
claims Plato two attitudes.
(a) We may leave it unexplained;  and in this case we would b e  
led by S id v o ia  (511 a 1, c 7, d 2, 5, 533 d 6, e 8 — which refers here, I 
presume, to our common  way of thinking) and we would be like th e  
geometers (510 c 2-3, 511 b 1-2, 533 b 7), who proceed from th e ir  
hypotheses (è^ ÙTroeécreüJv — 510 b 5) not up to an apyq but down to a 
conclusion (510 b 6, c-d, 511 a 3-6, c 8-d 2), leaving them, th e  
hypotheses, unexplained (533 c 1-2). (As I argue in Annex II, 2.2., 
the Greek geometers suggested that we should accept, 
conventionally, that the 'foundation', the UTToQeaiC of an en su in g  
argum ent is sure and then continue our investigations as if it were so 
— cf. inter alia Men. 86 e. Thus, for them, a woGqaiC is what w e 
usually call a postulate, i.e. a proposition conventionally accepted as 
true for the sake of our investigations. And this is what Plato w a n ts  
to tell us here: that the hypotheses from which the geometers s ta r t  
are accepted, cf. ôpoXoyia — 533 c 5, as àpyaC, c 3, of their reaso n in g s 
without any questioning, and that they cannot turn their know ledge  
into ETTLCTTqpq, c 5, precisely because they leave their h y p o th ese s
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unexplained; cf. also Cratylus 436 c-e, which I quoted at the and of 
2 .2 .2 . ( 1).)
(b) Or, we may let ourselves led by voqoic (511 d 8, or vaoç, 
508 c 1, d 6 — which refer here, I presume, to a superior  way of 
thinking) and advance upward from our hypothesis (è^ ÙTroeeaecüC —
5) to an avuTToeeroC apyq (510 b 7, 511 b 3-c 2, 533 c 8) (in short: w e 
may try to explain what lies at the very bottom of our ùiToeeaiC); an d  
then, after reaching this aviiTToeeroC dpyfj, proceed from it d o w n w ard  
the conclusion (511 b). (And only in this way, claims Plato, we w ill 
reach ÉwiaTqpq, 533 e 8, i.e. actual  knowledge.)
It has been argued that these two attitudes toward h y p o th eses  
announce the later Platonic method of a u v a y m y q  and S i a i p e a L C ;  or that 
they correspond somehow to the geometrical procedure of analy sis  
and synthesis (2) (for countless details on this issue see R obinson 
1953, 162-77). As far as I am concerned, I think that Plato, a lthough  
he speaks about a general methodological point, has in mind his  
theory of e i 8q ;  and so all this can be actually understood only b y  
placing it within the context of this theory.
4.1. The d y v T r o e c T o C  d p x P  e s  t o  d y a d o y
The way we construe what Plato says in the Divided L ine 
depends, obviously, on the way we interpret the notion of avuTroeeroC 
a p y f j .  What is then this a v u T r o e e r o C  d p y q ?
Plato does not explicitly say too much about the avuTroGeToC 
d p y q .  But he suggests (i) that T o  d y u G o y  is the a v u T r o G e T o C  a p y f j ,  and (ii) 
that the sun is an analogy for it. (i) First, Plato says in the Sun that T o  
dyaGoy has a unique place in our knowledge (just as the sun has in  
sight), and then, in the Divided Line, he says the same thing ab o u t 
the avuT ToG eT oC  d p y f j  (3). Then, (ii) in the Cave, he says that what th e  
released prisoner sees the last of all is the sun, and in the D ivided 
Line he said that the a v u i r o G e T o C  d p y f j  is reached at the end of an  
upward path (which implies that, since the sun  is an analogy for b o th  
T a y a G o v  and the a v u i r o G e T o C  a p y q ,  these two are one and the sam e 
thing). On the whole, however, this indirect evidence — for claim ing 
that TO a y a G o v  is the a v i n r o G e T o C  dpxq and that the sun is an analogy  
for both — 'seems sufficient' (as Robinson 1953, 160 says).
Now, what is T o  d y a G o v ?
It is generally accepted, as there are several testim onies (4), 
that Plato did hold a lecture 'on the idea of good' which became v e ry  
soon proverbial for its obscurity (something which could have h a rd ly  
escaped the attention of the Ancient comic writers (5)). We do n o t 
know exactly what Plato said about the good in his lecture. We know
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from Aristoxenus (Elementa harmonica II 30-31) that the P latonic 
notion of d y a e o v ,  as Plato himself described it in his famous pub lic  
lecture on it, does not refer to a moral value, ( d y a e d v ,  although it may 
refer to a moral value, cf. Mx. 237 a 6, or Hp. Mi. 376 b 1, "does n o t 
coincide in meaning with the English 'good', and in particular [...] i t  
had not necessarily any moral force", as Guthrie 1975, 503 put it; cf. 
also Nettleship 1951, 218-19: " t o  a y a e o v  does not in the first invo lve  
any moral qualities.") But we cannot make too much out of all this.
So, what does Plato say in the Republic  about the good?
In the Republic  Plato says several things about it; he says fo r 
instance that q roii ayaeoti l8ea is what makes 'just things and all th e  
rest xpfjoipa and üjcj)é\i[ia — useful and beneficial' (505 a); and th a t  
the philosopher-kings of Kallipolis, in order to really u n d e rs ta n d  
justice, should understand the ultimate object of knowledge —  q  t o i j  
àyaeou iSéa (504 d, 505 a 2). But we cannot make too much out of 
this either.
Now, Plato himself admits that the good is something q o y i C  
o p d c i e a i  (cf. 517 c l )  and at 506 e he makes Socrates introduce an  
analogy:
Nay, my beloved, let us dismiss for the time being r i  TTor’ è a r i  
r d y a O d v ,  for to attain to my present surmise of that seems a p it c h  
above the im pulse that wings my flight today. But of what is t h e  
offspring [ e K y o v o C ]  of a y a G o v  and most nearly made in its  
likeness [6 p o i d r a r o C ]  I am willing to speak [...],
4.2. TO dyaOou as that which is 
eTTEKeiua rrjc ovaiaC
The 'seen things' ( t c l  opwpeya — 507 b 1, 508 a 6 , 509 b 2), 
claims Plato, correspond to 'the known things' ( rd  v o o u p e y a — 508 c 1 ; 
or TOC ytyi^cjocjKopeva —  508 e 1, 509 b 6 ); the eye (oppoc —  507 d 11, 5 0 8  
b 1) to the soul (4^XP —  508 d 4) (although he does not say explic i tly  
so); the sight (d ^ tC —  507 d 8 , 11, e 1; or f] t o u  dpai/ SuvapiC — 507 c l )  
to know ledge (eiricTTfipri — 508 e 3509 a 6; or yvtucriC — 508 e 4); th e  
light (^wC —  507 e 4) to truth (dXqOeia —  508 d 5, e 1, 4); and the s u n  
(fjXioC — 508 a 7, 11, d 1, 509 b 2) to the 'idea of the good' ( q  t o i j  
dyaGou iSea —  508 e 2-3).
The context in which the analogy between the sun and t o  
dyaGov occurs is then a broader analogy between what we may call 
the TOTToC opaToC and the to ttoC  v o t i t o C . Now, within each to t t oC, Plato  
confers the same vital position to sun and dyaG ov, respectively:
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(a )
(i) the sun is the cause o f light, and light makes possible s ig h t
and makes things visible (508 a); and
(ii) it provides to the seen objects (TCt ôpcüpeva) not only l ig h t ,  
but yéveaiç,  and rpocj f^j too, without being itself yeveaiC 
(509 b).
( b ) ^
(i) TO ayaQov is the cause of d X q S e ia  (508 e), and d X p e e ia  is th a t
which makes possible knowledge (508 d); and
(ii) it provides ( ir p o o e iv a i )  the o ù a ia  of all  e i8 r |, being a b o v e  
(iJTr€pexovToC) and beyond  (e ireK eiv a ) o i io ia  in 'd ig n ity '  
(TTpeCTpeiQC) and 'power' (8 u i^ d p e i) (509 b 8) (and so it is called p 
TOU iravToC  dpyq  — 511 b 7, and TrdvTCüv auTp opGmu Te kœi kœXcüv 
ctÎTia — 517 c 2).
Things, as anyone can see, are getting very complicated. The k e y ­
word, however, from which we should begin the analysis of all th is, 
is, in my view, ouaia.
An English physicist said once that all physicists want to sp e ak  
about that which baffles them, i.e. about God, but they wait u n til 
they win the Nobel prize. In philosophy, things are different: th e
Nobel prize is not awarded, and the philosophers may speak from the 
very beginning about that which 'will always baffle them' (as 
Aristotle says in Metaph. 1028 b 1-5), i.e. about being.
4.2.1. Plato's notion o f  being: ova ia  qua 'whatness'
What is being for Plato?
Here is a question which we must not leave unexam ined o r 
undetermined, nor must we affirm too confidently that there c a n  
be no decision; neither must we interpolate in our present lo n g  
discourse a digression equally long, but if it is possible to set a
great principle in a few words, that is just what we want.
This is what Timaeus says to his auditors, when they reached th e
topic of ei8ri (Ti. 51 c-d); regarding the topic of 'being in Plato' I shall
follow his advice.
As I claimed, Plato hypothesizes a theory which claims that th e  
'object of knowledge' are the e i8 r|, and that these eiSq are like  
TTapa8eiy|j.aTa, the sensible things being but their copies, eiSojXa. A nd 
in the Sophist he puts the distinction between Trapd8eiy[jLa and  
ei8œXov in these terms: an ei8cnXov is only a pretender, a p ip o c  (cf. 240 
a 9 , b 2 ) of a pf] 6v, i.e. of something which it itself is not (cf. a 9): of 
its ef8oC qua Trapd8eiypa (240 c 1-2). That is: an eiScnXov is an 6v (cf. b 
9 ,1 1 , 1 2 ), something which exists; but it exists only insofar i t
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'em b o d ies ' a m od el; and, so , from  the tw o  o f  them , m o d e l and c o p y ,  
the o n ly  6v  d X r|0 ivd v  (a 9, b 2, 3, 5 ), the on ly  'real thing' (ovtujC 6 v — b 
3), is  the model,  the copy  b e in g  o n ly  an 6v ttcüC (b 9 ), a p re te n d er , a 
pipoC  o f  it.
T o  con clu d e; for P lato  'being' has grades; that is: so m e  ovra are  
m ore than o th ers (cf. p d x x o v  o v r a — R. 515  d 3). A n d  th o se  that a r e  
more are th o se  that are ov tojC,  i.e . the eiSri qua  T ra paS e iypa T a .  ovtcuC 
m ea n s then  dXr|8wC (cf. Sph. 2 4 0  b 10; cf. a lso  R. 5 1 5  d: paXXov ovra  
are d X T j e e a r e p a  d v r a ) :  that is , to be as a model, real ( d X r i e i v o u )  not as a 
copy, w h ich  is  o n ly  a f a k e  o f  the real model.
W e k n ow  then w hat is  for  P lato  'to be more' and to be less'. B u t  
w h a t d o es he a c tu a lly  u n d er sta n d  by 'to be'? In m y  v ie w , t h e  
c le a r e s t  a n sw er  to th is q u e s t io n  is  co n ta in e d  in  a p h ra se  that o c c u r s  
in  a very  trou b lesom e p a ssa g e  —  the Timaeus 27 d ff.
T h is p h rase  is  the very  o p e n in g  phrase o f  the c o s m o lo g ic a l  
d isc o u r se  and it  reads:
e u T i v  oSv Sf] KaT’èpqv So^au TTpœTov S ia ip eT eov  rdSe- t (  t o  ov 
del, y e v e a iv  Se oijk eyov, kœi t i  t o  y iy v o p e v o v  pev d ei, 6v Se 
odSeiTOTe; to  \xev Sp vo fjaei psTd Xoyou TrepiXpTTTOv, d e l kœtœ 
TaÛTd 6v, TO 8 ' a S  8d^q peT 'aiaGfjaecuC dXoyou 8o^aaT ov,
y iy v o p e v o v  Kal diroXXijpevov, ovtüjC 8è oij8é'iTOTe 6v (27  d 7 -28  
a 4 ) (6 ).
H ow  sh o u ld  w e  take this d is t in c tio n  b e tw e e n  t i  t o  o v  dei, yevea iv  8e  
OÙK e y o v  and t i  to  y iy v o p e v o v  pev d ei, ov 8e oij8eTTOTe? U su a lly , it h a s  
b e e n  in terp reted  as referrin g  to what follows in  the d ia lo g u e .
T h e Timaeus  c o n ta in s  a 'p r o d u c tio n is t  th eory ' in  w h ic h  t h e  
u n iv e r se  is  e x p lic it ly  d e sc r ib e d  as a 'product' m ad e from  a 
'p r im ord ia l g iv e n  m atter' (c f . 5 2  d) by a d iv in e  dppioupyoC  (cf. 28  a 
ff., 2 9  d -e , 31 b, e tc .)  w h o  has a 'm odel', the vopTov (w ^v (3 0  c), in
fron t o f  h is e y e s  (3 0  c, 38  b -c , 39  e). N o w , what follows  after t h e
a b o v e  q u oted  d is t in c tio n  (2 7  d 7 -2 8  a 4 ) is a p a ssa g e  in  w h ich  P la to  
sp ea k s , abruptly,  ab ou t tw o  'e lem en ts ' o f  h is 'p r o d u c tio n is t  th e o r y ':  
the D e m iu rg e  (8qp ioupydC ), as the a iT ia  o f  the u n iv e r se  qua
y i y v d p e v o v ,  and the D em iu rge's ch o o sin g  as the m o d e l (T rapd8eiypa) o f  
the u n iv e r se  'that w h ic h  is a lw a y s  the sam e' ( to kœtœ TaÛTd eyov d e i) ,  
n ot 'som eth in g  generated' ( y e v v p T o v ) .
So, i f  the a b o v e  q u oted  d is t in c tio n  (27  d 7 -2 8  a 4 ) b e lo n g s  to
what follows,  th en  it sh o u ld  be tak en  as re ferr in g  to the d i s t in c t io n
(m a d e  a fe w  lin e s  later) b e tw e e n  the tw o  p o s s ib le  models: t h e
T iapddeiypa that is  KaTd TUiiTd eyov dei and the yevvp T ov  Trapd8eiypa. 
But this does not make any sense: for h ow  co u ld  the D e m iu rg e  t a k e
as m odel  for the u n iv e r se  he is about to f r a m e  t i  t o  y iy v o p e v o v  pev
del ,  ov  8e ou8enoT e? H ow  cou ld  he m ake a y i y v o p e v o v  (i.e . the u n i v e r s e )
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by looking at a yiyvopevov dei that is not an dv? Plato does not say i t  
is impossible, he only says that if that was the case, the u n iv e rse  
would have been où KaXdv (28 b 3). Now, w hat  is that yiyvopevov pev 
del, ov 8e où8eTTOTe qua yevvpTov Trapd8eiypa? The prim ordial g iven  
matter, one may argue, for that is a yiyvopevov dei which is not an dv, 
for it is in a state of d ra^ ia  (30 a 5), 'shaken' by chaotic Sùvapeiç (52  
d-e, 53 a), not at rest (ou% po-uyiav), and moving in an irregular a n d  
disorderly way (dXXd Kivoupevov uXpppeXwC Kai drdKTcoC) (30 a). But, if  
this was so, then what Plato says here is that the Demiurge could  
have framed the universe by taking as model its very materia l .
This difficulty cannot be solved by claiming that the cosmogony 
of the Timaeus was not meant to be taken in its letter. This d ifficu lty , 
I hold, can be solved only  if we assume (i) a hiatus  between th e  
distinction made at 27 d 7-28 a 4 and what follows,  and (ii) a 
dist inction  between ' t i  t o  y i y v o p e v o v  p e v  dei, o v  8 e  oû8eTTOTe' ,  'th e  
universe qua y i y v o p e v o v '  and 'the y e v v p T o v  ■ T a p d 8 e i y p a ’.
Plato introduces the distinction from 27 d 7-28 a 4 by saying: 
e o T i v  o S v  8 p  K a T ’ e p p v  8 o ^ a v  n p a j T o y  S i a i p e T e o v  T d 8 e  (my italics). W h at 
this TrptüTov indicates, I think, is precisely that the distinction to b e  
made is to be distinguished from what follows; but he does not m a rk  
what follows by a 8 e u T e p o v .  Now, if this distinction from 27 d 7-28 a 
4 is to be distinguished from what follows, how should we c o n stru e  
it?
Let us look at the only hint we have: that t i  t o  ov  del, yevecriv 8e 
OTJK eyov ovTüüC, is vopaei peTd Xoyou TrepiXpTTTov, being del KŒTct TaÙTd ov; 
and that t i  t o  yiyvopevov pev del, ov 8e o08eTroTe is 8o^p peT’aiaepoecoC 
dXoyou 8o^aaTov, being a yiyvopevov Kal diroXXijpevov, and so not an  
o v t ü j C dv. If this phrase does not refer to what follows, i.e. to the issu e  
of model-copy, o v t u jC dv cannot m ean to be as a model, real 
(dXpGivdv), not as a copy, which is only a f a k e  of the real model; in  
short: if this phrase does not refer to what follows  we can n o t 
construe o v t q j C here as dXpOcuC (as Plato does in Sph. 240 b 10). W hat 
then does o v t o j C mean here? The answer depends, in my view, u p o n  
'vopCTei peTo. xdyou TrepiXpTTTov' and 'del KaTd TauTd dv'.
In the Sophist, at 248 a, Plato puts things in almost the sam e 
terms: man is, he claims there, through aicrepcriC, in Koivcuvia w ith  
yeveaiC; and, through XoyiapoC, in Koivwvia with dvTcoC odofa; and h e  
defines the dvTwC odo ia  as being del KaTd TouTd (daauTcuC, and yeveaiC  
as being dXXoTe dXXwC. Now, this way of putting things (from Sph. 248 
a and Ti. 27 d 7-28 a 4) raises two questions: (i) what is the object of 
knowledge, and (ii) what is the meaning of being.
(i) As I argued in 1.1., Plato claims explicitly  that we can know  
only that which is del KaTd TauTd maauTmC (cf. Cra. 440 a-b, R. 585 c f., 
Sph. 249 b, Phlb. 58 a, 61 e, etc.); that is: the object of su re
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know ledge can only be that which de l  pe v e i  K ard  r a d r d ,  that w hich  
always remains the same'.
(ii) He also claims explicitly that 'to be’ means either 'to be d e l  
K a r d  T a i i T d  a jaauTCDC'  or 'to be d x x o r e  dxXœC'; and that only 'to be d e l  
K a r d  Tadrd wcrauTwC' is actually (oyrojC) 'to be'. This claim, h o w ev er, 
states, implicitly,  the meaning of to be ovtidC. For 'that which can be  
the same' is a what;  in other words: only a determination,  a w h a t  can  
'always remain the same'. If so, then for Plato being is understood as 
whatness, quidditas, Washeit (this claim, that for Plato being m ean s 
prim arily whatness has been endorsed by many com m entators — 
from Heidegger (7) to Owen (8 ) and Kahn (9)); and for him, th a t  
w hatness  which remains the same is more  than that w h a tness  w hich  
changes.
Thus, what the distinction from Ti. 27 d 7-28 a 4 says is this: as
long as something is only T i  T o  yiyvopevov  d e i ,  i.e. as long as it is in an
u n d e te r m in e d  state (in other words: as long as it canno t be s o m e ­
thing, or have a particular what), it cannot be actually known, a n d  
that is why it is an o v t ü j C 8e oû8eTroTe ov, a no-thing;  whereas as long
as something is t i  t o  o v  del ,  y e v e o i v  8e ouk  eyov ,  i.e. as long as it is
always in a determined state (in other words: as long as it is a lw ays 
the same some-thing), it can be actually known, and that is why it is 
an dvTtJüC ov (10). (A f ter  this distinction Plato introduces, abruptly ,  
two other issues: the Demiurge as the a i T i a  of the universe as 
y i y v o p e v o v  and the two  possib le  models  of the universe which h e  
might have chosen — 28 a ff. This distinction, I believe, b e tw e e n  
model and copy, is not a reference to the distinction made earlier; i t  
may be, as Cornford 1937, 27 suggested, a reference to an o ld e r 
problem, stated in the Republic 597 c-d, where he says that the good 
craftsman is the one who takes as model for what he wants to m ak e  
the e î 8 o C  of that something, which is always the same, not an a lre a d y  
made copy of it; a good carpenter, for instance, Plato claims there, is 
that which, when making a couch, has as model the very e l8 o C  of 
couch, not a couch made by other carpenter. This reading, h o w ev er, 
would imply that Plato claims here, at Ti. 28 a ff., a rather s tra n g e  
thing, namely that the Demiurge could have taken as a model for th e  
universe he is about to frame either a model that is always the sam e 
or an already existing copy of it; I do not know how to cope with th is  
implication; but, having no alternative, I am inclined to ad o p t 
Cornford's reading.)
To sum up so far: for Plato 'being' has two main levels, and one 
of them has two grades.
(a) The criterion which separates the two levels is w h a t n e s s .
(i)  'That which is as a d e t e r m i n e d  thing' ('that which has a w h a t')
b e l o n g s  to  t h e  r e a l m  o f  a c t u a l  b e i n g  ( o v t c u C  o v );  w h e r e a s
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(ii) 'that which does not have a what' cannot in any way b e 
known by man, and so, although it exists, it is as though it  
belongs to the realm of non-being. Such a thing seems to be t h e  
primordial matter, from which the Demiurge framed th e  
universe; for it was a matter in which predom inated à r a ^ ia  (30 a 
5), since it was 'shaken' by chaotic SuvapeiC (52 d-e, 53 a), not at 
rest (ou% fiC Tuyiav) and moved in an irregular and disorderly w a y  
(àXXà Kivoupevov TrXpppeXcuC Kai ardKTCjaC) (30 a). Being so, in a 
ceaseless a T a ^ ia , the primordial matter exists,  but not as  
s o m e t h in g ,  as a determined  TL, as a what;  it exists, but, being n o t  
some-thing,  it exists as n o - t h i n g ,  as an dvTOiC oij8eTroTe o v  
( 11 ).
(b) The criteria which introduce g r a d e s  within the realm o f  
whatness  are two: causality  and t ime.
(i) That which, in the realm of w h a tn e s s ,  causes the w h a t  o f  
s o m e th in g  is m o r e  than that whose w h a t  is caused. That w h i c h  
causes the what  of something is what stands as its model  (e.g. t h e  vopTOV (gov, or the ei8p in general), and that whose w h a t  is  
caused is but a copy  of a model (e.g. the universe qua copy or th e  
sensible things g w a € r 8 w X a  in general).
( i i )  That whose w h a t  does a l w a y s  remains the same (e.g. th e  voprov (wov, or the e:i8p in general) is m o r e  than that w h o s e  
w h a t  remains the same only a l i m i t e d  period of time (e.g. th e  
sensible things qua  eiSooXa in general, and the universe q u a  
copy). (The universe is said to have an endless duration, 41 a-b;  
but, we may claim on Plato's behalf, since it is only a copy of a 
model, 92 c, some p a r t s  of its w h a t  are not always  the same.)
(Plato does not say anything about what the grounds of his belief in  
these ontological views and distinctions may be. If one asked h im  
about such grounds, I imagine him replying with a line fro m  
W ittgenstein's On Certainty: "I can't give you any grounds, but if you 
learn more you too will think the same".)
Let us now go back, however, to the Republic  and the passag e  
of the Line.
TO dyaeov, as I said, is determ ined at 509 b as being b e y o n d  
(eireKeiva) oucria in 'dignity' (TrpeapeiQt) and 'pow er' (8'uvdpei). Now, if  
oùaia is understood by Plato as whatness, then what does he m ea n  
by the phrase: T o  ayaGov is beyond (erreKeiva) oùofa in 'd ig n ity '
(TTpeo'peiqt) and 'pow er'(8uvdpei)?
This could only mean that Plato believed that w ha tn ess  is n o t 
the ultimate determination of  being; there is something else, w hich  
has more rrpeapeia and 8uvapiC. To say that 'x is beyond y in TTpeajSeia' 
implies that x has a 'superior rank' than y due to x ’s being older  th a n  
y, i.e. that x has a 'seniority of birth', TTpeajSuyeveia, over y. If so, th e n  
to say that there is something which has a seniority of birth o v e r 
whatness, and more power  than it, suggests that w hatness  has an  
origin, an dpxp (cf. 511 b 7 and 517 c 2 where T o  ayaGov is called p
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TOU TTavTÔC àp xp  and TrdvTwv auTp ôpOüJV Te kœI KaXwv a ÎT ia , resp ec tiv e ly ; 
cf. also 509 b 8 , where it is said that T o  dyaG ov provides, TTpoaeXvai, 
ouCTia of all eiSp).
Now, this m etaphysical view according to which being  in  
general has an 'origin' which is 'beyond' being  itself is to be found in  
the doctrines of some other philosophers (such as Heidegger, fo r 
instance, who, to put it very roughly, claims that being  is g ro u n d ed  
on time). What is then, for Plato, this origin of being qua whatness ,  
which is the dvuiroGeToC dpxp  of the theory of e i8 p  —  namely T o  
d y a G o v ?  In my view there is no clear answer to this question in  
Plato's Republic.  Plato, it seems, was certain that being qua  w h a tn e ss  
has an d p xp ; but w h a t  exactly this dpxp is — he was not (at the tim e  
he wrote the Republic)  very sure (and he explicitly admits that T o  
d y a G o v  is something p o y iC  o p d a G a i)  (12). So, all that we can say ab o u t 
it is this.
(i) For Plato the e i8 p  form a KoapoC k u tu  X dyov, i.e. a s t r u c t u r e d  
to t a l i t y  (c f. 500 c: "the things of the eternal and u n c h a n g in g  
order neither wrong nor are wronged by one another, for t h e y  
all abide in KOcrpoC KaTd X dyov"). (In the Sophist,  as I shall a r g u e  
in Chapter Five, being qua whatness  is determ ined by t h e  
K O i y i p y i  a  of e i 8 p ;  so, we may say, the Republ ic  contains in nuce a 
view that w ill be thoroughly unfolded only later, in the S o p h i s t . )
(ii) TO d y a G o v  (as 509 b implies) is that which determ ines all t h e  
e i 8 p ,  i.e. the totali ty  of e i8 p ;
( i i i )  TO dyaG ov ( a s  509 b  s t a t e s  e x p l i c i t l y )  is t h e n  t h a t  w h i c h  
d e t e r m i n e s  t h e  c o m m u n i t y  o f  e f 8 p .
4.2.2. The two peOoSoi and their aims: 'determining the dyvrrodeToC 
dpxp o f  the theory of  eiSp' and 'determining ri ttot’ eariy  CKaaroy 
eîSoC
In the Republic  Plato claims that dialectic has two aims: one is 
to apprehend T o  dyaGov, which is 'the limit of the intelligible' (532 a
7“ b 1 ); and the other is to find out 'what each thing is', t i  TTOTe ar i v
€KaaTov (532 a 7, 533 b 1).
The meaning of all this can be properly understood only if w e
place it in the context of what had been achieved before  th e
Republic.  The best account of what had been achieved before th e  
Republic  is to be found in the Phaedo. What Plato claimed in th e  
Phaedo  is, as I argued, this: in order to solve the Trdvu G aupaoT ov  
puzzle brought forward by the given way in which T o  XoyicrTiKov 
p a v G d v e i, we have to follow a certain peQo8oC; and, following th is  
p e G o S o C , Plato hypothesized the theory of forms.
Now, after  this, in the Republic,  Plato claims that, if we accep t 
the theory of € i 8 ti , then we have to do two things: one is to a tte m p t
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to determ ine what each elSoC is; and the other is to attem pt to  
determine T o  ayaGov, which is 'the limit of the intelligible'. In order to  
reach these two aims, we have to follow particular peGoSoi (cf. 532 e 
1: TiveC 0 8 0 1 ; cf. also 531 d 1 and 533 b 3, respectively). So:
(i) if  TO ayaGov is the dpyfj of whatness;
(ii) then, the peGo8oC that aims at apprehending T o  ayaGov a im s  
actually at apprehending the dpXP of w h a tn e s s .  But:
(iii) the peGo8oC that aims at apprehending T o  ayaGov is said i n 
the Line to be 'one that 'advances upward from a hypothesis (e^  
LnroGeCTetnC) to the dvuw oG cToC  dpxfj' (cf. 510 b 7, 511 b 3-c 2, 533 c 
8) (because, as I claimed, the dvuTToGeToC dpxG is T o  ayaGov)
(13);
(iv) the theory of e i S p ,  however, is a UTToGeatC (cf. Phd. 100 a) in  
which b e i n g  is understood as w h a t n e s s ;  so, I construe
(vi) the peGo8oC that aims at apprehending T o  ayaGov as a 
peGo8oC aimed at reaching the dvuTToGeToC apXB of th e  
hypothetical theory of ei8ri, i.e. the dpxf| of what lies at t h e  
bottom of this theory, nam ely at the bottom of u n d e r s ta n d in g  
being as whatness (cf. 533 b-c: those who do not follow  th is  
upward path do not have a clear vision about  T o  oV ,  which may be 
taken, I think, as about what is the d p x p  o f  being).
Plato does not say too much about this peGo8oC; he only says
that it is a 8ia\eKTiKfi peGoSoC (533 c 7), and that it must do tw o 
things: it must rely only on ei8r|, making no use of any of th e ir  
images, eiKoveC (510 b 8 ), as the geometers do (510 b 4, d 6-7, e 3 f., 
511 a 6 ); and that it must 'destroy [avaipouca] the hypotheses, up to  
the dpxp, in order to become firm [iva pepaKjüCTpTai]' (533 c 7-d 1). 
(And then, after reaching the avuiroGeToC àpxfj, he says, we have to  
proceed from it toward our initial hypothesis — 511 b).
There have been suggested several interpretations of th is
peGo8oC (see Robinson's account on this matter, p. 162 ff.); but, since
Plato tells us so little about it, "all interpretations of this path a re  
doubtful", as Robinson 1953, 162 put it. As far as I am concerned, I 
am reluctant to support any of these interpretations, and I think th a t  
we simply have to admit that there are no reliable hints about 'how  
the trick is done' (to use an expression from Robinson, p. 160) 
according to this peGoSoC. (In the Republic Plato does say too m uch  
about the other peGo8oC either, i.e. the one that aims at finding 'w h a t 
each thing is'; he claims, however, that the "dialectician is he who can 
view things together [ œ u v o i t t i k o C — viz. in their connection]" — 537 c, 
which seems to imply that knowing what each thing is has to do w ith  
knowing the Koivwvia of things (14).)
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"For certainly, my friend," says the Stranger in the Sophist, "the
attem pt to separate everything from everything else is not only n o t
in good taste but also shows that a man is utterly uncultivated a n d  
unphilosophical" (259 e, translation from Fowler 1928). This 
statement, together with many others, suggests that that which is
actually at stake in Plato's metaphysics is not the question of 
separation (as it has sometimes been argued), but that of
communion, Koiycnyia (15). This is what I shall attem pt to prove in  
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The theory of eiSr) (III): 
oua ia  as SuvapiC KoivmviaC
In the Phaedo  Plato claims that the eiSq must be aauveera, for, 
he argues, 'it is very likely [pdtXiara eiKoC] that what is del Kara Tadrd 
üjaauTüjC [i.e. the ei8r|] is dauv0eTov' (78 c 6-8). Plato, it seems, fo u n d  
this argument very likely; and, we may assume, he would have l ik ed  
it to be true. But, he became more and more aware of the en o rm o u s 
difficulties raised by the idea of dauveera el8q. So, malgré lui (in a 
w ay), he had to accept that the €i8t| are, on the contrary, auveera, i.e. 
in a Koivüjvia. (To cover my back against a possible objection, I
mention that this is just a way of speaking; that is: I do not claim that
the Koivoüvia Twv €i8œv implies that the ei8ri are 'auveera ', in the  
Phaedo's sense.)
This idea, however, occurs in many dialogues. In the Republic,
for instance, Plato speaks about the KoapoC T q j v  ei8wv (500 c; cf. also
476 a). In the Timaeus  he goes further and attempts to d e te rm in e  
more precisely this idea; here, he claims th a t the Demiurge fra m e d  
the universe after a model (irapadEiypa — 28 a 7, 37 c 8, 39 e 7, etc.) 
that contains in itself all 'intelligible creatures' (ret ydp rd  vopTd (g a  
Trdvja €KeXvo kv eaurcy trepiXapov ex^i — 30 c 7-8); in other words, all 
these intelligible creatures are — both individually and in their tr ib e s  
(Kae* ev Kal Kard yevp) — the parts (p o p ia — c 6) of the model. But th is  
means that 'the world of intelligible and living beings' (the so -called  
'world of forms') exists only as a totality (i.e. as a TravreXeC C^ov, an  
all-com plete creature, as Plato says at 31 b 1); or, to put it in a 
different way, this means that each 'intelligible creature' (or el8oC) 
does not exist separated from the other 'intelligible creatures' (o r 
£i8t]), but with them (cf. also Vollrath 1969, 260). In short: th e  
'forms’, it is suggested in the Timaeus,  exist only in their totality. Yet 
this with does not mean that each el8oC is connected with all th e  
others. Each el8oC is connected only with some of the other ei8r|, w ith  
which it forms a yevoc, a 'tribe' (cf. Kard yevp — 30 c 6). So, if we may 
use this modern expression, the totality of 'intelligible creatures' is a 
structured totality (and so it is, as far as possible, its copy, th e  
sensible universe — cf. 31 a-b) (1).
This idea, however, that the ei8r] are in a KoivcuvCa was fu lly  
developed in the Sophist .
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5.1. The Koiycovia rwy eiSojy
A t the very core of the Sophist lies the issue of how the ontical 
'realm  of ei8ri' is reflected  by language (2). And here in the Sophis t  
Plato claims explicitly: if  we put things in these terms —  i.e. if  
speaking  is about ei8rj and if some words unite with one another, a n d  
some not, cf. 261 d 5-7 (as we can see in any thesaurus of E nglish  
language) — then we have no choice: we have to adm it that the ei8rj  
are a u v e e r a ;  and, if we accept that there is only one  'com bination ' o f 
words that 'depicts reality ' (which is what the ph ilosopher is a f te r , 
not the sophist —  a point that is strongly assum ed by the Sophist, cf. 
for instance 253 d; see also 6.2.2.), then we have to adm it that th e  
e iS r i form a particular  K o iv w v ia .  That is:
(i) if  there were no K oivtuvia  of £ i 8t] (or at least a partial o n e ) ,  
then no kind of discourse would exist (259 e-260 a; of. also 252 a 
ff.) (that is: "the complete separation o f each thing from all is t h e  
utterly final obliteration of all discourse [TrdvreC X o y o i], for o u r  
speaking [XoyoC] is possible because of the c o m m u n io n  
[aupTrXoK-n] between the €i8r)" —  259 e);
(ii) on the other hand, if  all the ei8r) would be in KOiVüüVia w i t h  
all £ i 8 t], then many absurd situations would follow  (e.g. 'the re s t  
would be in movement) (252 d-e).
This way of putting things echoes  the first step of the p e0 o 8 o C  
described in the Phaedo: if  'we cannot make our journey with g r e a te r  
confidence and security by the surer means of a divine x d y o C  and w e  
cannot 'ascertain the facts, whether by p a G e i v  or by e u p e i v ' ;  and if w e  
decide not to 'leave off before we have come to the end of o u r  
resources' (cf. 85 c), then we do not have any other choice apart f ro m  
f in d in g  the m ost plausible theory, i.e. the theory that fits better th a n  
any other theory into our puzzle, and hypothesizing it. That is: th e  
theory that fits best into the puzzle raised by the link b e tw e e n  
speaking and ei8rj is that the eiSr] are in a particu lar K oivcuvia. P la to  
does not, however, apply here in the Sophist the p e0o8oC  described  in  
the Phaedo,  nor does he m ention anything about what p e0 o 8 o C  sh o u ld  
we follow for reaching an answ er to the question about the 'way th e  
e i 8 q are'.
Now, if the sensible things are copies of eiSri, and if the eiSq a re  
structured in a particu lar Koivœvia, then the sensible realm  is, as a 
whole, a copy of the Koivcuvia tüjv e i 8 ü)v. So, Plato says actually  tw o  
things in the Sophist:  that our world is not chaos, but rd^iC; and th a t  
this m undane rct^iC is an approxim ate copy of a p e r fec t  t&Iiç — th e  
KoivcDvid, or the k6 ct|jloC tüüv e i 8 cüv (and in Ti. 30 a 4-5 he does p u t
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things in these terms: the universe is brought by the Demiurge eic 
rd^ iv  rfjc  dra^iaC ; cf. also R, 500 c, where he says that the ei8q form a 
KoapoC Kard Xoyov). But, one may claim, this idea of an ontological  
harmony  is not actually Platonic, it is an idea that occurred in all 
major Greek thinkers that lived before Plato.
The idea of an ontological harm ony  is, I agree, to be found (in  
one form or another) in many (if not all) Preplatonic thinkers. B ut 
what occurs for the first time with Plato is an extraordinary effort to 
determ ine this idea; that is, an extraordinary effort aimed at going 
beyond the ambiguous notions of dppovia, Koivujvia, KoopoC k t \ .  (u sed  
so much by his predecessors) and finding out w h a t  this ontological  
harmony consists of (3).
The results  of this effort are, in my view, to be handled w ith  
great care; for, I believe, they are only the approximation  of an  
aspect of reality that is extremely difficult to grasp. These re su lts , 
however, come in two parts: a part centred upon the five p ey ia ra  
yévr],and a part centred upon the notion of 8uvapiC KoivcDviaC.
5.2. The pey iara  yéyr\
"Since some ei8r| blend with one another, and some not", P lato
claims, "they might be said to be like [axe8ov oXov] the letters of th e
alphabet [rd  ypdppara], for some of these dvappoarei TTou upoC dxxpXa, 
rd  8e auvappoTTei" (252 e 9-253 a 2).
The Trapd8€iypa of letters occurs several times in Plato (cf. Tht.
201 ff., Pit. I l l  a-278 e, Phlh. 18 a ff., Ti. 48 c 1), and it b rin g s
forward several problems. Here, in this passage from the Sophist, it is 
aimed, I hold, at pointing out a single thing: that some cLSri are l ike  
the vowels, without which the other, like the consonants,  'cannot b e 
fitted together' (253 a).
Plato claims that some ygv^ (a word which here, I think, is u se d  
as a synonym for ei8r|) combine with one another (rd  pev Twv yevwv 
KoivtuveXv êoéXeiv dXXf|XoiC — 254 b 7) and some will not (rd  8e pfj — 
254 b 8; cf. also 253 b: "some yevq aupcjxDvouCTiv, some do not"); an d  
from those that combine, some combine to a small extent (rd  pev eir' 
oXiyov — b 8) and some to a great extent (rd  S ’ eirl noXXd — b 9), 
whereas some combine with all (since there is nothing against th e ir  
being combined with everything — rd  8e 8id Trdvrœv odSèv KcoXueiv Toïc 
Trd a i KeKoiv(JüVT|Kévai , b 9-10). Now, which are those yevp that are like  
the vowels and that Koivuovoiiaiv 8id TrdvTœv?
The answer to this question, one may say, is very clear: th o se  
yevq are called by Plato rd  p e y ia ra  yevq, and they are five: ov, raijTov,
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edrepov , KivqaiC and aTdcriC (254 d-255 d). But in my view things a re  
more complicated.
There are three arguments about the eiSq of to  ov, TauTov, 
edTepov, KivT\aiç and oTdoiC, and their conclusions are:
(a) TO o v ,  TauTov and ed T ep o v  are the ei8r] that are in K oivtu v ia  
with all e i 8r) ;
(b) KiVTicriC and CTTdcriC —  although they are in com m union w i t h  
both TO dv, TœÛTov and SdTEpov —cannot be 'combined' w i t h  
each other;
(c) KlVTtcriC is som ehow in com m union with both dv , TcruTOV, 
0d T £p ov  and c T d a iC .
I cannot enter here all the details of these three arguments. I shall 
say, however, a few things about what I believe is at the core of each 
of them.
5.2.7. rd ov, ravrév and Qarepov as the eiSr] that are in Koiywvia with all 
eiSrj
Plato claims that to  dv, TaÙTov and 0dT€pov 8id wdvTwv 
KeKoivcjjVT|K€ vai (cf., inter alia, 255 e, 256 a and 259 a), for
(i) TO dv is not the same thing as TaiiTov (255 c 3: dSuvaTOV d p a  
TaiiTov Kal TO dv ev  e îv a i ) ,  although to  dv is always in K oivcovia  
with TauTov (cf. 256 a 7-8: irdvTa [dvT a] partake, p e j e y e i v ,  o f  
Tall TO V); and
(ii) TO dv is not the same thing as 0aT€pov (255 d 3-4: to dv Kal to 
0dT£pov [...] TrdpTToXu 8i€c|)epeTev), although to dv is always i n 
KOivcnvia with GdTSpov (cf. 259 a 5-6: to t€ dv Kal 0aTepov 8ia 
irdvTüJV Kal 8 i ’aXXfjXujv 8ieXT|Xu06Ta.. he,  how ever, puts t h i s  
claim also in terms of 'partaking of the idea  TTjC 0aTepou' —  255 e; 
cf. also 254 b-257 a);
Now, what does this mean? The problem of 'identity' (or of th e  
principle of identity, principium identitas)  has been d iscu ssed  
throughout the history of philosophy, but every philosopher who h as 
approached it (e.g. Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Locke, Hume, Frege, 
W ittgenstein (4)), has tended to discuss it in his own  terms; yet th e  
idea is, roughly speaking, the same: everything that exists, e v e ry  
being, insofar as it is, it is 'identical with itself (that is: nothing could 
actually be without its 'being identical with itself). But the notion of 
identity is linked with that of difference: a thing can be iden tica l 
with itself only because it is different from all the other things.
In his terms, Plato claims the same thing: that e v e ry th in g  
which exists, as a t i  which is a ev (cf. Sph. 237 d), is something that is
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Tau TGV, 'the same as itself (cf. 254 d 15: aÙTo 8’ êauTw TaÛTov; cf. also 
256 b 1: Tau TOU TTpoC êauTfjv), i.e. something that is 'identical w ith  
itse lf; and that something can be 'identical with itse lf only because it 
is different  from all the other things (cf. Tht. 185 a 11-2: "each [thing, 
e.g. sound or colour] is different [cTcpov] from the other and the sam e 
[TauTov] as itself").
But here in the Sophist Plato expresses this idea at th re e  
different levels.
(a) The level of the eiSrj of T o  o v ,  T a u T o v  and e d c T e p o v .
First, Plato says that the very eiSrj  of t o  dv ,  TauTov and 0aT€pov 
cannot be separated;  that is: each one of these ei8Ti is only insofar i t  
is in KOLVüJvia with the other two; in other words: each one of th e se  
three ultimate ei8rj, like the most humble sensible thing, is on ly  
because it has an identity, which, in its turn, is possible only b ecau se  
it involves a difference.
(b) The level of eiSp in general.
Every €l8oC that is, Plato seems to imply, is only because it is in  
K o i v o j v i a  with the eTSoC of T o  d v ;  and so, it must be also in K o i v c u v i a  
with the £ i 8 Ti of T a u T o v  and e d T e p o v .  That is: the e i 8 r i  of T o  d v ,  T a u T o v  
and e d T E p o v  are 'universal', i.e. they are in K o i v t u v i a  with all € i 8 q .  
They are then, as Plato said, like the vowels, without which the o th e r  
€i8Tj, like the consonants, cannot be fitted together (cf. 253 a) (5).
(c) The level of all the dvTO in general.
For Plato the realm of existence is divided into two 'sub rea lm s': 
that of e(8v\ qua  rrapaSeiypaTa (the one that is an ovtüüC dv) and th e  
realm of sensible things qua ei8cjo\a (the one that is only an dv t tujC) .  
That is: the sensible things are copies  of e i8r | ,  and if all the ei8ri are in  
Koivmvia with the eiSri of t o  dv, T a u T o v  and 0aTepov, then all sen sib le  
things participate in these three Ei8q.
5.2.2. oîiaia as SvvapiC KoiymyiaC. Whatness as caused by Qdrepoy
Now, this way of putting things (i.e. 'to say that the very eiSp of 
TO dv, TauTov and 0ctTepov cannot be separated') implies two things.
(i) One is that being in general means whatness;  for that w hich  
the Koivüüviai with TauTov and OaTepov brings forth is precisely an  
identi ty ,  a what; so, to say that the very et8oC  of t o  dv cannot b e  
separated from these two €iSt| is to say that being in general is 
a lw ays whatness.
(ii) And the other is that whatness in general is determ ined as 
being due to Koivmvia; for whatness  'results' from the Koivtnvia of t o  dv 
with TauTov and 0aTepov.
8 9
In less abstract words: the what  of every efSoC (and so of e v e ry  
sensible thing) is due to the 'net of Koivcuviai' in which it is 'caught'. 
This claim is explicitly  formulated by Plato in the P arm enides  134 a: 
"[the eiSr)] are what they are with reference to one another an d  
toward one another [auTct œùtcüv Kal irpoC aura €KeXa ré €ctti], and so 
likewise are the things in our world [Kal ra  rrap’ qplv œaauTCüC irpoC 
all to:]" (translation from Cornford). I hold (as Fine 1990, 98) that th is  
view was contained in the Republic, and (as Heidegger 1992 b) th a t  
Plato attempted to develop it in in the Sophist .
In his lecture on Plato's Sophist (1992 b, 474-80) H eidegger 
claims that in the Sophist  oùcria is determ ined as SuvapiC KoivojviaC, 
and he produces the following argument:
(i) TO o v  is first determined as TO KEKTT|pevov G lv a p tv  o l t ’ eiC  
TO TTOieXv €IT ’ e l c  TO Tra0€iv (247 d 8-e 1; of. also 248 c 4-5: r\ tou 
TTctaxeiv f\ 8 p a v  8u vap iC ).
(ii) K oivtüvia , however, is determined in the same way as to  dv, 
namely as a 8 u v a p iC  of either Trd0ripa or TTOiripa (248 b); w h ic h  
is to say that 'each thing, in so far as it is, it is itself a n d  
something else' (1992 b, 475-6, Heidegger's italics).
(iii) TO dv is therefore actually determined as a 8uvapiC 
KOI VO) VI aC, that is, as the 'capacity of com m union’ ( M i t e i n a n d e r -  
sein-Konnen,  or Moglichkel t  des M i te inander se ins  — 1992 b, 485  
f.; cf. also 1969, 9).
8uvapiC, in these passages, was mostly translated by 'power' (e.g. 
Cornford 1951, ad locum). According to Souihle 1919, 149 th e
Platonic 8uvapiC  is a property of a thing, and this property m an ife s ts  
itself in an active and/or passive relationship with something e lse  
(this view of a 'passive power' of things has been claimed by som e 
other philosophers, e.g. Locke, who was, however, severely critic ized  
for it by many XVIIIth century thinkers). On the other hand, one 
may claim that the expression To KeKTTipevov 8uvapiv eiT’eiC To TToieiv 
€it ’ e ic  TO Tra0eiv (247 d 8-e 1) seems — since the concept of SuvapiC 
implies the idea of 'acting and being acted upon' — a bit of a 
pleonasm, and so one could be tempted to take SuvapiC, in th is  
context, as 'possibility'; yet such a reading raises se v e ra l 
com plications.
As far as I am concerned, I am inclined to avoid both 'p o w er ' 
and 'possibility' in favour of 'capacity', which in my view fits b e t te r  
in the above context. And so, I read Plato’s determination of to  ov as 
TO KEKTqiJLEVov Suvafiiv eiT ’ eic to  ttoieiv e i t  eiC to  Tra0€Xv (247 d 8-e 1) 
as implying that 'to be' (to  ov) means to have the capacity  of 'acting  
or being acted upon'; and I endorse Heidegger's way of con stru in g  
this argument and conclusion (namely that here in the Sophist  P lato  
determines to  ov as 8uva|j.iC KoivcuviaC).
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If so, however, what does this mean — that T o  o v  is d e te rm in e d  
as SuvapiC KoivojviaC? It means, in my view, that, in order fo r 
something to be, it has to be capable of communion, of in te rac tio n  
with something else. But because 'to be' is always 'to be a suc h -a n d -  
such thing', it means that the such-and-suchness,  or whatness, is 
actually determined as being due to a 'capacity of communion'.
In other words: each eTSoC (and so each sensible thing) is 
'caught' in a particular net o f  KOLvaiyiai; and this net o f  Koiucoyiai is 
what determines its what  (6). Now, every Koivtuvia in which an eTSoC 
is 'caught; has a 'direction', a rrpàc t i ; and this irpdc  can be either TTpoC 
eauTov (cf. 256 b 1 — in which case we say that that eTSoC is in  
Koivojvia with ravjov) ,  or TrpoC ETEpov (cf. 255 d 1 — in which case w e
say that that eTSoC is in Koivwvia with edtTEpov). (At 255 d 1 P lato
clearly determ ines the notion of edcTEpov as 'that which is a lw ays 
relative to other', t o  ETEpov a£i irpbc ETEpov; cf. also d 5-6; that is: th e  
'state of being ETEpov', i.e. 'other than' or 'different from', is the 's ta te  
of being in a relation to other', upoC ETEpov.) The identity of an eTSoC, 
however, is due to the Koiyujyia with other eiSp; in other w ords:
whatness is due to otherness. How then does Plato determ ine th is
notion of otherness?
5.2.3. € rep ay as pi) dy
In the Sophis t  the notion of otherness  is first determ ined as pf) 
ov; this comes in two parts.
In the first one (which begins at 231 and ends at 238), P lato  
starts from the ij/EuSpC opoiœaïC between two ovra  (e.g. that between a 
philosopher, a statesm an and a sophist, cf. 216 c-217 a, or th a t
between a wolf and a dog — cf. 231 a). This dEu8 f]C opoimaiC b e tw e e n
two dvTa is then determined as a Koivœvia between an dv and a pi) dv; 
and then the pi) dv is determ ined as another dv, i.e. as a ©ccTEpov dv 
(238 a 5), which in its turn is determined as e î k ü j v  (236 a 8-9) (Thus, 
Plato starts from the question of the 'false' copy, e.g. a dog as a fa lse  
copy of an wolf, and ends up with that of the 'true' copy, i.e. with th e  
question of e i 8 t] qua T r a p a S e i Y p a T a  and their sensible copies). T he 
second part (which begins at 256) starts from the question of how an  
EÎ8 0 C is related to the other eiSx]. I cannot enter here into the d e ta ils  
of the first part; I shall say, however, a few things about the second  
one.
Each eT 8 o C has its own 'identity', and so it is different from all 
the other e i 8 t). All these other E i 8 q  appear first as what that eïSoC is
not, i.e. as as a pi) dv which is indefinite; this is what Plato says a t
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256 e 5-6: eKaarov [...] tûv  eîSüüv [...] diTeipov Se TrXfjeei t6  pi) dv (" th ere
is an indefinite number of ei8q that each efSoC is not") (7).
Each el8oC, however, is 'caught' in a particular net of Koivmviai 
with some  other ei8r| (and that is why it is said to be ttoXu— cf. 25 6 
e5: EKaCTTov [...] tüjv ei8c5v ttoXij pév êcjti to  dv) (cf. also R. 476 a: "in
itself each eT8oC is one, but by virtue of their Koivojvia with actions 
and bodies and with one another they present th em se lv e s  
everywhere, each as a m ultiplicity of aspects"). That is: each eI8oC is 
in Koivüüvict only with a part  of what it is not; and this Koivmvia with a 
p a r t  of what it is not is what determines its what  (8).
So, says Plato, t o  pi) dv, although it is what one may call th e
EvavTiov TOU dvToC, is not 'nothing', but ETEpov pdvov (cf. 257 b 3 -4 )
(9). And as ETEpov, t o  pi) dv is present in all ovra  ( t o  pi) dv [...] KaTct 
irdvTcx Ta dvTa 8iEcrTTappEvov — 260 b 7-8; in other words: i) eaTEpou 
c|)ucriC dyEi eIc ouCTiav t o  pi) dv — 256 e 2-3) (therefore we may righ tly , 
6p0üüC, say that everything, aupiravTa, is and is not — cf. 256 e 2 -3 )
( 10).
5.2.4. The two kinds o f  erepay: the oAAo ri and the d y r i r i d e p e y o y
As I said, for Plato each eT 8 o C is in Koivwvia with only a p a r t  o f 
what it is not, i.e. with only some  other e i 8 t].
Now, at 257 c 7-8 Plato says that i) 0aTEpou d'uoiC is cut u p  
(KaTaKEKEppaTiapEva) into little bits, like £TriaTf|pTi. That is: exactly as 
the TToXXai TEXvai and EwioTppai are the parts (pdpia) of the p ia  
ETTiaTfjpri (257 c 10-d 2), so, he claims, there are parts (pdpia) of th e  
pia cj)UCTiC TOU 0aT£pou (257 d 4-5). So, how should we take th is  
statement about the 'parts of the nature of otherness’? (11)
The way Plato puts things here is, I think, fairly confusing. B ut 
the idea itself is not. What he is actually saying, in my view, is this: 
each e Î 8 o C  is in Koivtuvia only with some other e i 8 t], and these o th e r  
ei8v\ are of different kinds (i.e. the pia c|)uaiC t o u  0aTEpou has pdpia). 
Which are then these kinds,  or, to put it like Plato, which are th e  
parts of the nature of otherness? Obviously, one may introduce h e re  
many distinctions. Plato, however, at least in the Sophist, seems to b e  
interested only in one, that between (a) the ETEpov as a mere dxxo t i  
and (b) the ETEpov as an dvTiTi0£p£vov.
(a) An e T 8 o C,  say x, is 'caught' in a K o i v w v i a  with some e i S tj th a t  
are just other than itself (and each one of these Ei8q is a mere 'o th e r ' 
than x; for instance: t o  K a X d v  is in a K o i v u j v i a  with t o  S i K a i o v  — cf. in te r  
alia Ale. 1, 115 a ff — and in this case the latter is, for the former, a 
mere d X X o  t i ) .
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(b) But, daim s Plato, an elSoC may be in a Koivtuvia with an  
eTSoC that is its own other. To support this claim Plato choses th e  
example of ’the beautiful' ( t o  k u X o v )  And he claims that [ t o ]  pf] KaXov 
[...] 0ÙK dXXou TLVÔÇ ETEpov EŒTiv i) TT\C TOU KaXou c{)UaEÜJC (257 d 11). T hat 
is: some EiSp have an avTiTi0EpEvov, 'something which is p u t  
opposite', and this kind of ETEpov, namely the dvTLTi0EpEvov, is, says 
Plato, a part ( p d p io v )  of 0dtTEpov (257 d 7) (12).
So, if each particular eTSoC is 'caught' in a particular 'net' of 
Koivüüviai, then the totality of ei8t| is, so to speak, a s t ru c tu re d  
totality. That is: the EiSq, in their totality, form a part icular  n e tw o rk  
of Koivcjüviai (13).
If so, however, w h a t  is an e î 8oC? If its w h a t  is determ ined b y  
the particular 'net' of K o iv œ v ia i  in which it is 'caught' with other  EiSp, 
it is a auvapcjjoTEpov, a 'compound'. But, if it is a auvapcjjoTEpov, does i t  
have parts? Or it is like a knot? And what  does the Koiycuyia b e tw e e n  
two eiSx] actually mean? A co-presence? An adjoining, as the analogy  
with letters suggests? But if an eT8oC is a auvapcfjoTEpov, it cannot b e  
like a letter, it can only be like a syllable.
These two questions — 'What is the Koivcüvia between tw o 
e i 8t|?' and 'What is an eÎ 8 oC if its what  is determined by the Koivœviai 
with other EiSq?' — remain, in my view, unanswered. P la to 's  
discussions of the notions of dxov, ev and p é p o C  (cf. for instance Prm.  
158 c, or Sph. 245 b), of letters and syllables (cf. Tht. 201 ff.. Pit. 2 7 7  
a-278 e, Phlh. 18 a ff., etc.), and of the Koivtuvia tüjv e i8üjv itself do 
not, I believe, offer any firm answer to the above m en tio n ed  
questions.
5.2.5. The eiSr] o f  KiyrjaiC and arda iC
Now, what is the role of the other two pEyicTa yevr\ — KivqaiC 
and cTTOcaïC? Plato's arguments about them have, as I said, two m ain  
conclusions.
(a) Kivr)criC and QTCcaiC —  although they are in com m union w ith  
both TO ov (254 d 10), t œ Û t o v  and 0 a T £ p o v  (255 b) — cannot b e  
’com bined’ with each other (they are, says Plato, àpEiKTüJ TTpbC 
àXXfjXüJ —  254 d 7-8; cf. also 250 a); and
(b) KLvnCTiC is som ehow in com m union with both ov , TaiiTOV, 
0ûCTEpov and aTctcriC; that is:
(i) K L vqaiC  is not TauTOV and also TOUTOV (256 a 10-11);
(ii) KiVT|CTiC is not CJTaaiC and also QTaCTiC (256 b 6-c 4);
(iii) KiVTjcriC is not GctTEpov and also GctTEpov (256 c 8-9); and
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(iv) KiVTiaiC is not ov  and also ov  (256 d 8-9).
(B ut, h o w  can  K ivqaiC  be e d r e p o v  w ith o u t b e c o m in g  its o p p o s ite , i .e . 
w ith o u t ch an g in g  its cjjuciC in to  its op p osite , v iz . a r d a i c  — cf. 2 5 5  a - b ?
A n d  h o w  can  KivrjaiC and a r d o ïC  be both rauTov w ith o u t b e in g
a c tu a lly  the sam e?  P lato  took  a great e ffo r t  to a n sw er  t h e s e
q u e s t io n s , and h is t ir e so m e  a rg u m en ta tio n  d o es n ot a lw a y s  s e e m  
f la w le s s . It is , h o w e v e r , n ot m y p u rp o se  here to d isc u ss  in  d e t a i l s  
th e s e  a r g u m e n ts .)
S o , h o w  sh ou ld  w e  take th e se  c la im s about K ivqoiC  a n d  a r d a iC ?
A s in  the ca se  o f  the other three p e y ia r a  y evq  ( t o  ov, rauTov a n d  
e d r e p o v ) , the d isc u ss io n  o f  K ivqoiC  a n d  o rd o iC  c o v e r s  m ore than o n e  
le v e l;  h ere — (a) the le v e l  o f  the e i S r j  o f  kCvtjoiC a n d  o rd o ïC ; and (b )  
that o f  €i8t] and their se n s ib le  c o p ie s  in  general.
(a) The e i S - q  o f  K ivq o iC  and o r d o iC  are in  K oivcuvia w ith  both  to  
dv (2 5 4  d 10), rauTov a n d  G drepov (2 5 5  b), i.e . th ey  exist  a s  
s o m e th in g  determinate.  B ut th ey  can n ot be 'com b in ed ' w ith  e a c h  
other: K iv q o iC  is other than o r d o i C  (255  e l l ;  2 5 6  c 6 ), and th ey  a r e  
dpeiKTw T-poC dXXqXw (2 5 4  d 7 ), and e v a v r ia  (2 5 0  a 8).
(b) Y et K ivqoiC , says P lato , is  so m e h o w  (irq), in  K oivw via  w i t h
o r d o iC  (2 5 6  b 7 ). T h is c la im , h ow ever , d oes not c o v e r  the le v e l  o f  t h e  
e i S r )  o f  K ivqaiC  and a r d a iC .
(i) On the on e hand , th is c la im  refers to 'w hat has b e e n  a r g u e d  
earlier' (irp o rep o v  dTrd8eiU v — 2 5 6  c 1), i.e . to the fa ct that w ith in  t h e  
p h e n o m e n o n  o f  k n o w le d g e  (y iy v w o K eiv ), so m e th in g  w h ich  is  K ivqrov  
(i.e . # x f j ,  (wq, vouC —  2 4 9  a 9; or, in  short: d^XL y iy v d o K e iv  —  248  a and 
d) is  in  a sui generis  K oivw via  w ith  so m e th in g  w h ich  is dK ivqrov ( i.e . 
the e i8 q  — - 249  c 1; or, in  short: o i ia ia  y iy v d a K e a Q a i —  248  a and d).
( ii)  O n the other hand, the p h en om en on  o f  k n o w le d g e  is  n ot t h e  
o n ly  in s ta n c e  in  w h ic h  KivqaiC m ay be sa id  to b e  so m e h o w  ( tt-q), in  
K oivüjvia w ith  a r d a iC .
(a )  A s I argued , for P lato  the realm  o f  e x is te n c e  in  g en era l i s  
d iv id e d  in to  tw o  'su brealm s': that o f  e iSq  qua irap aS eiyp aT a  (th e  o n e  
that is  an o v t c ü C  dv) and the rea lm  o f  s e n s ib le  th in gs qua ei8w X a ( t h e  
on e that is  on ly  an dv irm c). N o w , every  e f8 o C  that is, is o n ly  b eca u se  i t  
is  in  K oivw via w ith  the eT8oC o f  t o  dv; and so, it m u st b e  a lso  in  
K oivojvia w ith  the e i S r \  o f  TauTov an d  0dT epov. B ut, e v e ry  e î8oC  is d e l 
Koad TauTd dv (cf., inter alia, Ti. 4 8  e 6), i.e . its  what d o es a lw a y s  
rem ain  the sam e; and it d o es  a lw a y s  rem ain  the sam e, w e  m ay c la im ,  
b ecau se  it is in  K oivw v ia  w ith  the efS oC  o f  c T d a iC . (A nd, i f  for the w h a t  
o f  an e Î 8 o C  is resp on sib le  p rec ise ly  the 'net' o f  K o iv w v ia i in  w h ic h  t h a t  
eXdoC is  'caught', w e  m ay say  that that which remains the same  i s  
a c tu a lly  th is 'net' o f  K o iv w v ia i.)  T h e se n s ib le  th in g s, h o w e v e r , a r e  ;
copies o f  e iS q ;  so, i f  all the e iSq  are in  K oivw via w ith  the e i8 q  o f  t o  dv,
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T a Ù T o v  and e d r e p o v ,  then all sensible things participate to these th re e  
eiSx], But, if all e i S p  are in K o i v t u v i a  with the eX S o C  of a r d c r i C ,  do 
sensible things also participate to this e X S o C ?
( p )  We know that for Plato a sensible thing, a y i y v o p e v o v  d v ,  is 
something k i v t | T o v ; but this y i y v o p e v o v  d v  is, only because it
'embodies' an e X 8 o C ,  i.e. something d K i v p r o v .  And so, although P lato  
does not explicitly say this in the Sophist, one may argue that th e
KivpTov realm of the e i 8 t u \ a  is, somehow ( i r q ) ,  in Koivojvia with th e
d K i v T j T o v  realm of the e i 8 r i .  (Which does not imply that the e i 8 r i
become 'touched' by K i v q a i C ;  as Plato says in Cm. 439 e 3-5: "w hat 
is always the same [ t o  a i i T o ]  and in the same state [ œ a a u T o C ]  can 
never change [ p e r a p d X X o i ]  or be moved [ k i v o Xt o ] " .  But, in a way, th e  
realm of the copies, which is kinetic,  is 'touched' by a r d a i C ,  in so fa r 
the copies have a relative stability, i.e. a relative what, or id e n tity  
due to the unchangeable models they embody.)
To sum up: for Plato 'to be' means 'to be caught in a p a rtic u la r  
net of K o i v c ü v i a i ' ,  and this 'net' of K o i v o j v i a i  determ ines the 'what' of 
each d v ;  and an d v  is always in K o i v c u v i a  with r a O r o v  (i.e. with itself), 
with e d r e p o v  (i.e. with other d v r a ) ,  and with either a r d a i C  (in w h ich  
case it is an e l 8 o C )  or with K iv r j O iC  (in which case it is a y i y v o p e v o v  d v  
that is a 'copy' of an e f 8 o C ) .  Now, an d v  that is in K o i v w v i a  with a r d a i C  
(i.e. an e X 8 o C )  is (somehow) in 'communion' with (i) d v r a  that are in  
K o i v Q j v i a  with k i v t | 0 ‘i C  (in the way in which a model is in 'com m union ' 
with its copies); and with (ii) other d v r a  that are in K o i v t o v i a  w ith  
a r d a ï C  (i.e. with other e i 8 r | ) .  (But, if every d v  is alw ays 'caught' in a 
K o i v ü j v i a  with r a i i T o v  and  e d r e p o v  and with either  K i v q a i C  or a r d c r i C ,  
then it seems that only the K o i v c u v i a i  with d v ,  r a d r d v  and e d r e p o v  are, 
so to speak, 'universal', whereas the K o i v o j v i a i  with K i v r jO iC  a n d  
a r d a i C  are actually not. That is: only the e i 8 r |  of d v ,  r a d r o v  an d  
e d r e p o v  8 i d  T r d v r a j v  K o i v c u v o u a i v ,  being thus like the vowels.)
y e v o C  and e Î 8 o C / î 8 é a  seem to be synonymous ( e d r e p o v ,  fo r 
instance, is called both y e v o C  and î 8 é a  — cf. 256 b 8 and 255 e, 
respectively). Yet y e v o C  points out something that it is not present in  
e X 8 o C / i 8 e a ,  viz. the idea of 'descent', or 'origin'. In my view, it is th is  
idea of origin that Plato wants to stress out when he calls the five  
e i 8 r |  of d v ,  r a d r o v ,  e d r e p o v ,  K i v q a i C  and a r d a i C  péyiara yéyrj; and so, h e 
suggests that every d v  is in K o i v œ v i a i  with r a i i r o v ,  e d r e p o v  and KivTjOiC 
or a r d a i C ,  which are therefore its ultimate origins, its p e y i o - r a  y e v q .  
(The e i 8 q ,  it seems, are atemporal and their copies — temporal,  cf., 
inter alia, Sph. 248 a 12 ff.. Pit. 269 d, Phlb. 15 a-b, Ti. 27 c, 48 e ff. 
So, what is then the relation between K i v q a i C ,  a r d a i C  and t ime?  This, 
however, is a question I cannot tackle here.
95
To sum up so far:
(i) In order to solve the irdvu Ô aupaaT ov puzzle brought fo r w a r d  
by the given way in which t o  XoyLaTiKov p a v G d v e i, P la to  
introduced the theory of e i8 r |, which states that the 'object o f  
knowledge’, the € i 8 q ,  are like i r a p a S e iy p a T a ,  the sensib le t h in g s  
being but their copies, e iS m X a .
(ii) This theory, however, should be tested, and Plato speaks i n 
the P h a e d o  about two tests: one by seeing whether its
implications aupcjjcnvei dXXfjXoiC, and the other by attem pting to  
include it into a wider one. And he applied (to some extent) b o th  
these tests (e.g. in the final m y th  of the Phaedo 107 d-108 a; a n d  
in the Timaeus,  resp ectively ) (The theory of e iS p  q u a  
u a p a S e iy p a T a  brings forward another puzzle — that of the tw o
ontological realms. In the Timaeus, Plato attempted to solve t h e  
puzzle o f these two realms by including it into another th e o r y ;  
but that theory too, in spite of being iK avov , produces a n o th e r  
puzzle —  that o f the creation itself.)
(iii) In the R e p u b l i c  Plato claims that if we accept the theory o f  
e i8 r |,  then we have to do two things: one is to attempt to
determ ine what  each e ï S o C  is; and the other is to attempt to
determine the dvUTTd0EToC d p x p  of the theory itself.
(iv) In the theory of € i8 t | being is understood as whatness;  an d , 
as I claimed, in the R e p u b l i c  it is s u g g e s t e d  that w h a t n e s s  i n 
general is determ ined by the KOiycnyia  of e i 8 t | .  N o w ,  t h e
dvuTToQEToC apxfj o f the theory itself (called t o  a y a G o v ) is th a t  
which determ ines the com m unity of e iS p . This apXB, h o w e v e r ,  
remains som ething p o y iC  o p a a G a i (517 c 1). But, if we c a n n o t  
determ ine the avuTToGEToC a p x p  of the theory of e i8r], we c a n  
better determ ine the notion of being qua w h a t n e s s .  This is w h a t  
Plato undertakes in the S o p h i s t .
(v) In the Sophist  Plato claims explicitly: if  we put things in these 
terms —  i.e. if  s peak ing  is about €l8Tj and if some words unite w ith  
one another, and some not — then we have no choice: we have to  
admit that the e i8 r | are auvG eT a and that they form a p a r t i c u l a r  
Koivüüvia.
(vi) In the Sophist  being  is determined as whatness;  a n d  
whatness  in general is determ ined as being due to KOlvoJVia Ttuv 
€ i 8 u j v  (14). In other words: each eX8oC (and so each s e n s ib le  
thing) is ’caught' in a particular net of  K O i y c n v i  a i ;  and this net o f  
KOl PUj y i a i  is what determines its what  (15). If this is so, h o w e v e r ,  
i.e. if  w h a t n e s s  is due to KOlVWVia, that means that whatness  i n 
general is due to otherness,  for K O ivcuvia is KO i y c o v i a  with others.
(vii) In the S o p h i s t  the notion of o t h e r n e s s  is first determ ined as 
pi) bv; and Plato d istingu ishes between two kinds of ETEpov q u a  
pi) bv: the aXXo t i  and the avTiTiGÉpEVOV. But he did not g o  
further than this. One may determ ine this particular KOivcjjvia 
Twv e i 8 u j v ,  in the sense that he may identify which e i 8 t |  
’com bine’ with which. But 'What is the KOivrnvia betw een tw o  
e i 8 t | ? ’ and 'What  is an eT G g C  if its w h a t  is determ ined by th e  
K o iv c o v ia i  with other e iS t ] ? ’ are two questions that remain, in m y
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view, unanswered (and their 'object' remains som ething p o y iC  
O p a a G a i) (16).
It is time now — after I have considered the theory of eiSri 
(Chapters 1-3) and its ultimate grounds (Chapter 4-5) — to look a t  
the task of 'finding out Ti TToT ’ eaTiv eKaaTov eîSoC' (Chapter 7). B ut 
first (Chapter 6), I would like to take into account the topic of dxf)G eia 
— which is linked with both the theory of eiSri and with 'ti ttot eotiv 
EKaaTOV eTSoC'.
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C H APTER SIX  
The notion of dXiqeeia
6.1. The two fields of  knowledge: t o  aiae-qroy  
and TO àyaLaôTjToy
A s I argued  in  0 .1 .3 ., S ocra tes w as fa ced  w ith  the fa ct t h a t  
there are tw o  f ie ld s  o f  k n o w le d g e  — on e in  w h ic h  the 'ex p er im e n t' is  
p o s s ib le  and w h ere  c o r r e sp o n d e n c e  appears, a c c o r d in g ly , as the b e s t  
cr iter io n  o f  truth; and an oth er  o n e  in  w h ich  the 'ex p er im en t' is  n o t  
p o s s ib le  and w h ere  c o h e r en ce  appears as the o n ly  cr iter io n  o f  t r u th .  
T h e d is t in c tio n  b e tw e e n  th ese  tw o  f ie ld s  o f  k n o w le d g e , th ou gh  in  a 
m ore re fin ed  form , occu rs a lso  in  P lato .
P lato  c la im s that in  k n o w in g , the learn ing  part o f  our so u l d e a l s  
e ith er  w ith  e m b o d ie d  e iS p , th rou gh  the b o d ily  se n se s , or w ith  t h e  
€ i6p  th e m s e lv e s , th rou gh  sp e a k in g  (cf. inter alia Phd. 99  d ff. a n d  
Tht. 185 b -1 8 6  a). B ut, n o t all the eiSq  can  be d ea lt w ith  b y  b o t h  
th e se  w a y s , for  so m e o f  them  are em b od ied  in  se n su o u s  c o p ie s , w h i l e  
so m e  other are not. S p ea k in g , then , can be about both  the e m b o d ie d  
and the n o n -e m b o d ie d  e iSt). (T h is id ea  a lso  p o in te d  ou t in  t h e  
Timaeus 37  a-c, w h ere  the w o r ld -so u l is  sa id  to spea k  ab ou t t w o  
'fie ld s' — that o f  to aio-GriTov and that o f  to XoyiaTiK ov (1); and in  t h e  
Sophist  2 6 4  a 4 -6 , w h ere  P lato  c la im s that 'S id v o ia  m ay occu r  e i t h e r  
in d e p e n d e n t ly  [kuO ’ œtjtô] or S i ’ aiaeqaE w C , in  w h ic h  c a se  w e  c a n  
righ tly  ca ll it  c jjavT ao ia '.)
W h en  sp ea k in g  is  about the e m b o d ie d  E i S p ,  it  p ro d u c e s  im a g e s  
on  (as it w ere ) the 'in ternal screen ' o f  the sou l (cf. Phlb. 39  b ff.: 
"w hen w e  sp eak , there occu rs in  our so u ls  a S r i p i o u p y o C ,  a ( m y p d ^ o C ,  a 
p a in ter , w h o  start to p a in t [ ypdc j jE i ]  in  th em  im a g e s  [eIkoveC] o f  t h e  
X E y o p E v a ;  and then  o n e  se e s  so m e h o w  [ o p p  ttüjC] in  h im s e lf  [ev a u T w ]  
im a g e s  [eIkoveC] o f  w h at h e  p r e v io u s ly  op in ed  or a sse r te d  [tccC tcov 
So^acT0EVTüJv  K a i  X Ey G EV T wv  E i K o v a C ] " ,  m y p a ra p h ra se ) (2 ). (In  t h e  
Sophist, at 2 3 4  c ff., P lato  sa y s that on e m ay 'd ece iv e ' other p e o p le  
n o t o n ly  w ith  b p a r a  E i S u j X a ,  but a lso  w ith  a c o r r e sp o n d in g  art, w h ic h  
has to do w ith  w ord s, 2 3 4  c 2, and w h ich  can  d e c e iv e  by  ' s p o k e n  
im ages o f  all things', E iS c u X a  X E y o p E v a  iTEpi  w d v T w v ,  c 6; and at 2 3 5  a ff ., 
the TEyvT] aocjj iQTiKTj is  c a lle d  a texvt] EiScjoXoTToiiKfj,  a lth o u g h  t h e  
so p h ist, w e  are to ld , is  co n cern ed  w ith  cfavTdapaTa, 2 3 6  b 7 , n o t w i t h  
'realistic' E i K o v a ,  a 8, and so  h is texvt) E iS tu X o T T o i iK p  is  actu ally  a texvti
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<t)avTaaTiKq, c 4.) When speaking, however, is about the n o n ­
embodied eiSx], we may infer, it does not produce images on (as i t  
were) the 'internal screen' of the soul.
Knowledge then has, for Plato, two main fields: T o  a i a e r i T o v  (o r 
the non-abstract field), which is the field of knowing eiSp by looking 
at their embodiments either 'in reality', through  eyes, or on th e  
internal screen of the soul, where they were projected by that ty p e  
of speaking that produces images; and T o  a v a i a e p T o v  (or the a b s tra c t 
field), which is the field of knowing through that type of speak ing  
that does not produce images (3).
Now, d\f)0eia,  I shall argue, occurs in the fields of both t o  
a i a O r i T o v  and t o  d v a i a G r i T o v  (although Plato tends sometimes to 
reduce the question of aiaGriaiC to that of b\l/iC, to the effect th a t, 
when he speaks about the dXpGeia that occurs within the field of t o  
aiaGTjTov, he takes into account only the aXfjGeia that occurs in see ing  
— as he does for instance in some passages from the Philebus).
6 . 2 ,  d x f j o e i a  within t o  a i a O p T o u
6.2.1. The dxfjeeia that occurs in seeing
Let us now consider what Plato says in the Philebus  about th e  
dX fjG eia  that occurs in seeing. His argument comes in two parts.
(i) If a man sees an object that yom es into his view from d is ta n c e  
and ind istinctly  [pf] Trdvu aacj)üjC], and wants to decide [K piveiv ]  
about what he sees, he will start [through S i d v o ia  — cf. 38 e 6 -7 ]  
to speak to h im self or to his com panion (asking 'What is th a t  
object which catches my eye there?' and then answ ering). T h e  
conjunction  between [sight] [in text: aicrGfjcJEiC] and pvfjpri [c f.
Tht. 163 e: 'a man who sees something acquires from that moment 
knowledge o f the thing he sees, and this know ledge is the p v f j p r j  
of that thing'], together with the TTaGfjpaTa that a c c o m p a n y  
them, may be said to write [ ypd( | ) €LV]  (as it were) X o y o i  in o u r  
so u ls .
(ii) When sight [together with p v r j p p  and with the T r a G q p a T a  that 
accom pany them] writes what is true [dXriGfj ] ,  the result is t ha t  
true opinion [d X q O q C  S o ^ a ]  and d X rjG e i C  X o y o i  spring up in u s, 
w hile when the internal scribe [ypappaT E uC ] that I h a v e  
suggested writes what is false [ij/EuSTi] we get the opposite sort o f  
S d ^ a  and X d y o i .
(Phlb .  38 b-d, my paraphrase)
In a few places, Plato says that knowing something through  th e  
learning part of the soul (i.e., in my terms, dealing with the field of T o  
d v a i a G r i T o v )  is an act perform ed by S i a v o e i a G a i ,  which takes p lace
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within the 'medium' of Xeyeiv (cf. Tht. 185 c, 189 e-190 a, Sph. 263 e, 
264 a, Ti. 71 b, etc.). And this way of putting things may suggest th a t  
knowing something through the senses  (i.e. dealing with the field of 
TO alaepTov) is an act which is not perform ed by SiavoEiaGai, a n d  
which has nothing to do with speaking. But this is not what P lato
believed. He believed that knowing is an act perform ed by th e  
learning part of our soul — either through  senses, or through  itself, 
by speaking (cf. Tht. 184 d ff.); yet the learning part of the soul is, as 
Plato says in Tht. 185 c, a 8ia tt\C yXüüTTpC 8uvapiC, a 'faculty th a t  
works through the tongue, i.e. through speaking'. So, we may in fer,
even when it knows through  the senses, it must somehow know  
through speaking too. This idea is not explicitly expressed in th e  
Theaete tus ,  but it is in the Timaeus and the Philebus.
In the Timaeus, the world-soul is said to speak about tw o 
'fields' — that of T o  aicrepTov and that of T o  XoyiaTiKov; I p a ra p h ra s e  
the passage from 37 a-c (using some segments from C ornford 's
translation, 1937):
[...] w henever the world-soul is in contact [ècjjdTTTTjTai] w i t h  
anything that has dispersed existence [aKeSacrTpv oiicriav] o r
with anything whose existence is indivisible [dpe piOTO v], it is s e t  
in motion all through herself and tells in what respect p r e c i s e l y ,  
and how, and in what sense, and when, it comes about t h a t  
som ething is qualified as either being r a v j o v  or ETEpov i n 
respect to any given thing, w hatever it may be, either in t h e  
world of TCC yiyvopEva, or in the world of TCt KaTd TauTd EyovTa 
a e i .  Now whenever the XdyoC takes place concerning the Tad To v 
and GdTEpov of an bv which belongs to the sphere of T o  
aiaGTiTOV, then arise 8b^ai and TTiaTEiC, which are pépaïoi a n d  
dXT|GEiC. But w henever the XoyoC takes place con cern in g  t h e  
TaiiTOV and GdTEpov of an bv which belongs to the sphere o f T o  
XoyiaTiKov, then vouC and ETriaTTjpp are necessarily  a c h i e v e d  
[which are, most obviously, also pE(3aioi and dXriGEiC].
The learning part of the human soul, we are told in the Timaeus,  is a 
copy  of the world-soul, for it is made out of the same (though less 
pure) ingredients (i.e. odoia, TauTov and GdTEpov — 41 d); and it copies, 
in its revolutions (^ E p i^ o p a i) , the revolutions of the world-soul (90 c- 
d; cf. also 47 b-c). So, we may infer that what Plato says about th e  
world-soul at 37 a-b covers the human soul too; that is, we may in fe r  
that the human soul too will 'produce' in its revolutions (TXEpictjopai) a 
XoyoC with itself, which deals either with the field of T o  aiaGriTov o r 
with that of T o  XoyioTiKov (i.e. that of T o  dvaioGriTov). That is: w h en  
the learning part of our soul knows through  the senses, it also know s 
through speaking.
Let us now go back to the passage from the Philebus  I q u o ted  
above.
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(i) First, it says that seeing is a process of 'writing true or fa lse  
Xoyoi in the soul'. That is: when I see something with my soul 
through my eyes, 'the ypapiJLaTeuC that dwells in our soul' (see 39 a 7) 
starts to 'comment' the seen image. And it is this speaking  th a t  
accompanies seeing  that makes sight  to become sharper (cf.
38 c 5); in other words, it is this accompanying speaking  that ayeiv 
€iC 4)0)C that which we see.
(ii) Here there occurs for the first time the question of tru th . 
W hat is true or false, that is, is not my mere seeing  with the soul, is 
what I believe  I see, i.e. it is my 86^a about what I see. But this So^a 
does not appear at the level of 'perceiving'; it appears w hen my soul 
begins to 'write', i.e. to speak,  about what it perceives (4).
So, what is aXfjeeia at this level? It is a criterion o f  truth,  
namely the correspondence  between what is seen by me and what I 
believe I see.
6.2.2. àXi\eeia and speaking in general. The aXqeeia that occurs in  
speaking about to  aioeqToy
As I argued, Plato distinguishes between two main fields of 
knowledge, that of to  aioeriTov (or the field of embodied — i.e. n o n ­
abstract — eiSri) and that of to  avaiaeriTov^ (or the field of n o n ­
embodied — i.e. abstract — elSin); and for him speaking  can be a b o u t 
either of them.
Now, Plato makes this distinction also in the Sophist  (cf. 264 a 
4-6: '8idvoia may occur either independently [kœG ' aiJTÔ] or Sl ' 
ataOfjacwC' — my translation). But here in the Sophist  he sp eak s  
about TO Xéyeiv and to  àXTieèç/\|/euSèC Xeyopevov in general; h e  
form ulates, that is, the question of speaking and that of t ru e /f a ls e  
speaking in a way that covers both speaking about to aiaG-qrou an d  
speaking about ro ayaiaerjroi^. His whole argument (as I see it) comes 
in three main parts (which I shall mark in what follows by a, b a n d  
c).
(a) Xeyeiv as a a\Jv0ecriC of words.
For Plato speaking, xéyeiv ,  is not 6 vopdCeiv^. It is, as he claims in  
the Sophist, at 261-3, a 'putting-together' (a ovvQeaiÇ  — 263 d 3, or a 
ŒupnXoK  ^ — 262 c 6) of the two main kinds of words (ovopaTa o r 
xdyo i), namely nouns (called also ovdpocTa) and verbs (pfjpotTa) (cf. 261 
e 5-262 a 1, 262 b-e, 263 d; cf. also Tht. 202 b 4 and 206 d 2). And, 
he argues, it is precisely this TrXeypa (262 d 6), i.e. this 'net' (o r 
'network', to use a modern word) of nouns and verbs, not the m e re  
act of naming (ovopdceiv — 262 d 3), that 'deserves' the name XoyoC
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(262 d 5-6) (here by XoyoC is meant, obviously, the act of speak ing ) 
(5).
Now, a auv0ecriC of words (or a Xeyopevov), he says, is a XoyoC 
TivoC (cf. 262 e 5-6), i.e. a XoyoC about something, t i ,  which we m ay
call its 'subject' (cf. 262 e 5-6; cf. also 263 c 10-11); a Xeyopevov,
however, is a Xeyeiv t i  Kara tivoC, i.e. a auvOeaiC between a 'su b jec t' 
(the KU0' oS XeyeraC t i )  and a 'predicate' (the t i ) ;  and this avvQeaiç  is a 
SqXouv, a 'letting-appear as' of the 'subject' (cf. what Plato says at 263 
a ff.). (Rendering SqXoiJv by 'let appear as', I agree, may so u n d  
'tendentious'; but I do not see any m ajor  objection to this reading; the 
proper meaning of SqXoUy is 'to show', 'to make visible' —  which b e a rs  
the idea of 'providing access to the way something looks like') (6).
(b) The CTiJv0eaiC of words and the Koivcuvia tŒv eiScjüi^ .
(i) In the Sophist Plato claims explicitly (a) that some eiSq
dxx^XoiC, while others do not (cf. 253 b 11); and that som e
words too, in their turn, ouvappoTTonaiv dXXqXoiC (cf. 261 d), w h ile  
others do not; and (p) that the very possibility of speaking d e riv e s  
actually from the Koivojvia Twv £i8üjv (cf. 259 e "any discourse [XoyoC] 
we can have owes its existence to the oupwXoKq tcïïv €i8mv") (w hich  
implies that speaking  in general is about ei8r|, cf. also Prm.  135 b-c).
(ii) At first sight, it seems that Plato suggests a rather b iz a rre  
view, namely that words form a particular 'network' which 'd ep ic ts ' 
the objective  s tru c tu re d  totality of ei8r]. That is: if speaking in  
general is about £i8t], and if the ei8r| are in a given, p a rtic u la r  
Koivcüvia, then — it seems to follow — every avveeaiÇ of w ords 
'depicts' an objective  aupTrXoKT] tüüv £Ï8üjv. Yet Plato is far fro m  
suggesting such a view.
(iii) In Sph, 234 c ff. he says that one may 'deceive' o th e r  
people not only with o p a ra  £i8cjuXa, but also with a corresponding a rt, 
which has to do with words (234 c 2), and which can deceive b y  
'spoken images of all things', £i8o)Xa X£ydp£va T^pl TrdvTcov (c 6); cf. also 
232: through these £i8ujXa X£yd[jL£va the sophist may make e v e ry th in g  
appear as something else: the divine things (tœ 0£'ia — 232 c 1), all 
that is visible in sky and earth and everything of that sort (daa 
(|)av£pôt yf|C T£ Kal onpavou Kai twv iT£pi ra  ToiauTa— c 4), y£V£0 'iC a n d  
oÙŒia (c 8), the laws or any political matter (vopoi [Ka\] aupirai^Ta toc 
TToXiTiKcx — d 1), and each and every (d 5) (so that it a p p e a rs
that nothing has been left out — c|)aiv£Tai yoîjy Sf] ayeSoy oii8£v 
TjTroXiTT£'iv). That is: in every 'field', words can be combined in w ays 
that do not 'depict' reality — i.e. not every advO eaiC of words 'd ep ic ts ' 
an objective oupirXoKq tüîv £i8o)v.
Now, the T£xvri aoc[)iaTiKT^ , says Plato, is a rexvr] £i8tJüXoTroiiKfj 
(235 a ff.), which — being concerned with cj^avTctapaTa (236 b 7) and  
not with 'realistic' £iKova (a 8) — is actually a t£xvti (pavTaaTiKfj (c 4).
1 02
That is: the realm of reality is 'made' by the actual, given way in  
which the eiSx] are 'combined' (see the already m e n tio n ed  
occurrences of TT€(|)UKevai at Phdr. 265 e 2: to divide ei5r| follow ing 
their 'objective articulation' — as Hackforth translates, and at 266 b 
6). But, besides this realm of reality, there is also the 'realm' of
cpavTdapara, i.e. — if I may use this term — the realm of phantasy.
The locus of this 'realm of phantasy' is the soul (viz. th e
'learning part of the soul'), which can put together, by speaking, b o th
non-abstract eiSq ('producing' eiScoXa Xeydpeva) and abstract eiSq. And 
it can 'provide' in this way cjjavrdapara irepi TrdvTcuv eiScui .^ So, P la to 's 
claim th a t "the complete separation of each thing from all is th e
utterly final obliteration of all discourse [irdvTeC \6yoi], for o u r 
speaking [XoyoC] is possible because of the communion [oupTrXoKq] 
between the eiSri" (Sph. 259 e), should be taken, I think, like this: th e  
very possibility of speaking (be it a speaking whose anvGeaiC of 
words 'depicts' an objective  ctupttXokti tŒv eiSoji^, or a speaking w hose  
avvQeaiç of words 'depicts' a fan tas t ic  aupTrXoKfi Twi/ oiSwy) d e riv e s  
actually from the fact that the eiSri (that which speaking is about) a re  
not dobyGcTa.
(iv) In the Phaedrus,  how ever, Plato claims that this field of 
(pavTdopaTa is not, as it were, boundless (cf. 261 e: "[...] wherever m en  
speak we find this single art [i.e. rhetoric]... which enables people to 
make out everything to be like everything else [irdv TravTi opoioiiv], 
within the limits o f  possible comparison  [...]" — my italics; this is, I 
must say, Hackforth's translation; in the original Greek, this phrase is 
less clear and, I agree, may be construed in several different w ays). 
In Hackforth's reading, however, Plato seems to say here that, in
principle, we may put together in a auveeaiC any words we like; bu t, 
in fact, our choices are limited (we cannot, for instance, say an y th in g  
we like about a given 'subject'; in other words, the num ber o f
'predicates' that we can associate with a given 'subject' is lim ited ).
Now, what does Plato actually mean by 'the limits of possib le
com parison '?
When two words are in a oijyeeaiC, and when th e y  
anvappoTToncjiv dXXfjXoiC, the resulting dppovia/aiipcjxjjvia refers (as I 
argued in 2.2.2., b, p) to a ctuv0€tov TTpdypa, i.e. to a statem ent (cf. Sph. 
262 e 1: to. [Xeyopewa] dppoTTovra Xoyov dwppydoaTo), which is
determ ined as a succession (rd^iC) of words (rd  ècf)e^ fiC Xeyopeva — 
261 d 8) that has meaning (rd  Xeyopeva SpXonyTa/aripaivovra — e 1-2). 
Thus, we can read the above-quoted phrase from Phdr.  261 e like  
this: in speaking 'we can make out everything to be like e v e ry th in g  
else', i.e. we can, through a crdvGecriC of words, let any eTSoC appear as 
being determ ined by any eXSoC; but, only 'within the limits of 
possible comparison', that is: we can, through a QvvQeoiÇ of words, le t
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any etSoC appear as being determ ined  by any eXSoC as long as th is  
'appearance' makes sense (and has, accordingly, a meaning fo r  us). I f  
so, then, we may say, that which lim its the possible com bination o f 
£i8ti through speaking  (or, in other words, that which lim its th e  
'realm  of phantasy ' that speaking is able to produce) is meaning;  
w hich is to claim  that 'the realm  of phantasy ' is lim ited  by th e  
boundaries of intelligibility (7 ).
(c) TO àxrieéc and To i|/£u8€C X£yop£yoy.
The fact that besides the realm  of re a lity  ('m ade' by the ac tu a l, 
given way in which the £i8ti are  'com bined') there is a realm  o f 
cj^avTccapaTa ('made' by all the in tellig ib le ways, how ever fantastic, in  
which the £ i8 p  may  be 'com bined'), is that which m akes possible th e  
existence of falsity .  In the Sophist, the way Plato puts things in  
regard to this issue of fa ls i ty  is this:
(i) If in a Xeydpcyoy, its 'subject' appears as it actually is, th e n  
that X£'yop£i^ov discloses th a t which it is about as it actually is; in  
short: if so, then that X£yop£yoy is dXp8£C (cf. 263 b 4-5: X£y£i 8£... b 
[XoyoC] pky dXpeqC ret ovtœ üüC £œtiv, i.e. the XoyoC in which things a re  
spoken as they are is dXqGpC).
(ii) If, on the contrary, in a X £yopevov, its 'subject' appears as i t  
is not, then that X£yop£vov hides, as it were, th a t which it is a b o u t  
(the notion of 'hiding' is not actually expressed in the text; it m ay , 
however, be easily inferred from the whole context; and in Phdr. 261  
e, w here Plato discusses the question of 4^^GoC qua  lie, it o ccu rs  
explicitly  — cf. e 4-5: [...] Kal dxxou opoioiJVToC Kal aTroKpUTTTopovo'u £ic 
4>cjüC dy£Lv); in short: if so, then that Xeyopevoy is \)i£\j8£C (cf. 263 b 7: 6 
S£ 8f] [XoyoC] £ T £ p a  t5v  ovtojv, i.e. the XoyoC in which things a r e  
spoken other than they are is il/^^SfjC). (The issue of i|;£u8oC is a lso  
d iscussed in, as I said, Phdr. 261 ff. and in Hp.ML, but here w hat is 
really at stake is the question of lie, not of falsehood  in general, as in  
the Sophist .)
Now, as I claimed, a aiJve£CTiC of a 'subject' and a 'p r e d ic a te ' 
m ay be said, generally speaking,  to be a 8pXouy, a 'le ttin g -ap p ear as ' 
o f the 'subject'; but this 'appearance as' of the 'subject' is not th e  
same in the two fields of know ledge; that is: in speaking about to  
aiaepTov the 'appearance as' of the 'subject' is not the same as in  
speaking about to  avaiaeriTov.
In his last public appearance, Dennis Potter m entioned a t r u e  
anecdote from the times when television started to leave b e h in d  
radio broadcasting: asked by a journalist why does he p refer radio to  
television, a young child answers that he finds the scenery better on  
radio program m es. This anecdote echoes a point which Plato m ade in  
the Philebus, and which clarifies what the 'appearance as' of th e  
'subject' is in the field of to  aiaGriTov.
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(i) When we speak, there occurs in our souls a SrHj-lOTJpyoC, a 
(wypd^oC, a painter, who start to paint [ypdc|)£i] in them i m a g e s  
[eiKO veC] of the Xeydpeva; and then one sees som ehow [opg ttcjoC] 
in h im self [€V aiJTty] im ages [elKOveC] of what he p r e v i o u s l y  
opined or asserted [rdc Ttüv 8o^aa0€i^TCüv Kal 
eiKOVaC].
(ii) [... So,] the images [eiKOveC] of true opinions [dXT|0elC So^ai] 
and Xoyoi are true [dXr|0eiC], whereas the images of f a l s e  
opinions [ijteuSeiC 8d^ai] and Xdyoi are false [il/eaSeiC].
(Phlb .  39 b-c, my paraphrase)
(i) Now, what Plato says in the above quoted passage from th e  
Philebus  is this: if I speak  about the embodied eiSq (i.e. if I deal w ith  
the field of T o  a(o0T|Tdv), this will produce in my soul images  of th o se  
€i8r| (and this is something that does happen to everyone of us — cf. 
39 c 1-2: fj TouTo oiik eoTi yiyvopevov uap’ qpiv; crc[)68pa \iev oSv). (This 
point is also made in the Sophist: at 234 c ff,, where Plato says th a t  
one may deceive other people not only with opara ei8mxa, but also 
with a corresponding art, which has to do with words, 234 c 2, an d  
which can deceive by 'spoken images of all things', eiSœXa Xeyopeva 
TT£pl irdi^Tüüv, c 6; and at 235 a ff., where the t€xvth aoct)iCTTiKT| is called  
a T£x^T| eiSaaXoTroiiKfi, although the sophist, we are told, is co n cern ed  
with (lavTdapaTa, 236 b 7, not with 'realistic' eiKova, a 8, and so h is  
T£X^^ ei8mXo'iToiiK'ri is actually a tcxvt) cl>avTaŒTiKfj, c 4). (This 'view', if 
I may say so, occurs also in Aristotle, who claims that th e  
m etaphorical speaking — which is grounded on terms that belong to  
the field of t o  aicrGriTov — 'brings something before eyes', irpd oppdtTajv 
TToiei, cf. Rh. 1410 b 33 and 1411 b 21-25; cf. also Po. 1459 a 7-8: t o  
yap eS p€Ta(j)ép€iy t o  t o  opoLov Oewpeiv eoTiy; and it is also adopted b y  
various modern authors — for details see Ricoeur's 1975, 283 ff. 
discussion of the issue of 'verbal icon'.)
(ii) And here there occurs for the second time the question of 
truth. If I speak  about the embodied eiSq, this will produce in m y  
soul images  of those ei8ri; and they, these images, may be true o r 
false. So, what is aXfjOeia at this level? It is a criterion o f  truth,  
namely the correspondence  between that which I speak about and  
that which my speaking 'projects' on the 'internal screen' of my soul.
To sum up: in the field of t o  aioGriTov, truth appears as a 
criterion o f  truth,  understood as the correspondence  between an  
image (either as an ei8a)Xov proper or as an ei8üüXov Xeyopevov) a n d  
that 'reality' which the 'image' refers to. Now, how did Plato p u t  
things in the field of t o  cxvaiaOriTov?
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6.3. dXfjOeia within t o  àyaiaOqToy
In the field of T o  avaioeriTov the truth about things is re a c h e d  
through speaking. But 'speaking about T o  d v a i c r e r i T o v '  is not the sam e 
as 'speaking about T o  a L a e p T o w ' .  Speaking about T o  a i / a t o - G p T o y  can b e  
done through abstract  or non-abstract terms; I shall deal with th e  
question of 'speaking about about T o  ài^aïaepTov in n o n-a bs tra c t  
terms'  in 8.3.1.; here, in what follows, I would like to say a few  
things about 'speaking about about T o  avaioeriTov in abstract terms'.
(a) First, in the field of T o  di^aiaepTov the abstract speaking does 
not produce proper images; when we say that 'virtue is know ledge ', 
or that 'knowledge is good'; or when we say that the sophist 'com es' 
from "the art of contradiction making, descended from an in s in ce re  
kind of conceited mimicry, of the sem blance-m aking, derived from  
image making, distinguished as a portion, not divine but human, of 
production, that represents a shadow play of words" (Sph. 268 c-d) — 
we do not see images on the internal screen of our mind.
(b) Secondly, in the field of T o  avaicr0r)Tov the 'results' of 
abstract speaking cannot be confronted  with 'reality', as in the fie ld  
of TO aiaOriTov the image that results from speaking can b e  
confronted through sight, with the 'reality' which the 'image' re fe rs  
to; the 'reality' of T o  àvaiCT0r|Tov cannot be grasped directly, and w e 
cannot check whether the 'results’ of our speaking correspond w ith  
it. Thus, in this case, we cannot use the criterion of correspondence.
As I argued in 0.1.3., Socrates was faced with the fact th a t  
there are two fields of knowledge — one in which the 'experim ent' is 
possible and where correspondence appears, accordingly, as the b e s t 
criterion of truth; and another one in which the 'experim ent' is n o t 
possible and where coherence (on which the Socratic elenchus is 
grounded) appears as the only criterion of truth.
A similar, yet far more refined view is held also by Plato; fo r 
him, in 'speaking (in abstract terms) about T o  avaia0T|Toi^', th e  
criterion which can tell us something, indirectly, about it is what w e  
may call the aupc^cuvCa Tœv XeYopevtüv, or, with a modern expression , 
the coherence of  a body o f  beliefs (this point has been su p p o rted , 
through different arguments, by various comm entators, such as 
W aterfield 1989, 50-3, or Fine 1990, 86 ff., 97 ff.). Coherence,
however, may be taken either as 'consistency', or as 'implication', o r 
as 'explanation'. But, as I argued in 2.2.2., Plato's aujj.(j)Cüvia cannot b e  
reduced to either of them. For him, the Xeyopeva that aapc^wvouaiv 
dXXfjXoiC are those Xeydpeva that are consistent and hang together in a 
'significant way' (which may be construed as a relation of 
implication, or explanation between them). That is: in speaking (in 
abstract terms) about T o  dvaia0T|Tov we cannot confront our Xeyopeva
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with 'reality' via another means of knowledge; here, the on ly  
criterion of truth is the CTLijj.ct>cuvia of our Xeyoiaeva: if they a re  
consistent and if they hang together in a significant way they may b e  
true (i.e. they may correspond to reality). In short: for Plato, in som e 
cases, coherence is the only thing we have, and so it may be taken as 
a criterion of truth. ("Spices", says Lehrer 1990, 131, "may en h an ce  
the flavour of good ingredients, but if the ingredients are spoiled, 
enhancing the flavour increases the risk of our consuming food th a t  
is dangerous to our health. Explanation, simplicity, a n d  
inform ativeness are but the spices of truth." To paraphrase L eh rer, 
we may say that, according to Plato, in some cases the only thing th a t  
we can eat are the spices.)
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CHAPTER SEVEN
The jjieGoSoL that aXqGe'uo'ucri ti TTOT’eari 
eKttCTTov e Î 8 oC
As I argued in Chapters Four and Five, Plato claims that, once 
we accept the theory of ei8Ti, we have to determ ine (i) what each  
e ïSoç  is (cf. R. 531 d, 532 e); (ii) what t o  ayaSov is (which is 'the lim it 
of the intelligible') (cf. R. 533 b); and (iii) what the elSoC in general is 
(a task which, as I argued in Chapter Five, is undertaken in th e  
Sophist). Now, all these three aims can be reached by follow ing 
particular p£8o8oi (cf. R. 532 e 1); but Plato does not tell us m uch  
about these péeo8oL — with the exception of those that may lead us to 
the determination of what each eTSoC is.
7.1. opiCciy Tà ciSï]: the quest for  definitions
For Plato, as I argued, the 'is', the ens  of a res, equals T i , 
quidditas, whatness; but for him  not all the characteristics that fo rm  
the 'what' of something are, ontologically, equal. That is, for P lato  
there is an 'ontological hierarchy' of the characteristics of a thing, fo r 
only some of them form its aperfj (to use a word which he u se d  
sometimes in the early dialogues to designate the 'essential side' of 
something); to put it in the Aristotelian scholarly jargon, an el8oC h as 
'accidental' and 'essential' features (cf. Metaph.  1051 b 9 ff.) (1).
(Neither Plato, nor any of his predecessors, put this distinction as
clearly as Aristotle; but, I think, it is rather safe to claim that in som e 
of the pre-A ristotelian thinkers there is to be found, in one form o r 
another, this belief that each thing has an 'essential side' — for w hich  
they use mostly the words cj^ucriC and o ija ia .)
For Plato, however (like for Socrates — see 0.1.3.), the 'object' of 
knowledge is the Koiyojyiai of 'things'; for what we what we ac tua lly  
know are relations between eiSri (cf. Cra. 438 e: "What other way can 
there be of knowing [things], except through one another [8i 
’ àxxfjxcüv], when they are akin to each other [auyyevfj] and th ro u g h  
themselves?"; and Tht. 186 a, "[the £i8ti] seem [...] to be things w hose  
being [ouaia] is considered, one in comparison with another [irpoC 
dXXrjXa], by the soul [...]"; these two passages m ay  be taken as
covering the knowing of £iSri by both seeing and speaking; yet m o st
of the places in which this idea is pointed out, that to know is to
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know the Koivcjjviai tü)v eiScüv, occur in a context where at stake is th e  
question of knowing by speaking — cf. for instance Sph, 253 e 1: th e  
aim of knowledge is "to distinguish in what ways the ei8q can o r 
cannot combine [Koivojveiv SfivaTai]") (2). So, to know the 'e ssen tia l 
side' of an efSoC is to know its essential Koivwviai with other eiSq.
In his early and middle periods, Plato believed that th e  
Xeyopcvov which reveals the 'essential what of something' (the XoyoC 
TqC oùaiaC, which should be distinguished from a mere description — 
cf. Lg. 895 d 4) is a opiapoC (cf. also R. 507 b 2-3: 'we say that m an y  
things are and define them through a XoyoC [SiopiCopev tw Xoytii]' — my 
paraphrase). In the Meno, for instance, although the so-called th e o ry  
of ei8ri is not fully  developed, Plato claims very clearly that an eX8oC 
can be expressed by a Xeyopevov qua ôpiapoC (e.g. 'shape is the on ly  
thing which accompanies colour' — 75 b; 'shape is the limit of a solid ' 
— 76 a; or 'colour is an effluence from shapes com m ensurate w ith  
sight and perceptible by it' — 76 d). (A opiopoC is then an oratio  th a t  
'reflects' the ratio, 'the essential inner XoyoC' of an €l8oC).
Most of Plato's early dialogues aim at achieving a iKavoC 
opiapoC. Yet, as we know only too well, they all fail in this a tte m p t 
(and, besides, in Plato there is not a proper peOoSoC toward a o p ia p d c ) . 
Their results, nevertheless, are not entirely negative, for they state a 
few aspects of the opicrpdc question.
(i) One is that a opiapdc is a Xeydpevov in which that which is to 
be defined is l inked  with other things. Put it in the terms I used in  
the last chapters, a opiapoC is a Xeydpevov which attempts at show ing 
the essential Koivcoviai of an eîSoC with other eiSr].
(ii) Another one is that the search for these essential KoivcDviai 
starts from something already known, from a TrpoyiyvtuaKopevov, i.e. 
from a number of Koivœviai assumed as certain. That is: the search  
for definitions does not take place against a tabula rasa, but against a 
prelim inary understanding (3).
(iii) And another one is that the failure of our attem pts to 
achieve a iKavdC ôpiopoC shows that our prelim inary knowledge (on 
which the whole inquiry is grounded) is, in most of the cases, n o t 
flawless, for it either does not match the reality, or is co n trad ic to ry  
or unjustifiable. But not in all cases: occasionally, our attempts to 
achieve a iKavdC opiapoC show that some items of our p re lim in a ry  
knowledge are reliable — either because they are obviously t ru e  
(when they match reality, or are coherent, or are deducible from  
something known as certain), or obviously false (in which case th e y  
are usually marked by the words yeXoXov, (Itottov, dSdvarov or dXoyov).
What should we do then, if we do not want to give up o u r 
attempt to find a iKavdC o p iap d c?  Well — Plato seems to suggest in h is 
early dialogues, which all fail to reach one — there is nothing w e
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could do about it: we must accept our failures and acknowledge th e  
dTTopiai we reached. In the Meno, however, he introduces a q u ite  
promising pe0o8oC; but this pe0o8oC is not, as it might appear to be a t  
first sight, aimed at reaching a definition. This pe0oSoC has a less 
ambitious task.
7.2. The p é e o S o ç from the Meno
7.2. L  The geometrical analogy (86 e-87 b)
This pe0o8oC is first explained by an analogy, which is ac tu a lly
a problem of geometry (86 e-87 b).
The problem is about the possibility of a given ytupiov to b e  
inscribed in a given circle as a triangle (86 e-87 a 1) (4). This 
passage, having so many difficulties, could scarcely fail being o v e r ­
interpreted. In 1935, Gueroult (1935) counted over a h u n d re d
interpretations. The most interesting ones belong to Butcher (1888 , 
219-25), Benecke (1867, see Bluck, 1961, 447 f.), Farquharson (1925 , 
21-6), Cook-Wilson (1903, 222-9), Gaiser (1964, 264-82), S te rn fe ld  
and Zyskind (1977, 206-11) (a presentation and critical discussion of 
some of these solutions are to be found in Bluck 1961, Appendix); yet 
not all of them are very convincing. There are, I think, three m ajo r 
requirements for any interpretation of this passage: (i) to respect its  
grammar (although this is far from being clear); (ii) to form ulate th e
geometrical problem in such a way as to be soluble with th e
mathematics of that time (not with, say, some theorems from Euclid's 
E lem ents  which w ere unknown at that time); and (iii) to be sim ple  
enough (which is a strong requirem ent, due to three main reasons: 
first, the problem was supposed to be understood by someone like
Meno, who is not a mathem atician; secondly, Plato does not give too
many details about it, as if he considers it to be rather simple; an d
thirdly, its function is to offer a helpful analogy for what Plato is
going to talk about later, and a helpful analogy should be at le a s t
reasonably simple).
Like Thomas (1980, 167-70), I am rather inclined to ta k e
Butcher's and Benecke's solutions as being the most plausible. Both of
them respect the three requirements mentioned above.
According to Butcher's interpretation the passage 87 a 3-7 m ay  
be reconstructed as follows:
If the figure [rectangle ABCD] is such that when applied to t h e  
given line [BH] o f the circle, it falls short by another f ig u r e  
[rectangle CDEH] similar  to the one just applied [ABCD], then o n e  
conclusion follow s [i.e. the triangle BFD, which is equal in area to  
the rectangle ABCD, can be so inscribed], and if this is im p o s s ib le
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another conclusion  follow s [Thomas, 1980, 168; for B u tch er 's  
diagram see Annex 1, Fig. (1)],
According to Benecke's interpretation the passage 87 a 3-7 may b e  
reconstructed as follows:
If the figure [square ABCD] is such that when applied to the given  
line [AL] of the circle, it falls short by another figure [sq u a re  
CDLM] identical  to the one just applied [ABCD], then o n e  
conclusion follow s [i.e. the triangle ACL, which is equal in area to  
the square ABCD, can be so inscribed], and if this is im p o s s ib le  
another conclusion  follow s [Thomas, 1980, 168; for B e n e c k e 's  
diagram see Annex 1, Fig. (2) (5)].
I favour, as Thomas 1980 does, Benecke's solution, m ain ly  
because of its visual simplicity, which has to be, as I said, an  
essential characteristic of any plausible in terpretation of th is  
geom etrical problem.
The details of this geometrical problem are rather obscure, bu t, 
as Robinson 1953, 114 claims, 'irrelevant for the m ethodological
point'; what is important, however, is, I think, the 'lesson' of th is  
problem: when we cannot find an answer to a question (e.g. 'It is 
possible for this figure to be inscribed as a triangle in this circle? '), 
we have, in order to pursue our investigation, to ask a n o th e r  
question ('What happens if we apply this figure to a certain line of 
the given circle?'), which can be answered, and whose answer w ill 
allow us to deduce the answer to the first question. In other words: if  
we cannot prove directly a given proposition y, we should fin d  
another proposition x, equivalent to y, so that if x is true, then y is 
true, and if x is false, then y is false; and this proposition x, until it is 
proved or disproved directly, is a hypothesis (6).
7.2.2. Socrates' application o f  the peOoSoC (87 b-89 e)
Now, the peeoSoC that is explained, analogically, by th is  
problem of geometry (86 e-87 b), is then applied by Socrates h im se lf  
(87 b-89 e). Socrates' application is extremely long and not a lw ays 
very clear; I think, however, that it can fairly  be represented like
this.
(a) If virtue is knowledge, it is teachable (87 b 2-87 c 9).
(i) Question A: Is virtue teachable?
(ii) Hypothesis A: Virtue is knowledge.
(iii) Answer A: If virtue is knowledge, then virtue is teachable.
(b) If virtue is good, it is knowledge (87 c 10-89 a 8).
(i) Question B: Is virtue know ledge? (That is; Is hypothesis A
tr u e ? )
(ii) Hypothesis B: Virtue is good.
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(iii) Answer B 1: If virtue is good, and if  only know ledge is good , 
then virtue is knowledge (87 c 10-d 10).
(iv) Answer B 2: If virtue is good, then it is b en eficia l as w e ll;
and, since som ething is beneficia l only when it is a cc o m p a n ie d
by know ledge (for know ledge is beneficia l — cf. 88 d 5-89 a 8 ), 
then, if  virtue is beneficia l, virtue is know ledge (87 d 11-88 c 6 )
(7 ) .
(c) Virtue is not teachable for there are no teachers o f it (89 a -e
3 )
(i) Apparently virtue is teachable, for it is certainly not a c h ie v e d  
by nature. (If virtue was achieved by nature, then there sh o u ld  
be experts among us who could recognize the naturally good at an 
early stage; but there are not such experts, and so virtue c a n n o t
be achieved by nature) (89 a-b).
(ii) But, on the other hand, if virtue was teachable, then t h e r e  
should be teachers o f virtue; but there are not such teachers (8 ) ,  
and so virtue is not teachable (89 c 5-e 3). (And, being n o t
teachable, virtue is not knowledge —  99 a) (9).
So, what can be said about this peOoSoC?
First, here in the M eno  there is change of focus. Almost all 
early dialogues aim, as I said, at achieving a op iapdC , but they all fail. 
In the M eno  the topic of opicrpoC occurs throughout the dialogue (cf. 
71 b, 72 c, 73 d 1, 74 a 10-11, b 2-4, 75 a 3-4, 8, 86 d-e, 87 b, 100 b, 
etc.). But the peOoSoC introduced here is not focussed on achieving a 
definition of virtue (i.e. of the essential Koivujviai of the eXSoC of 
virtue with other ei8r|, but on establishing a particular feature of
virtue on the ground of its Koivcuviai with other eiSri). That is: th e  
pe0o8oC introduced here does not actually aim at reaching a 
definition: it aims not at finding the essential Koivwviai of an eXSoC, 
but at establishing a few particular K oivœ viai of it.
Secondly, it introduces a trick, which is based on the use of 
iJTro0£a£iC and which should be used when we cannot prove o r 
disprove directly a proposition (10). The trick is very simple: if w e 
cannot prove or disprove directly a given proposition y (say 'virtue is 
teachable'), we should find another proposition x (e.g. 'virtue is 
knowledge') (which, until it is proved or disproved directly, is a 
hypothesis), equivalent to y, so that if x is true, then y is true, and if  
X is false, then y is false (11). If the hypothesis x can be proved o r 
disproved directly (as it seems to be the case with the hypothesis o f 
the geometrical problem), then we are in a position to draw a 
conclusion about y. But what if, in its turn, x cannot be proved o r
disproved in a direct way? In this case, claims Plato, we should fin d
another proposition z (say, 'virtue is good'), so that if z is true, then x 
is true, and if z is false, then x is false (and so, consequently, know ing  
that X is true or false, we can infer whether y is true or false) (th is  
kind of arguing is very akin to the geometrical method of d-TTaymyii). 
(Why, however, is the hypothesis 'virtue is good' not, in its tu rn .
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deduced from another hypothesis? Because, it seems, it is thought to 
be sound enough — cf. f] iiTToericriC \xévei fjpTw, 87 d.)
To sum up: according to the peGoSoC offered by the Meno, w h e n  
we cannot prove or disprove directly a given proposition y, w e 
should find a hypothesis, i.e. an equivalent proposition x, so that y is 
true if X is true, and false if x is false (this finding of a hypothesis is a 
heuristic process; that is: in order to be laid down, a hypothesis m u s t 
first ho found  — cf. 2.1.).
As I argued in 2.1., for Plato the truth-value of a lUTroGeaiC qua  
statement, at the moment when it is being hypothesized, is not y e t  
known. So, how can we, according to the Meno, assess the truth-value 
of a-UTToGeaiC qua statement?
7.2.3. Testing a hypothetical statement
A hypothesis y could be tackled from two different d irections: 
from its premisses or from its consequences.
(i) If X,  then y; and x; hence y.
(ii) If X,  then y; and non-x: hence non-y.
(iii) If y, then z; and non-z: hence non-y,
(iv) If y, then z; and z; hence y.
(i) is a valid argument in modus ponens;  (ii) is an invalid a rg u m en t, 
because it commits the fallacy of denying the antecedent; (iii) is a 
valid argum ent in modus tollens; and (iv) is an invalid a rg u m e n t 
because it commits the fallacy of affirming the consequent.
Now, the pe0o8oC introduced in the Meno states, s tr ic tly  
speaking, only (i) as a possible test of a hypothesis ('if virtue is
knowledge, then virtue is teachable'); but the last section of Socrates ' 
argum ent (89 c 5-e 3) suggests that (iii) may also be taken as a
possible test ('if virtue was teachable, then there should be tea ch e rs
of virtue; but there are not such teachers, and so virtue cannot b e
teachable'). (Here the consequence of a statem ent is assessed by an  
'empirical test'; but a consequence may also be assessed by a 
'consistency test': if it is consistent with our current stock of beliefs, 
or with a body of statements accepted as true, then that consequence  
is true as well.) (The last section of Socrates' argument, viz. 89 c 5 -e
3, implies, nevertheless, that 'if there are teachers of virtue, th e n
virtue is teachable'; it suggests, in other words, that (iv) may also b e  
a test. As I said, (iv) is not a valid argument (12); in my view ,
however, Plato seems to suggest that this argument should not b e
taken as prov ing  the truth of y, but as corroborating  y, which is a 
perfectly défendable position.)
This argument of reduction to falsehood ('if y, then z; and n o n - 
z: hence non-y') is very much used by Plato, especially in the e a rly
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dialogues, and Socrates often rejects a hypothesis because its  
consequence is d\oyov(Hp. Ma. 303 c 3) or aSiii^aTov (Hp. Ma. 303 d 
4) (cf. also Chrm. 172 c, e). (Sometimes in Plato there is not a 
reduction to falsehood,  but to absurdity — which is a form of 
falsehood, cf. Robinson 1953, 23; in this case a consequence is
rejected not because it is dxoyov or aSavarov, but because it is cctottov 
or yeXoiov.) (An example of such a reductio ad ab su rd u m  occurs also 
in the Parmenides (13).)
Now, as I said, the |j.é0o8oC introduced here in the M eno  does 
not actually aim at reaching a definition, i.e. at finding the e ssen tia l 
Koivojviai of an gf8oC, but at establishing a few particular Koivwviai of 
it. Why did Plato change his focus? The clearest answer, as far as I 
know, is to be found in the P arm enides.
7.3. The peOoSoCfrom the Parmenides
The Parmenides is, perhaps, the most difficult Platonic d ia logue 
(despairing comm entators have said all kinds of things about it;
Brumbaugh 1961, 6, for instance, called it "the driest, most tire so m e
joke ever devised"). It is not my purpose here to enter in its abyss; 
all I am concerned with is a methodological point that P lato  
introduces in it.
Roughly speaking, there are two main m ethodological p a tte rn s  
in the Parmenides: the one used by Zeno (127 a -130 a) and the one 
used by Parmenides (137 c-166 c). The one used by Zeno aims a t 
testing a hypothetical statement by checking its consequences (and i t  
is actually a reductio ad absurdum: 'if y, then z; and non-z: h ence  
non-y ').
The one used by Parm enides (cf. 135 e-136 a) is m o re
complicated; roughly put, it is aimed at checking not only th e
consequences of a hypothesis y ('if one is', el ev t o n  — 137 c-160 b),
but also the consequences of its contradictory, non-y ('if one is not', 
ei ev iJLTi eoTi — 160 b-166 c). This two-part argument raises en o rm ous 
difficulties. I shall leave them aside, however, and focus on th e  
methodological point that Plato introduces here, namely th e  
requirem ent to check the consequences of both a hypothesis and its  
con trad ic to ry .
As I said, the way our knowledge works raises a puzzle th a t  
Plato attempts to solves by introducing the theory of £i8ti; but th is  
theory brings forward other puzzles. Yet (as Plato made Zeno say in  
the first section of the Parm enides), we have to choose the view th a t  
has 'less ridiculous consequences'; that is: the consequences of th e  
theory of ei8ri are 'less ridiculous' than the consequence implied b y  
the assumption that the eiSri do not exist (cf. Prm. 135 b-c); in o th e r
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words: if nothing was 'always the same', then we could not know  
anything and speaking would not be possible, for words refer to th a t  
which is 'always the same' (cf. also Tht. 183 a-b).
In the Republic  Plato seems to suggest that if we, against all 
odds, accept the theory of eiSri, then knowledge enables us (i) to  
apprehend the 'ultimate assumptions' of the theory itself (i.e. To 
d y a ed v , which is 'the limit of the intelligible' — 532 a 7- b 1); and (ii) 
to find out 'what each thing is', Ti TToT’ ecrTiv ckogtov  (532 a 7, 533 b 
1). This Ti ttot’ eoTiv eKaoTov refers, as I claimed, to the essential w h a t  
o f  each eiSoC  (i.e. to its essential Koivujviai with other €i8ri); and in th e  
early dialogues Plato believed that the 'essential what' of an eTSoC 
can be revealed only by a XeyopEvov qua ôpiapoC. But, as we know , 
almost all his attempts to achieve a iKavoC opiopoC failed. Why? T he 
answer comes in the Parm enides.
(iii) "You [, Socrates, says Parmenides,] are undertaking to d e f in e[opiCecjGai] 'beautiful', 'just', 'good' and each of the €i 8t] [too
soon], before you have had a [prelim inary] exercise [irplv 
y\j|JLvao-6fjvai]" (135 c 8-d 1; cf. also 136 a, c).
(iv) This prelim inary yupvaCTia — 'without which aX fjO eia w il l  
escape you' (d 6) and which consists o f 'speaking about € i 8 q '  (e 1-
4) — should aim at checking the consequences of both (a )  t h e  
{jTToSeaiC that states the existence of an eTSoC and (j3) of its  
contradictory, i.e. o f the ù u o G e a iC  that states the non-existence o f 
that e f S o C  (e 8-136 a 2). That is: "whenever you hypothesize th a t  
an [ e f 8 o C ]  exists or does not exist or has any other character, y o u  
ought to consider the consequences with reference to itself a n d  
to any one of the other [€ i8ri] that you may select, or several o f  
them, or all of them together, and again, you must study t h e s e  
others with reference both to one another and to any one [etSoC ] 
you may select, whether you have hypothesized the [etSoC ] to
exist or not to exist" (136 b-c). (One may say that this quotation is
tendentious, because the word elSoC  does not actually occur i n
the text; but, I think, it is obvious that Parmenides refers to € i8 q
h e r e .)
So, why are we failing to achieve a iKavoC opiapoC of an eÎ8oC? 
Because, Plato says, we attempt at achieving such a ôpiapoT before a
preliminary training. But why is it so?
What this prelim inary training provides, at a first sight, is a 
way to establish whether an eXSoC exists or not; if we are not su re  
whether an eX8oC exists or not, we should hypothesize both its 
existence and non-existence, and then check the consequences of 
each position; and, the text seems to imply, we should adopt th e  
hypothesis whose consequences are 'less ridiculous'. But then, how  
can this help us to achieve a IxavoC opiapoC of an eXSoC?
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What this yujjivacria actually offers in the end is not a m e re  
likely conclusion about the existence or the non-existence of an elSoC. 
This y u p v aa ia  does not deal with a few words, as a ôpiopoC does, b u t  
with a 'sea of words' (TreXayoC Xoymv — 137 a 6). That is: like a opiapoC , 
this yupvaoia has to do with a particular eXSoC. But it is not focussed  
on the essential  Koivwviai of an eX8oC, as a opiapoC is; it is, on th e  
contrary, a 8ie^o8oC re Kal TiXdvri 8id TrdvTtuv [tojv ei8œv] (136 e 1-2), a 
circuitous and exhaustive wandering [through the eiSri]' (as R obinson 
1953, 277 translates) — i.e. it is focussed on all the Koivwviai that a 
particular eX8oC (and its àvTiTieé|JL€vov, its 'opposite') has with o th e r  
€i8ri (an idea which is somehow prefigured in R. 402 c).
So, what Plato says here in the P arm enides  seems to be this: we 
cannot attempt to find the ôpiapoC of an eXSoC (i.e. its 'essential' what, 
namely its essential  Koivcoviai with other eiSq), until we have a v iew  
of all the Koivdjviai that that eXSoC has with other eiSrj.
Yet why should we consider the Koivœviai of both an eX8oC an d  
its dvTiTi0ep.evov — say, of both ev and rroXXd, or KaXov and KaKov? The 
answer comes in the Sophist: the w hat  of an eX8oC is determ ined b y  
its KoivcDviai with other  eiS^; and one of these other  eiSq is p rec ise ly  
its dvTiTi0€|jLevov (cf. 257 d) (14). In other words: what the yvpvoaia  
from the Parm enides  aims at is a determ ination of all the Koivcoviai 
that a particular eXSoC has with other eiSri — including with its v e ry  
dvTiTi0epevov.
At the core of the Sophist, which comes — in my view — a fte r  
the Parmenides introduced this yupvaaia, is the attem pt to ach ieve
the 'essence' of the sophist. In the Sophist, however, this yupvaaia is
not undertaken (which may be explained by saying that Plato w as
now concerned with other things, so he did not go again th ro u g h
what he already said in the Parmenides). Now, the Sophist, u n lik e  
almost all the earlier dialogues that aimed at achieving a kavoC 
opiapoC, ends with one; but here, the fo r m  of kavoc  opicjpoC h as  
changed; it is not, as it was suggested in the Meno, a phrase of th e  
type 'shape is the limit of a solid' (cf. 76 a).
7.4. The pedoSoC from  the Sophist
7.4.1. 6v, TavTov and edrepov as that which is primarily spoken. The
(jvvayüjyrj and S ia ipeaiC  o f  speaking
In the Sophist  Plato claims that speaking  is about e i8 r|, and th a t  
there is a particular Koivmvia tüjv eiSœv (cf. 252 a-e, 259 e-260 a). 
Now, the dialectician, i.e. the one who has achieved actual know ledge  
about ei8r| by speaking  about them, is, says Plato, the one who is ab le
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to "to distinguish in what ways the e i 8r| can or cannot com bine 
[KoivüJveiv Suvarai]" (Sph. 253 e 1); to discern, that is,
(i) first, the eT8 oC which is 'present' in many (piav l 8 eav S ia  
TToWmv) (8 iot TToWcDV means probably 'in many yiyvo|jL€va'); and 
t h e n
(ii) the many eiSr\ which are different from each other, b u t 
"embraced from without by one el8oC" (ijtto piaC 
TT€piexo|JLe vaC); and then
(iii) the one eXSoC which 'evolved' in a unity through m a n y  
wholes (Kal jjLiav aS 8 i ’ oXcuv ttoXXüjv év èvl ^uvrippevqv) ( S i ’ 
dXwv TToXXüJV means, I think, 'through many e i 8 ri'); and, finally,
(iv) the ei8r| that are entirely apart and separate (Kal rroXXaC 
XüJplC irdvTi] 8icjüpiQ|jLévaC).
(253 d)
Thus, by doing so, the dialectician will not "take the sam e [rauTov] 
eX8 oC for a different [ e r e p o v ]  one or a different one for the same" (253  
d). And that means, inter alia, that speaking  in general deals, 
ultim ately, with To ov, raijTov and ed rep o v  (which is exp lic itly  
expressed in Ti. 37 a-c).
Now, in some dialogues (Phdr. 249 b-c, 265 d-266 c, 273 e; Sph. 
253 a ff.; Pit. 285 a ff.; Phlb. 16-18), Plato speaks about a p ro c e d u re  
which consists of two 'operations' — (a) CTuvaycoyfj and (b) S ia ipeo iC .
(a) A auvaycuyfj is to 'discern' a pia ISea 8id ttoXXcuv eiScuv, i.e. to  
'see' the eXSoC that 'embraces from without other € i 8 t]' (as the So ph is t  
253 d 7-9 suggests; cf. also 250 b); that is, 'to dyeiv rd  iroXXax^ 
8ieaTTap|jLeva [ei8q] into a single i8ea ' (265 d 3) (and this auvopdceai — 
cf. CTuvopaovTa, d 3 — of a single i8€a is what provides clarity to  
speaking, to oa(j)oc, d 6, and what makes possible the reaching of an  
agreement, opoXoyoupevov, d 7).
(b) After one sees a pia i8ea 8id rroXXmv eiSojv, claims Plato, one  
has to perform a 8iaipr|criC, i.e. a separation (cf. ôpiCopevoC — Phdr. 
265 d 4) of the c i8 q  'embraced from without' by that single i8ea. (But 
this 'division KaT’ ei8ri', e 1, should be made KaT’ apepa fj Trecj)UKev, e 1 - 
2, i.e. following their natural — 'objective', as Hackforth translates — 
articulations, and so "we are not to attempt to hack off parts like a 
clumsy butcher", e 2-3. This way of putting things implies that th e  
e i8q  'embraced from without' by that single i8ea are like a body, i.e. 
that they are structured in a particular way; in other words, th a t
they form a particular net of K oivojviai.)
This two-operation procedure of auvaycuyfi and SiaipeaiC seem s 
to be the job of SiaXeKTiKoi (cf. Sph. 253 d), which is an usual n am e  
for philosophers. This may suggest that only  the philosophers a re  
using it, in their attempt to determine what each eX8oC is; and th e
common view is precisely this — that Plato speaks here about a
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philosophical  method (which is usually referred to in m o d e rn  
exegesis as 'the method of synthesis and division'). Plato, h o w ev er, 
says explicitly:
(i) first, that this tw o-operation procedure of CTUvaywyf) an d  
S i a i p e a i C  is a business of s p e a k i n g  in general ('of Xeye iv  Kal 
c lp o v e l v '  —  Phdr, 266 b 4-5; 'of the Teyvri tüüv Xdywv'  — Phdr. 273  
d 7, e 3; 'of X eye iv '  — Phdr. 273 e 5; cf. also Phlb.  16 c: " [th is  
procedure] is the instrum ent through which all [ n d v T a  — m y
italics] d iscoveries ever made in the sphere of T€XVT| have b e e n
brought to light"); that is: it is s p e a k i n g  in general, through t h e
a u v a y t u y a i  and S i a i p e a e i C  of various € i 8t], which 'e s ta b lish e s '  
their K O iv w v ia i ;
(ii) and secondly, that only the philosophers, in their s p e a k i n g ,  
through their GMV o y i ^ y  o i  and 8 ia ip e c J € iC ,  are able to find out t h e  
actual  K O lVüüViai that exists between eiST] (cf. the occurrences o f  
Trecj)'UKevai at Phdr.  265 e 2: to divide ei8ri fo llow in g  t h e ir  
'objective articulation' —  as Hackforth translates; and at 266 b 6).
To sum up so far: in speaking, soul establishes a K o t v t n v i a  of v a rio u s  
eiSri, by determ ining their being identical with them selves (and th is  
is done through an 'operation' that Plato called a o v a y ü j y f j )  an d
different from others (and this is done through an 'operation' that he
called 8 i a i p e a i C ) .
7.4.2. S i a K p i y c L y  r d  y e v r )  r w y  e i S c u v
The two 'operations' of speaking, namely a u v a y t o y f j  a n d  
S i a i p e C T i C ,  cannot be of much help in our attem pt to determ ine th e  
essentia l  'what' of an eTSoC,  for they can only provide an  
'enum eration' of the 'parts' of an e l 8 o C  (i.e. the €i8ti 'embraced fro m  
without by an e Î 8 o C '  — cf. Sph. 253 d 7-8), and the 'enum eration o f 
the parts of something cannot tell us what that something is' (as 
Plato claimed in Tht. 207 a ff.). So, what should we do if we want to
know the essential  'what' of an e l 8 o C  (assuming that we h a v e
successfully practiced the y u p v a a i a  from the Parm enides)?
At the beginning of the Sophist  Socrates raises the question of 
8 i a K p i v e i v ,  in regard to their y e v o C ,  the c | ) i X o a o ( | ) 6 c  and the G e o C  (216 c 
2-4), in order to be able to distinguish one from another (216 a 5 -c  
4). Then, right after this, Socrates raises the question of S i a i p e l c r e a i ,  
in regard to their y e k o C ,  the cj) iXoao(j)ôC, the ttoXitikoC and the CToc|>iCTTf)C 
(217 a 7), again, in order to be able to distinguish one from a n o th e r
(216 c 8-d 2). Leaving aside the first question of d istingu ish ing
between c|3iXoCToct)6c and G e o C ,  Socrates says then about his second  
question (that about distinguishing between the c|)iXocto4)6t, th e
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ttoXltlkoC and the ao4>iaTfjC) that we, in our attem pt to d is tin g u ish  
them, should see whether their names correspond to one yevoC, to  
two or to three (217 a); in other words, that we should d is tin g u ish  
things by checking the relations between their names and their yivr] 
(cf. Heidegger 1992 b, 248).
Now, what does Plato mean here by yevoC? Usually, an d  
especially in the Sophist, yevoC is translated by 'genus', and it is 
opposed to eXSoC, taken as 'species'. Heidegger 1992 b, 243 ff., 
however, takes yevoC in its literal sense, i.e. as descen t (A b ku n ft) ,  
on the ground of a word that the Stranger uses for yevoC a few lines 
later, at 218 c 5, namely to  cj)uXov, which means 'race', 'people ', 
'nation', 'clan' or 'tribe' (cf. p. 243: "[yevoc is] that from which a th ing  
comes into being as it is, the stem, the origin [of something]" — m y  
translation). Yet what can we make out of this way of putting th ings
— that a thing has a descent?  First, however, we should ask o u rse lv es  
what is a 'descent'?
We say that a man Y traces his descent from the Queen X, a n d  
we mean that that man 'originated' from Queen X via a c e r ta in  
number of ancestors. Thus, we may say that this line of ancesto rs,
which began with the Queen X is responsible  for the way Y looks like,
for he inherited his features from his ancestors. In the Sophist, th e  
yévoC of something is, I think, to be understood as such a 'line of 
ancesto rs '.
Let us take, as Plato suggests, the clear example of the angler. 
First, when I want to know what an angler is, I do not deal with a 
particu lar  angler; I deal with the eXSoC of angler (for, as Plato argued , 
we can know only 'that which remains the same' — i.e. the eiSii). Now, 
the yevoQ of the angler, is, schematically, the following (see 219 a - 
221 c): TEyvTi, KTqaiC, yeipcuTiKii, eripeuTiKfj, CtyoerjpiKfj, evuSpov,
aXieuTiKfj. That is: the eXSoC of angler is 'embraced from without' b y  
the eiSri (cf. 219 a 8 where KTrjcriC is called eXSoC) of Teyvx], kttiœiC ktX. 
(When two EiSr, descend from a common ancestor — i.e. from th e  
same ei8oC — they are related, cruyyevri. This is the case with the eiSri 
of the angler and the sophist; they have a common ancestor, the eXSoT 
of Teyvri, and they both share a segment of the line of 'ancestors' th a t  
descends from the eXSoC of jeyvx], namely: ktt^cjiC, xeipcuTiKT, eripeuTiKq
— after which they 'separate': when they reach the art of an im al
hunting, 'the angler is going to the seashores, rivers and lakes a n d
angling the animals which are in them', whereas the sophist is going 
to 'land and water of another sort — rivers of wealth and b ro ad  
m eadowlands of generous youth to take the animals which are in  
them' — 221 d-222 a d.)
This procedure of revealing the yévoC of an eXSoC is called  
SiaKpiveiv TO yévoC (cf. Sph. 216 c ff.) (15). Now, the case of th e
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angler is, says Plato, eijyvcuQTov, 'well known' (218 e 2). That is: 
SiaKpiveiv the yévoç of the eTSoC of angler will not provide us an y  
'item of knowledge' that we do not already know. And yet, says 
Plato, following the peGoSoC (219 a 1) of this 'operation' of 8iaKpiveiv 
the yévoç of an elSoC, we will reach precisely the answer to the t i  
ooTiv question (at 217 b 2 the expression 'SiaipeTaGaL the y lv o Q  of th e  
the cj>i\ocjocj)6c, the ttoXitikoC and the cjocjjiaTfiC' is changed w ith
'8iopiaacrGai t i  ttot ’ eoTiv each one of them', which suggests that th e  
answer to the question 'What is the elGoC x?' is given by SiaKpiveiv 
the yévoç  of the eXSoC x); in other words, this 'operation' of 8iaKpiv€iv 
the yévoç of an eT8oC provides precisely the 'essential' w ha t  of th a t  
€l8oC, i.e. its 'essential* Koivcuviai with other eiGp. In short: th e
essential 'what' of an eTSoC resides in its yevoC (in its se insm asigen  
Abkunft, 'essential origin', as Heidegger 1992 b, 247 put it; cf. also p. 
259). (And the Sophist  ends with a firm answer to the q u es tio n  
regarding the 'essential' what  of the eXSoC of the sophist: first, there is 
a auvaywyfj of all the 'individual' sophists into a pia iSea, which is th e  
reyvri aoct>iaTiKfi; in other words: the eXSoC by the participation to 
which the 'individual' sophists are as they are is this kind of t€x^T|, 
namely Teyvrj CTO(j)iaTiKf|. And then, after the 8iaKpiveiv of its yevoC h as 
been accomplished, the eX8oC of the sophist appears in its 'e ssen tia l' 
what: this eX8oC of the Tey^F aoc^iaTiKq comes from "an insincere k in d  
of conceited mimicry, of the sem blance-m aking breed, derived fro m  
image making, distinguished as a portion, not divine, but human, of 
production, that presents a shadow play of words" — 268 c-d.)
(The so-called method of synthesis and division, which is sa id
to be emphasized in the Phaedrus, Sophist, Politicus and Philebus,
is not, in my view, a peGo8oC proper; as I argued, it seems that th is  
tw o-operation procedure of auvaywyri and SiaipeaiC is a business of 
speaking in general — cf. Phdr. 266 b 4-5; 273 d 7, e 3, e 5; Phlb. 1 6 
c. That is: it is speaking  in general, through the auvaytuyai and  
GiaipeaeiC of various €i8q, which 'establishes' a KOLVojvia of them . 
Now, what Plato says is that only the philosophers, in their sp eak ing  
about various eiSri, through their  aw ayajyai and 8iaipeaeiC, are ab le  
to find out the actual K oivw via that exists between them; and, at least 
in the Sophist, he seems to claim that the peGoGoC of 8iaKpiveiv th e  
ylvT\ of eiSx] is the most appropriate one for such a task.)
7.5. yoeCy rà eiSr]
On the one hand Plato claims that one cannot attempt to d isclose 
completely an eXSoC (TeXéœC èTncjTfjiJLin — VII 342 e; cf. also VII 342 e 
and Lg. 966 b) if one does not take into account its eiSmXov, ovopa
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and X o y o i.  On the other hand, he argues that alone by G ew peiv (w hich  
'provide' the eiScuX ov) and X e y e iv  (which 'provide' the o v o p a  and th e  
X o y o C ) one cannot 'reveal' how that eXSoC dXpGwC è o r i v  (cf. VII 343 b 
1, 343 d 8-e 1). Yet by 'moving up and down from one of th e se  
en tities  to another', he says, we may, through the process of v o e i v  
(342 d 2, 343 a 2), succeed (cf. 343 e 2-3) (Plato's terminology is n o t 
fixed; his commentator, however, for the sake of clarity, has to u se  
certain terms with just one technical meaning; this is the case h e re  
with the verb v o e i v ) .
v o e i v  is, for Plato, the ultimate mode of aXriGe-ueiv; but, odd ly  
enough, it is precisely this ultimate mode of aXTiGeaeiv that he left in  
obscurity. Why? Maybe because v o e i v  is an 'event' which is b e y o n d  
X e y e i v ,  and so one cannot describe  it adequately in words (and that is 
why, perhaps, he says that no 'serious man will ever think of w ritin g  
down' his v e v o p p e v a  — cf. VII 344 c). He says, however, a few th in g s 
about it.
(a) First, the act of v o e iv  occurs suddenly  (e^aicjiVpC — cf. Sm p.
210 e 4; VII 341 c 7) (16).
(b) Yet, although it is sudden, it is like an ’expected r e v e la t io n ',
for it is prepared  by a long training, which includes m oving u p
and down o v o p a r a ,  X oyo i, and a ia G fjo e iC  (VII 344 b; c f .
also Smp.  210 e 3).
(c) The very act of v o e iv  is most often described in terms of a n 
aiaO ria iC , i.e. of a f u l l  s i g h t  (KaToij/iC — Smp. 210 e 4; cf. a lso  
KaGopav — 211 b 6, e 1) which reveals an eXSoC as it is (cf. Smp.
210 e, 211 b, e) (17). An eXSoC, revealed by voeXv, how ever, w i l l
not take "the form of a face, or of hands, or of anything that h a s
to do with acüpa; it will be neither a XoyoC, nor eTno'Tijpp, n o r  
something that exists in something else [...]; for it is an aiJTO Ka0’ 
avTO p e e ’ aiJTOiJ p o v o e iS e C  d e l 6v" (Smp. 211 a) (18).
So, what can we make out of all this? I shall try, in what follows, to 
offer a rather rough comment.
(i) First, why did Plato compare the act of voeiv an eXSoC with a 
sight?  Because, I believe, he wanted to point out the idea that th is 
act, as the act of seeing, implies having a direct access to its 'object'. 
(But the KaroijfiC of voeiv is not an actual seeing; it is like seeing on ly  
insofar it provides a direct access to its 'object'.) If so, then it m ean s 
that only in voeiv an eXSoC, I have a direct access to it; and that in  
seeing an embodiment of it (in 'reality', or on the 'internal screen’ of 
my mind), or simply in 'understanding' it through an 'a b s tra c t 
account', I do not deal directly with it (19).
(ii) Secondly, is there any actual peGoSoC toward this act o f 
v o e i v ?  We may say, going beyond Plato's text, that the peG oSoi w hich  
aim at disclosing the — 'essential' or not — K o iv œ v ia i T ü j v  e iS o jv , e.g. th e
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p éeoS oC  of 8 ia K p iv € iv  th e  yevri o f  e i8 r i, are also ways, p e 0 o 8 o i ,  to w a rd  
the act of v o e iv  t c c  e iS r |. But this would be to go too far; for the act of 
v o e iv  Ta e i8 r | occurs — if  it occurs — after an obscure pattern, and so 
we cannot speak about any actual p e 0 o 8 o C  toward it.
(iii) Thirdly, what does in fact happen during this act? Does th e  
KŒToij/iC of v o e iv  grasp the K oiv a jv ia i in which a particular eXSoC is 
'caught' with other e i 8 q ?  Or does it grasp an isolated  eX 8 o C ?
The expression KaTo\|/iC (Smp. 210 e 4; cf. also Koceopdv — 211 b 
6, e 1) means actually full s ight  (cf. also W artelle's 1973, 1 12
comments on the occurence of KaGopav in Aristotle Rh. 1409 a 33: 
"KaGopav est traduit par M. Dufour par 'voir nettem ent', mai le 
préverbe K ara- marque peut-être la nuance de complétude plus q u e  
celle de netteté"). One may say that K ard^iC  supports the idea that in  
the act of v o e iv  there are grasped the K o iv œ v ia i in which a p a r tic u la r  
eXSoC is 'caught'. On the other hand, the expression a l r o  k o g ’ a l r o  peG’ 
aiiToX! pouoeiSèç  a e l  6v (Smp. 211 a), which refers to an eX8oC re v e a le d  
by v o e i v ,  suggests a 'seeing of one e i8 o C ' .
As far as I am concerned, I tend to believe that, if we accep t 
that there is such a thing as 'noetic knowledge', it must be a 'g rasp ing  
of relations'. As far as Plato  is concerned, he would probably say th a t  
we cannot put this experience into words, and so we just c an n o t 
speak about it.
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CONCLUSIONS
HYPOTHETICAL DIALECTIC 
AND METAPHYSICS
8.1. Plato's hypothetical dialectic
As I said in the Preface (see a.), Robinson 1953, v claims th a t, 
roughly speaking, there are two main methodological stages in Plato: 
that of the Socratic elenchus (prominent in the early dialogues); an d  
that of the Platonic dialectic, which contains two d is tin c t 
methodological devices, hypothesis (prominent in the Meno, Phaedo, 
Republic and Parmenides), and synthesis and division (prom inent in  
the Phaedrus, Sophist, Politicus and Philebus).
As far as I am concerned, I construe things differently. (W hat 
follows may cause some strong reactions; I ask the reader, h o w ev er, 
before launching his objections, to take into account what I sa id  
about my approach in section c of the Preface.)
8.1.1. A synopsis o f the pédoSo i
Plato's philosophy, I hold, covers two main 'areas': (a) that of 
the metaphysical nature  of the objects that can be known; and, once 
we accept the theory of eiGq (which is Plato's answer to the q u es tio n  
of the metaphysical nature of the objects that can be known), (b) that 
of how a particular eXSoC can be known. These areas are in v es tig a te d  
by means of several peGoSoi, but Plato is not always very explicit 
about their patterns. Regarding these péeoSoi, however, my co n clu ­
sions are the following.
(a) Plato's answer to the question regarding the m etap h y sica l 
nature of the objects that can be known comes in three main p a rts ; 
but he gives an explicit account only of the peGoSoC through w hich  
the first part was achieved.
(i) The first part of the answer (which first occurs in its f u l ln e s s  
in the P h a e d o )  introduces the theory of eiSr], which states th a t  
the 6 i8 t | are the only objects of know ledge and that they are a 
sort of T TapaSeiypaTa; and this theory is achieved and te sted  
through the peGoSoC described in the Phaedo  (see C h a p ter  
T h r e e ) .
(ii) The second part of the answer (which occurs in the R e p u b l i c )  
contains two main assumptions; that within the theory of eiG q  
being is understood as w h a t n e s s  and that w h a t n e s s  is d e te r m in e d
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by the Koivojvia of e i 6 r | ;  and it states that we should go b e y o n d  
the assum ptions of the theory and reach its àvuT ToGeT oC a p y f j ,
(called TO à y a G o v ), which is the cause of w h a t n e s s  in g e n e r a l .
This S i J v a p i C ,  however, remains som ething p o y i C  o p a a G a i ,  as 
well as the p e G o S o C  which is supposed to reveal it, for Plato d oes  
not say too much on either o f them (see Chapter Four).
(iii) The third part of the answer (which is fully developed in t h e  
S o p h i s t )  attempts to explicate and ground the two assum ptions o f  
the second part of the answer (that within the theory of eiSri
being is understood as w h a t n e s s ,  and that whatness  is determined 
by the KOiycDVia of e i S ï ] ) .  Yet the whole discussion about TCC 
p ey iC T T a  y e v r j ,  in spite of explicating and grounding to so m e  
extent the two assum ptions, left a fundam ental q u e s t io n  
unanswered — namely 'What is the KOiyœyia  t ü j v  e i S t u v ? '  A n d  
unanswered remains also the question about what was t h e  
p e G o 8 o C  through which he attempted to ground these tw o  
assum ptions (see Chapter Five). (A lthough the p r o c e d u r e  
through which he establishes that the e i 8 r |  are in a K O i v t u v i a
echoes the first step of the p e G o S o C  described in the Phaedo,  f o r
he argues like that: if  s p e a k i n g  is about £ i8 t| and if some w ord s  
unite with one another, and some not — then we have no c h o ic e :  
we have to admit that the e iS q  are a a v G e r a  and that they form a 
p ar t i cu lar  KOlVüJVia.)
(b) Now, if we accept the theory of e ï 8 q ,  in spite of all th e  
difficulties it raises, knowledge in general becomes a question o f  
knowing the eiSx]. The question becomes thus: how are we to know  
each e Î 8 o C .  Each e T S o C ,  however, has an 'essential' what, and th is  
'essential' w hat  must be first known. In his early and middle periods, 
Plato believed that the X e y d p e v o v  which reveals the 'essential what of 
something' is a o p i a p d c ,  i.e. a 'definition'. But, most of his attem pts to  
achieve such a o p i a p d c  failed (see 7.1.).
(iv) So, in the Meno,  Plato introduced a p e G o 8 o C  that aims not at 
finding the essential K o iv to v ia i of an cTSoC, but at e s t a b l i s h in g  
some particular KOiVüJViai of it. This p e G o 8 o C  is based o n 
TJTTOGecjeiC and it should be used when we cannot prove o r
disprove directly a K O ivtuvia  between two e iS r i  (see 7.2.), Yet, why
did Plato changed his focus — from the essential K oivcü via i of a n 
e l S o C  to just some particular K o iv o jv ia i of it? The c le a r e s t  
answer, I believe, is to be found in the P a r m e n i d e s .
(v) In the Parmenides  Plato claims that we cannot attempt to
find the o p i c r p o C  of an e X 8 oC  (i.e. its 'essential' what, namely its
essent ial  KOlVQJViai with other e i 8 r | ) ,  until we have a view of a l l  
the KOlVüJViai that that eX S oC  has with other e i S r i  ( in c lu d in g  
with its à v T i T i O é p e v o v ) ;  and he introduces a p e G o 8 o C  w h ic h  
states that we should first aim at determ ining al l  the KOiVüüViai 
that an eXSoC has with other e i 8 q  (see 7.3.).
(vi) Finally, in the S o p h i s t  Plato claims that the essent ial  'w h a t' 
of an €X8o C resides in its y e v o C ,  i.e. in its d e s c e n t  from o th e r
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£l8T]; and he introduces a peGoSoC aimed at SiaKpiveiv the yevoC 
of an el8oC (see 7.4.). This peGoSoC (w hich should be u sed , 
arguably, after we have applied the peGoSoC from th e  
P a r m e n i d e s )  is, Plato seems to imply, able to provide us with a kavoC opicrpoC. (A lthough the f o r m  o f opiopoC does not r e f e r  
here to a phrase o f the type 'shape is the limit of a solid', as M e n .
76 a states, but to a 'enum eration of the parts of a yévoC, as it is  
claimed at the end of the Sophist; cf. also Sph. 221 d-222 a d.)
(As I argued in 7.5. for Plato all our 'epistemological dealings' w ith  
ovopara , xdyoi, dij/€iC, and aioGfjoeiC should eventually aim at reach in g  
the 'act' of voeiv tcl eiSq, which is the ultimate mode of aXriGeaeiv (cf. 
VII 344 b; cf. also Smp. 210 e 3, etc.). We may say, going b e y o n d  
Plato's text, that the peGo8oi which aim at disclosing the — 'essen tia l' 
or n o t— Koivcoviai t ü j v  eiScüv, e.g. the peGoSoC of 8iaKpiveiv the yevp of 
ei8r|, are also ways, peGoSoi, toward the act of voeiv t c c  ei8p. But th is, 
as I said at the end of 7.5., would be to go too far; for the act of voeiv 
T& ei8ri occurs — i f  it occurs — after an obscure pattern, and so w e 
cannot actually speak about any actual peGo8oC toward it.)
Now, what does Plato say about all these peGo8oi?
8.1.2. The dialectical character o f  the peOoSoi
The peGo8oi I briefly described above are either referred to as 
dialectical, or implicitly connected with SiaXeKTiKfj, dialectic, o r 
SiaXeyeiv, dialogue.
(a) In the first area:
(i) the peGo8oC which introduces the theory o f ei8r| (cf. Phd.  101 
e ; cf. also 99 d ff. and 67 a-b), and (ii) the peGo8oC which is  
supposed o reveal the cxvuTToGeToC apXP of the theory of ei8p ( c f .
R. 511 b 4, c 5, 532 a 2, 533 c 7) are explicitly  called d ia lec t i c;  ( i i i )  
as regarding the grounding o f the two assum ptions of the th e o r y  
that Plato undertook in the Sophist,  there are no reliable h in t s  
about any particular peGo8oC he used; yet he took great effort to  
present his 'way of reasoning' (his peGo8oC in a very w id e  
sense) into this matter as a d ia lo g ue  between two characters ( t h e  
Stranger from Elea and Socrates/Theaetetus).
(b) In the second area, the situation is this. When Plato refers i n 
general to the peGoSoC that aims at determining what each eXSoC 
is (cf. R. 534 b 3, 531 e 2 ff.), he calls it dialectic.  Though, when h e 
speaks about the different types of this peGoSoC, only one — i.e .
(vi), that of 8iaKpiveiv the yevoC of an eX8oC — is e x p l ic i t ly  
called d ia lec t i c  (cf. Sph.  231 c 9, 253 d-e); but, again, he took g r e a t  
effort to present the other two peGoSoi — i.e. (iv) and (v) — as 
having the form of a d ia lo g u e  between two characters (S o cr a te s  
and Meno in the M e n o  and Parmenides and the young Aristotle i n 
the Parmenides,  cf. 137 b ff.).
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In short, as Robinson 1953, 70 put it, "the word 'dialectic' had a 
strong tendency in Plato to mean 'the ideal method, whatever th a t  
may be.’” But what does this word, 'dialectic', mean in Plato? A nd  
what is the connection between dialectic and d ia logue?
In the Introduction I argued that for Socrates the a ssu m ed  
ignorance was that which required a peGoSoC (see 0.1.1.); that for h im  
the locus of certainty is the communion of minds (auvoucria) (see
0.1.2.); that that is the reason for which one of the main 'elements' of 
his peGoSoC is the dialogue (see 0.1.3.); and that Plato's ph ilosoph ical 
search began as it did because of Socrates influence, i.e. because i t  
started somehow from the results of Socrates' philosophy (see 0.2.). 
Now, the main 'elements' of Socratism (e.g. the assumed ignorance, o r 
the eXeyxoC)  are often echoed in Plato texts (cf. for instance Sph. 2 2 9  
c: 'the great source of all errors', 'the one very large and bad sort of 
ignorance', 'which may be weighted in the scale against all o th e r  
sorts of ignorance put together', is 'when one supposes that h e  
knows, and does not know'); but the 'element' of Socratism that P lato
ad op ted  throughout his work was the dialogue.
As I claimed (0.1.2.), Socrates did not write anything p rec ise ly  
because writing  is an individual  process, which cannot be done  
koivÆc. Plato, on the contrary, wrote a lot; but, because he, as 
Socrates, believed that the quest for knowledge should be done  
koivüjC, he was not, after all, very happy about writing philosophy.
There are two main Platonic 'attacks' against writing — one in  
the Phaedrus,  and one in the seventh letter. These attacks are a im ed  
at two targets: at the possibility, offered by the author's absence, to  
m anipulate that which is written (cf. Phdr. 275 e: a text, a
yeypappei^oC, may be 'ill-treated and unfairly abused, for it is not ab le  
to defend or help itself, always needing its parent to come to its he lp ' 
— my paraphrase); and at the individuality  of writing, as opposed to 
the com m union  of speaking  (cf. Phdr, 275 d: a yeypappei^oC can n o t 
a n sw er  to the questions of its reader: it always remains silent, Trdvu 
criyq). Plato's 'attacks' on writing have been in terpreted in m an y  
ways; as far as I am concerned, I think that they were meant to point 
out that writing is 'weak', because it cannot provide a real 
communion between writer and reader, i.e. a real communion of
m inds.
In my view, for Plato, as for Socrates, the locus of certainty is 
the communion of minds (auvouaia) (cf. for instance Tht. 181 c: "I 
[Socrates] must not be alone in my opinion; you must take your sh a re  
[auppeTex^] in the risk, so that we may meet together whatever fa te  
shall befall us [iVa koivtJ) dv t i  Kai Se-g]" (1))- And for him, as
for Socrates, c[)i\oaocj)eiy is actually a au|jL4>iXoao4)eiv. (With a few  
exceptions, the main character of each dialogue is Socrates; but not a
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single dialogue has as title his name: they all have as title a n o th er  
man's name, who is Socrates' main interlocutor. This a p p a re n t  
bizarrerie was intended to suggest, I believe, Plato's conviction th a t
the locus of certainty is the communion of minds.)
The task of a communion of minds (auvovaia) is to reach an  
agreement, a auvcopoXoyffaeai, about the thing sought to be known. A t 
the beginning of the Sophist, Plato claims that all we possess in
common are names (218 c 1); the thing (to epyov), however, to w hich  
each of us gives a particular name may be different (218 c 2). Now, 
an agreement (crui^cupoXoyffcreai, which the Stranger from Elea tries so 
hard to achieve — cf. 246 e 8, 247 c 1, d 7, 248 a 1, d 1, 249 e 7, 25 2 
a 5, 253 b 9, 254 b 10-11, 256 a l l ,  etc.) about the thing itself (to 
TTpdyjJia), claims Plato, as well as the dXgeeC of a t i , can be re a c h e d
only 8id Xdywv (218 c 4-5; cf. 253 b 10).
That is: a communion of individual minds is possible on ly  
through the medium of XdyoC, language; and that is why for Plato the 
path, péeoSoC, towards certain knowledge (by which emaTigpiri is 
achieved) is a Twv xdymv peGoSoC (Sph. 227 a 8; cf. also Smp. 202 a 6 -  
7: 'how can it be èTTiaTpprj without XoyoC?'; see also R. 533 b, 534 b; 
Sph. 253 b 10; Phlb. 57 e-58 a, 59 a, 61 e). But a communion of 
individual minds through the medium of XoyoC is actually a S id - 
XoyoC; and so, the pcGoSoC, toward certain knowledge is not a m e re  
Tciïv Xoytuv peGoSoC, it is a Sia-XeKTLKT] peGoSoC (R. 533 b 3, c 7). (As I 
argued at the begining of Chapter Two, given this ambiguity th a t  
pcTd has in compounds, the word péGoSoC implies both a path th a t  
goes tow ards  something' and 'a path that is covered together', i.e. 
with, peTŒ, others. So, if he did coin the word peGo8oC, he managed to  
find a word which suits rather well his view according to which th e  
locus of certainty is the com m union  of minds.)
To conclude: Plato's peGoSoi are dialectic, in the sense that th e y  
are supposed to be undertaken through 8ia-Xeyeiv, dialectic, b ecau se  
he believed that the locus of certainty is the com m union  of m in d s 
and that such a com m union  is possible only through the medium of 
XdyoC, language; and the fact that Plato chose to write dialogues —i.e. 
copies, ei8œXa, of living (8 ia-)x6yo i (cf. Phdr. 276 a) — is, in my view , 
a symbolic gesture, designed to point out precisely this belief of h is 
(2 ).
(In the Sophist 263 e Plato claims that thinking, 8Ldvoia, is 
"the inward dialogue [SidXoyoC] carried out by the the soul [iliuyfi] 
with itself without spoken sound"; and in the Theaetetus 189 e-190 a 
he goes even further and says that "when the soul is th in k in g  
[Siavooupevp] it is simply talking to herself [8iaXeyeaGai] ask ing  
questions and answering them, and saying yes or no." One may claim  
that these two passages do not support the idea that dialectic  im plies
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a communion  of minds as the locus of certainty. In my view , 
however, this claim — that thinking is a dialogue, or a sequence o f  
questions and yes-and-no answers — is nothing but an exaggeration. 
We 'hear' sometimes, in our minds, the hubbub of many voices — like  
a character from Samuel Beckett's last writings — or even p ro p e r  
dialogues, but to say that thinking is a dialogue, let alone a seq u en ce  
of questions and yes-and-no answers, is either a naivete or an  
exaggeration. As far as I am concerned, I cannot but take this claim  
as an exaggeration that Plato made deliberately; and I think that its  
sole aim was to point out his belief that the locus of certainty is th e  
com m union  of minds; in other words: he believed so strongly that in  
thinking certainty can be achieved only by a com m union  of m in d s
through the means of dialogue, that he, for the purpose of
emphasizing this belief, claimed, obliquely, that even the ind iv idua l  
thinking, as an inferior copy of the paradigmatic communal th inking,
must have the form of a dialogue.)
8.1.3. The hypothetical character o f  dialectic
As I said, Plato's philosophical search covers two main 'areas' —
(a) that of the metaphysical nature of the objects that can be kn o w n  
and (b) that of the eiSr) themselves; and both these areas a re
investigated by péeoSoi which, as I argued, are dialectical; they (w ith  
one exception), however, are, in one way or another, connected w ith  
the use TJiroeeaeiC.
(a) In the first area:
(i) the p£0oSoC  which introduces the theory of e i8 r | aims a t 
finding, using and assessing "UTroGeaeiC (cf. Phd.  100 a-101 e);
(ii) the p e6o8oC  which is supposed to reach the 'limit o f t h e  
in tellig ib le' (i.e. the avUTToGeroC d p y q ) aims at 'd e s tr o y in g '  
liTToGecreLC (R. 533 c 7~d 1); and
(iii) the p € G o 8 o C  which introduces the view that in the theory o f  
e i8 r | being is understood as w h a t n e s s  and that w h a t n e s s  is  
determined by the KOiycuuia o f € t8 g  starts from a h y p o t h e t ic a l  
argument (if s p e a k in g  is about e iS q  and if some words unite w ith  
one another, and some not — then we have no choice: we have to  
admit that the € i6r| are a u v G e ra  and that they form a p a r t i c u l a r  
KOLVtiJVia —  cf. Sph. 259 e-260 a; cf. also 252 a ff.).
(b) In the second area:
(iv) in the M e n o  Plato introduces a p eG o 8 o C  which should be u sed  
when we cannot prove or disprove directly a KOivcnvia b e tw e e n  
two eiSri; and this peG o8oC, which aims not at finding th e  
essential K O ivœ via i of an elGoC, but at estab lish ing  a f e w  
particular K o iv to p ia i  of it, is based on UTToGeCTeiC.
(v) in the P a r m e n i d e s  Plato introduces a p€Go8oÇ which aims a t 
determining all  the K O iv u jv ia i that an eX8oC has with other e iS q
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(possibly as a preparation for determ ining what are its e s s e n t i a l  
KOivcoi^Cai with other e iS p ) ,  and which is also based o n  
TJiToGeaeiC; and, finally,
(vi) in the Sophist  Plato seems to suggest that the e s s e n t i a l  
'what' of an elSoC resides in its yevoC, i.e. in its d e s c e n t  fr o m  
other eiSri; and he introduces a peGoSoC aimed at SiaKpii^eiP t h e  
yévoÇ of that eXSoC, which is not based on iJTToGeCTeiC.
As I argued in 2.1 the w ord uiroGeCTiC has in Plato v a rio u s 
meanings ('theory', 'statem ent', 'starting point for discussion', etc.); 
and the main determination of a TjiroGecriC qua  theory or statem ent is 
that its truth, although probable to some extent, remains to b e  
established. Now, he (as far as I know) does not use the ad jec tiv e  
liTToGeTiKoC. Had he use it, I believe he would have meant by it n o t 
only something connected with the use o f inrodéaeiC, but also what we 
mean by hypothetical, i.e. something not yet surely proved as true or  
fa lse.
All these peGoSoi I mentioned above can be called h yp o th e tica l  
in this sense, because — when they deal with the field of to  
avaicrGriTov (and, apart from the situations in which at stake is 
determ ining a non-abstract eTSoC, this is always the case) th e ir  
results, even if they are not explicitly said to be obtained 
TjTToGéaeüJv, remain, to a greater or smaller extent, uncertain. At th e  
end of Chapter Two, I argued that the péGoSoC which introduces th e  
theory of eiSp (theory which belongs to the field of to  àvaiaGriTov) is 
grounded on the oup^wwia of our Xeyopeva; and at the end of C hap ter 
Six I argued that the peGoSoC in general which aim at determining the 
abstract eiSq themselves is also grounded on the aupcj)covia of o u r 
Xeydpeva. As I argued in the above mentioned chapters, the aupcjxuvia 
of our Xeyopeva is a criterion that does not guarantee  truth; a resu lt, 
that is, grounded only on the aupcj^cuvia of our Xeyopeva, is not fu lly  
justified (although its truth could be very likely). That is why th e  
peGoSoC which introduces the theory of eiSp and the peGoSoi w hich  
aim at determining the abstract eiSri themselves are hypothetical, in  
the sense that all they can offer are hypothetical results. And so, to 
risk a general formula, we may say that Plato's methodology is b o th  
dialectic  and hypothetical; or, that his dialectic  (as a general term fo r 
his methodology) is hypothetical. (Thus, for me, unlike for Robinson, 
the Platonic methodology is not very different from the Socratic one, 
which is, however, less elaborated and which is based, mainly, only  
on one procedure, that of eXeyyoC; because both methodologies are (i) 
dialectic, in the sense that they are supposed to be u n d e r ta k e n  
through S ia-X eyeip , dialectic, because for both Socrates and Plato th e  
locus of certainty is the com m union  of minds, and such a c o m m u n io n  
is possible only through the medium of XoyoC, language; and (ii)
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hypothetica l,  for the results achieved through these methodologies — 
grounded as they are mainly on the tcüv XeyopevtDV —re m a in
not fully justified.)
(If so, however, then in Plato there is a rather d iffe re n t 
situation that in most of other Greek thinkers. The Greek th in k e rs  
tended to ground their arguments about that which is beyond th e  
reach of our experience on foundations, not on coherence  — if I m ay  
use these modern terms. They called sometimes these fo u n d atio n s 
ijTroeeaeiC; and they provided, roughly speaking, two solutions fo r 
assuring the 'firm ness’ of a foundation, (i) The Greek g eo m ete rs  
suggested to accept, conventionally, that the foundation, the woGeaiC 
of an ensuing argument is sure and continue our investigations as if  
it were so — in which case their foundation is what we usually call a 
postulate, i.e. a proposition conventionally accepted as true for th e  
sake of our investigations. And (ii) Aristotle suggested that w e 
should accept as the foundations of our arguments only those dpyai 
which are ev id en tly  sure — in which case his foundation is what w e 
usually call an axiom, i.e. a statement for which no proof is re q u ire d , 
because its truth is self-evident. The problem of the certainty of 
'what could be put under as a ground' for our reasonings, w hich  
Greek philosophers tried so desperately to solve, ended up, how ever, 
in the Sceptic aporia: either an unsupported agreement or an in fin ite  
regression. Plato, however, attem pted to solve this aporia b y  
introducing coherence as a possible criterion of truth. For o th e r  
details about all this and for the unique place that Plato has am ong 
Greek thinkers as regarding the use of the word woGeaiC, and th e  
implications of it, see Annex II.)
8.2. Hypothetical dialectic and metaphysics
As I said in the Preface (see b, 1), Robinson 1953 claims th a t  
the Platonic hypothetical method (as he construes it) is not lin k ed  
with the Platonic metaphysics. For, argues Robinson, Plato did neither 
achieve his m etaphysics through this method (which is 
recommended, but not used); nor did he derive this method from his 
metaphysics (in which case he must have asked "what it is in th e  
nature of things and the nature of men that makes [...it] desirable", o r 
"suitable" — p. 178). (As I said, Robinson 1953, 178 claims that "if a 
method is suitable, that must surely be because the reality sought to 
be known is such and such, and the human mind that seeks to know  
it is such and such"; but, he believes that "Plato’s insight did not go as 
far as that" — p. 178).
In my view Robinson was wrong. So far, I showed that th e  
criterion on which Plato's peGoSoi are grounded is coherence
130
(CTop.c[)üJvia TCüv Xeyopevajv) (see 8.1.3.). In what follows, I will show  
that Plato made an attempt to prove that both human mind an d  
'reality' are harmonic, i.e. that coherence is imm anent in both re a lity  
and th inking; and that this 'correspondence' between his m ain  
methodological criterion ( a u p ^ a j v i a  X e y d p e v t D v )  and th e
metaphysical principle of d p p o v i a  is what makes his p é e o S o i  suitable.
8.2.LThe correspondence between the avpcpujyia râ)y k e y o p e y œ y  a n d  
the a p p o y i a  rujy e i S œy
(a) As I argued, in the Sophist  Plato claims that t o  d v ,  T o u T o v  
and e d c T e p o v  S i a  u d v T w v  K e K o i v c u v T | K e v a i  (cf. 255 e, 256 a and 259 a). 
And that means that reality  in general is thought as whatness,  a n d  
that whatness in general is thought as being caused by the Koiyujyia 
with others. In less abstract words: (i) reality  is reduced to e iS p ; (ii) 
the eiSri exist as having an identity (a what); and (iii) the id en t i ty  of 
every e l S o C  (and so of every sensible thing) is thought as be ing  
caused by the K o i v m v i a i  in which that e T S o C  is 'caught' with o th e r  
c i S T j .  The 'world of e i S q ' ,  however, is, according to Plato, not a chaos, 
but a K o a p o C  T w v  e i S o j v ;  in short: the K o i v a j v i a  t ü j v  e i S i o v  is, we may say, 
a d p p o v i a .  (When he said that philosophy is the p e y i o r g  p o u c r i K f j  —  Phd. 
61 a 3-4; cf. also R. 548 b 9; TL 88 c 5 — he might have thought th a t
this way of putting things is appropriate because philosophy, like
povQiKfj in general, is concerned with a p p o y i a i . )
(b) In the Tim aeus  Plato produces the same argum ents a b o u t 
world-soul and human soul. The two arguments run as follows.
(i) The world-soul
(a )  The soul of the u n iv e r s e  is framed by the Dem iurge fr o m
oÙŒia, TOÙTOV and GdcTepov (35 a) (I will not enter into t h e
details concerning the 'indivisible' and 'divisible' kinds o f oTjcTiœ, 
TttTJTOV and G aTSpov and the division of the w orld-soul in to  
harmonic intervals —  for which Cornford 1937, 60 ff. offers v e r y
valuable com m ents); that is: the soul of the universe is an €K T£
TOÛTOU Kai GaTEpou Kai TpC oiJcriaC p e p e iy p e v r i (35 b 3; cf. a lso  
37 a 2-4).
(P) From this p e p c iy p e v q  the Demiurge made two rings (36 b - c )
(the rings of sam eness and of d ifference — 35 a), which he f ir s t  
divided in certain proportions (b) and then set them in m o tio n
(c-d). I cannot enter here into the com plicated p r o b le m s
regarding the divisions and the motions (c|)Opai, Tr€pic|)opai o r 
T T ep io S o i) of the two rings (for which Cornford 1937 is, again, o f  
invaluable help). What is important, however, is that th e  
c o m p o s i t i o n  of the w orld-sou l (cf. 37 a 1), as well as its m o t i o n s  
(i.e. the motions of its rings) (cf. 47 d 2-3) are h a r m o n i c .
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(ii) The human soul
( a )  The learning part of the human soul ( t o  XoyicrTiKOV) is a 
copy of the world-soul: it is made out of the same (though le s s
pure) ingredients (i.e. OLicria, t œÙj o v  and GctTepov —  41 d).
(|3) From this pepeiypeV T ] the Demiurge made two rings ( t h e  
rings of sameness and of difference —  43 e f., 44 d), which he f ir s t  
divided in the same proportions as those of the w orld-soul (43 d, 
cf. also Cornford 1937, 149, n. 1) and then set them in motion; b u t
its revolutions are not as those of the world-soul, for they a r e
perturbed by various things, e.g. by the inflow  of n o u r is h m e n t  
or the sensations com ing from without (e^oGev aiaGfjaeiC),
"which draw in their train the whole vessel of the soul" (44 a )
(cf. also 43 a ff., 47 b, 90 d). Thus, when a soul whose r e v o lu t io n s
are troubled "meet with som ething outside [.,.] they sh o w
them selves mistaken and foolish  [about what falls under r a v T O V  
and what under GcxTepov]" (43 c-d). Yet, if one take care o f h i s  
soul, "we might reproduce the perfectly unerring revolutions o f  
the god and reduce to settled order the wandering motions in o u r  
[revolutions]" (47 c; Cornford's 1937 translation); and so t h e
learning part o f the soul w ill eventually im i ta t e  the h a r m o n ie s  (d p p o v ia i)  and revolutions (w cp i^opat) of the world-soul (90 c-d; 
cf. also 47 b-c). Thus, not only the c o m p o s i t i o n  of the human so u l, 
but also its motions  are h a r m o n i c .
Now, what does this mean — that the composition  and the motions of 
the world-soul and the human soul are harmonic? But first — what i t  
is actually at stake in Plato's claim that the world-soul is a 'm ix tu re ' 
of ouaia, TaijTov and GctTepov?
The world-soul is said to 'participate (peTeyouaa) in XoyiapoC 
and àppovia (36 e 6-37 a 1), and to have an 'intelligent' (£p({)povoC) 
and eternal life (36 e 4). Now, what it actually 'does' in its eternal life  
is to 'perform a sort of revolutions (TTepic[)opai) which e v e n tu a lly  
produce a XdyoC (cf. 37 b ff., 47 b, 90 c-d). That is: what it 'does' in its  
revolutions is to know. I paraphrase the passage from Ti. 37 a -b  
(using some segments from Cornford's translation, 1937):
[...] w henever the world-soul is in contact (£({)iiiTTT|TaL) w ith  
anything that has dispersed existence (aKeSacTTpv ouCTiav) o r  
with anything whose existence is ind iv isib le (àpépiŒ TOV), it is  
set in motion all through herself and tells in what r e s p e c t  
precisely, and how, and in what sense, and when, it comes a b o u t  
that something is qualified as either being TOVTOV or €T £pov i n 
respect to any given thing, whatever it may be, either in th e  
world of TŒ y iy v o p e v a ,  or in the world of Ta kœtœ TaiJTCt e y o v T a  
a € l .  Now whenever the X o y o C  takes place concerning the TOUTOV 
and GctTepov of an OV which belongs to the sphere o f t o  
aiaGpTOV, then arise 8oÇ ai and ttic tt6 iC , which are [3e(3aioi a n d  
dXriGeXC. But w henever the XoyoC takes place concern ing th e  
Tail TO V and GdcTepov of an o v  which belongs to the sphere of t o  
XoyiOTiKOV, then vouC and emaTT]|JLr| are necessarily  a c h ie v e d  
[which are, most obviously, also p é(3 a io i and dXiT|GeiC].
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As I claimed in 7.4.1., in speaking,  soul establishes a Koivcovia of 
various eiSri, by determining their being identical  with th em se lv e s  
(and this is done through an 'operation' that Plato called cmvaymyq) 
and different  from others (and this is done through an 'o p e ra tio n ' 
that he called 8iaipeaiC). That is: in knowing through SiavoeTaGai 
(which takes place within the 'medium' of Xeyeiv — cf. Sph, 263 e, 
Tht. 189 e-190 a), soul deals, ultimately,  with oùaia, tœûtov an d  
edrepov.
So, when Plato claims that the world-soul and the human souls 
are a 'mixture' of oucria, raiJTov and Odrepov, what is at stake is t h e  
question o f  know ledge ,  not a question of p h y s ic a l  'anatomy'. If so, 
then Plato's claim — that, from an epistemological  point of view , th e  
world-soul and the human souls are made out of odcria, tœijtov an d  
ed repov  — means that soul in general, in its way towards know ledge, 
deals with oijaia, tœ^tov and edrepov because  it was made in such a 
way as to deal with oûoda, TaÙTov and edrepov. Put in m o d e rn  
philosophical terms: the way we know the objects we encounter in  
our experience is 'construed' according to what is already given in us, 
i.e. according to our transcendental  'elements' (viz. oucria, raiJTov a n d
edT€pOV).
But, as I said above in (a), in the Soph is t  Plato claims that th e  
p ey ia ra  yevv\ of to  ov, tuiitov and edTCpov Sid rrdvTüJv K€K0 ivwvT|K6 vai (cf. 
255 e, 256 a and 259 a); which means that the ultim ate 'elem ents' of 
rea l i ty  (be it t r a n s c e n d e n t  or im m a n e n t )  are the s a m e  as th e  
transcendental  'elements', viz. to  ov, tœijtov and edTepov (3). And th e  
similarity does not stop here.
To go back to the previous question, namely what does th is  
mean — that the com pos i t ion  and the m o t io n s  of the world-soul a n d  
human souls are harmonic?  Due mainly to Kant, we know what th e  
notion of transcendental is aimed at, and we may speak about it in a 
highly abstract way. That is why, we are prone to regard w ith  
suspicion Plato's speaking about 'that which is already given in o u r 
mind' in terms of 'two rings that were divided and set in motion by a 
Demiurge'. But these are his terms (which he tells us not to take in  
their letters — cf. 29 b-d, 30 b, 48 d, 53 d, 55 d, 56 a a, 57 d, 59 c, 
etc.), and the way he puts things implies that for him 'that which is 
already given in the soul' (what we call transcendental) has th re e  
'elements', which were put together in a harmonic way, and w hich  
are in harmonic motions; it implies, in short, that the structure  a n d  
the dynamics  of the transcendental are h a r m o n ic .
But, as I said above in (a), for Plato the transcendent  r e a l i t y  
(i.e. the 'world of £i8ri') is a appovia (for the £i8t| form not a chaos, b u t  
a KoopoC); and that means that the transcendent reality (and, to som e 
extent, its copy, i.e. the immanent  reali ty )  are not only 'made fro m
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the same elements' as the transcendental,  but that they are in th e  
same way, namely in a harmonic way (4). (Now, what does harm onic  
mean in all this? One may say that it means 'according to som e 
particular proportions, which may be expressed mathematically' — cf. 
Ti. 35 b-36 d. But this answer will only hide the fact that appovia 
remains here a rather obscure word, and that that which is 
designated by it recedes from us.)
To conclude:
(i) As Robinson 1953, 178, I believe that "if a method is su ita b le ,  
that must surely be because the reality sought to be known is  
such and such, and the human mind that seeks to know it is s u c h  
and such". But unlike him, I do not believe that "Plato's in s ig h t  
did not go as far as that" (p. 178).
(ii) Plato argued that the t ranscendent  reali ty  (and, to so m e  
extent, its copy, i.e. the immanent r e a l i t y )  are not only 'm ade
from the same elements' as the t ranscendental  (i.e. t o  o v ,  t u i j t o v  
and G d t T e p o v ) ,  but that they are  in the same way, nam ely in a 
harmonic  way.
(iii) So, we may say that the peGoSoi which aim at d e te r m in in g  
the abstract €iSp, as well as the peOoSoi that introduce a n d  '
develop the theory of e i8r |, are su i ta b l e  (to use R o b in so n 's
expression) because the c r i t e r i o n  on which they are g ro u n d e d ,
i.e. the crijpc|)tijvia t o j v  Xeyopevtuv, corresponds  to the p r i n c i p l e s  
of both 'the reality sought to be known' (àppovia t ü j v  e i8 ü j v ) a n d  
to that of 'the human mind that seeks to know it' (àppovia TpC 
ijjuxfjC). In short: I claim that Plato's pe0o8oi in g e n e r a l a r e
'suitable' because their criterion is coherence, and coherence is  
'immanent' in both reality and thinking.
There remain, however, two things that need to be clarified. One is
the difference between the 'levels' at which the two groups of
pe0o8ot function; and the other is the relation between th e  
methodological criterion of coherence and the m etaphysical p rin c ip le  
of coherence in the case of the pe0o8o i that introduce and develop the 
theory of ei8r|. The first one, I think, can be clarified rather easily  
and I shall discuss it in what follows; the second one, however, ra ises
more problems and I shall deal with it in extenso in 8.2.2.
The pe6o8oi which aim at determining the abstract ei8ri 
themselves function, so to say, in the field of T o  dvaicr0r]Tov (i.e. in th e  
field of 'abstract m atters'), but at the level o f  e i S r j .  And they aim a t  
determining the Koivcuviai that exist between particular abstract ei8r| 
— 'courage', 'justice', etc. — by relying on a criterion, the criterion of 
coherence (aupcjjujvia), which corresponds to the m etap h y sica l 
principle of both the investigated transcendent reality (the Koivcüviai 
that exist between particular abstract eiSg) and the tran sce n d en ta l,
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viz. the principle of coherence (appovia). That is why, we may say, 
they are su i tab le .
The p€0 o8 oi which introduce and develop the theory of c t8 p 
function also in the field of to  avaio'0r|Tov, but at a meta-eiSr] level,
i.e. at a level that has as its object the very level o f  eiSr) a n d  
everything that this level of e iS g  presuposes.
In Chapter Four I showed that in the Republic Plato claims t h a t  
there is something beyond  (èTreKeiva) ouaia in 'dignity' (irpeapeig) a n d  
'p o w er ' (S-uvdpei) (509 b 8 ) — which he calls to  dya 0 6 v; that is: oijoia 
(understood as whatness) has an origin, an dpxB (cf. the expression r\ 
TOÎJ TravToC dpxp, at 511 b 7), namely to  dya0ov (cf. also 509 b 8 , w h e r e  
it is said that to  dya0ov provides, irpoaeTvai, o u a i a o f  all £ i8 t|). And th is  
origin, Plato says, is 'the limit of the intelligible' (532 a 7- b 1). Yet, 
when he starts speaking about to  a y a 0 6 v, he refers to it as q tou 
dya0ou l8ea (508 e 2-3). Why then, does he name iSea  'that which is 
beyond all iSeai  and determines them all'?
In Chapter Five I showed that in the S o p h is t  Plato claims also 
that there is someting 'present' in all e i8 r| — namely to  o v , tœtjtov a n d  
0dT£pov. These three 'elements' are also at 'the limit of th e
intelligible', he suggests; and he claims that they make possible th e  
ouaia (i.e. the whatness)  of every £l8 oC (for they make possible th e  
Koivüjvia Twv £iS(Jüv). Yet, he call iSéai these three 'elements' that a r e  
'beyond' all i 8 £ai (cf. for instance the expression iSéa TpC 0 aT£pon a t  
255 e). Why?
Because the rne ta-£ i8 p level, like the 'level of £ i8 t|', is 
investigated by the same means, i.e. by speaking; and for P la to
speaking does always  operate with £ i8 t). We can, that is, u n d e r s t a n d  
this m e ta -£ i8 'n level only by speaking about it (although, a rg u a b ly ,  
we may say that one can also know it through the act of vo£iv); a n d
speaking can operate only with £ i 8 p. In short: we can understand  th e
very notion of £TSoC (and everything that belongs to this 'm e ta - £ i 8 T| 
level') only by using some particular su i -g en er i s  £ i8 t|, like p toÎj
dya0 oîj i 8 £a or r\ totj 0 aT£pou iSéa. (Today, however, this idea o f  
circulus vitiosus is seen as a triviality.)
So, the p£0 o8 oi which introduce and develop the theory of £ i8 p 
operate also with £i8 t], and, I believe, they also determ ine th e
Koivojviai that exist between these sui-generis  £ i8 p (for these £i8 p too 
are aiJv0 £Ta, like, for instance, the very £i8 t| of to  o v , tq ijtov a n d  
0dT£pOV).
Now, since these s u i-g en er i s  £i8 p are abstract,  the p£0 o8 oi t h a t  
operate with them (i.e. p£0 o8 oi which introduce and develop th e
theory of £ i8 p) cannot but rely on the criterion of c o h e re n c e
(CTup4>üJvia Twv X£ydp£vwv) (cf. for instance the account on the p£0o8oC 
that introduces the theory of £i8 p from the P haedo  100 a ff.). Thus,
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we may say (generalizing, I know) that the geeoSoi which in tro d u c e  
and develop the theory of eiSq are also suitable, because they rely on 
a criterion, the criterion of coherence (avpcjjcovia), which co rresp o n d s 
to the m etaphysical principle of both the investigated 'm e ta -re a li ty ' 
(the Koivüjviai that exist between particular eiSq that concern th e  
'meta-£i8Ti level') and the transcendental — viz. the principle of 
coherence (dppovia).
8.2.2. From a v p f t u y i a  tüûv k e y o p e y w y  to a p p o v i a  r œ y  e iS o jy  and f r o m  
a p p o v i a  Tujy eiSajy to a v p f c u y i a  tüjv keyopevcoy
In philosophy of science there is a very sharp d is tin c tio n  
between the two main contexts in which a scientific theory may b e  
discussed: the context of justification and the context of d isco v ery  
(these way of putting things was consecrated by, inter alios, 
Am sterdam ski 1971). In discussing a scientific theory within th e  
context of justification, one is concerned prim arily (or exclusively) 
with its validity;  whereas in discussing a theory within the context o f 
discovery, one is concerned primarily with its genesis. In the field of 
sciences, both the scientists themselves and the philosophers o f 
science have tended to consider the genesis of a theory as being of 
little scientific (and philosophical) importance (although, it is u su a lly  
argued, this may have a psychological, historical or sociological one).
I would like, in what follows, to say a few things about th e  
genesis of Plato's claim that transcendent reality (and, to som e 
extent, its copy, i.e. the immanent reality) are not only 'made from  
the same elements' as the transcendental, but that they are in th e  
same way, namely in a harmonic way. But I am not concerned h e re  
with psychological, historical or sociological aspects of this genesis; I 
am concerned with a philosophical aspect.
This philosophical aspect refers to the fact that Plato began h is 
philosophical search by assuming a methodological p rin c ip le
(oup^wvia TÜJV Xeyopevcjjv) which led him to a conclusion that ju s t i f i e d  
it (i.e. to the conclusion that transcendent reality and th e  
transcendental are harmonic). So, we may ask, what justified th is  
methodological principle at the moment of his application, i.e. be fore  
it led to its justifying conclusion? This question may be answered in  
several ways, by assuming either that it was Plato's own in tu itio n
which made him rely on a principle that later proved to be fu lly  
justified; or that the justifying conclusion (or a part of it) was, in 
nuce, already present in his mind when he started to apply it.
No one can pretend that he has the right answer to th is
question, for there is too little to rely on in terms of textual ev idence. 
None the less, I want to suggest very tentatively the answer which I 
believe is the most plausible.
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Plato, as I argued at the beginning of Chapter One, started from  
the 'topic' of man, that for him is, essentially, that part of the soul ( t o  
XoyiaTiKov) which aims at achieving knowledge. And he might h a v e  
realized, somehow, that aupcj^ujvia (or coherence in a wide sense) is, to  
use Ewing's expression, 'immanent in all our thinking' (apud B onjour 
1985, 101). (In other words: the idea that the transcenden ta l  is 
harmonic, which was later explicated, was assumed, I think, in one 
form or another, from the very beginning.) And it is this view, th a t  
QLip<j)Cüvia is 'immanent in all our thinking, which, probably, led him to  
the conclusion that reality  too must be harm onic .
The relation between a philosopher's m etaphysics and his logic 
has been the subject of many debates. Usually, what was at stake in
these debates was the question of foundation, that is the question of
'which is founded on the other' — m etaphysics on logic, or logic on
metaphysics. (In this century the tendency was, I think, to conclude 
that one’s logic is, eventually, the foundation of his metaphysics.)
Plato's position, however, is rather clear: even if, arguably, a
logic assumption (i.e. the assumption that CTupcjjcuvia is 'im m anent in  
all our thinking) led him to a certain m etaphysica l  fram ework ( th a t  
reality must be harmonic), for him logic is grounded on m etaphysics .  
That is: eventually, he argues that the aupcfjcjüvia that is im m anent in  
all our thinking is grounded on the the fact that reality  is harm on ic .
All this, it seems to me, is, to some extent, expressed in th e  
Sophist. If we put together some of the claims Plato brought fo rw a rd  
in this dialogue, and complete them in a particular way (which I fin d  
rather plausible), we can obtain the following argument.
(a) From tüjv Xe-yopEvwv to à p p o v ia  tüjv eiSüJV.
(i) If s p e a k i n g  is about e ’i8ig and if  some words unite with o n e  
another, and some not (261 d 5-7), then we have to admit that th e  
£i8t| are 0"U v0ETa and that they form a par t i cu la r  KOlVüJVia (252 a 
ff.) (see 5.1.). That is: since there is a KOivcuvia of words, t h e r e  
must be a KOiVüJVia of €i8T|.
(ii) Words, how ever, avvap poT T O uaiv  dXXpXoiC (261 d; of. a lso  
262 e 1.
(iii) So, we may continue his argument, since there is a avpcjjüJVia 
TÜJV XeyopevüJV, there must be a à p p o v ia  Tüjv €i 8üjv.
(iv) And, if th inking is the same thing as speaking (c f. 263 e: 
" S ic tv o ia  and XoyoC are the same thing"; see also Sph. 264 a), w e  
may say that the conclusion  that r e a l i t y  must be h a r m o n i c  is  
derived  from the premise that avpcjjüJVia is im m anent in all o u r  
th in k in g .
(b) From à p p o v ia  t ü jv  eiSüjv to aupcjjüjvia t ü jv  X ey d p ev ü jv .
(i) But the very possib ility  of speaking  derives actually from t h e  
KOiVüJVia TÜJV ÉiSüJV (cf. 259 e "any discourse [XoyoC] we c a n  
have owes its existence to the aujj-TrXoKp t ü Tv € i 8 ü j v ") (5).
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(ii) Some e iS r } , however, 0"U(i(|)WV£i, while others do not (253 b 11).
That is: the K O i v c ü v i a  Tüüv e iSüjV is actually a à p [ j L O V i a / a u p c j ) ( j ü v i a .
(iii) So, we may continue his argument, it is this a p p o v ia  Ttuv 
eiScDV on which is grounded the aupcfjo)v i a  t o j v  X e y d p e v w v  (6).
(iv) And, if thinking is the same thing as speaking (c f. 263 e), w e  
may say that the premiss that that aujJLcjjüJVia is im m anent in a l l
our thinking is grounded on the conclusion  that r e a l i t y  is
h a r m o n i c .
To sum up: Plato assumed the methodological criterion of
coherence  because he believed that coherence is 'immanent in all o u r
thinking' (though he expressed this idea explicitly only later, in th e
Timaeus), and because he felt that this belief justifies the use of such 
an analogical methodological criterion. Through this m ethodological 
criterion, however, he eventually reached the belief that reality  too
is coherent; but he did not think that he arrived at this b e lie f
because  he used the methodological criterion of coherence. He, on th e
contrary, thought that it is the coherence of reality which ac tually  
fully justifies the use of coherence as a methodological criterion.
8.3. Dialectic, metaphorical language 
and metaphysics
As I said in the Preface (b, 1) and at the beginning of 8.2., 
Robinson 1953 claims that the Platonic hypothetical method (as h e  
construes it) is not linked with the Platonic metaphysics. For, h e  
argues, Plato did neither achieve his metaphysics through th is  
method (which, in spite of being recommended, is not used), n o r 
derive this method from his metaphysics. Robinson 1953, how ever, 
has a different opinion about the Platonic m etaphysics and what h e  
calls 'Plato's methods of analogy and imagery' (p. 222). His position , 
as far as I can see, is this.
(a) The method o f analogy
(i) Plato is not always very enthusiastic about analogies ( c f .
Euthd.  298 c, Chrm. 165 e and 166 b. Men. 73 a, Phd, 99 e, R. 337 c , 
etc.) (215 ff.) Yet, he uses them a lot — especially  in the m id d le  
dialogues, where he should have used the re c o m m e n d e d  
hypothetical method (pp. 209 ff.).
(ii) Plato, how ever, believed that "’analogies' or 'g e o m e tr ic a l  
equalities are frequent in reality and basic to its structure" (c f .  
the passage o f the Divided Line from the Republic,  Phlb. 16 d, Ti,
31 c, etc.) (p. 209); and "his Pythagorean conviction  indicates o n e  
simple rule of method: 'look for proportions in reality, for th e y  
are there and you will find them'" (p. 209).
(b) The method of imagery
As regarding images, "according to what [Plato] says about th e m  
he ought never to use them" (p. 220-1); although, in Cra. 432 c h e
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daim s that "there is such a thing as correctness in im a g e r y  
(eiKOVoC 6p0dTT]C)" (p. 218), which im plies that "there must b e  
legitim ate occasions for its use" (p. 218). Plato, how ever, u se s  
images in excess  (cf. the R ep u b l ic ,  the Timaeus,  etc.) (pp. 218 ff.).
(c) Conclusion
So, we may say that Plato's "employment of analogy" is, to so m e  
extent, "supported by his own views on analogy"; but his "use o f  
images is condem ned by his own views on images and im ita tio n "
(p. 222).
To sum up: according to Robinson, Plato's methods of analogy a n d  
imagery are linked with his metaphysics. For he used them a n d  
(partially) achieved his metaphysics through them. And, in the case  
of the method of analogy, he derived it, somehow, from h is 
metaphysics, for he suggested that this method is suitable because i t  
corresponds to a metaphysical principle ('the presence of analogies in  
rea lity ') .
As far as the 'method of analogy' is concerned, Robinson was, I 
think, right. But he was wrong, in my view, about the 'method of 
imagery'. In what follows, I shall argue that this method too is 
derived from the Platonic m etaphysics, although this derivation is 
implicit. I shall not, however, put things in Robinson's terms.
The expression 'Plato's methods of analogy and imagery' (by  
which Robinson wanted to cover the use of all Platonic m e tap h o rs , 
analogies, myths, allegories, etc.) is not, I think, very ap p ro p ria te ; 
and there are two main reasons for that. One is that the d iffe ren ce  
between 'analogy' and 'imagery' is quite difficult to define; and th e  
other is that to speak about a m e th o d  of analogy/im agery would b e  
to go far beyond Plato's intentions.
Plato’s dialectic (or, with a more specific expression, 'P la to 's 
| j L e 0 o S o i  in general) does (do) resort, in various degrees, to m e tap h o rs , 
analogies, myths, allegories, etc., i.e. (to use the safest g en era l 
formula) to a metaphorical language. But he does not say an y th in g  
about a pattern or a rule that has to govern the use of m e tap h o rica l 
language; so here everything seems to depend on one's own poetica l  
skills, i.e. on how pouaiKoC one is. (When he said that philosophy is 
the peyLUTTi pouaiKfi — Phd. 61 a 3-4; cf. also R. 548 b 9; Ti. 88 c 5 — 
he might have thought that this way of putting things is a p p ro p ria te  
not only because philosophy, like pouaiKfj in general, is concerned  
with a p p o y i a i ;  but also because philosophy has to resort, to som e 
extent, to m etaphorical language, whose use depends on the h e lp  
given by Muses, not on any | a é 0 o 5 o C  designed by man (7).) In short: 
for Plato, it seems, the use of m etaphorical language is not (and, 
arguably, cannot be) reduced  to a certain p e 0 o 8 o C .  I prefer, how ever, 
to put my claim in terms of the correspondence between Plato's 
philosophical use o f  metaphorical language and his m e ta p h ys ic s  (no t
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in Robinson terms, i.e. as the derivation o f Plato's method o f  im a g ery  
from  his metaphysics).
(I am aware that the following in terpretation exaggerates  
things, more or less; but, I believe, the articulation of a view th a t  
occurs only implicitly  in a philosophical text may sometimes b e  
brought to light only by exaggerating things. I am also aware that my 
interpretation sim plifies  things, more or less; for, given the lim ited  
space I have here at my disposal, I did not take into account all th e  
passages that concern the question of m etaphorical language in  
Plato.)
In my view, the most important distinction that has to be m ad e  
within the field of m etaphorical language is that between the use of 
m etaphorical words and the use of m etaphorical discourses (e.g. 
myths, allegories, etc.). In Plato’s texts this distinction is evident; b u t  
he does not discuss it or say anything explicit about the use of 
m etaphorical language. He says something explicit only ab o u t 
philosophical myths. Now, my argument comes in two parts.
First (in 8.3.1.) I shall argue that Plato's use of ph ilosoph ical 
myths is linked with his metaphysics, because its heuristic p a tte rn  
('to partially unconceal something avaioeriTov by som eth ing  
aio-0iT|Tdv') is metaphysically justified by the 'participation' of what is 
aia0T]T6v in what is avaia0r|Tov.
Then (in 8.3.2.) (with all the risks implied by generalizing th e  
results achieved by a rough analysis of a complicated question), I 
shall claim that, in Plato, on this heuristic pattern is grounded th e  
philosophical use of m etaphorical language; and conclude that fo r 
him the philosophical use of metaphorical language is linked with h is 
metaphysics, because its heuristic pattern is m etaphysically ju s tif ie d  
by the 'participation' of what is a îo 0 q T d v  in what is d v a i ( j0 r |T o v .
8.3.1. The philosophical use o f  myth
As philosophical matters are concerned, Plato's favourite k in d  
of m etaphorical discourse is the myth. Why does he resort in th e se  
m atters to myths? So far, there have been suggested v arious
answers; for instance: (i) because he wanted to give a re lig ious
ground to his philosophy (cf. the theories of Baur and W indelband — 
apud  Frutiger 1930, 152 ff.); (ii) because Plato’s time coincided w ith  
the climax of the Greek myth (cf. Friedlander 1958, 171); or, as Hegel 
1971, 108 himself argued, (iii) because of Plato's own inab ility ,
Unvermogen, to think with abstract concepts.
In my view, none of these answers touches the heart of th e
matter. For Plato, a myth is, to put it very roughly, a Xeyopevov w hich
'carries (ct>£pei) something over (perd)', that is, an e m b o d im e n t  in
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which a 'thought' has been 'transferred' (p e T a ^ e p e ra i)  (cf. for instance 
Ti. 26 c 9: "we [, namely Critias, Timaeus and Hermocrates,] will now  
disclose the city that Socrates described to us yesterday [i.e. Socrates' 
thoughts about an ideal TroXireia] by transferring it into the 'story' of 
the ancient city of Athens and Atlantis [tt]V ttoXiv... vvv pereveyKovreC 
€TTi TaXpeeC]" — my paraphrase; cf. also, inter alios, Marignac 1951, 
25) (at 26 c 9 Socrates' account about the ideal iroXiTeia is called a
myth, and at 26 e 5-6 the myth of the ancient city of Athens an d
Atlantis is called an àXr|0ivôç XoyoC; but, Plato's d in  d'oeil is, I th ink , 
evident) (8).
For Plato, however, such an embodiment' is neither a m e re  
fiction, nor an âXri0f]C XoyoC (as some do believe — cf. Grg. 523 a; cf. 
also Phdr. 244 a and 253 c); for him, a myth is, "taken as a whole,
false, but there is truth in it also [toÎjto pa0oC 6È ttou wC to dXov ij/eijSoC,
e v i  8e Kai dXT|0Tj]" (R. 377 a 5-6); it is, in other words, if I may use an  
expression from R. 382 b 10-c 1, an oij irdvu aKparov i|/£a8oC (9). To 
conclude: for Plato a myth, in spite of not being supported by a 
rigorous 'demonstration' (aTTo8€i^iC — cf. Phd. 92 d, Tht. 162 e), has a
certain heuristic 'power' (cf. g tüjv eiKOTüJv Xdywv SdvapiC — Ti. 48 d 1 -
2), for it may reveal a part of the truth (cf. Smp. 215 a 6; g ciküjv toîj
àXg0ovC ev£Ka; cf. also Ti. 53 d-e).
So, the right answer to the question about why Plato does
resort to myths in his dealing with philosophical matters is, I hold,
this: because he believed that they rely on a heuristic pattern w hich  
may reveal a part of the truth (10). What does then this h eu ris tic  
pattern actually consist in?
Plato did not give an explicit answer to this question; but th e  
context in which he used the majority of his philosophical myths may
throw a light on what his answer might have been.
As I argued (see 8.1.1.), Plato's philosophy covers two m ain  
'areas': that of the metaphysical nature  of the objects that can b e  
known; and that of how a particular el8oC can be known. Now, th e  
m ajority of Plato's philosophical myths are used in the first 'a rea ';
that is: the context  in which he used the most of his myths is that o f
designing and testing the theory of e i8g .
To be more precise. As I said at the beginning of 8.1.1., P la to 's 
theory of e i8 g  comes in three main parts; and, at least in the first tw o 
of them, there are philosophical myths galore. For instance: the final 
myth of the Phaedo 107 d-108 a (an eschatological myth with m a n y  
subsequent versions), which is, in my view, linked with one way of 
testing the first part of the theory of €i8g (this test is about seeing  
whether the implications of the theory aupc^ujvei dxxgXoiC — fo r 
details see Chapter Three); the myth of the Cave from the Republic,
which is linked with the second part of the theory of ei8g (see
Chapter Four), etc. (In the Sophist, however, where the third part of
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the theory is developed, Plato attempted to discuss the whole m a tte r  
in abstract terms and avoid the use of myths or other m etap h o rica l 
devices — see Chapter Five). Whereas in the other area, that of how a 
particular eXSoC can be known (where at stake is reaching the op ip oC  
or determ ining the yévoç  of a particular € Î8oC ), Plato, as far as I can  
see, tends not to use any myth (or other metaphorical device) (11).
Now, this 'area' of the theory of ei8g belongs to what I called
the 'field of To avaiaegTov', i.e. to the field of 'abstract m a tte rs ';  
whereas the myths which attem pted to embody various aspect of 
this theory have a visual content (myths, I believe, are always v isua l  
— cf. Marignac 1951, 24: "Fimage peut être un mythe: elle connaît
alors son développem ent maximum") (12). If so, then the h e u ris tic  
pattern on which the use of myths is grounded consists in tu rn ing  
something ayaiae-qroy into something aiaOriToy (i.e. in turning an  
'abstract matter' into a 'non-abstract' one), in such a way that a p a r t  
o f  the truth is revealed.
Now, what is to turn something aya ia O r j r o u  into so m eth in g  
aiaOTjToy in such a way that a part o f the truth is revealed? It is, 
roughly put, to frame' fo r  something ayaiaeriToy, through speaking, 
an a i a d p T o y  embodiment, in such a way that that e m b o d im e n t  
unconceales a part o f  that which is embodied in it. If I may u se  
Plato's terms from the Philebus  39 b-c, to speak about about to  
a v a l o G g TGV in non-abstract terms is to put back to work 'the (w yp d ^ oC  
that dwells in our souls' (see Chapter Six).
If so, however, there remain then two im portant questions to
be answered: what would be, in this case, the criterion of truth? A nd 
how can a part of something a v a ic e g T o v  be unconcealed b y 
something a i a e g T o v ?
The first question first. How can we know whether a ce rta in  
myth is an oij iravu otKpaTov i|/eu8oC or a mere \|/€ij8 oC? H o w  can w e 
know, in other words, whether one's 'inner (w y p d ^ ^ C  has framed an  
'image' that reveals a part of the truth? Plato, to the best of m y 
knowledge, does not offer any answer to this question. But, if w e 
continue his line of though (as I see it), then the most p ro b ab le  
answer is this.
(i) The requirem ent of coherence (i.e. of the aupcjjcjDVia th a t  
should exist between the X e y o p e v a  which form a myth) is ,  
obviously, too weak to act as a real criterion of truth (although i t  
remains a necessary requirem ent of a myth that is an oij irdvu  
aKpaTov 4^Xi8oC).
(ii) So, in order to decide whether a myth has or not some truth in 
it, we have to confront  the aiaGgTOV em bodim ent it provides f o r  
an d v a ia G g T o v  'reality' w i th  that very 'reality' and check if  th e  
embodiment unconceals any o f its parts.
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(iii) But, such a confrontation  (unlike a confrontation  that ta k es  
place entirely in the field to  aiaGgTOV) is tinged with a 
subject ive  bias. That is: we may have different opinions a b o u t  
how much of an abstract reality is portrayed in a myth and h o w  
well that reality is portrayed in it. That is why, in the case o f  
speaking about about to  dvaiorGgTOV in non-abstract term s,  
there is not a s t r o n g  criterion o f truth.
Let us now turn to the other question. How can a part of 
something avaiaGgTov be unconcealed by something aiaegTov?' T hat 
is: how can one's 'inner Cüjypdcjjoç' turn something that is not v isua l  
into an e i S t u X o v  X e y o p e v o v ,  a spoken  image? To the best of m y  
knowledge, there is no explicit answer to this question in Plato; b u t  
there is one, I think, which is implicit.
In the Philebus  Plato speaks about a (wypd^oC that 'dwells' in  
our souls (who, when we talk about the field of to  a ia e g T o v  begins to 
'paint images'); and he calls this ( w y p d ^ o c  (at 39 b 3) a S g p i o u p y o C .  
The occurrence of this word, S g p i o u p y o C ,  makes one think of th e  
'Demiurge of the un iverse '. Is there any link between th e m ?  
Apparently, it is not. But (to paraphrase Plato's way of in tro d u c in g  
the issue of n o X i C  in R. 368 d), the Demiurge's creation 'describes in  
larger letters' the same poietic act of framing fo r  so m e th in g  
ayaiadTjToy an aiad-qroy embodiment, in such a way that th a t  
embodiment unconceales a part o f  that which was embodied in it. 
That is: both the Demiurge (when he creates the universe) and m an 's  
'inner (wypd^^c' (when he creates a myth for an abstract m a tte r )  
unconceal, partia lly  (the Demiurge through Tro ieXv ,  the 'in n e r  
Cüjypdc])oC'  through X e y e i v ) ,  something d v a i o - e g T o v  by an a i a e p T o v  
em bodim ent (13).
Now, to go back to our question — how can one's 'in n e r  
Ccjoypc tc j joC'  turn something that is not visual into an e i S o j X o v  X e y o p e v o v ,  
a spoken  image?  Implicitly or explicitly, Plato claimed many tim es 
that language  in general depends on ontology (cf. for instance Sph. 
259 e: the very possibility of speaking derives actually from th e  
KOLVüJvia Tüjv éiSüjv).
If so, however, then we may say that the question of
embodying something d v a i a e p T o v  into an e i 8 ü j X o v  X e y o p e v o v  d e p en d s  
on the more general, ontological question of embodying that which is 
d v a i a G g T o v  (the v o g T o v  ( g o v  or the e i 8 g  in general) into sensib le  
things. We may say, in other words, that a particular kind of
m etaphorical discourse, i.e. the myth (as an ojj TTccvu ocKpaTov \ l / e i j 8oC,  
viz. as an image that partially discloses an abstract m atter) is 
possible because, ontologically, sensible things are images th a t  
partially disclose their non-visible models. (Or, otherwise put, w h en  
one's 'inner (myp dc j jo C*  turns something that is not visual into an
£ i 8 üjX o v  X £ y d p £ v o v ,  he repeats the archetypal gesture of the D em iurge,
143
who turned a non-visible model into an eiScoXov T T o i o u [jl£ v o v . )  Thus, w e 
may conclude that in Plato the 'true myth' relies on a on h e u ris tic  
pattern ('to partially unconceal something dvaiaegTov by som eth ing  
a tc r egT ov ' )  that has a m etaphysical justification ('the ontological 
participation of what is a i o G g T o v  in what is d v a i a e g T o v ' ) .
8.3.2. The philosophical use o f  metaphorical language and its 
metaphysical justification: the 'participation' o f  to aiaeprou in to
àyaia6ï]Toy
All the claims I have made above are about P la to 's 
philosophical myths. Could one generalize these claims and a p p ly  
them to Plato's philosophical use of metaphorical language?
I cannot engage here in a large-scale analysis of the question of 
m etaphorical language in Plato. I believe, however, that such a 
generalization is legitimate. I believe, that is, two things.
(a) First, that on this heuristic pattern ('to partially unconceal 
something avaioegrov by something a îoegrov ') are grounded th e  
philosophical uses of both metaphorical discourses and words.
(i) To extend my interpretation of Plato's philosophical use of 
myth to his philosophical use of m etaphorical discourse in g en era l 
does not raise, I think, major objections. That is: if the ph ilosoph ical 
use of the most representative kind of m etaphorical discourse (viz. 
myth) is grounded on this heuristic pattern ('to partially unconceal 
something avaioegrov by something aicregrov'), then one may claim  
relatively easily the same about the philosophical use of 
m etaphorical discourse in general.
(ii) To extend, however, my in terpretation of P la to 's  
philosophical use of myth to his philosophical use of m e tap h o rica l 
words may seem, at first sight, more problematic. Plato does n o t 
refer, explicitly, to what happens when a word is used figuratively in  
a philosophical context. But his philosophical m etaphors — e.g. eTSoC, 
yevoC or t o  dyaGov — are, obviously, names of non-abstract no tions 
given to abstract ones; so, we may say that they too aim at f r a m in g  
fo r  something àyaiaBr)Toy an aiaerjToy embodiment, in such a w a y  
that that embodiment unconceales a part o f that which is e m b o d ie d  
in it.
To make a short digression: philosophy has always resorted to 
m etaphors (either because, as Ricoeur 1975, 369 ff. put it,
philosophy, due to its 'nouvelle manière de questioner', 'met le 
langage en état de carence sémantique', p. 369, and so it has to u se  
'des mots du langage ordinaire en vue de repondre à [...cette] caren ce  
de dénomination', p. 370; or because "le discours ph ilo so p h iq u e  
recourt, de façon délibérée, à la métaphore vive afin de tirer des
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significations nouvelles de l'impertinence sémantique et de porter au  
jour de nouveaux aspects de la réalité à la pointe de l 'in n o v a tio n  
sémantique", p. 370). The question of m etaphor is e x tre m e ly  
complicated; and the countless studies on semantics, logic, rh e to ric , 
linguistics, etc. that have clustered round it cannot be su rv e y e d  
within a lifetime. I cannot enter here into the details of any 'th e o ry  
of metaphor'. In my view, however, in philosophy, in most of th e  
cases, the use of m etaphor is grounded on this heuristic pattern of 
revealing an abstract notion (or an aspect of an abstract notion) b y  
the attempt to 'embody' it, as it were, into a non-abstract notion (14).
To sum up so far: I believe that, in Plato, the philosophical u se  
of m etaphorical language in general is grounded on this h e u ris tic  
pattern ('to partially unconceal something ava iaG g ro v  by som eth ing  
aioegTov') .
(b) Secondly, I believe that for Plato the philosophical use of 
m etaphorical language is linked with his metaphysics, because its  
heuristic pattern is m etaphysically justified by the 'participation' of 
what is a ïoepT ov  in what is d v a i a e g r o v .
I believe, that is, that in Plato (i) the distinction b e tw e e n  
speaking in non-abstract and abstract terms is grounded on th e  
distinction between intelligible and sensible reality; and (ii) the fac t 
that we can express (partially) abstract ideas through n o n -a b s tra c t 
terms is grounded on the fact that the sensible is a 'm anifestation' of 
the intelligible.
As Ricoeur 1975, 366 put it, the idea that m era-physics a n d  
me^a-phorical discourse correspond to each other in their attem pt to 
"emporte les mots et les choses au-delà..., meta...” (p. 366) "revient à 
dire que tout l'usage de l'analogie, en apparence neutre au regard d e  
la tradition 'm étaphysique', reposerait à son insu sur un concep t 
m étaphysique d'analogie qui désigne le m ouvem ent de renvoi d u  
visible à l'invisible; la prim ordiale 'iconicité' serait ici contenue: ce 
qui, fondam entalem ent, fait 'image', ce serait le visible tout en tier; 
c'est sa ressem blance à l'invisible qui le constituerait comme im age; 
conséquem m ent, la toute prem ière transposition serait le t r a n s fe r t  
du sens de l'empirie dans le 'lieu intelligible'" (15). (A view w hich  
was adopted by other philosophers, such as Heidegger, who c la im ed  
that 'the metaphorical exists only within metaphysics' — 1957, 89).
As I said, in the Timaeus 29 b Plato claims that all 'accounts ' 
are 'akin', ( a u y y e v e i C )  with the o v x a  that they describe; so, he argues, 
an account about what is only a changing €ikcüv (29 b2-3; 92 c 7) (i.e. 
the visible universe) of a 'lasting and stable' ( p o v i p o v  Ka i  p é p a ï o v  — 2 9 
b 6) i r a p d S e i y p a  (28 b 7; 29 b 4) (i.e. the 'intelligible' universe) — 
precisely because it is 'akin' to what is not p o v i p o v  K a i  ( 3 e [ 3 a io v  — can
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only be € ÎkoC (cf. 29 b 5-c 2, d, 30 b, 48 d, 53 d, 55 d, 56 a, 57 d, 59 c, 
68 b, 69 b, 90 e), viz. 'probable'.
Plato's philosophy itself is, mainly, about that which is p o v i p o v  
KŒI p é p a ï o v ;  nonetheless, his philosophy is rather e i K o C  than p e p a i o v .  I f  
I may use these terms in a different context, I would say that th e  
Platonic work and its exegesis are also auyyeveiC: the work be ing  
more e i K o C  than ( 3 é p a i o v ,  its exegesis can only be an e lKtoC e p p g v e i a .  
And so it is my interpretation of Plato's hypothetical dialectic (an d  
my reconstruction of his philosophical search as a whole) — eiKoC.
As Plato, however, I believe that an eiKoC account, even if it is 
not supported by a rigourous 'demonstration' (d irdSei^iC  — cf. Phd. 9 2 
d, Tht. 162 e), has a certain S u v a p i C  (cf. g  tcüv e iKOTcuv  X o y o u v  S - u v a p i C  —  
Ti. 48 d 1-2) that may lead to truth (cf. Smp. 215 a 6: g  eiKÙv toi) 
àXgeoDc èVeKa; cf. also Ti. 53 d-e). I believe, that is, that my eiKwC
é p p g v e i a  — even if it sometimes relies, as Plato's philosophy itself,
only on the cnjpctjcüvia of various hypotheses — may lead us to som e
part of the truth.
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EPILOGUE
Truly the fabric of mental fleece ,/R esem b les  a w e a v e r 's  
m asterp iece,/W h ere a thousand threads one tr e a d le  
throw s,/W here fly the shuttles hither and th ith er ,/U n seen  t h e  
threads are knit together,/A nd an in fin ite c o m b in a t io n  
grows./Then the philosopher steps in/And shows, no otherw ise i t  
could have been:/The first was so, the second so ,/T herefore t h e
third and fourth are so;/W ere not the first and second, t h e n / T h e  
third and fourth had never been.
This is what M ephistopheles, in Goethe's Faust (verses 1 9 2 2 -3 3 ), 
says to a student-to be in philosophy (translation taken from th e
Oxford University Press edition, 1954). Arguably, none of the g re a t 
philosophers was M ephistophelian; but these words of 
Mephistopheles, I believe, applies to all of them: they all saw that the  
fabric o f  mental fleece resembles a weaver's masterpiece, where a 
thousand threads one treadle throws; and they all attem pt to p ro v e  
that the way their thoughts are knit together no otherwise it could  
have been. And Plato is no exception.
My way of construing Plato's philosophical search can fairly b e  
represented like this:
(i) Plato starts from the puzzling, given way in which o u r
know ledge works.
(ii) Then he solves this puzzle by revealing the existence o f a 
sort of transcendent universal  aspects  that are actually the o n l y  
objects of knowledge —  the e i 8 g .
(iii) And he ends up by claiming;
(a )  that the actual 'reality' consist of these universal a s p e c t s  
(which are som ehow embodied by the sensible objects);
((3) that 'reality' is 'harmonic' (i.e. the universal  aspects  form a 
'structured totality');
( y )  that the human intellect is of a 'harmonic' nature (i.e. it c a n  
deal only with 'structured totalities');
(8 )  that know ledge aims at revealing both the t r a n s c e n d e n t  
universal aspects that recede from their im m anent e m b o d i m e n t s  
and the structure of the transcendent reality (i.e. the way t h e
universal aspects are structured); and
(e )  that know ledge, in order to be true, has to be 'harmonic', o r  
'coherent' (coherence being, in that field of know ledge which is  
beyond sensible experience, the only criterion o f truth).
In short, the moral of Plato's philosophical search  seems to be this: if
we want to explain the puzzling way in which our knowledge w orks,
we will find out that our explanation brings many other q u estio n s
forward, as in a weaver's masterpiece a thousand threads one treadle 
throws. Now, some of these questions we cannot solve, and they, in
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their turn, brings other questions forward. But, in spite of ending u p  
with various unsolved questions, our explanation no otherwise it 
could have been.
W hitehead's 1929, 62 famous saying, that "the safest g en era l 
characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that i t  
consists of a series of footnotes to Plato", is usually taken with a 
pinch of salt. A poet, says Plato in the Ion  (533 e and 536 a), is h u n g  
upon his Muse, and upon the poet are hung the actors, the choric 
dancers, the masters of the chorus and the underm asters. How could  
we, to 'develop' this way of puting things from the Ion, not take with 
a pinch of salt a saying which implies that all W estern p h ilo so p h ers  
are nothing but choric dancers hung upon Plato (who, arguably, is 
hung himself upon a Muse)? And yet, I believe, W hitehead's say ing  
is an exaggeration that points out something true about the E uropean  
philosophical tradition, namely that this tradition has tented to 
follow the Wegmarken of Plato's philosophical search (1).
First, European philosophy, in most of the cases, has been an  
idealism, i.e. an attempt of the T  to understand the world not from  
the things which are 'outside' him, but from himself. That is: most of 
the major European philosophers (e.g. Descartes, Kant, Fichte, 
Schelling, Hegel, Nietzsche or Heidegger), like Plato, started to re v e a l 
'reality' from the question of man. "What we know in the w orld  
around us is our own spirit, and when our understanding 'p e n e tra te s ' 
into a thing, it actually 'penetrates' into the interiorness of the self" — 
this seems to be the message of the m ajority of E uropean
philosophers (2).
Secondly, most of the European philosophers have ended up b y 
dealing, in one form or another, with some of the main th em es  o f
Plato's 'theory of ei8g': the 'universals' that are the actual objects o f
knowledge, the relation between these 'universals' and 'reality', th e  
opposition 'transcendent—im m anent', the 'harmonic structure' o f 
'reality', the 'correspondence' that exists between the tran sce n d en ta l, 
transcendent and imm anent 'structures', the 'coherence' o f
know ledge.
So, we might say, not only Plato's philosophical search, given its 
starting-point (the puzzling way in which our knowledge works), no  
otherwise it could have been; but also the m ajority of the E uropean  
philosophical 'doctrines', as long as they start from the question of 
man, no otherwise they could have been — i.e. Platonic.
In 1934 Einstein published a collection of essays entitled M ein  
Weltbild, in which there is an 'entry' called "Wie ich die W elt sehe", 
'how do I see the world'. At this point I would like to say few th ings 
about — to paraphrase the above-mentioned 'entry' of Einstein's book  
— wie ich die Philosophie sehe.
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In my view, philosophy, in its most glorious form, is an a tte m p t 
that aims at revealing, in its entirety, the given way in which 're a lity ' 
is. A philosopher, that is, is not a creator proper, a Demiurge, for h e  
does not bring anything into being; he only tries to bring an e n tire  
'receding reality' to light. Now, the 'reality' with which th e
philosophers have dealt along the history of philosophy has b e e n  
itself in a process of becoming. Parmenides and Hegel were n o t 
confronted with the same 'reality'. Most of the E uropean
philosophers, however, have focussed on those aspects of 're a lity ' 
that do always remain the same. And so, we may say, they all h a v e  
attem pted to bring to light the same things, although their 's to ries ' 
are different.
All this, I believe, should not be very controversial. If so, 
however, then W hitehead's saying, read in these terms, implies th a t  
even their 'stories', in most of the cases, are not actually d iffe ren t; 
which amounts to say that most of the European philosophers — in  
their attempt to reveal, in its entirety , the given w ay  in w hich  
'reality' is — have followed the Wegmarken of Plato's ph ilo soph ical 
search .
Now, is this is a confirmation of Platonism? In other w ords, 
does this prove that Platonism managed to reveal the 'basic aspec ts  
of reality' as they actually are? I cannot engage here into a la rg e -
scale analysis of this issue, and I do not know what its conclusion
would be. I am inclined to believe, none the less, that such an  
analysis will lead toward an affirmative answer to the ab o v e- 
mentioned questions. (In which case, to understand Plato will p ro v e  
to be not only a question of understanding the beginning of o u r 
philosophical tradition, but also a question of understanding us an d  
the way reality appears to us.)
Yet I can state this much of all writers in the past or future w h o  
profess know ledge of the matters to which I devote m y s e l f ,  
whether on the ground of having learned them from me o r 
others, or as a discovery of their own. It is, in my o p i n i o n ,  
im possible that they should understand one whit o f the business.
This is what Plato wrote in the seventh letter (341 b-c, tra n s la tio n
from Taylor 1934, 201). The most striking thing in this passage is th e  
sureness of Plato's tone. Where does this sureness  stem from? One
can only speculate; as far as I am concerned, I would rather not, a n d
end, platonically, with a an unsolved question.
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ANNEX I
Three figures regarding the geometrical problem in
the Meno  86 e ff.
Figure ( 1 ) A — I
B
Figure (2
Figure (3)
B
A
M
E
D
A rB
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ANNEX II
Hypothesis and metaphysical topography
i. The literal sense of ùnoOecnC
For us, the word 'hypothesis' has, roughly speaking, only one 
meaning: a theory, or explanation which is still uncertain, u su a lly  
because its predictions have not yet been fully confirmed. For th e  
Greeks it was different: "We should realize", says Sextus Em piricus, 
"that things are called TJiroeeaeiC in many different senses" (M  III, 3; 
translation from Barnes 1990, 90).
The Greek word uiroGeaLC had numerous meanings: 'in ten tio n ', 
'purpose', 'advice', 'pretext', 'occasion', 'excuse', 'actor’s role', 'su b jec t 
proposed for discussion', 'subject of a poem or treatise', 'supposition ', 
'premiss', 'starting-point', 'beginning' (cf. LSI). Confronted with all 
these meanings we may be inclined to ask that very Socratic 
question: What, if any, is their common feature? The attem pt to  
answer this question, 1 am afraid, is likely to end up in a Socratic 
way. That is why I shall focus in what follows on the literal (p e rh a p s  
original) sense of the word ijTToGeaiC, which 1 shall take then as a 
'reference' in discussing its usages in philosophical contexts.
The noun {j'iroGecriC and the verb TJTroTiGqpi derived from th e  
verb TiGripi, 'to place, put, set'. The preposition tjtto, which m ean s 
'under' (Lat. sub)  or 'by', denotes in compounds mainly what is 
'under', e.g. uTreiiJLi ('to be under'), îitto(3œiv(jü ('to go under'), or {ittotiGtipl 
('to place under', to place under as a foundation', or 'to lay dow n'). 
G e a i C  means 'placing', 'settling', or simply 'position' (1); and w o - G e a i C  
means, accordingly, in its proper sense, 'a placing under', although in  
usage it denotes 'that which is placed under', das Untergelegte. Yet a 
ijTToGeaiC, according to the vast majority of its usages, is n o t 
something merely placed lower than something else, but som eth ing  
placed under something else as a foundation  (cf., inter alios, 
Rosenmeyer 1960, 398). That is why a cat placed under a ta b le  
cannot be called a w o G e a iC ,  whereas a stone ( \ iG o C )  placed (Q e p e v o v )  
as a foundation (G ep eX io v )  for a house can (for the associations 
between G ep eX io v  and iJTToGeaiC see for instance Sextus M  111 10 a n d  
12 ).
AiJTrdG€aiC, however, namely something which is laid down as a 
foundation for something else has, roughly speaking, th re e  
determ inations, (a) First, the pu ttin g  of something as a fo u n d a tio n  
must be performed by an agent. (That which is used as a fo u n d a tio n  
may not be created by the agent himself, but its p u t t in g  as a
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foundation is his 'gesture'; a stone, for instance, which lays as th e
foundation of a building, may not be created by the builder h im self,
but it is the builder who turns it into a foundation.) (b) Secondly, th e  
putting  of something as a foundation for something else precedes th e  
standing  of that something else over its foundation — as it is the case 
with the foundation of a house, which is 'laid down' before  the h ouse  
proper is built (hence the meanings of 'starting-point' and 'beg inn ing ' 
of the word i J T T oe e a i C ) .  (c) And thirdly, that which lies u n d e r
something else as a foundation supports that something else; when 1 
place something under something else, so as they are firm ly  p re s se d  
against each other, that which was placed under, because of what w e 
call the force of gravity, bears the weight of that under which it h as  
been placed. Because of this situation, 'that which is under', a 
w o e e a i C ,  supports that which is over, for which it is like a 0 e p e \ i o v ,  
p d a i C ,  ground.
These three determ inations of the literal, perhaps orig inal 
sense of the word ijTroOeaiC were preserved, to a greater or le sse r  
extent, in many of its m etaphorical usages, where 'that which w as 
placed under as a foundation for something else' became 'the re a so n
for doing or saying something else'. 'An intention', 'a purpose', 'an  
advice', 'a pretext', 'an occasion', or 'an excuse' of an action is
something which has been settled by somebody before the action  
begins, and so it acts as the ground of that action; 'an actor’s role' is 
something which has been settled by somebody before th e
performance begins, and so it is the ground of the actor’s 'b e h av io u r ' 
on stage; 'the subject proposed for discussion' is something which has 
been settled by somebody before the actual discussion begins, and so 
it acts as ground of that discussion; 'the subject of a poem or tre a tis e ' 
is something which has been settled by somebody before the writing 
begins, and so it acts as ground of that writing; and 'a supposition' o r 
'premiss' of a reasoning is, obviously, something which has b e e n  
settled by somebody before a reasoning begins, and it acts as th e
ground or starting-point of that reasoning (2).
2. The philosophers's vnoeéae iÇ
2.1. The grounded world. The ontological àpxf) as 'that which lies or  
stands under as a foundation o f the world'. vnoKeipevoy and vndcrracnC
As I argued in 1.3., the idea that every thing in our w orld  (as 
well as the world itself) must have an 'origin' (i.e. an dpxp, c|>TjaiC or 
a i T i a )  is, in one form or another, to be found in all major G reek 
thinkers (cf., inter alios, Burnet 1908, 10-11). This idea, how ever, 
that nothing comes into being out o f nothing, was left in jus ti f ied  b y
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the Greek thinkers; and so, we have to take their belief in th e  
existence of 'origins' as a given postulate of their thinking. But th e  
Greek philosophers did not left unjustified only their belief th a t  
every thing in our world must have an âp%p — they also le f t 
unjustified their localizations of the d p y c x i .
If claiming anything about the Presocratic philosophers was not 
such adventurous a business, I would say that for them the 'o rig ins' 
of the world, the dpyoci, are thought as supporting the world Kdrtueev, 
'from below'. For Thales, for instance, the earth lies on water (cf. fr. A 
14: yfjv ed’ uSaroC KeTcr0ai; cf. also fr. A 12); if u8mp here means dpyfi 
(as in: dpxqv toÎj i r a v T o C  e f v a i  K a i  T e X o C  to  u8ujp, Hyppolytos, Haer. I 1), 
then Thales' 'principle' (i.e. water) is a sort of GepeXiov of the w o rld  
(yfj). Also, Anaximenes’ dfjp (fr. A 5,13-14), as well as Hippasos’ (fr. 7, 
9-10) and Heraclitus' (fr. A 5, 14) irup, are all referred to as a 
which 'lies under', inroKeipevT).
Given the fact that all we know about the P resocra tic  
philosophers comes from a few fragments preserved by some la te  
authors in their own writings, we may only guess what th e ir  
intentions were. This 'localizing the origin' of the world under th e  
world, however, was not meant, I guess, to be taken literally.
One may say that physically, because of what we call the force  
of gravity, everything needs a support, a ground; and so the fact th a t  
each oiKoSopriaiC, 'edifice', for instance, must be supported by a 
GepeXiov, is a fact given as such to human experience. Thus, one m ay  
speculate, because of this vorhanden  situation — as a G erm an 
philosopher might put it — the Greeks were inclined to think th a t  
somehow not only any aedificatio, but every single ov must have, 
metaphorically  speaking, a ground, a basis. In other words, one m ay  
speculate that because of th is situation the Greek philosophers w e re  
inclined to think that everything which exists 'relies', as it were, on a 
'foundation', which, as a foundation, precedes it and so stands as a 
beginning, dpyfj, for it. We cannot, however, construe an y  
sophisticated argum ent on these fragments, because they ac tu a lly  
belong to relatively late authors, who often tend to speak about th e ir  
own 'ontological principles' as being 'localized under' (3).
Nonetheless, in the above fragments it is suggested  that th e  
'origins' of the world, the dpya i ,  are (in my view poetica lly)  'localized ' 
under  the world. (And later on, the Greek philosophers started to u se  
the words u'Trdpyov and uTrap^iC instead of apxfj.) If so, one m ig h t 
expect to find the word uTToGecjiC used in connection with the no tion  
of apxp. Yet the word w o G e a i C ,  which had a glorious destiny in  
epistemology,  was somehow avoided in the Presocratic ontology  — 
and the reason for this is not, 1 think, its prefix, ûtto-, but its root, 0e-; 
for the Presocratics thought their ontological 'grounds', their dpxai.
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not as 'put under', iJTToeépevai, but rather as merely 'laying u n d e r ',
LiTTOKeipevai .
The Greeks, it seems, had a propensity to think 'that w hich  
holds  a city' as 'something laid down (Gepevov) for the city'. That is 
why, perhaps, the two roots of the verb riO rip i (0e» and 0p-) are to b e  
found in many expressions which refer to 'that which holds a rroXiC': 
its law (0epiC, ©eapa, GecrpoC), its justice (Gecrpocjijvri), its leg islation  
(vopoGeaia), its constitution (Geapiov), its written statute (reGpdC) o r 
its treatises (auvGeaiai, auvGijKai) — they all are being 'laid' by a 
vopoGeTTjC. But a law or a treatise can be 'put' in a city because th e y  
are, as it were, 'products' of men (cf. for instance Plato Hi.Ma. 284 d 
4: Ti0€VTai TÔV vopov oi riGepevoi) or, sometimes, of gods (cf. fo r 
instance Xenophon Cyr. VI, 6: Trapd toùC tôjv 0€Ôjv GeapouC). (The 
beginnings of the Athenian democracy, as Ostwald 1969 convincing ly  
argued, are characterized, inter alia, by the change from the usage of 
GeapoC, a 'statute' imposed, 'put', upon a people by  a vopoGerriC, to 
that of vopoC, a 'statute' accepted — 'distributed among', cf. vepm, ‘to 
distribute' — by a people as 'valid and binding' — see Oswald, p. 55.)
The Greek philosophers, when they speak about that w hich  
supports ontologically  something else, prefer to use the w ords 
TjTTOKeipevov and woaTacriC (which had illustrious careers in ontology) 
and not {jTroGeaiC (4). And a possible reason for this may be the fac t 
that for them the ontological àpyai are not 'products' of either men or 
gods (as a law or treatise is), and so they cannot be referred to (in  
my view, 1 repeat, poetically) as being 'put under the w orld ', 
ijTToGepevai, to support it: they can only 'lie', Keipevai, or 's tan d ', 
iCTTapevai, 'under' it. Yet, when they speak about that which su p p o rts  
epistemologically  something else, they seem to prefer the w o rd  
ijTToGcaiC to others, such as TjTToXpij/iC, 'assumption', or (why no t?) 
ijTTovoia, 'meaning which lies at the bottom of something' (e.g. at th e  
bottom of an argument).
2.2. vTToOeaiç as the OepéAioy o f  reasoning. The epistemological dpxp as 
'that which is put under as a foundation o f reasoning’. Geometers' a n d  
Aristotle’s vrrodéaeiç
Aristotle claims that only the apyal which are sources of 
motions "are called dpyai in the strict sense" (EE 1222 b 20 ff.). This 
strict sense of apya i ,  continues Aristotle, "is not found in dpya i  
incapable of movement, for example in those of m ath em atics , 
although the term is indeed used of them by analogy" (b 25 ff.) In  
short: the ontological dpycci are, in Aristotle's view, not to b e
mistaken for the epistemological d p y a i .
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For Aristotle (as for many other Greek philosophers, e.g. Sextus 
— cf. M  III 4 and 5) the epistemological dpyai are the beginnings of 
dem onstrations, dpyai rmv àîroSel^eüJV (cf. Met. 1013 a 15 ff. or Ph. 
195 a 18 ff.). These  dpyai, unlike the ontological dpyoti, were th o u g h t 
as 'being p u t '  by som ebody as the beginnings of an ensu ing  
argument, and as preceding  and supporting it, in the way a 
foundation (GepeXiov) precedes and support, say, a house (5). Sextus 
for instance makes this comparison: "The setting up of the ho roscope 
[cjüpoQKOTToC]" — he says — "is the dpxfj, and, as it were, the GepéXioC of 
astro logy"(M  V 50). That is why Aristotle, together with many o th e r  
Greek philosophers, compared the dpyq Tujv àiroSei^eüüv with a 
'foundation', GepeXiov, or with 'something put under the en su ing  
argument as a foundation', i.e. with a inroGeaiC (cf. inter alia, M etaph.  
1013 a 16: tojv àiroSei^etJüv ai âTroGeaeiC) (6).
A foundation proper, however, can support 'that under which i t  
has been placed' only if it is resistant enough, pepaiov , i.e. able to bear 
the weight of 'what is over'. An epistemological (jTioGeaiC, that is: an  
àpxp Tcuv àiToSei^ecüv, should, as a foundation proper, be reliable too, 
that is (3e(3aia, firm, trusty, sure, in a word: true. (Cf. Demosthenes 11, 
10, 5, although this passage, as a 'SiaipeaiC purist' would say, d ea ls  
with the ground of an action, not of a reasoning: "Just as th e
foundations of a house and a ship and other such structures must b e  
very strong, so the dpyai and TJiroGecreiC of actions ought to be t ru e  
and just" — apud  Rosenmeyer 1960, 398.) In Against th e
Mathematicians  (III 10) Sextus says (I paraphrase): "if what is
hypothesized is not true — that is, as the saying goes, if th e  
foundations are rotten [aaGpol GepeXioi' — we may hypothesize it a 
myriad times, the conclusion which follows will be that of an in q u iry  
which starts from non-existing apyai". Because, continues Sextus a
few lines later (111 12), any woGeaiC, as any foundation (GepeXioC), 
must be firm ((3e[3aiov), if what follows is to be agreed upon, 
otherwise, as the geometers will say, the iJTToGecjeiC are 'out of p lace '
(aTOITOl).
"Sometimes" — claims Epictetus (diss I vii 22-3) — "it is
necessary to postulate [a irpc ra i] aiJTToGeaiC as a sort of basis [èiTipàGpa] 
for the ensuing argument. Now should one accept every o ffe red  
TjTToGeCTiC? And if not every one, then which?" (translation fro m
Barnes 1990,106). In other words, how can we assess the stab ility ,
the certainty (to pejSaiov) of what lies as a foundation of o u r 
argum ents? This question of how certain are the foundations of o u r 
reason ing  was actually one of the Greek philosophers's obsessions, 
and that is why the concept of hypothesis, understood as that w hich  
is laid down as a premiss and starting-point of a reasoning, plays a 
key role in the works of many geometers and m athem aticians from
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differen t schools, and in those of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, th e  
Neoplatonists and the Sceptics.
How then, to go back to our question, can we assess th e  
stability, the certainty of what lies as a foundation of our a rg u m e n ts?  
If we exclude Plato, we may say that the Greek thinkers p ro v id ed , 
roughly speaking, two solutions.
(a) According to the Meno 86 e, where Socrates proposes to 
make a hypothesis as the geometers do, it seems that the G reek 
geometers suggested to accept, conventionally, that the 'foundation ', 
the iiTToeeaiC of an ensuing argument is sure and then continue o u r 
investigations as if it were so. (In this case iJTroeecriC means what w e 
usually call a postulate, i.e. a proposition conventionally accepted as 
true for the sake of our investigations. In Greek m ath em atics ,
however, the word iJiToeecriC may also mean a presupposition, a
definition, or an dp%q (7).)
(b) Aristotle, on the contrary, suggests that we should accept as 
the 'foundations' of our arguments only that which is evidently sure . 
In Posterior Analytics (72 a 20 ff.) he claims that "among the f irs t  
principles or apyai on which any science is based there will b e
hypotheses" (apud Barnes, 1990, p. 93). It is not very clear how  
Aristotle separates from the group of the first principles th e
subgroup of 'hypotheses'. What it is important, however, is that fo r 
Aristotle laying down a hypothesis P means the assertion of P as a 
first principle, i.e. as a first truth (an Aristotelian hypothesis is w h a t 
we usually call an axiom, i.e. a statement for which no proof is 
required, because its truth is self-evident — see, inter alia, APo. 76 b 
14-5 and 23-4). Since the first principles are evidently tru e , 
'hypothesizing' them is not at all an approximate, u n c e rta in  
operation, as it was the geometers's 'hypothesizing' according to th e  
Meno.
In the history of Greek philosophy, the confrontation b e tw e e n
these two meanings, a postulated ground and a self-evident ground,
was won by the latter. The word woeeCTiC was used more and m o re  
to name a 'principle', whose truth is self-evident (8). Here fo r 
instance is an example from a late author, Alexander of Aphrodisias
H ypotheses are first principles of proofs, because there is n o 
proof of such propositions, i.e. of first principles, but they a r e  
posited as evident and known in them selves [ a i i T o G e v ]  [...], a n d  
what is assumed without proof they call an hypothesis (or e v e n ,  
more generally , a thesis) and say that it is h y p o t h e s i z e d
[translation from Barnes 1990, 94].
(m APr  13 . 7 - 1 1 )
And, if we rely on Sextus' testimony, even the Greek g eo m ete rs
started to mean hynTToGecriC a self-evident dpxp :
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The geom eters, seeing the mass of problems which dog t h e m ,  
retreat into what they think to be a matter safe and free f r o m
danger, nam ely the postulating of their geom etrical f i r s t
principles by hypothesis [to TjTroGecrecjüC aiTeXaSai TaC TqC
y e c o p e T p i a C  d p x d C ] [translation from Barnes 1990, 95].
(M III 1)
The problem of the certainty of 'what could be put under as a 
ground' for our reasonings, which the Greek philosophers tried so 
desperately to solve, ended up, however, in the Sceptic aporia: e ith e r  
an infinite regression or an unsupported agreement. According to 
Sextus for instance "those who assume something by hypothesis a n d  
without proof are satisfied by a bare assertion [ i | / i \ f ]  cf)dcriC] alone" (M  
III 7, translation from Barnes 1990, 97). Because for him a woOeaiC, 
even if it is an allegedly self-evident dpxn (as, for instance, the th re e  
dpxai on which Asclepiades tried to ground his medical science — cf. 
M  111 5), as long as it is not supp or ted  by an diroSei^iC, can only b e  
a 'bare' assertion, a Tj/iXfi 4 > d a i C  (cf. M  I 157, 188, 279, etc; cf. also 
Barnes 1990, 97, n. 8). And so for Sextus the hypothetical mode leads 
to a suspension of judgem ent (èiToxfi), because, being concerned n o t 
with proving that something is true, but only with agreeing  th a t  
something is true, it lacks any value:
The mode from an hypothesis occurs when the Dogm atists, b e i n g  
thrown back ad infinitum,  begin from som ething which they do 
not establish but claim to assume simply and without proof b y 
virtue o f an agreement [translation from Barnes 1990, 98].
(M III 1)
That which was placed under, seems to be the conclusion of Sceptic 
philosophy, in order to support that under which it has been p laced  
needs, in its turn, a ground. Otherwise, as long as 'that what is p laced  
under' is not itself supported by something else, a iJTroGeaiC cannot b e  
more that a groundless ground. Yet Plato, long time before th e  
Sceptics, by using the criterion of the aupcjjauJia tüjv Xoywv (i.e. th e  
criterion of coherence), suggested a possible escape from th e  
difficulties raised by foundationalism (see 8.1.3.).
3. Plato’s ÙTToôéaeiC
Plato used the word woeecriC in various philosophical passages; 
with him, however, things are (as usual) more complicated.
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3.1. The suspended world. Physical and metaphysical topography in  
Plato
In Plato the main ontological distinction is, roughly speaking , 
that between (i) a changing, tem poral, visible, sensuous, 'p ro fan e ' 
realm, and (ii) an unchanging, atemporal, non-visible, in te llig ib le , 
divine one (see, inter alia, Smp. 208 a 8-b 1; R. 509 d-511 e, 534 a 
2-5; Sph. 247 c-248 a; Ti. 27 d 7-28 a). Let us not, for the m om ent, 
enter the complicated details regarding this distinction, and say only  
that the intelligible realm is for Plato the 'origin', the apyp of th e  
sensuous realm. And that is to say that the Greek idea, according to 
which our world depends on something else (e.g. on üSœp, in T hales' 
case), occurs also in Plato. Now, Plato, like many other G reek 
philosophers, localizes the apyfj of 'our' world (in his case, the so- 
called 'intelligible realm'); but, contrary to the m ainstream  of G reek 
philosophy, he localizes it 'above', not 'under' the world (as, fo r 
instance, it seems to be the case with Thales' uSœp, on which th e  
world lies). (And he, like all Greek philosophers, not only le f t  
unjustified his belief that our world must have an âpxp — see fo r 
instance Ti. 28 a, which simply postulates it; he also left u n ju s tif ie d  
his 'localization' of this dpxp).
In what follows, I shall argue (a) that in Plato we have to 
distinguish between the physical and the metaphysical dvcu and KctTcu, 
and (b) that for him, poetically speaking, the sensuous realm is n o t 
grounded  upon, but hung  from the intelligible realm (which is sim ply  
given, not put  where it is by a Demiurge or any other 'agent'); then 1 
shall (c) propose, ten ta tively ,  a possible explanation of P la to 's 
m etaphysical topography, and (d) conclude that, given his way of 
putting things, he could not use, in connection with the in te llig ib le  
realm, any expressions prefixed by t j t t o -  such as TjiroeecriC,
TJTTOK€l|J.€VOV, TJTTO|JLeVOV Or TJTTOOTaOlC.
(a) The problem of the physical orientation in Plato is an  
extremely complicated subject, as anyone can see from O ’Brien's 
study (1984) on the Platonic notion of weight, with which th e  
problem of direction is closely linked (see for instance Ti. 62 c-63 e, 
where the notions of 'up' and 'down' are explained in conjunction  
with 'light' and 'heavy', and with the movement that earth and fire  
have towards their 'parent element'). Aristotle claims (Cael. 308 a 17 
ff.) that Plato does not hold an absolute view on 'up' and 'down' (9). 
And this opinion is supported by several passages, e.g. the Tim aeus  
62 c, where Plato says that "it is quite a mistake to suppose that th e  
universe is parted into two regions, separate from and opposite to 
each other — the one a lower to which all things tend which have any  
bulk, and an upper to which things only ascend against their will"
(10). Yet Plato, in many other passages, speaks of high and low
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'regions', as he does for instance in the Phaedo  112 b 3, where h e  
describes the waters of Tartarus as moving avtu Kod KaTtu, or in th e  
Phaedrus 247 b, where he refers to the summit ( d K p a u )  of the 'a rch  
that is over the heaven below [eirl tt\v u T T o u p d v i o v  d \ | ; i S a ] '  (cf. also R. 
519 b). But, if the universe, as a whole, is not parted into two regions, 
one lower and one upper (as it is stated in TL 62 c), why does P lato  
refer to a TjTToupdvioC 'region'?
According to the peretDpoXdyoi, Plato claims in the Cratylus 3 96 
b-c, the way to have a pure mind (tov Kaeapov voxiv) is 'to look 
upward' (opdv rd  dvtu). But, as Socrates argues in the Republic, th e  
study of astronomy "does not compel the soul to look upward [eic to  
dyw opdv] nor lead it away from things here to those higher things" 
(529 a), nor "does any other study turn the soul's gaze upward [dvcu]
than that which deals with being and the invisible [to ov t€ ^  Kal to
ddpaTov]" (529 b). And, continues Socrates (529 b-c),
i f  a n y o n e  t r i e s  to  l e a r n  a b o u t  t h e  t h i n g s  o f  s e n s e ,  w h e t h e r  
g a p i n g  u p  [dV(jJ K e x p v c jo C ]  o r  b l i n k i n g  d o w n  [K a T ü J  C T u p p e p u K a j C ] ,  I 
w o u l d  n e v e r  s a y  t h a t  h e  r e a l l y  l e a r n s  — f o r  n o t h i n g  o f  t h e  k i n d
a d m i t s  o f  t r u e  k n o w l e d g e  —  n o r  w o u l d  I  s a y  t h a t  h i s  s o u l  l o o k s  u p ,
b u t  d o w n  [ o u T E  d v o j  dXXd KdTCü], e v e n  t h o u g h  h e  s t u d y  f l o a t i n g  
o n  h i s  b a c k  o n  s e a  o r  l a n d .
This passage from the Republic  (see also Phdr. 249 c) states v e ry  
clearly: the physical dv cn  and Kd.Tw (which are relative, according to Ti. 
62 c and to Aristotle's in terpretation) are to be distinguished fro m  
the metaphysical d v m  and KctTw (which are absolute). That is: for Plato, 
physically, the sensuous realm 'is not parted into two regions, 
opposite to each other, one low, and one up up (cf. Ti. 62 c); but he, 
given his poetical way of putting things, depicts the intelligible re a lm  
as being situated somewhere, above the sensuous realm (and th e  
passages of the Line and the Cave from the Republic do not leave an y  
doubt about this localization of the intelligible realm above  th e  
sensuous realm — see especially 515 e). (11). Thus, when he sp eak s 
about high and low 'regions' (as he does in the Phaedrus 247 b), h e  
does not have in mind a physical distinction b e tw een  high and low 
parts of the sensuous universe, but the m etaphysica l  d is tin c tio n  
between the intelligible and sensuous realms, to which he, in his urge 
to embody his thoughts in poetical images, gave a 'spatial localization: 
the former somewhere up, the latter somewhere down (12).
(b) Roughly speaking, an dpxn (e.g. Thales' u6wp) is, in an  
ontological context, that which 'keeps' our world. In Plato's case, 
however, since his âpxp (i.e. the intelligible realm) is situated above  
the world (i.e. above the sensuous realm), the world is 'kept' by i t  
av(jü0€v, 'from above', as it is in the final myth of the Republic (here .
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in this myth, the universe is said to be 'fastened by chains to th e  
dSapdvT ivov hook of a spindle', which, I believe, is a metaphor for th e  
intelligible realm (13)). (For Plato, however, if 1 can make a sh o rt 
digression, man also is ‘hung’ upon the metaphysically 'higher rea lm ', 
like an upside-down plant whose roots, being up, hold him from  
above — cf. Ti. 90 a-b (14); or like a puppet hung by cords a n d  
strings upon the Gods — cf. Lg. 644 d-e.)
To sum up: for Plato — unlike for some Presocratic p h ilo so p h ers  
and unlike for most of us — the world of becoming and man h im se lf  
are not grounded  upon, but hung  (15) from something which h as 
more 'ontological dignity'. Why then, m etaphysically, does P lato ’s 
world seem to be ‘upside-down’?
(c) As I mentioned earlier, the fact that each olKoSopriaiC, 
'edifice', must be supported by a G e p e X i o v  is a fact given as such to 
human experience. And so, because of this situation, one can th in k  
that every th in g  must have a e e p c X i o v ,  and be supported, as it w ere , 
eepeXideev, ‘from the bottom’. (In other words, paraphrasing w h a t 
Plato says at Phd. 99 c, one may think that there is a mighty a n d  
sustaining Atlas in every thing.) This m etaphysical o rien ta tion , 
where what is down is held as 'essential', because it supports what is 
up, is to be found in many different cultures, from the ancient tim es 
— full of myths and philosophâm es  which present the image of a 
'supported world' — to our times, where the most common m e ta p h o rs  
of 'essences' are 'foundation', 'basis', or 'ground'. According to th is  
orientation, however, what is 'under' is taken as what is 'secu re ', 
'stable' and 'firm' — in short as what is 'superior' (16). But som eth ing  
which is under something else, even if it is more secure and stab le , 
tends, in many different cultures, to be regarded as 'inferior'. In  
Greek for instance, the 'better' part of a city is the a K p o i r o X i C ,  not th e  
{iTTOTToXiC (for the tendency to 'localize' under or down what is, 
roughly speaking, 'negative', see, inter alia, Aeschylus' description of 
Tartarus in Pr. 219-220 as a 'deep black hole', peXappaepC KEuepmv); 
or, to take another example, K a e a i p e c u ,  ‘to take down’, means also, 
m etaphorically, 'to humble' (cf. also ra'TEivoC — which also m ean s 
'low' and 'humble').
For Plato ctKpoC,  'high', is the attribute of excellence, of 
superiority. The 'heaven' ( o i i p a v o C ) ,  where the gods dwell, is 'up ',
whereas the human race lives ‘down below’ (Smp. 190 b 8); the m o st 
im portant offices in a state are 'the highest' (Lg. 765 d-e, where th e  
post of the supervisor of education is called ‘the most im portant o f 
the highest offices’, a K p o T a x a j v  d p y m v ) ;  the rulers of Kallipolis a re  
called 'the highest', ccKpoi  T ü jv  d p y o v r t o v  (R. 459 b 11); the men w ho 
are to institute M agnesia’s regulations about the official posts a re  
'men of the highest parts', p a X i c r r a  ocKpoi  (Lg. 753 e 5); an  
accomplished craftsman is an ocKpoC S r i p i o u p y o C ;  a co n su m m ate
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guardian is an o c K p o C  c j ) i j \ a ^  (Lg. 965 b 6-7); and the best p h ilo so p h ers  
are the c t K p o i  e ic  c j ) i X o c r o ( j ) i a v f R .  499 c 7; cf. also Ti. 20 a 4-5).
The Greek ôtto , however, expresses, with Genitive and Dative, 
both the idea of 'under' and that of 'subjection' or 'dependence'. This 
'subjection' can be a 'subordination to a person' (e.g. elvai Wo r iv i  — 
'to be subordinate to a person', or Wo t i v l  — ‘under one’s pow er’, cf. 
LSJ), or even a ‘logical subordination of things under a class’ (e.g. in  
Aristotle’s Cat. 1 b 16, cf. LSJ). In Greek then. Wo, 'being under' ( th a t  
is: 'bellow something else'), implies, m etaphorically, (i) in feriority  (to 
some extent) (a common word for 'inferior' is TJiroSefjC — lite ra lly  
'something fasten', Seov, 'under', Wo, 'something else') and (ii) 
dependence (the most common Greek word for 'dependant' is WpKooC 
— 'being under command'; cf. also WoyeipioC— 'dependent', i.e. 'be ing  
under one’s hand' and ijTTOCTTpaTpyW -—'to serve under the com m and  
of a o-TpaTTiyoC'; and the most used verb to express the notion of 
dependence is d p T d c j ü ,  which, in the passive voice, means, literally, 'to  
be hung upon'). It is true that the notion of 'dependence' can also b e  
expressed in Greek "via the verb Keipai in combination with th e  
preposition W , "and there the perspective is opposite" (R osenm eyer 
1960, 398, n. 14). For Plato, however — perhaps because in his d ay s 
the notion of 'dependence' was chiefly expressed through th e  
preposition tjtto (or through the verb à p r a m )  rather than through th e  
verb KEipai in combination with the preposition kv (or simply because 
he, in his mystical 'adoration' of the eiSp, followed that u n iv e rsa l 
tendency of the religiously inclined men to 'localize' that which is 
‘sacred’ above, and not under (17)) — it seemed more 'natural' to 
localize our dependent and inferior world of becoming Wo, 'u n d e r ', 
that which truly is, i.e. the e i S t] .
(d) To sum up: for Plato the sensuous realm is 'held' by its  
cipyn, i.e. the intelligible realm, from above, exactly as in the Ion th e  
poet is said to be held (Ex^^ai — 536 b 1) by the Muse upon whom h e  
hangs (EWpTpTai — 536 a 8). Thus, Plato could not use, in connection  
with the intelligible realm, any expressions prefixed by tjtto-  such as 
W o G e c t iC ,  T jT T O K E ip E v o v ,  WojjLEVov or WooTuaiC (in the case of the te rm  
'tjtt6 - 0 e c t i C ' ,  besides the inadequacy of the tjtto" ,  there is also th e  
inadequacy of - S e q i C ,  for the Platonic intelligible realm is sim p ly  
given above the sensuous realm, not p u t  there by an 'agent' — b e  
him even a Demiurge). And so for Plato, as for the other G reek 
philosophers, the word 'Tjiro-OEaiC' could not be used in ontological 
contexts. He, however, like other Greek philosophers, used it in  
epistemological contexts. But here too, he seems to be unique.
3.2. The ascension towards the intelligible
Plato does not say that each pÉGoGoC that aims at ach iev ing  
knowledge is an ascension (18). But he speaks about knowing the
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intelligible realm  in general as an a v d ( 3 a a i C  — see for instance th e  
Phaedo 109 d-e:
A lth o u g h  w e  l iv e  in  a  h o llo w  o f  th e  ea r th , w e  a s s u m e  th a t w e  a r e  
l iv in g  on  th e  s u r fa c e , an d  w e  c a ll th e  air h e a v e n ,  as th o u g h  i t  
w e r e  th e  h e a v e n  th r o u g h  w h ic h  th e  stars m o v e . A n d  th is  p o i n t  
to o  is  th e  sa m e , th at w e  are to o  f e e b le  and  s lu g g i s h  to  m a k e  o u r  
w a y  o u t to  th e  u p p e r  l im it  o f  th e  air. I f  s o m e o n e  c o u ld  r e a c h  t o
th e  su m m it [ e i  t i C . . .  e ir’ ccKpa e X 0 o i ] ,  or p u t th e  w in g s  to  f ly  a l o f t ,
w h e n  h e  p u t u p  h is  h e a d  h e  w o u ld  s e e  th e  w o r ld  a b o v e , ju s t  a s  
f is h e s  s e e  ou r w o r ld  w h e n  th e y  p u t up th e ir  h e a d s  o u t o f  tW  s e a .
A n d  i f  h is  n a tu re  w e r e  a b le  to  b ea r  th e  s ig h t , h e  w o u ld  r e c o g n i z e  
th a t th a t is  th e  tru e  h e a v e n  an d  th e  tru e l ig h t  an d  th e  tru e  earth .
(Cf. also R. 511 b 4-5: "the contemplation of the things above is an  
ascension [ d v d p a a i C ]  of the soul to the intelligible region [ v o p r o C  
TOTToC]"; 534 e: 'dialectic is the coping stone [ e p i y K o C ]  of all s tud ies '; 
and Phd. 101 d, R. 510 b, 515 e 1, 7, 517 a 3-5, 533 d 2-3, Phdr. 
249 c, Tht. 175 c-d, Ti. 20 a 4-5 (19).)
Roughly put, Plato claims that, metaphysically ,  man lives in an  
ontologically inferior world, usually without knowing that which is 
above him, namely the intelligible realm, and so he dwells, as it
were, in hollows (or in caves, as the Cave allegory in the Republic  
puts it); and that man's supreme achievement is to raise him self in to  
the 'upper region' of the intelligible realm, i.e. to 'perform an
ascension', an dvdpaaiC .
For the Greek philosophers, the main task of cj)i\ocrocj)La is, 
roughly speaking, to know the ultimate principles of the world. For 
those who think that things are 'grounded', 'founded' or 'based' u p o n  
principles, the quest for those principles would be like a d e sc e n t  
towards the profound depths of the world (hence the adjective p a G u ,  
deep, often associated with G e c o p p p a ,  a thing contem plated by th e  
mind — cf. for instance Porphyry, Plot. 14, 15ff,); whereas for th o se  
who think that things are held from the above by 'principles', or by a 
God, the quest for principles would be like an ascent towards th e  
upper-most predominant heights of the world. (Again, the symbolism 
of initiation as an 'ascension', i.e. as a knowledge of 'what really is', is 
present in many ancient rituals and myths — see Eliade 1958, 104-8 , 
who assembled a great deal of evidence on this).
In the time of Plotinus, writes Porphyry in his Life o f  Plotinus  
(16, 1-9), there were many Christians and sectarians who h a d  
abandoned the old philosophy, and who claimed that "Plato had n o t 
penetrated [ i r e X d a a v T o C ]  to the depths of intelligible reality [ e i c  T o  
p d G o C  Trjc  voTiTT)C o d a i a C ] . "  But since for Plato (i) the v o ^ T q  o d a i a ,  th e  
intelligible reality, is ‘localized’ above the world of becoming; and (ii) 
the 'knowing' of this intelligible reality which is above is (to use th a t  
phrase from the Phaedo 109 e 2-3) 'a reaching of the summit' ( e r r ’
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(XKpa Epxeo-eai), then those Christians and sectarians, if they wanted to 
express their idea in Plato’s terms, should have said something like  
'Plato had not reached the heights (oijk è x f j x i i e e v  ett ' c t K p o v )  of 
intelligible reality.' This expression (i.e. è X p X u G e v  ett’ d K p o v )  occurs 
actually in the Timaeus 20 a 4-5, where Socrates says that T im aeus, 
besides holding the most im portant and honourable offices in h is 
own state, "has reached the heights of all philosophy [<j>iXoaocl)iaC.. .ett 
’ c tKpov  c tTTàaqç  È X f jX u 0E v] "  (cf. also R. 499 c 7: 'the best p h ilo so p h ers
are the d K p o i  e I c  c | ) iXo(jO(j ) i av' ) .  This idea, however, that the p a th
followed by a philosopher is an 'upward path' (as it is exp licitly
called in the Symposium  211 c. Republic 510 b ff. and im p lic itly
suggested in the Phaedo 101 d) occurs also in the Theaetetus 175 c- 
d, where Socrates says that what a philosopher does to a novice is to 
"drag [him] upward to a height at which he may consent to drop th e
question 'What justice have 1 done to you or you to me?' and to th in k
about justice and injustice in themselves [..., making him feel] dizzy 
from hanging [ K p E p a a G E i C ]  at such an unaccustom ed height an d
looking down from mid-air" (cf. also Sph. 216 c 6-7: 'the re a l
philosophers [ovtüüC c t ) iX6ao( | )o i ]  survey from a height [KaOopo i jvTEC  
i u | / o 0 E v ]  the life beneath them [tov tÆv KaTcu f3 io v ] ' ;  and 246 b 7: th e  
'friends of forms' [ o i  tüjv e îScüv — 248 a 4] defend their position
somewhere in the heights of the unseen [ a vc oG Ev  d o p c c T o u ] ' ) .  For
Plato, then, knowledge in general is an elevation  (and that is why th e  
philosopher is — as Plotinus says, I, 3, 1-2, alluding to the P haedrus  
myth, 246 c — ÈnrEpwpÉvoC, ‘winged’) (20).
3.3. Ascension and viroOecnç
As I said in 2.1., the w ord w o Ge q iC has various meanings in  
Plato: (i) a 'theory' (the so-called the 'theory of forms', for in stance , 
cf. Phd. 99 b ff.); (ii) a 'statem ent adopted to support (or re jec t) 
another statement' (Chrm. 160 d, Prt. 339 d, Men. passim, R. 437 a.);
(iii) a 'starting point for discussion' (Hp. Ma. 302 e, Chrm. 171 d, Prt. 
361 b, Grg. 454 c, R. 550 c, Prm. 136 a-b, Tht. 165 d, 183 b, Sph. 2 3 7  
a, 244 c); (iv) a 'starting point for practical action' (Lg. 743 c, 812 a); 
and  (v) a 'proposed subject for discussion' — Prm. 127 d (o r 
generally, 'the subject matter of a discussion' — cf. Lg. 812 a).
It is not my purpose here to offer a study of le-m ot-ùnoeeaiç-  
chez-Platon-typQ, and so 1 shall not discuss all these meanings of th e  
word {jttoGe q iC. 1 believe, however, that the three 'e ssen tia l' 
determ inations of the physical, perhaps original sense  of the w o rd  
tjitoGectiC are to be found in (iii), (iv) and (v); for, as 1 argued, a 
starting point for discussion or for practical action and a su b jec t 
proposed for discussion is something which has been settled b y
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som ebody  before  the actual discussion or action begins, and so it acts 
as the ground  of it. But in the case of the first two meanings — (i) a n d
(ii) (which are the meanings that w o e ea iC  has in ep istem ological 
contexts) — things are a bit more complicated.
Some Greek philosophers used the word ijit66ectiC in  
epistemological contexts, with reference to an 'epistem ological apxfi'; 
and, as 1 claimed, this may be due (to a greater or lesser extent) to 
the fact that the literal meaning of tjtt60€ctlC fitted with th e ir  
m etaphorical view that the 'epistemological apxai,  unlike th e  
ontological àp x a i ,  being p u t  by som ebody as the beginning of an  
ensuing argument, are like a foundation, GepeXiov,  that precedes a n d  
support a construction.
Now, if in epistemological contexts a w o e e c r i C  is for Plato a 
theory or a statement, then  that theory or statem ent is, 
m etaphorically, put down by someone. Thus, one may claim, in P la to  
a theory or statem ent qua  UTToeeaiC is also an 'epistem ological dpxT* 
which is thought of as a foundation, GepeXiov,  that precedes an d  
supports a construction. Yet the textual evidence which may b e  
invoked in favour of this view is extremely scarce; for he used th e  
word iJTToeeaiC in epistemological contexts as if he was not b o th e re d  
at all by its literal m eaning (i.e. 'physical foundation'). That is why i t  
has been argued that in Plato the word TjiroeeCTiC either carries, to 
some extent, its literal meaning, but that this meaning is not ta k e n  
into account by him (see for instance Rosenmeyer 1960, 407), or th a t  
for Plato TjTToeeaiC in general does never mean 'physical fo u n d atio n ' 
(see for instance Robinson 1953, 98) (21).
In the Republic, however, TjTToGectiC occurs in a passage in w hich  
it is clear that Plato was very well aware of its literal meaning a n d  
that he attempted to exploit it somehow. Here, at 511 b, he com pares 
a tjttoGecteiC with a 'rung', or 'step' (ÉTiipaaïC), on which one may 'g e t 
upon' toward the avu-n-oGEToC dpxp, i.e. toward the limit of th e  
intelligible realm (I take the àvuTToGEToC apxfj as to ayaGov, which is 
said at 532 a 7- b 1 to be 'the limit of the intelligible') (22). H ere 
then, a w o GeoiC is, m etaphorically, a theory (or a statem ent) that is 
put down by someone; but it is put down  as that which su p p o rt 
one's ascension toward 'the limit of knowledge', not as that w hich  
support, from below, like a foundation, an argument (or a body of 
knowledge). (When it is being put down, a tjttoGectiC is, in Plato, a 
theory or a statement whose truth, although probable to some extent, 
remains to be established — cf. also Robinson 1953, 95 and B arnes 
1990, 93; thus, a tjttoGectlC cannot be, metaphorically, a pÉpaia ÊTTipaaïC, 
a 'firm rung'; if so, then how could one climb on such 'unsafe ru n g s ' 
toward the 'the limit of knowledge', the only firm thing — cf. R. 533 c 
7-d 1)?
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Plato, as I argued, supported his 'investigations' by using th e  
criterion of aupc|)tuvia Twv Xoyœv, i.e. the criterion of coherence, 
suggesting thus a possible escape from the difficulties raised b y  
foundationalism. Now, he does not develop this metaphor of the rung; 
if w e  do, and if we take into account his 'coherentism ', we might say  
that for him the rungs on which one ascends toward the limit of 
knowledge are not themselves supported by something pépaïov, i.e. 
by Si f i r m  f o u n d a t i o n :  the rungs, it seems to me, insofar they are a re  
aijpcj)(jüvoi, s u p p o r t  one another.) (Most of the comm entators, how ever, 
tended not to take Plato's comparing a Tj-îToeécreLC with a 'ru n g ' 
seriously (23), mainly because he does not use it elsewhere (24).)
To conclude. As I argued, in its literal sense uTToGeaiC m ean s 
'something put by somebody under something else a s  a  f o u n d a t i o n ' .  
Plato did not use this word in ontological contexts, and this may b e  
due to some extent to the inadequacy suggested by its lite ra l 
meaning: (i) the Platonic intelligible realm is (metaphorically) n e ith e r  
a f o u n d a t i o n  which su p p o rts  something else (on the contrary it is 
said to be a b o v e  the sensuous realm), nor is it p u t  where it is by an  
'agent' (be he even a Demiurge); and (ii) the sensuous rea lm , 
although it might be said to be p u t  by a Demiurge u n d e r  th e  
intelligible realm, it is obviously not its f o u n d a t i o n .
He, however, used this word in epistemological contexts. His 
comparing the act of 'knowing the intelligible realm' with an  
'ascension' corresponds, m e t a p h o r i c a l l y ,  to his m e tap h y s ica l 
topography, in which the intelligible realm is localized above. So, 
given his great interest in the proper sense of the words (see fo r 
instance the C r a t y l u s ) ,  one may be inclined to believe (as 1 in itia lly  
did) that he would attem pt to use an epistemological term ino logy  
consistent with the m etaphorical idea that knowledge in general is a 
sort of an ascension. But he, surprisingly, seems not be bothered b y  
this problem; and, in his using the word ijTroeecriC in ep istem ological 
contexts, he seems to ignore its literal meaning (i.e. that of 'physica l 
foundation') (although his comparing a w o e e c r i C  with a 'rung', in R. 
511 b, may be invoked as an indication that he thought about th e  
fact that TjTrdOecjiC has a literal meaning after all, and about a possib le  
way to fit it with his idea that knowledge in general is a sort of an  
ascension.)
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N O T E S
P r e fa c e
1 There is even a study entitled "Plato, Woody Allen and justice" (see C o lw ell 
1991).
2 Why, however, would one like to understand Plato's philosophy in the f ir s t  
place is another question (which I shall deal with —  very briefly, however —  in 
the E pilogue).
3 Yet the logical rou te  that Plato’s search followed is not mirrored v e r y  
accurately by the c h r o n o l o g y  of his dialogues. For it so happened that in h is  
dialogues he mixed up things a little bit; that is he, say, explicated a prem iss i n 
a late dialogue, or assumed a conclusion  long before he stated it exp licitly  — to  
the effect that the written trace o f his whole search seems sometimes to have a 
fa irly  'anacoluthic' character.
4 Apud  Eco 1992, 24.
5 Plato's m etaphorical devices, especially  his myths, were m inutely d e sc r ib e d  
and analyzed (cf. for instance Stewart 1905, Frutiger 1930, M arignac 1951, 
Findlay 1978, or Elias 1984). But the vast majority of his interpreters do n o t  
think, like Plato, that such devices are the only kind of rigour that we c a n  
achieve in our attempt to understand p hilosophical matters. We cannot b u t  
regard his myths, allegories, analogies, etc. with suspicion, if not, as H eg e l,  
with indifference (cf. 1971, p. 109: 'Plato's value does not reside in his myths').
In tr o d u c tio n  
Socratism  and Platonism
1 I am indebted to Mr Alexandra Dragomir for drawing my attention to th is  
p o in t .
2 This 'standard' Socratic request occurs throughout the early dialogues — s e e  
for instance Hi. Ma. 295 b: you [Hippias], 1 suppose, will easily discover i t
[viz. 'what beauty is'] once you are alone. Still, 1 beg you most earnestly to 
discover with me here, or, if  you please, let us look for it together as we a r e  
now doing."
3 A term used many times in the Socratic dialogues (see for instance La. 196 b 
6, Ly. 223 b 3, Prt. 338 c 7, etc.).
4 Vlastos 1983, 72 argues that in the dialogues before the Gorgias  S o cra tes  
"describes the elenctic refutation of p  by saying that non-p  'has b e c o m e
evident to us' (E ^ d vq  'HM-iv) (cf. Prt. 353 b 5-6; Euthphr. 15 c 1-2; R. 335 e 5, e tc .)
or by observing that the interlocutor now 'sees' (opqC  — Euthphr.  11 a 3) o r
'knows' ( i Q T E  — Prt. 357 e 1) that non-p".  But here, in the Gorgias ,  c o n t in u e s  
Vlastos, Socrates claims that his thesis has been proved t r u e  (479 e), "or,
equivalently, by a powerful metaphor, [...that it has been] 'clamped down a n d  
bound by arguments of iron and adamant' (508 e - 509 a)" (p. 71). M o r eo v er ,  
thinks Vlastos, the G o r g i a s  contains textual evidence (472 b-c, 474 a, 474 b, 482  
a-b) for supporting the claim that, in this dialogue, Socrates is making t h e
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fo llow in g  assumption: "Anyone who ever has a false moral b elief w ill a lw a y s
have at the same time true beliefs entailing the negation of that false b e lie f"  
(p. 52). In a note from the same volume (1983), however, Vlastos concludes th a t  
this assumption from the Gorgias  does not occur in any other dialogue, w h ic h  
means that we have to take it as "Plato's present to his teacher" (p. 74.).
5 Both Vlastos 1983, 29 and W aterfield 1989, 44 claim that this is the fo r m a l
pattern of the most prom inent form of elenchus; not the one suggested b y
Robinson, which runs, according to them, as follows:
(i) p (q r)
(ii) (q r) non p
(iii) p V non p
(iv) Therefore non p
6 A ll the Socratic dialogues (including those whose authenticity is not b e y o n d  
any doubt) are centred around this reaching of a o p o X o y ia  — see for in s t a n c e  
Hp. Ma. (294 c 8, 299 c 2, 303 d 4-6); Ale. 1 (109 c 3, 11 b 3, c 1, 112 c 5, d 5, 113 b 6 , 
115 c 7, 116 c 9-10, 133 c 18, d 10), etc.
Chapter One
Plato’s way of putting the question o f know ledge
1 According to the Timaeus 69 c-71 d, each part of the souls has a 'bodily seat':
TO X oyiaT iK O V — the head; ô GujJioC — the heart; and T o  ETTGup^TtKOV — t h e  
belly (for details see Cornford 1937, 281-6). Some scholars, however, may a r g u e  
that Plato did not constantly believe in the tripartition o f soul; for tr ip a r t it io n  
is not m entioned in the Phaedo,  which works, apparently, with a r o u g h  
opposition between soul (seen as rational) and body (seen as the source o f  
desires); and in the Laws  it seems to disappear.
2 Cf. also Hp. Mi. 376 c 2, where know ing som ething is put in terms of r e s t i n g  
from a wandering (TTanaoiJLEGa TqC irXdvTjC). This idea, how ever (that s u r e  
knowledge has to remain the same) is also, 1 think, at the core of Plato's s a y in g
that 'to know' is 'to ke e p  having knowledge' —  cf. Phd. 15 d 8-10: "'to know' [TO
E iS E v a i]  means simply 'to retain' the know ledge which one has acquired, a n d  
not lose it" (cf. also Smp. 208 a 1-2.).
3 Cf. also Phlb, 17 e: "The unlimited variety [t o  dîTEipov] that belongs to and is  
inherent in the particulars [i.e. in the 'realm' o f what is dXXoTE dXXtuC] le a v e s  
one, in each particular case, an unlim ited ignoramus." What 1 b elieve th is  
statement says is this. The field o f knowledge stretches from the [JLEyiCTTa y£VT|, 
the 'widest genera', to the 'lower' e i 8 t |, the 'narrowest species'; but it does n o t  
contain that part which is right under the 'narrowest species', i.e. t h e  
diT E lpoV , dXXoTE dXXtoC realm of individuals. That is: even when I look at, say , 
a particular ant, 1 cannot know its most s p e c i f i c  part, that which is dXXoTE 
dXXcoC.
4 And the Stranger from Elea h im self is called a GeoC È X E y K T i K o C  (Sph. 216 b 
5-6).
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Chapter Two 
The p eG oSoC  towards theories
1 In this passage he does not actually use the word peGoSoC; but he used i t
earlier, at 97 b 6 , and it is obvious, from the context, that here, at 100 a ff., h e 
speaks about a possible p eG o 8 oC out of aporetic situations,
2 Cf. M éridier 1909, 234: "[...] selon toute apparence, [le mot p€0o8oC  est u n e  
création de la langue ph ilosophique, qui l'a forgé pour son usage. P e u t-ê tr e  
Platon en est-il l'auteur. En tous cas, c'est chez lui qui nous le trouvons pour la  
première fois [...]."
3 Cf. 1897, 419: "In earlier dialogues, as P h a ed o  (79 e, 97 b) and R e p u b l i c  (435 d, 
510 b-c, 531 c, 533 b-c, 596 a), this word [p€0o8oC ] had not yet a fixed m e a n in g  
and was equivalent to 'argument', 'study', or 'way o f reasoning'. In t h e
Phaedrus  p E G o 8 oC  (269 d, 270 d) is used in the same prim itive m eaning o f 'w a y  
of reasoning'. In the Theaetetus  (183 c) it means 'hypothesis' or 'theory'."
4 Cf. 1897, 419: "But in the Sophist  there appears for the first time a ' lo g ic a l  
method', essentia lly  different in form and contents from the 8 iaXeKTiK'n
peG oSoC of the R e p u b l i c  (533 c), which meant no more than the study o f  
dialectic, or vision o f the idea o f Good."
5 Cf. for instance R. 515 e: the one who left the Cave in order to see the light o f  
the sun had to be drag out by force (cf. (3ia — e 6 ), for the ascent' is ' r o u g h  
and s teep' .
6 Cf. also the beginning of Discours de la méthode  ("[...] la puissance de b ie n  
juger et distinguer le vrai d'avec le faux, qui est proprem ent ce qu'on n o m m e  
le bon sens ou la raison, est naturellement égale en tous les hommes") and t h e  
Timaeus  51 e ("mind [VOÏÏC] is the attribute of the gods and of very few men").
7 Earlier on, at 85 c-d, Simmias alludes to this 'procedure', when he said: "It is  
our duty to do one_ of two things, either to ascertain the facts, w hether b y 
p a G e iv  or by e u p e iv , or, if  this is im possible, to select [X a p o v ra ] the best a n d  
least refutable [S -u ae^ eX eyK T O raroC ] human XoyoC, and use it as a raft to r id e  
the seas of life — that is, assum ing that we cannot make our journey w ith  
greater confidence and security by the surer means of a divine X d y  o C . "
8 And what is at stake in that which precedes Socrates' intellectual h is t o r y  
(nam ely the topic of the im m ortality of the soul) is also a body of  s t a t e m e n t s  
(cf. Ta e ip T jp ev a  —  85 c 1, d 9, and Tct X e y o p e v a  —  85 c 4, which are translated as  
'theory'/'theories' by T redennick).
9 Some scholars (like, for instance Archer-Hind in his edition of the Ph a ed o ) ,  
claimed that a Platonic hypothesis is always a defin ition. But this claim is e a sy  
to refute, since in Plato there are so many hypotheses which are n o t
d efin itions (e.g. the hypothesis that 'many exist' — cf. Prm.  136 a 6 ; cf. a lso
Robinson 1953, 100). Some other scholars claimed that all hypotheses in P la to
are 'statements o f existence'. But Plato calls 'hypotheses' many statements th a t  
do not posit the mere existence of something (e.g. 'virtue is know ledge' — M e n .  
87 c 4), and in the Parmenides  136 b 7-8 he says exp licitly  that one m a y
hypothesize either "that anything whatsoever exists or does not exist or h a s  
any other character [dXXo iraGoC trdaxovToC]." Rather seldom, Plato d oes
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hypothesize the existence o f something —  cf. for instance Prm. 136 a 6 ( w h e r e  
it is hypothesized that ’many exist’).
10 Cf. also Barnes 1990, 92: "In the Platonic tradition, h yp oth esiz in g  h a s
prim arily an heuristic function."
11 The verb Ti0T|pi (and its cognates) is used by Plato throughout t h e  
dialogues, and it may mean: ‘to hold a view, 'to regard as’ (R. 331 a, 334 e, 352 d, 
Pit. 257 b, Sph. 246 e), 'to assume' (Phd. 79 a, R. 340 a, 430 a, Tht. 191 c), or 'to
judge’ (Pit. 275 b). All these m eanings, however, bear the idea o f 'holding' o r
positing a p r o v i s i o n a l  statem ent whose truth, although probable to so m e
extent, remains to be established; cf. Robinson 1953, 95: "If you posit ( r i G e a a i )  
a proposition, then that proposition 'stands' (KEiTai) until you withdraw it  
( d v a T i G e a a i )  or replace it by another ( p e r a T i G e a a i ) . "
There are degrees of confidence in a hypothesis, from s im p le  
acceptance (Phlb. 13 b) to strong confidence (R. 437 a, Phd. 92 d). W h en ,
however, a hypothesis is posited under a strong agreem ent o f tw o  
interlocutors, it is a opoXoyqpa (or opoXoyia) (cf. R. 437 a, Tht. 165 c ) .
(A lthough it is not a general rule, a opoX oyripa is not put under e le n c h u s .)  
(There are in Plato, also, r h e t o r i c a l  hypotheses, due to pedagogical r e a so n s;
but, as Robinson 1953, 97 claims, "Plato very rarely speaks of h yp oth esiz in g  a 
proposition that one knows at the time to be false. His conception  o f
h yp oth esiz in g  hardly, if  ever, extends to sh eerm ak e-b elief. [... And] his w ord
for assuming what you already know or believe to be false is not UTTOTiGecjGai  
but a u y x m p E iv .")
12 This passage reads: "It is our duty to do one of two things, either to a s c e r ta in  
the facts, whether by [JLaGeTv or by eijpeTv, or, if this is im possible, to s e le c t  
[XapdvTa] the best and least refutable [Suae^eXeyKTOTaToC] human XdyoC, and 
use it as a raft to ride the seas of life [etc. — my italics]" (see also t h e
occurrence o f e X e y x ^ iv  at 85 c 5).
13 Barnes 1990, 93 claims that: "[According to Plato] in h yp oth esiz in g  that P, 
you do not commit yourself to the truth of P, not do you assert that P. [...] i n 
hypothesizing that P, you do not argue  for P or produce any sort o f reason i n
favour o f it." Now, if  Barnes suggests that in h ypothesiz in g  that P, you do n o t
a rg u e  for P or produce any sort of reason in its favour at all, I do not a g r e e
with him. In Plato (at least) 'hypothesizing has prim arily an h e u r is t ic
function' (as Barnes h im self admits — see p. 92), for a hypothesis is a 'p ie c e  
aimed at fitting into a given and incom plete puzzle'; and the 'degree of its
fitting' stands as a 'reason in favour o f it'. That is: in h yp oth esiz in g  that P, y o u
argue, som ehow, for P, because you have hypothesized  P as a p la u s ib le
hypothesis (and the plausibility is due to the 'degree o f its fitting' into a g iv e n  
puzzle). But this 'fitting' is not a. g u a r a n t e e  of its truth, which remains to b e 
e s ta b lish e d .
14 For Robinson's main arguments in favour of this interpretation  see 1953,
127, 130-1.
15 Robinson's solution is the fo llow ing (pp. 128-9). (i) Plato’s whole idea, h e  
claim s, is this: "that which follow s from the hypothesis is to be set down as
true, and that whose contradictory follow s from the hypothesis is to be se t  
down as false. This idea has two parts; and, since they are not c o n tr a d ic to r ie s  
(for the contradictory of 'that which follows from X' is not 'that w h o s e  
contradictory follow s from X' but 'that which does not follow  from X'), th e
accurate expression of the whole idea is som ewhat cumbersome." In fa c t,
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Robinson interprets the in con sisten cy  in terms o f deducib ility , e.g. a 
proposition q is inconsistent with p if  non-q is deducible from p; and if p is  
true, then q must be false (e.g. if the proposition p: 'I have only one brother' is  
true, then the proposition q: 'I have three brothers' is inconsisten t with p 
because its negation, namely the proposition non-q: T do not have t h r e e
brothers', follow s from p). In this case, we have an acceptable criterion to  
establish which propositions are true (those which are deducible from a tr u e  
h ypothesis) and an acceptable criterion to establish which propositions a r e  
false (those whose negations follow  from a true hypothesis), (ii) Thus Plato has 
in mind both deducibility and in con sisten cy , but these two ideas “cannot b e 
neatly expressed by a single verb and its negative, because they are n o t  
contradictories but contraries” . So, Plato sacrifices a part o f his m eaning a n d  
chooses an appropriate metaphor for ‘co n s is te n c y - in c o n s is te n c y ’ , which a r e  
actually  contradictories.
16 I very well know that p.oiJcriKr| is, as Cornford 1937, 158 (n. 4) put it, " a w id e  
term, including poetry and the thought conveyed in it"; but this does not m e a n  
that p-OuaiKt] does not sometimes hints  primarily to music (as, I believe, it is the 
case here).
17 Whereas puGjJLoC refers (roughly speaking) to a TŒ^iC of sounds q u a  
durations (cf. Lg. 665 a; cf. also Smp.  187 b7-c 2).
18 The modern terms 'symphony' and harmony' refer to a rd ^ lC  o f  
s i m u l t a n e o u s  pitches (i.e., roughly speaking, to c h o rd s ) ,  whereas the G reek  
CTTjpLcjjtJüVia and àpp-ovia refer to a rd^ lC  of c o n s e c u t i v e  pitches (i.e., r o u g h ly  
speaking, to m e l o d i e s ) .
19 Thus, Robinson's claim — that "there is no passage in which [CTup^aJVETv o r  
Siact)üüV€Tv (or its cognates)] certainly indicate deducibility or the a b s e n c e  
there of" (1953, 127) —  seems to be refuted.
20 The cosm ology of the Timaeus is a 'collection' of theories  — m e ta p h y s ic a l ,  
physical, physio log ica l, theological, etc. That is why, when Timaeus says th a t
'his X o y o i  about the gods and the generation o f the universe may not b e 
altogether o p o X o y o L '  (which, as I said, can be taken as a synonym  f o r  
CTUpc[)CJüv o i ) ,  he speaks about theories  that may not c n j p c j j c n v e t v  d X X r ) X o i C .
21 In some metaphorical usages, d p p o v i a  and aupcj^mvia are said to imply not a 
mere r d ^ iC , but a K o a p o C  (cf. R. 430 e; cf. also Ti. 47 d 6).
22 The 'probability' that is at stake here is not the 'probability' of the S o p h is ts ,
which Plato contrasted with truth in Phdr. 267 a 7.
23 Cf. also W aterfield 1989, 51: "[0"upc|)(i)VeTv does not imply a chain o f  
successive inferences (p q -> r ...),] where each stage is checked for v a lid ity  
o f inference from the preceding one. [...] In the first place the c o n s e q u e n c e s
are CLTto ('from') the starting point, not one another: no succession  is
envisaged, but rather p (q • r- s). In the second place, the con sequences a r e
checked a X X i r f X o i C  ('with one another'), not merely with each previous one."
24 The consequences of a statement are usually well marked by one of t h e
following expressions: (i) a u p p a i v e i v  (Hp. ML 369 a 4-5, Men. 87 a, Tht. 165 c
10, 164 b, Chrm. 164 b 9, Grg. 408 e, Prm. 142 c); (ii) rd  a u p ( 3 a i vovTtt (Grg. 495
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b, 496 e, 479 c, 508 b, Men. 87 b, R. 437 a, Prm. 136 a 1, b 8 , 142 b 3); or (iii) T a  
È T T o p e v a  (Cra. 436 d).
Chapter Three 
The pe9o8oC towards theories and 
the theory of e i 8 r| (I)
1 Plato's usage of the word TrapdSeiypa raises a number d ifficu lties, m a in ly
because of the am biguity this word, which may mean both (i) an instance o r 
example, i.e., in a broad sense, a copy  of something; (ii) a model  for so m e th in g ;  
and (iii) an exemplary i n s t a n c e  of so m e th in g  (cC LSJ). All these t h r e e  
m eanings are to be found in Plato, (i) The Greek Trapd8€iypa is u s u a lly
rendered by 'model', and so the main sense of the verb from which it d e r iv e s ,  
Trapa8eiKvupi,  is to a certain extent, lost. r rapaSe iK vnp i  means 'to portray', i.e .  
'to represent so and so'; its result, a TrapdSeiypa, is then, e ty m o lo g ic a l ly
speaking, a sort of an embodiment,  an ins tant iat ion  or, in a broad sense, a n
example  (cf. Men. 11 a 9-b 1), i.e. an 'entity' in which another 'entity' is
portrayed', (ii) In Plato, however, the word Trapd8€iypa is mostly used as
referring to what is a m o d e l  of som ething. In the Timaeus,  for in s t a n c e ,  
T r a p d 8 e i y p a  means 'the model of the universe' (cf. 28 a 7, 37 c 8 , 38 b 8-c 1, 39 e 
7, 48 e 5, 49 a 1) (which is contrasted with its sensible copy  —  dyaXpa, 37 c 7, 
eiKüJ V, 29 b 3, c 1, 37 d 7, or pipr)Ka, 38 a 7, 51 b 6). (iii) Plato claims very o f t e n  
that we have to use, in our philosophical inquiries on a d ifficu lt 'case', a
clearer and simpler, yet similar one, i.e. an exemplary in s ta n ce ;  and he u se s  
here the word irapdSEiypa (see Tht.  154 c; Sph. 226 c, 251 a; Pit.  277 d; cf. a lso  
Aristotle Rh 1356 b 3). (This sense of TTapd8eiypa is som ehow situated b e tw e e n  
the other two, since an ‘exemplary instance’ of som ething is a 'copy' which is  
the most 'close' to its model.) And he him self uses som etim es this p r o c e d u r e  
(called by some scholars 'the method of Trapd8eiypa'). For instance: t h e
attempt to understand the sophist is made through the Trapd8eiypa of t h e  
anglerfé'/ï/i. 218 e-221 c); the attempt to understand the statesman is m ad e  
through the TTapd8€iypa of the w ea v er (P /t . 279 a-283 a); the attempt to
understand the T i y y t ]  crocfriaTiKT] is made through the i rapdSeiypa  of TEXVp 
TTOiriTiKin (Sph. 233 d ff.).
2 So, when Plato claims that an eiKCOV is not, he does not mean that that eÎKüJV 
does not ex ist at all; that is: he does not claim, like Parm enides (cf. Sph. 258 c 
ff.), that dv and \xr\ 6v  are c o m p l e t e l y  separated (cf. 237 a: ou y dp pf) TTOTe 
TOUTO 8apxi, (^ Tjo-LV, e îvai  pf] eovTa- dxxd cnj TTja8’ dc|)' ô8oü diCiipEvoC e l p y e  
voTipa); when Plato claims that an e l k ü j v  is not, what he actually means is th a t  
that €IK(JJV does not exist dvTCoC, as a Trapd8eiypa does. ( o v t c ü C  means h e r e  
dXpTOjC, cf. Sph. 240 b 10; cf. also R. 515 d, where pdXXov dvT a seems to m e a n  
dXT]0eCTTepa d v T a ;  that is: an o v t c o C  o v  is an àXT)0ivôv ov, a iTapd8eiypa, v iz . 
an dv which is not a pTpoC, that pretends' to be another dv.)
3 I think it may be worth noting aj>assage from the Republic  where the id ea  
that 'to be OVTW C qua  'to be dXT|Tü3C (as a model is) is not separable from 'to b e  
d v T ü j Ç ' q u a  'to be unchanging'. The passage in question is 514 b 8 , where P la to  
says that the shadows projected on the wall of the cave — which are the c o p ie s  
of real dvT a, i.e. of things which are projected by the fire —  are m o v i n g ,  
cj)£p0 VTaC. (Plato was very much aware of the distinction between c h a n g in g
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and im m ovable beings and of the fact that his predecessors used to c la im  
either that only the changing beings are or that only the im m ovable b e in g s  
are — cf. Tht. 180 c-181 b and Sph.  246 a ff. He, however, rejects t h e s e
traditional views and claims that both changing and im m ovable beings ex is t .
For, he says in Sph. 248 a and d, there is at least one instance in w h ic h
changing and u nchanging beings are in K o i v c n v i a ,  and this instance is th e  
phenomenon of knowledge, y i  y  vto c T k e i v , which is a K o i v u j v i a  between a 4^X1 
y i y v o a K E L V ,  which is som ething k i v t i t o v  —  cf. 249 a 10; and an o i i c r i a  
y i y v o a K E a G a i ,  which is som ething aKLvpTOV — cf. 249 c 1; cf. also Cra. 440 a -  
b .)
4 In Ti. 52 a the way Plato puts things suggests that com mon names r e f e r ,
prim arily, to £ i 8 q, although they may also refer to the sensible em b o d im e n ts  
of EL8 T|.
5 For s p e a k i n g ,  as far as it uses common nam es ,  is about e i 8 r| (cf. Sph.  259 e; 
"any discourse [ \ 6 y o C ]  we can have owes its existence to the a u p i r X o K r i  t ü j v  
£ l 8 c ü v " ;  that is: the very possib ility  of speaking  derives actually from t h e  
ontological  KOlvCDVia TWV e ïSü JV ,  a view which im plies that speaking  i n 
general is about E i 8 q ) .
6 Plato's saying that 'pdOrjCJiC is d v d p v r ia iC  (72 e 5-6) stems, I believe, fr o m  
his focuss ing  in this dialogue on the issue of àvàpvT]crLÇ (w hich is c o n ta in e d  
by that of p d O q a iC ) ,  not from his r e d u c i n g  the question of pdOriCTiC to that o f
dvdpvqauz.
7 To actually know an E l 8 o C ,  how ever, t o  X o y i a T i K O V  should deal with it o n ly  
t h r o u g h  itself, i.e. it has to s p e a k  about it and a v o i d  looking, through the e y e s ,
at it — cf. Phd. 67 a 6 -b 1 and 99 d ff. (som ething which Plato kept saying i t
throughout the dialogues —  see R. 534 b ff.; Tht. 186 b-e,187 a, 189 e; Sph.  227 a 
8 , 253 b 10; Phlb.  57 e-58 a, 59 a, 61 e; Ti. 28 b ff., etc.).
8 Plato was never doubtful about soul's immortality; but, it seems, he was n e v e r  
too happy with the ways he i m a g i n e d  the l i k e l y  details of 'soul's fu tu r e  
habitations', for he came back to this issue several times, and each time he p u t  
things differently —  cf. Phdr.  249 a; R. 621 a-b, Ti. 41 e.
9 Cf. (i) the Ph aedo  98 a 2 ff., where Socrates claims that if  Anaxagoras h a d
supported his view on causality, he, Socrates, would have been^ "prepared to
give up hankering after any other kind of a i T i a  ( a i T i a C  c t X X o  E Î S o C ) " ;  (ii) the 
Phaedo  98 c ff, and the P h i l e b u s  27 a ff., where there are d istinguished  a c a u se  
proper and its 'condition'; (iii) the Timaeus  46 e, where there are d is t in g u is h e d  
two kinds of a i T i a i :  a rational cause (embodied by a Dem iurge) and a n o n -  
rational one (em bodied by a rather obscure 'entity' often called 'N e c e ss ity ')  
(for the rational and non-rational a i T i a i  see also the Laws  896 e ff.).
10 Cf. Aristotle Metaph.  988 a 9 ff.; D iogenes Laertius 3. 69; Sim plicius in P h y s .  
26. 5 ff,; "Aëtius" 1.3.21 (b) = Stobaeus Eel. 1.10.16; A lcinous, Didascalicus  9.1.; 
Seneca Let ter  65.7). (I am indebted for many of these references to R. W. 
Sharpies' paper "Counting Plato’s Principles", which he delivered at t h e  
Scottish A ssociation for Classical Philosophy in Edinburgh on 2nd of J u ly  
1994.)
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11 He also claims that others are generated spontaneously, TCt a r r o  Taiip.a.TO'U, 
but this is not a t h i r d  different mode of generation; it is rather that both TOC 
cjjucrei  ' y i y v o p . e v a  and T a  t e x v 'Q y t y v o p ^ v a  m aybe generated sp ontaneously  o r  
not spontaneously —  cf. 1032 a 30 ff. and 1034 a 10 ff.)
12 In Aristotle the explanation of the generation of Tot cj)Tja£i o v T a  is less c le a r  
than that of T a  T r o i o u e v a .  Roughly speaking, it seems that for him T a  cj juae i  
o ' v T a  are the 'result' of (t>uaiC (Ph. 192 b 8 ff.; cf. also Metaph.  1032 a 13 ff.); b u t  
what 4>iJ{TtC is, is not clearly stated (or so I find). (For an in teresting , y e t  
som ehow risqué attempt to make clear Aristotle's obscure notion o f c|)TJCTiC s e e  
Heidegger 1967 and 1976.)
13 Since later antiquity philosophers have tended to think of causes only as 
efficient causes; that is why we are inclined to think that a purpose, or m a tter , 
let alone a form, can be called 'causes' only in a very m etaphorical way. But, 
and this could be regarded as almost a truism, we do som etim es explain t h e  
same phenomenon in several different ways. If we accept that an e x p la n a t io n  
is an a n s w e r  to a w hy-question  (as, for instance, van Fraassen 1980 a, 42  
claims), then we will have to accept that a questioner always asks his q u e s t io n  
within a determ ined context. Therefore, what is asked for by a question l ik e  
'Why is it the case that p?' is always contextually determ ined. (But w h y  did  
Aristotle choose this p r o d u c t i o n i s t  causes? One may speculate, as H e id e g g e r  
1984, 117 does, that the very idea o f cause was brought forward by the world o f  
producing —  understood as the production o f one being f r o m  another.)
14 There has been a lot of debate about how this expression  should be ta k en .
The meaning o f the expression S e u T E p o C  ttX o u C  can fairly be put as 'taking to  
the oars when the wind has failed' (see Gallop's 1975 com m entary ad lo c u m ) ,  
which bears the idea o f 'giving another, second-best try'. Now, to what  is
Socrates giving a second-best try? The answer to this question is anything b u t  
obscure, for he says explicitly; "[...] I have worked out my second v o y a g e  
[ S E U T E p o C  ttX o d C]  in the quest of  a i r i a "  (99 c 9-d 1 — my italics; the o r ig in a l  
reads: etti  t t \V  t t | C  a i T i a C  ( T | T T | c r t v ) .  That is: the expression  S e t j t e p o C  ttX o u C 
refers to Socrates' introducing 'another, second-best pattern of c a u s a l  
explanation', namely that by eiSx] (see also Gallop's 1975 com m entary a d
locu m).  But why 'second-best'?
The references to the efficient a t  t i  a  ( v o u C )  as 'true' or 'real' (c f . 98 e 1 
and 99 b 3), suggest that Socrates considered it as being 'the best pattern o f  
causal explanation' (see his referring to v o u C  as 'true' or 'real' —  cf. 98 e 1: TaC 
(i)C a X q e w C  a i T i a C ,  and 99 b 3: t o  a i T i o v  tlü o v t i ).  But, since he was unable to  
discover it h im self or learn about them from others, he eventually  came u p 
with his own (second-best) causal explanation, nam ely that by e i 8 t | (99  c 9 -d  
1). (Sayre 1969, 4-5 claims that the expression S E U T E p o C  ttX o ÎjC does refer, in its 
letter, to Socrates' explanation by 'formal causes’ as being 'second best' to  
Anaxagoras' explanation by 'final causes, but he believes that this is o n ly  
Plato's irony.)
15 Gram m atically this phrase does not raise any problem, yet its 'spirit' is  
rather difficult to render in a translation, because the accent in this phrase is  
an o n to l o g i c a l ,  not an a e s t h e t i c a l  one. I list below a few translations:
16 Cf. Thomsen 1990, 320: "The image of the craftsman's production is for P lato , 
as for Aristotle, a starting point for the understanding of reality" (m y  
tr a n s la t io n ) .
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17 In Greek philosophy, Plato's Timaeus seems to be an exception, because th e  
theme of creation qua production is not to be found in other p h ilo s o p h e r s ,  
notably in the pre-Socratic fragm ents (cf. Heraclitus B 30: k6cj |j .ov t 6 v 8 e . . .  
o u T E T i C  0EWV OUTE àv0pcjüTTü)V ETTOiTiaEv) .  (Yet the m otif of an 'efficient' c a u se  
occurs, in one form or another, in some Presocratics —  cf. Parmenides' S a i p c n v ,  
Empedocles' c | ) i \ i a  and V E I K O C ,  Heraclitus' TFUp, or Anaxagoras' v o u C . )
18 The Greek 8 T]|JLtO'up'y6 C is the craftsman in general (cf. Paquet 1973, 31: "Le 
8 th jlio iipy6 C, en effet, c ’est l ’ouvrier en général — nous dirions, le tr a v a il le u r  
anonym e dont le métier ne se remarque plus, bien loin qu’il soit question de  
retenir son nom ni son rang social"). In Plato, however, as Classen 1962, 20, n . 
28 points out, "SrnJ-ioijpyoC is [...mostly] used where a iT ia  is com bined w ith  
ETriaTfjpri and vouC (Ti. 46 e 3-6, Sph. 265 c 1-9, Lg. 902 e 4 ff.)." For o th e r  
occurrences of the Demiurge see also Pit. 269 d-270 a, 273 b-d and Phlb.  27 b.
19 Plato's Demiurge is then not an o m n i p o t e n t  Creator, for his creation, u n l ik e  
Jahwe's, is not a creation ex nihilo.
20 In the Timaeus, matter, although it is not explicitly called an a i T ia ,  ceases to 
be an ignored 'element'. Here in the Timaeus  there are exp licitly  d is t in g u is h e d  
only two kinds of a i T i a :  the rational one (a tT ta  proper) and the n o n - r a t io n a l  
one ( a u v a i T i a i )  (cf. 46 e). The relation between these two a i x i a i ,  the r a t io n a l  
and the non-rational (cf. also Laws  896 e ff.), and the Demiurge and avdyKT] is  
not very clear. But the Timaeus 46 e supports strongly enough the idea th a t  
they are the same, i.e. the Dem iurge is the rational cause and dvdyKTi is th e  
non-rational one (for a similar position see Hackforth 1959). But to what d oes  
this non-rational cause belong?
Plato says that the Demiurge framed the universe out of a 'p r im o rd ia l  
given matter' (TL 52 d). But this primordial matter is not inert: it is, on t h e
contrary, "shaken" by chaotic 8 uva|j,ELC (52 d-e), and the Dem iurge has, as it  
were, to 'tame' it. (This primordial matter is a chaotically  m o v in g  
indeterminate mass o f elementary triangles and it is first 'tamed' into p r im a r y  
bodies —  cube, pyramid, etc. —  see 52 ff.) Now, what is the cause of this c h a o t ic  
motion? Plutarh (De animae procreatione in Timeo 1014 d-1015 c) claim ed th a t  
Plato should have postulated an irrational soul as the cause o f this c h a o t ic  
motion, because soul is the only cause of motion. Yet for Plato the p r im o r d ia l  
matter is not moved by any soul, or v o u C ,  because for him matter is not, as f o r  
Aristotle, passive. (Bronze, in Aristotle's numerous exam ples with statues, is  
not "shaken", at any stage, by any power or force. Aristotle has a h ig h l y  
technical conception of matter, and for him matter qua matter never exists b y 
itse lf without any form; but qua matter it seems to be inert.) For P lato , 
however, matter has to be 'tamed', because its own nature consists o f a c h a o t ic  
m ovem ent (53 b). And, in my view, what causes the motion of p r im o r d ia l  
matter is its heterogeneity  (cf. 58 a). Now, this h eterogen eity  of t h e  
primordial matter, I believe, is what Plato calls dvdyK q; in other words, it th is  
h eterogen eity  of the primordial matter that the Dem iurge and the astral Gods 
are said to 'persuade' to obey to a rational project (as things are put at 30 a 5, 
what the Demiurge does is to bring into order som ething which is d iso r d e r ly , 
i.e. heterogeneous —  E Î C  T c t ^ i v  a u T o  fjyaiJLEV ek t t \Q  d r a ^ i a C ) .  Is then àvdyKT]  
more like a material 'active' cause, which "always produce chance e f f e c t  
without order or design" (46 e)? To me this seems a fairly plausible conjecture.
21 Plato's m a i n  interest during his entire life seemed to concern the h u m a n  
com munity (his most important works — the Republic,  the Laws,  and even th e  
Timaeus — have the topic of society as their starting point). How then does h e
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explain the TT d  X l  C ? Does he use the same 'productionist' explanation? This is, o f  
course, a very complicated problem, and it is not my intention here to enter its  
details; but, at a bird’s-eye view, it seems that society and history are a lso  
explained, to some extent, by a 'productionist' model.
The statesman (Politicus),  the legislator (Laws),  the D e m iu r g e  
(Pol it icus)  — are all understood as 'makers', who 'handle' the human n a tu r e  
(i.e. the 'matter', the 'constituent' of the TToXiC— cf. th e  R e p u b l i c ) ,  by ' lo o k in g  
at a model —  be it Kallipolis (in the Republ ic ,  called at 472 b-473 a and 592 a-b a 
T T a p d S e i y jJ -a ) ,  the ancient city of Athens (in the Timaeus  and the Crit ias) ,  
M agnesia (in the Laws),  or the universe itself (in the Politicus  274 d). (In t h e  
T im a eu s ,  unlike in the P o l i t i cus ,  the Demiurge does not 'handle' in any way t h e  
polis,  and this seems to be coherent with the 'productionist' paradigm, for, i n 
general, a product that has been fin ished ceases to be in a relation with its  
producer, and it begins to exist for its own.) (The tendency to relate the 'sp a ce ' 
of ttc5XlC to the 'space' of TTOir|CTiC is not alien to the Greek culture. S r n a i o u p y o C ,  
for instance, comes from 8 fi|JLloC and e p y o v ,  and so, etym olog ica lly , it m e a n s  
'the one who works for the people', e.g. a ‘magistrate’ —  cf. Aristotle Pol, 1275 b 
29.; cf. also Morrow 1997, who claims that in the L a w s  the legislator uses t h e
'material at his disposal in Greek life', just as the Demiurge in the Timaeus  u se s
the materials available to him.)
22 Cf. Vlastos 1975, 111; "The phrase 'saving the phenom ena' does not occur i n  
the Platonic corpus nor yet in Aristotle's work. [...] The phrase 'saving th e  
phenom ena' must have been coined to express the c r e d ib i l i t y - s a lv a g in g  
operation in a case where phenomena, not a theory or an argument, are b e in g  
put on the defensive and have to be rehabilitated by a rational account w h ic h
solves the prima f a c i e  contradictions besetting their uncritical a c c e p ta n c e .
This is a characteristically Platonic view."
Chapter Four
The theory of e i 8 ti (II): t o  d y a G o v  as the d v u T T o G e T o C  d p x q  of the theory of
£i8ri
1 Robinson 1953,152 claims that "contemporary m athem aticians did n o t  
describe them selves as starting always from hypothesis. This passage [509 d - 
511 e] is not evidence for that; and the M en o ,  which exp licitly  borrows fr o m  
m athem atical procedure, surely im plies that what they called the 'b y
hypothesis' method was not their regular procedure but a special m eth o d , 
frequent indeed (TToXXdKiC Men. 86 e) but not preponderating." The w o rd  
h ypothesis is here, in the Divided Line, concludes Robinson, "Plato's
interpretation  of their procedure, and not the word they them selves w o u ld  
use" (p. 152). I do not think, however, that this d iscussion is, p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y ,  
very important; what is important is that Plato wants to point out that o n e  
'attitude' toward the 'foundation', the {jTToGeaiC of an ensuing argument is to  
leave it u n q u e s t i o n e d ;  and that his  'attitude' toward his theory o f e i8 t]  is  
com pletely the opposite.
2 The main definitions of this method are to be found in: Pappus, Collectio,  V II, 
Praef. 1-3 (ed. Hultsch, pp. 634.3 - 636.30); Euclid, Elements  XIII (cf. H eath ,
1926, vol.!, 138); and Aristotle EN  1112b 15 ff., SE 175 a 26-29.
3 Cf. also Barnes 1991, 83 on the close link between the Sun and the Line.
4 Cf.: Aristoxenus, Elementa harmonica  II 30-31; Sim plicius, In A r i s t o t e l i s  
physica,  6-11 and 25-31 Diels; Them istius, oratio 21, 245 C-D; P r o c lu s ,
com m entary on Plato’s Philebus,  4-18 Cousin; Alkinous (A lb in u s ? ) ,
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Didascal icus  27, 1, p. 129 Louis; Alexis, fr. 152 (II 353 Kock); Amphis, fr. 6 (II 237  
Kock); Philippides, fr. 6 (II 303 Kock).
5 Cf. Philippides, fragm ent 6K, [II 353 Kock] = Stobaeus Ixviii 6; A lexis, fr. 152 
(II 353 Kock), and Amphis, fr. 6 (II 237 Kock). Now, the Republic  536 b-540 c , 
the Parmenides  136 e, the Phaedrus  275 d-277 a, the Laws  968 c-e, and th e  
Seventh Letter 341 a-e claim that the topic of the 'first principles' is n o t  
suitable for everybody. So, why did Plato hold a public lecture on such a 
difficu lt subject as 'the good'? One of the most subtle explanation belongs to
Gaiser 1980, 20-8. According to him, Plato did hold that lecture, in spite o f h is
esoteric reserve, because at that time the consequences of a public lecture o n
the good were more acceptable than those o f maintaining the silence; and th a t  
situation was caused by the fact that the public was inform ed about h is  
doctrine by incompetent persons, who raised the suspicion about his ideas.
6 This passage has caused many controversies, mainly because the a € i w h ic h  
follow s the expression TO yivo\ i€VOV  |jL£V lacks in some MSS and because t h e  
am biguity of the verb yiyveuQai. It is not my purpose here to discuss th e s e  
controversies, which would require far too much space (for details about th e m  
see Comford 1937, 24-5 and Hackforth 1959, 18-9). As far as I am concerned, I 
am inclined to keep the second d e l .
7 Cf. H eidegger cf. 1994, 72: "Being means for Plato 'to be a what'" (m y
translation). For Plato, however, existentia is not only n o t  s e p a r a t e d  fr o m
q u id  d i t  as;  it is also r e d u c ib l e  to it, and this is, according to H eidegger, the m a in
'sin' o f Plato’s ontology (cf. 1988, 60 and 1992 b, 210).
8 Owen 1986 puts the question of the Platonic being in terms of e x i s t e n c e  a n d  
p r e d i c a t i o n ,  and he claims that Plato does not separate them, which im p lie s
that for him b e i n g  in general is always the e x i s t e n c e  o f s o m e t h i n g  
determinate ,  of a what  (which is another way of saying that for Plato being is  
understood as w h a t n e s s ) .
9 Cf. Kahn 1986, 22: "[Plato, as well as Aristotle,] system atically  subordinate th e  
notion o f existence to predication [... and] in their view to be is always to be a 
definite kind o f thing: for a man to exist is to be human and alive, for a dog to 
exist is to be enjoying a canine life." (That is: for Plato 'existence' is always t h e  
existence o f something determinate, of a 'what', of a such-and-such  being, i.e . 
the existence of an identity: rocks, trees, etc.)
10 At 52 a this distinction between two things is turned into a d is t in c t io n  
between three things, for there is, claims Plato, a rpiTOV yévoç, xwpa, w h ic h  
is apprehended, as in a dream, not by senses, but by a 'bastard' X o y ia p -d ^ C .
11 In the Symposium  there is a phrase that reads: f] y a p  t o i  TOXi pf) OVTOC 
e i c  TO ÔV l o v T i  o T ca o uv  a i T i a  TTOcaa e o r i  t t o i t i o ' i C  (205 b 8-9). First, let us a sk  
ourselves what does Plato mean here by t o  pf)  6 v l  We know from the T i m a e u s  
that for Plato a creation (TTOir i a iC)  ex n ih i l o  is not possible. So, t o  pf] 6v ,  i.e . 
that from which som ething has been brought forth 'into being', th r o u g h  
TroiT]CriC, is not nothing:  it must be the very m a t e r i a l  from which th a t  
something, the T T O i O i J p e v o v ,  was made.  The material, how ever, existed b e f o r e  it  
was turned into a T T O i o u p e v o v ,  and it is said to belong to the field of pf) o v ;  an d  
the T T O i o i j p e v o v  'comes into being' la t e r  than its own material, and it is said to 
belong to the field of o v .  How are we to solve this p c t Xa  CCTOTTOV way of p u t t in g  
things? The d ifference between non-being and being is presented here as a
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difference between 'raw material' and 'product'. What then is the m a in  
difference between 'raw m aterial’ and 'product'? A possible answer to th is
question is, I believe, to be found in the Timaeus. There the material fr o m  
which the Demiurge framed the universe was a pf]  o v ,  because, as I said, it did
not have a what. But, at the moment the Demiurge, through his TTOi'ncriC,  
brought this 'whatless matter' from disorder into order (cf. 30 a 4-5: elC  t o c ^ l v  
aiJTO f \yayev  €K t t ] C  a r a ^ i a C ) ,  i.e. at the moment he 'changed' the T r X T i p p e X f i C  
K a i  o c T a K T o C  K i v r j c n C  into an 'orderly' k l v t i œ i C  (as it is, for instance, the ' lo c a l  
movement' o f the planets, which is 'governed' by numbers and so, by order  — 
cf. Ti. 38 c and 39 c), he turned that whatless yevriO'iC into a KEKOO"pT]p€Vov 
i r p a y p a ,  i.e. into a what ;  at that moment, in other words, he brought th e  
universe eK Tou pp OVTOC (i.e. from the realm of whatless) e i C  t o  o v  (i.e. in to  
the realm of w hatness). (That is: the universe begins to be  only after t h e  
Dem iurge turned the a T a ^ ia  of the primordial given matter into a Ta^iC, i.e . 
only after it became a K € K o a p r | p e v o v  r r p a y p a  —  a what.) (In Phlb.  27 d the sa m e  
idea is put in different terms: the turning of y e v e a i C  into o v o i a  is a c h ie v e d  
with the aid of TŒ T o u  T i e p a T o C  p e T p a '  — i.e. by imposing limits upon it, a n d  
thus by conferring it an identity, 3. w h a t . )
Can we read this into that phrase from Smp. 205 b 8-9? Apart from t h e
Dem iurge, one may claim, all other 8 r ) p i o u p y o L  — be he a ( w y p d ^ o C ,  a n
OL K oS o po C,  or a v a u i r r i y o C  (cf. Grg. 503 e ff.) — when they turned t h e ir  
materials into a K € K o a p T | p e v o v  TTpctypa {of.Grg.  504 a 1, Smp.  186 d ff., 187 a -c ,  
Cra. 389 d-e, Lg.  626 c, 628 a), they turned a par t i cu lar  what  (a p a r t ic u la r  
material) into another part icular  what  (the product). They do not work, as th e  
Demiurge, with a whatless  material. This is, I agree, true. But, if we accept th e  
position of the Timaeus,  that a TTOiriaiC in general is not possible ex n i h i l o ,
then the way things are put in Smp. 205 b 8-9 makes sense only if  we take CK
TOU P B  dvToC  as 'from the realm of whatless' and e iC  T o  dv as 'into the realm o f  
w h a tn e ss '.
12 An interesting view is held by Fine 1990; cf. p.; "[...] Plato view s the Form o f  
the good as the teleo logica l organisation of things. If we so view the Form o f  
the good, we can explain why Plato claims both that the Form of the good is  
more important than other knowable objects, and also that it is not an ousia.  
[...] Each form is good in that it has the function o f playing a certain role i n
that system: its goodness consists in its contribution to that structure, to t h e
richness and harmonious ordering of the structure, and its having that p la c e  
in the system  is part of what it is. Plato believes, then, that each Form is
essentially a good thing —  not morally good, but, simply, good —  in that it is part
of what each Form is that it should have a certain place in the te le o lo g ic a l
structure of the world." (See also, for an equally in teresting view, H e id e g g e r  
1984, 185: "[the idea of the good] transcends the entirety of ideas and at t h e  
same time thus organizes them in their totality. As è ireK eiva , the f o r - t h e - s a k e -  
of-which excels the ideas, but, in excelling them, it determines and gives th e m  
the form of w holeness, KOivcavia, communality"; and p. 116: "the idea of t h e  
good is the basic determ ination o f all order, all that belongs together. I n s o fa r  
as belonging together, K O iv c o v ia , is the essential determ ination of being, P la to  
is saying that the idea of the good is the primary bearer of this c o h e r e n c e ,
KOLVÜÜVLa. ")
13 Why does Plato call this T o u  i r a v T o C  apXB T o  a y a G o v ?  The know ledge o f  
such an d p X B , he claims, is situated at the end, T eX euT aia (517 b 8) (exactly as 
in the Cave allegory, the one who is freed into the 'outside world' is able to lo o k
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at the sun only in the end, T eX euT aiov , 516 b 3). That which is beyond b e in g ,  
in other words, is that which is most  worth h a v i n g  in the field of k n o w le d g e ,  
i.e. the ultimate T e X o C  of knowledge; and in Greek the T e X o C  of som ething is  
often called d y a G o v  (c f. Nettleship, 1951, 218-19: "both to ordinary people a n d  
to philosophers among the Greeks the good [ d y a G o v ]  meant the object o f
desire, that which is most worth having, that which we most want [...]"). T h is
is, however, only a guess.
14 This idea is also stressed out in the Cave passage; th ere , the d i f f e r e n c e  
between the 'knower' and the 'ignorant' is expressed in terms o f 'released from  
fetters' (cf. X u a i v  . . .  TWv S e a p c n v ,  515 c 4-5) and 'fettered' (cf. S e a p c o T a i ,  514 b 
4). That is, the difference between 'knowledge' and 'ignorance' (cf. dcjjpoauvrj 
— 515 c 5) is the d ifference between 'the possib ility  of m oving around' (c f .  
i T € p i d y £ i v  —  c 7 )  and 'the inability of moving around'. But what has 'm o v in g  
around' to do with 'knowledge'? And why 'the inability of m oving around' is  
the 'origin' of 'ignorance'? The 'fettered', says Socrates, have their legs an d  
necks fettered from childhood, "so that they remain in the same spot, able to  
look forward only, and prevented by the fetters from turning their heads"  
(514 a). That is, they, being forced to look in only one direction, cannot see th e
way the things which constitute their world are related  to each other, e.g. h o w
the 'things' they see in front o f them (viz. the 'shadows on the wall') a r e
projected' there by a fire. In other words: 'ignorance' is caused by th e
'im m obility' of mind, i.e. by the absence of the possib ility  of 'seeing' t h e  
K O i V ü j y f a i  which exist between t o .  o v T a .  Whereas 'knowledge' can be a c q u ir e d  
only by 'seeing' these K o i v c ü v i a i ,  i.e. by 'seeing' the way things are r e la te d  
between them (i.e., in the m etaphorical language of the Cave allegory, b y 
m oving between the cave and the 'external world' and thus seeing how t h e  
shadows, the things them selves and the light that com es from the sun a r e  
related to each other).
15 But, if  so, why did so many of his commentators tend to believe that the m o st  
distinctive licence of his m etaphysics is the s e p a r a t i o n  of what is 'sp ir itu a l'  
from what is 'physical'? Anyone fam iliar enough with the Platonic philosophy  
knows that the question of o u a t a is  always at its core. But there are so m a n y  
accounts, arguments and scattered sentences about this question, that a n y o n e  
who intends to begin a Yty/avTopaxta TT€pi t t ) C  n X a T t u v o C  o u a i a C  (to
paraphrase a line from the Sophist  246 a) feels rather at a loss. It is v e r y
tempting to pick from Plato's m etaphysics only the 'clear' bits and ignore t h e
rest; and the most clear-cut Platonic m etaphysical issue is that about th e  
distinction  between a changing, tem poral, visible, sensuous, 'profane' r e a lm ,  
and an unchanging, atemporal, non-visib le, in tellig ib le, divine one. Plato w as  
m ostly concerned with the c o m m u n i o n  between these two realms (and the so -
called 'theory of participation’ is at stake in many of his inquiries), not w ith
their separation.  But again, the way he explains this com m union is so full o f
obscurities, that one can easily be seduced by the much simpler p ossib ility  o f  
taking Plato's distinction  between the two realms as a complet e  separat ion.
Chapter F ive
The theory of £ i 8 r |  (III): o u a t a  as 8 u v a | j L i C  K O t v ü J V t a C
1 This view according to which 'existence' is a totality may be spotted, in o n e  
form or another, in some other Greek thinkers, such Anaxagoras, who sa y s  
that "... nothing can be put apart nor com e-to-be all by itself, but things w e r e  
originally, so they must be now too, all  together" (my italics, translation ta k e n
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from Kirk, Raven and Schofield 1983; the original reads: dXX’ OTrcjJCJTTep
e t v a i  Kal vuv TrdvTa o p o u ,  fr. b 6); or Parmenides, who, speaking about 'b e in g ',  
says that it "never was nor will be, since it is now, all together,  one, co n tin u a l"  
(my italics, translation taken from Kirk, Raven and Sj;hofield 1983; t h e  
original reads: 0 Tj8 e t t o t  f j v  o u S  ’ e V r a i, etre i  v v v  e a i i v  o p o u  t tgcv ,  ev ,  a u v s x ^ ^ ,  
fr. 28 B 8 5-6).
2 This issue is pointed out right from the beginning: the matter of a p p e a r in g  
as such-and-such  without really being so ( t o  y a p  c |:a iv ea 0 a i  t o u t o  Kal t o  
SoKc iv ,  e lv a i  Se pp — 236 e) does not occur only within T& o p a T a  d vT a, b u t  
also within T& X e y d p e v a , for a sophist is able, through his X e y o p e v a , to m a k e  
everything  'look' as a n y t h i n g .
3 In the Preplatonic period the question of a p p o v ia  seems to b e lo n g  
exclu sively  to the Pythagorean circles; but it occurs actually in many o th e r  
thinkers (such as Heraclitus, Anaxagoras or Em pedocles). The notion o f  
d p p o v i a ,  however, was discussed by Plato's predecessors in four main c o n te x ts  
and they spoke about: (i) a musical harmony (Ion from Chios 5 B; Philolaos 6 
B); (ii) a m athem atical harmony (Pythagoras 58 B 15; Hippasos 15 B; P h ilo la o s  
24 B; Archytas 2 B); (iii) a harmony of the soul (Pythagoras 58 B 1, 41, 74, 85 B; 
Democritus 167 A; Philolaos 23 A, Hippocrates 11 B); and (iv) a harmony of t h e  
universe (Heraclitus 1 A, 22 A, 10 B, 51 B; Empedocles 18 B, 22 B, 107 B, 122 B; 
Philolaos; TrdvTa dvdyKB Kal dppoviQL y C y v ea G a i — apud  Diogene Laertios, V III, 
84; cf. also 1 B, 2 B, 6 B, 7 B). In the fields of music and m athem atics things a r e  
rather clear: certain intervals and proportions are called harmonic;  but w h a t  
exactly is the p h i l o s o p h i c a l  notion o f d p p o v ia  rem ains, I think, an o b s c u r e  
q u e s tio n .
4 See Locke, An Essay concerning Human Unders tanding  (Book II, c h a p te r  
27); Hume, A Treatise o f  Human Nature  (Book I, Part IV, section 2); L e ib n iz ,  
Discourse on Metaphysics  (9); Hegel, Encyclopedia o f  Philosophy  (sections 5 3 -  
75) and Phen om en ology of  Spir i t;  Frege, On sense and r e f e r e n c e  ;
W ittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus  (cf. 4 .2 .4 .1 .-3 ., 5.5.3., 5 .5 .3 .0 .1 .-3 .);  
H eidegger, Der Satz der  Indentitat.
5 We are on quicksand here. On the one hand, an e lS o C  has an identity b e c a u s e  
it is in Koivüüvia with the elS oC  of TOUTOV; on the other hand, this K O ivœ via
with the eTSoC of T aiiT ov is actually 'a K O ivœ via  with i tsel f  (cf. Sph. 256 a 12-
b 1: "when we call KiVBClC TaiiTOV, we speak about the peOe^iC, or KOivtjJVia 
[cf. b 2] between KiVT|aiC and itself") (cf. also H eidegger 1986, 11). A ll th a t  
Plato says in the S o p h i s t  about the KOivcavia tü ü v  e i 8 üüv in general (and a b o u t  
the peyiCJTa yevT |) is, as I claimed, only an a p p r o x i m a t i o n  o f a very d if f ic u l t  
matter, and this approximation can be the subject o f many objections.
6 The idea that every being is related with others is present, in one form o r 
another, in the 'doctrines' of many philosophers. Cf. for in s t a n c e  
W ittgenstein's Tractatus ,  where it is claimed that (i) the world is "a
com bination ( V e r b i n d u n g )  o f objects (things)", that (ii) "each thing is [...] in  
a space o f possible states of affairs" (2.013) and that "there is no  object that w e  
can imagine excluded from the possib ility  of com bining with others" ( 2 .0 1 2 1 ). 
(Cf. also 2.0141: "The possib ility  of its [i.e. an object] occurring in states o f  
affairs is the form of an object".) (Cf. also Whitehead, 1929, 5, where he sp ea k s  
about the 'coherence o f ideas': "'coherence', as here em ployed, means that th e  
fundam ental ideas, in terms of which the schem e is developed, p r e s u p p o s e  
each other so that in isolation they are m eaningless. [...] In other words, it is
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presupposed that no entity can be conceived in com plete abstraction from t h e  
system of the universe, and that it is the business of speculative philosophy to  
exhibit this truth.)
7 In his Phenomenology o f  Spiri t  Hegel puts things in a very sim ilar way; h is  
argument may be represented like this; (i) every being 'afhrms' its id e n t ity ;  
(ii) but this affirmation o f the identity of a being im plies the differentiation o f 
that being from all that it is not. And all which that being is not' is i n f i n i t e  
(cf. Sph. 256 e5-6; 6KaaTov [...] Twv ei8u5v [...] a ire ip o v  8e TTXfjGEt t o  \xt] o v ). 
(H egel, however, does not stop here; by affirming its identity, he continues h is  
argument, a being becom es related to infinity; therefore, the true essence o f  
beings is infinity; and the essence of ’infinity' is grounded on 's u b je c t iv ity ' ,  
because the 'act' of 'affirm ing an identity and d ifferen tia tin g  from o th e r  
identities' —  I am I' —  is a subjective act par  excellence; this is my p a r a p h r a s e ,  
for details see cf. H egel 1977, 106 ff.)
8 Cf. Heidegger's 1992 b, 556-7 comment on Sph. 256 e 5 ff..
9 If TO [IT] ov is taken as eTepov, then it is to be counted as an eTSoC ev, as a 
form among the many others (cf. 258 c 3; t o  [if] ov ... èvàpi9[iov tüjv ttoW üjv  
OVTCUV); and this is to go far beyond Parmenides' prohibition  (258 c 6-7); th a t  
is: we proved, says the Stranger, not only that TCt [if] ovTa [...] eariv  (258 d 5 )  
but we also 'revealed' the eT8oC to u  [if] ovToC (258 d 6-7).
10 Plato supports this conclusion with the case o f kivt|Œ iC. His argum ent a b o u t  
KiV'pO ' iC runs as follows:
(i) we must admit (cf. ô^oXo^BTEov — 256 a 10) that K ivriciC  is i n 
K O i v c ü V i a  with o v  (256 a 1; cf. also 254 a 10), and that means th a t  
K i v r ] 0 ' i C  exists;
(ii) KiVBCiC, however, is £T€pov than ov (cf. 256 c 11-12: 'can w e  
say that K iv q a iC  is £T€pov than TOUTOV, arTaaiC and 0aT£pov b u t  
not £T£pov than d v?');
(iii) but, if KiVTiCTLC is £ T £p ov  than dv, then k lv tio -iC  is a [if] d v ,  for 
the other of being' (i.e. that which is not 'being') is n o n - b e in g  
(cf. 256 d 5-10); in other words: in relation to kCvt]CXIC n o n - b e in g  
is (cf. 256 d 11-12: TO [if] d v  £Îvai);
(iv) and this exi s tence  of [if] dv, conlcudes Plato, extends to rrdvTO,
TO. Y£VT], because the f] 0aT£pou cj)uaiC 'operates' (àTT£pyaCo[i£VT]) 
in all of them as to make ( T r o i £ l )  each one £T£pov than d v ,  a n d  
therefore OUK d v  (256 d 12-e 3).
11 I rely very much, in what follow s, on H eidegger's 1992 b, 5 6 2 -6 9  
interpretation  of this segm ent from the Sophist. All these references to
Heidegger's interpretation o f Plato do not mean, however, that my approach is , 
to a greater or lesser extent, Heideggerian, in the sense that I read — or tend to 
read —  Heidegger back into Plato; if, sometimes, I endorse H eidegger's views o n 
Plato, it is because I believe that those views reflect Plato's thoughts (or, b y 
exaggerating things, illum inate some of their latent aspects). (For one w h o
starts his research in Plato’s philosophy from Richard Robinson's book o n
Platonic dialectic, the references to H eidegger may seem  som ehow s tr a n g e ;
and yet, surprisingly enough, Robinson studied in late 20s with Heidegger; a n d  
in his youth he was, it seems, a disciple of H eidegger — apparently in s k i in g
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too, according to a poem he wrote in Freiburg im Breisgau and p u b lis h e d  
posthumously in Oxford Magazine,  Hilary Term, 1997, p. 8.)
12 The idea that non-being should be understood as 'other' is pointed out o n e  
more time by Plato in regard with the notion of other qua à v T iT i0 é |j .e v o v . For  
he claims that every a v r i T i O é i i e v o v ,  say, T o  |if] KaXdv, is also an d v , namely a n  
dv which is 'determined' (a c f)o p ia 0 e v  —  cf. 257 e 2) as the other o f  a n e lS o C  a n d  
then 'put' opposite it as another dv  (d v T o C  6f] TTpdC dv àvTl0€O 'iC  — 257 e 6; c f .  
also e 3-4). So an e îS o C  —  say, KaXdv —  has not more being (|iaXXDV Tüjv  dvTüJV) 
than its d vT iT L 0£p£V O V  (|ifi KaXdv) cf. 257 e 9-11.) They are, says the S tr a n g e r ,  
the same (6 [ j l o l  tuC); that is, we have to say that neither t o  |if] p e y a  Kal t o  j ie y a  
aÛTO (cf. 258 a 1-2), nor t o  pf] S iK aiov  [Kal] t o  S iK a io v  (cf. 258 a 4-5) e îv a i ,  
has more being ( t o  peSrjv Ti pdXXov e l v a i )  than the other (cf. 258 a 5). A nd, 
claims Plato, this is so for all other € i 8 t | (cf. 258 a 7).
13 So, one may claim, the so-called 'world of forms' is not like a co llection  o f  
portraits, but a sort of tableau vivant  in which each character is both a s u b j e c t  
and a d é c o r  for the others. To go back, however, to the im age o f a network —  
can we say anything about the shape of this network? In other words: if th e  
ei8T), in their totality, form a p a r t i c u l a r  'net' of KOivtnviaL, i.e. if they a r e  
'disposed' in a particular way, what would be the fo rm  o f this 'disposition', o r 
'arrangem ent'? At 221 d ff. he says that two cruyyevfj dvT a (i.e. two dvT a  
which are in KOLVCûvla, or 'combine with each other'), as it is the case with t h e  
angler and the sophist, 'start from the same point' (T£ x  v ITT] C), go together the 
same road (i.e. KTf|(JiC, XGlpüJTLKOV, 0T|peuTLKdv), and then they diverge (when 
they reach the art of animal hunting, 'the angler going to the s e a s h o r e s ,
rivers and lakes and angling the animals which are them', the sophist going to 
'land and water of another sort — rivers of wealth and broad m eadowlands o f  
generous youth to take the animals which are them'). This way putting t h in g s ,  
together with what Plato says at 253 d (that many e i8 r | are "embraced fr o m
without by another 8oC " ), seems to suggest that there is a 'hierarchy' of t h e  
e i S r i ,  and that this 'hierarchy' has, as it were, the shape of a pyramid (a sort o f  
a 'genus and species pyramid'); and, since in the S o p h i s t  Plato argues exp licitly  
that there are five 'ultimate genera' (viz. the five p e y ia T a  yevT]), we m a y  
im agine that the top o f the pyramid is formed by these five genera. T h e  
spectrum of know ledge then begins with what is 'im m ediately above t h e  
individual' (which is a n e t p o v  — cf. Phlb. 16), and ends with the p e y ia T a  yeVT). 
(In seeing, one may argue, we first see the more general e i8 r |,  and then t h e  
'more particular' ones.)
14 Now, what this notion of KOivojviaC emerged from? One cannot b u t
speculate. As far as I am concerned, I would say that for Plato the notion o f  
'being' as 8 u v a p lC  KOiVüüViaC 'emerged', so to speak, from the given  fact th a t  
for him man exists in a world of K O ivtnviai. The sphere o f TroiT|CriC b r in g s
forth all the KOlVüJViai that exist between materials, tools, producer, etc. (in Hi.  
Mi.  374 e 3 man's 'relation' with tools, o p y a v a , is expressed in terms of a
KOiVüJVia between man and tools). The sphere of ttoXlC brings forth th e
KOlVtiJViai between the TToXiTai (cf. Ale. 1, 125 d: the way we live in TTOXeiC
consists in being in communion  with one another —  kol vüj votj vtüj v  [. . .]
TToXiT€iaC Kal aujjLpaXXovTüJV irpoC dXXfiXouC — 125 d 7; cf. also Aristotle Pol.  
1252 a 1 f.: TTaaav ttoXi v  optupev KOivtuviav T iv a  o lia a v );  the sphere of ëpœC, 
which is a 'longing for other' (Smp. 200 a-b), brings forth the KOiVüjviai
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betw een the e p a a r a i  (in Aristophanes' myth from the S y m p o s i u m  'love' is a 
'nostalgic' search for a lost K oivcovia — cf. 192 e 2-4; I leave aside th e  
'universal' character of ëpüüC, which is som etim es said to d r iv e  e v e r y t h in g  
towards dpjiovia/CTUiJLcjjCDvia, i.e. towards a 'concordant com m union' — cf. Sm p.  
187 a-188 d); the sphere o f 0 £ io v  brings forth the KOivcaviai betw een men a n d  
gods (cf. Smp.  188 b 7-c 1; man are in a K O ivw via with gods through 'rite o f  
sacrifice and divination'); and the sphere o f speaking brings forth th e  
KOiVüJvCai between words (cf. Sph. 262 b-263 d: speaking consists in th e  
au^JLTTXoKai and the a u v 0 e a iC  between o v o ^ a T a  and pripaTa; cf. also Tht. 202 b 
4, 206 d 2). And, since (as I argued) for Plato the locus of certainty is th e
a u v o u a ia  o f minds, philosophy itself, in its Platonic form, requires th e  
KOiV(jL)Via with others.
15 As I said, putting things in terms of T r a p a 8 e iy p a T a — eiS cn X a  does not go very 
w ell with the idea of a KOivtnvia Ttuv eiSüüV. Plato, how ever, says e x p lic it ly ;  
"the best I can make of the matter is this [[idXiCTTa ëpoiye KaTacfjaiverai (5Se 
exeiv]  —  that these e I Sri are like [üJCTTT€p] TTapaSeiypaTa e a r d v a i  èv t b  cjjucrei. 
The other things are made in their image and are d p o i t d p a j a ,  and this p€0€^iC 
they come to have in the e i8 r i is nothing but their being made in their im age"  
(Prm. 132 d). That is: he admits that the most acceptable way of putting t h i n g s  
is to say that the £i8t] are like [cf. djCTirep] TTapaSeiypaTa. (And this dfanep is  
pointed out by Aristotle when he says in Metaph.  1079 b 25 ff.: "to say that t h e  
e I8 t | are u a p a 8 £ i y p a t a , and that other things ‘participate’ [ p £ T £ X € t v ]  in them, 
is to use [...] poetical metaphors [pfiTacjjopdC \£y£iv  TroiT]TiKdC]" — m y  
paraphrase.)^ It is essential, I think, for our understanding o f Plato, not to  
fo r g e t  this (I) a n e p .
16 The S o p h i s t  suggests that there are two main kinds o f Koivwvia tüüv yëvcuv. 
(i) One is the i n c l u d i n g  KOivtuvia, i.e. the KOivcnvia that exists betw een tw o  
£i8r], of which one is included ("embraced from without" — cf. 253 d 7-8) b y  
the other. This is the case for instance with the £TSoC of angler which is  
included in the £ i8 t | (cf. 219 a 8 where KTrjaiC is called £Î8oC) of T£XVT|, 
KTrjaiC, x^^P<^TiKB, OripeuTiKT), CtyoPripiKfi, ëvuSpov, dXiEUTiKR. (T h is  
'inclusions' o f an e l 8 o C  form its yévoC; and 8iaKpiV€iv the yévoC of an eTSoC 
brings forward the very answer to the T l  e c t t iv  question, i.e. to the q u e s t i o n  
'what  is that €Î8oC?'; for details see 7.4.) (ii) The other is the m e r e  r e l a t i n g  
KOiVüüVia, i.e. the KOivcnvia that exists between two £i8p which do not i n c l u d e  
each other. This is the case with three péyiaTa y£vp — t o  ov, TaÙTOV a n d  
0aT£pov; none of them includes another in the way the eT8oC of t e x v t )  
includes the e Î 8 o C  of KTrJaiC; they are, if I may say so, in a reciprocal  r e l a t i o n ,  
but w h a t  this relation is Plato does not even suggest.
C h a p ter  S ix  
The notion of d \ T ] 0 £ i a
1 The question about the a ia 0 f]a £ iC  of the world-soul raises few difficulties. 
On the one hand, Plato says that the world's body 'has no sense-organs, 
because there is nothing outside it to be perceived'; but, on the other hand, 
the world-soul exists within a body, so "it may be imagined as having internal
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feelings, which would be covered by the word aistheseis", as Cornford 1937, 
96 put it.
2 'We remember what we have seen even if we shut our eyes' — says 
Socrates in Tht. 163 e. It is , in a way, the same, I believe, with the 'in ternal 
non-abstract seeing' produced by speaking: we see the 'subject' of a Xeyopevov 
'even if we shut our eyes' (although here the 'image' is not 'lent' from  
memory and then 'projected' on the 'internal screen', here the 'image' is 
produced 'on the spot' by speaking); the 'internal projection', however, in  
both cases, is, I think, 'a keeping of an image on the internal screen', and this 
keeping can be performed only by memory. And so it is with 'seeing through  
eyes'; in Phlb. 39 a 1-2 Plato claims that 'perceiving through senses' is 
accompanied by memory, pvppq; if we take the case of sight, then this claim, I 
believe, refers to the fact that seeing is a keeping an image present (cf. also 
Heidegger 1988,160).
3 This distinction between abstract and non-abstract forms raises some very 
difficult questions. One of them refers to the fact that we cannot determ ine 
the exact border between abstract and non-abstract forms. In the Sophist the 
non-abstract eXSoC of the angler seems to embody some aspects of the n o n ­
abstract eXSoC of the sophist; but does the non-abstract eXSoC of the sophist 
embody the abstract eXSoC of T o  pq dv? Roughly speaking, the Sophist is 
divided in two main parts: one that deals with the question of what the 
sophist is (in which there are proposed eight definitions of him, 216 a- 236 c 
— the first seven, and 264 d-268 d — the eighth), and one that offers a 
metaphysical 'theory' (236 e-264 b). Usually it is held that the first part, the 
one about the sophist, is just an illustration of the ontological theory 
developed in the second; and so, we may think that the subtitle added by the 
Mediaeval copyists (viz. Trepi ToTj o v t o C, On being), should be taken as the 
actual title of the dialogue. Yet the title that Plato chose is The Sophist, and 
this dialogue starts (216 a ff.) and ends (264 d-268 d) with the question of what 
the sophist is. So, I think (as Heidegger 1992 b, 412), it is exactly the other way 
around: the part of the Sophist which deals explicitly with the sophist is not 
incidentally its first part; it is its first part, because the whole dialogue starts 
from the wonder caused by the puzzling nature of the sophist (cf. 235 b 5, 237 
a, e-238 a, 241 b 7). But if this is so, and if we cannot understand what the 
sophist is unless we understand what t o  pq ov is — does this mean that the 
non-abstract cXSoC of the sophist embodies, somehow, the abstract eXSoC of t o  
pq dv? And, if so, could we call the eXSoC of t o  pq dv abstract? I do not know 
how to answer these questions, and I do not know if there is an answer to 
them in Plato. I believe, however, that the distinction between abstract and 
non-abstract forms (which is Plato), in spite of the very difficult questions that 
it raises, may help us to understand the way he thought several issues, such 
as the issue of truth. (I owe the point made in this note to Mr Alexandru 
Dragomir.)
4 In Tht. 165 b Plato says that 'if knowing [eTTiCTTaaSai] is seeing [dpctv], then  
we may say that one can both know something and not know it’; this points
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out, I think, precisely his belief that seeing, as long as it is not accompanied by 
speaking, cannot be actual knowledge.
5 This idea that the essence of speaking resides in auvGeaiC, i.e. in relating, is 
to be found also in Ferdinand de Saussure: "La loi tout à fait finale du langage 
est, à ce que nous osons dire, qu'il n'y a jamais rien qui puisse résider dans u n 
terme, par suite directe de ce que les symboles linguistique sont sans relation 
avec ce qu'ils doivent désigner, donc que a est impuissant à rien désigner sans 
le secours de b, celui-ci de même sans le secours de a, ou que tous les deux ne 
valent que par leur réciproque différence [...]" (apud Benveniste 1966, 40, who, 
it seems, endorses this Saussurian view).
6 This appearance of the Ka©’ oS Xeyerai T i  is —■ as Heidegger 1994, 104 (cf. 
also 1992 b 180,182) put it — not a mere <j)dvai, 'appearance', but a KaTac|)àyai, 
i.e. an 'appearance as'. In the Sophist 251 b-c, however, Plato says: "We speak 
of man, [for instance,] [...] and we attribute to him colours and forms and sizes 
and vices and virtues, and in all those cases and countless others we say not 
only that he is man, but we say he is good and numberless other things, [...but 
there are people who believe that] we must not call a man good, but m ust call 
the good good, and a man man" (translation taken from Fowler 1928). Here, 
when Plato speaks about those who believe that 'we m ust not call a m an  
good, but must call the good good, and a man man', he (according to 
Heidegger 1992 b, 501 and to many other scholars) had in view Antisthenes 
and his followers.
We know from Aristotle's Topica (104 b 19 ff.) that for Antisthenes ouk 
eoTiv àvTiXéyciv. Now, Heidegger 1992 b, 503 ff. construes this thesis of 
Antisthenes as implying that speaking, Xéyeiv, is reduced to 'identical 
predications'; and he claims that the main problem that the phenom enon of 
speaking raises is this. On the one hand, in every speaking, that which is its 
'subject', is 'posited' as one, as a ev; but, on the other hand, the 'subject' can 
be determined, in speaking, in many ways. This is, argues Heidegger 1992 b, 
500 ff., precisely the problem that was envisaged by Plato in his Sophist at 251 
a ff., where the Stranger discusses the question of 'how it is that we call the 
same thing [...] by several names' (251 a 5-6). For here, says Heidegger (p. 501), 
although Plato formulates the question in terms of 'a single thing' (TafiTov — 
251 a 6; e}n — b 2, 7) and 'its many names' (cf. iToXXà ovopaTa — 251 a 5, b 4), 
he actually has in mind the contrast between 'a single thing' (e.g. man — cf. 
251 a 8), and its many 'determinations' (e.g. 'good' — b 1). And the fact that 
speaking is understood by Plato as 'speaking about something as som ething 
else' is, concludes Heidegger, that which 'saves' Plato from A ntisthenes' 
position, i.e. from the view that speaking is merely 'identical predication'.
7 Along his history, however, man attempted — with a commitment that 
varied from one age to another — to broaden the boundaries of intelligibility 
and so to extend 'the realm of phantasy'. For the modern man, for instance, 
the 'realm of phantasy' is far more richer than it was for the Greek of the 
classical period. In the terms I used above, for the modern man there are 
more 'combinations' of ei8q that have a meaning than there were for the 
Greek of the classical period. In a way, modern art was a conscious attempt to
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'combine', without any discrimination, any eXSoC with any eXSoC; to 
paraphrase that expression from the Phaedrus I quoted above, we may say 
that modern art 'makes out everything to be like everything else, ignoring 
completely the limits of possible comparison’.
Chapter SevenThe |j.e0oSoi that aXqOeuouai t i  t t o t  e o T i v  e K a c J T O V  eXSoC
1 Heidegger 1994 interprets the Aristotelian distinction between the 'essential' 
and the 'accidental' what of an ov in this way (which, he seems to suggest, 
applies also, mutatis mutandis, to Plato) (I shall summarize this argument in  
a direct style):
The 'essential what' of an OV is thought as the 'gathering-together' 
(CTUVK€lcr0ai  — standige Beisammenheit) of all the features without w hich  
that OV could not be, i.e. as a co-presence of all these features. In other words: 
any essential feature of an OV is a cru V K e f [ J . € V O V  with the TJTrOK£l|J .€VOV of 
that d v  and they are à S u v a T O V  8 i a i p € 0 q v a i  {cL Metaph.  1051b 9 ff.: TÙ 
|JL£V d e l  a u y K e i T a i  k u l  d S u v a T a  S i a p € 0 r i v a i )  (1994, 95-6). (The 
essential what, however, is both a co-presence of some features and an absence 
of others, which are à8üVŒTOV OUVT£0qvo iL — cf. Metaph.  1051 b 9 ff.: TO 
8 ’ d e l  S i q p q T Œ l  K a l  d S u v a T a  a u v T e O r j v a i ;  that is: the essential w hat 
is also determined by a particular absence, i.e. by non-being — 1994, 95-6, 99.) In 
its turn, the 'accidental what' of an OV is thought as consisting of those features 
whose co-presence with or absence from the 'essential what' of an d v  cannot 
determine the very existence of that OV (1994, 95-6). (That is: the accidental 
what is a possible absence, and that is why Aristotle says about it that it is 
k y y v Ç  T l  TOO p q  OVTOC, Metaph. 1026 b 21— 1994,96).
2 If so, then Plato was, to use the modern philosophical jargon, a holist about 
knowledge. I believe there is enough textual evidence which may allow one 
to support such a claim (see, inter alios. Fine 1990, 98); for the idea that we 
cannot know anything in isolation occurs throughout his writings. Besides 
the passages which claim explicitly that to know an eX 8 o C  means to know the 
K o i v w v i a i  in which that eXSoC is 'caught', there are also several places where 
Plato expresses this idea in general terms, such as Hp. Mi. 369 d ('having a 
desire to understand [ € T r i 0 u p a i v  p a 0 € l v ] ,  I raise questions, and I examine 
[ 8 i a i T u v 0 d v o p a i ] ,  analyze [eTTavaoKOTrm] and put together [crup(3ipdCcjü] the 
answers [toc X e y o p e v a ] ,  in order that I may understand f i v a  p d 0 w ] '  — my 
paraphrase), or Phdr. 270 c ('you cannot understand something w ithout 
following the p e 0 o 8 o C  of taking it as a whole [ d X o v ] ' ) .  (The idea of a holist 
view of knowledge may be said to be implied by the very use of the verb 
C TU v iq p i ,  which means both 'to bring together' and 'to understand'.) (Plato's 
claim, however, that to know something means to know its 'possible ways of 
combining with other things', is to be found, in one form or another, in  
many philosophers; see for instance Wittgenstein's Tractatus, 2. 0123: "If I 
know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in state of affairs. Every 
one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.")
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3 This point is somehow suggested at at 71 h, where Socrates asks rhetorically: 
"Do you suppose that somebody who does not know Meno at all [p q  
YiyvwoKEi TO TTapdTTav] could say whether he is handsome and rich and well­
born or the reverse." That is: if I do not know anything at all ( t o  T r a p a i r a v )  
about something (i.e. if I do not have any preliminary knowledge about it), I 
cannot start finding out other things about that something.
4 In my view the geometrical problem is about 'whether this figure could be 
inscribed as a triangle in this circle' {rovSe t o v  k u k X o v ,  86e6) (my italics), not 
about whether the figure of square or parallelogram could be inscribed as the 
figure of triangle in the figure of circle'. In these terms the problem does no t 
have too much sense; it is possible of course, in principle, to inscribe a 
square/parallelogram as a triangle in a circle, but it depends on its size and the 
size of the circle. In other words, the problem is about the sizes of given 
figures, not about the figures of square or parallelogram and circle in general.
5 The main difference between these two interpretations regards the m eaning 
of T o i o u T O V  o T o v  (87 a 4). Butcher takes it as 'similar to', Benecke as 'identical 
to'. Each of these two readings entails a specific meaning for y m p i o v .  Benecke 
is claiming that the figure in question (i.e. t o  i s  the one already 
drawn at 82 b ff. (see Annex I, Fig. 3. This view has been accepted by m any 
scholars, such as Gow (1884, 175), Timpanaro-Cardini (1951, 402-9), and 
Brumbaugh (1954, 33-5).
6 This way of solving indirectly a given problem makes one think to the 
geometrical method of awaywyq. The method of aTTayojyq is connected w ith  
the geometry of the 5th century and it seems that it was first practised 
systematically by Hippocrates of Chios. (This method of aTraytuyq is analogous 
to the later method of geometrical analysis and synthesis.)
7 Here Plato uses the word < j ) p 6 v q a i C ,  not è î r i a T q p q ,  as he has done in earlier 
passages. But, since there are at least two passages (87 c-89 a and 98 d-e) w hich 
imply that the two expressions are used as synonyms, I translated them both 
by 'knowledge'.
8 In the Republic 528 b-c it is said that although solid geometry is teachable, 
there are no teachers of it. But here, in the Republic, the absence of the 
teachers and learners of solid geometry is justified, for, argues Socrates, there 
is no motivation for such an inquiry (which is difficult and no city holds it in  
honour). In the Meno, however, it is implied, there is nothing whatsoever to 
stop the activity of learners and teachers of virtue (for the 'question' about a 
particular 'branch of knowledge' and its teachers see also Ale. 1,109 d ff.)
9 What are the boundaries of Socrates' application? According to the 
geometrical analogy, it should contain only (a) and (b) (and Robinson 1953, 
117 believes that (c) does not actually belong to it, for, he claims, "after page 89 
neither the word 'hypothesis' nor any methodological remark occurs in the 
dialogue"). Yet, I think, we simply cannot cut off (c) from the previous two 
parts of the argument, i.e. (a) and (b).
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10 Cf. Robinson 1953,122: "[...] the Meno's discussion of hypothetical m ethod 
seems to have value as the symbol of a valuable change in Plato's writings. 
With the introduction of this method he is passing from destructive to 
constructive thinking, from elenchus and the refutation of other m en 's  
views to the elaboration of positive views of his own."
11 Here in the Meno {j i roeecTiC refers to a X e y o p e v o v ,  a statement, which is 
put down' (iJTTOTieeTai, or simply T ieerai) by somebody in order to support 
the continuation of a dialectical inquiry confronted with a difficulty (cf. for 
instance. Men. 86 d ff. and Prm. 135 c) (cf. also Robinson 1953, 95: 
"[TjTroTi0e|jLai] conveys the notion of laying down a proposition as the 
beginning of a process of thinking, in order to work on the basis thereof").
12 Although, as Sextus says, the Dogmatists, when they are attacked by the 
Sceptical hypothetical mode, reply that:
a warrant that the hypothesis is strong ( èppO3CT0ai)  is to be found in the fact 
that what is inferred from the hypothetical assumptions is found to be true —  
for if what follows from them is sound, then the assumptions from which the  
conclusions follow are also true and indisputable [translation from Barnes 1990,
109].
(M VIII 375; cf. M III 14)
In Plato this type of argument occurs fairly often, cf. for instance Ti. 29 a: "If 
the world be indeed fair and the Demiurge is good, it is manifest that he m ust 
have looked to that which is eternal, but if what carmot be said w ithout 
blasphemy is true, then to the created model. Everyone will see that he m ust 
have looked to the eternal, for the world is the fairest of creations and he is 
the best of causes".
13 In the first part of the Parmenides there are discussed two hypothetical 
statements (cf. 128 d 6 and 127 d 6, respectively): all is one' (ev [...] eXvai t o  
TTdv, 128 a 8-b 1), which is claimed by Parmenides; and 'beings are many' (Ta 
dvTU euTi TToWd, 127 e 1-2), which is claimed by some philosophers who 
attempted to refute Parmenides. After discussing these two hypotheses, Zeno 
concludes: we should prefer Parmenides' hypothesis because its consequences 
are 'less ridiculous' (cf. 128 d 5).
14 In Plato an e T 8 o C  is, fairly often, discussed in relation with its 
avTiTi0epevGV — see for instance 'courage' ( a v 8 p e i a )  and 'cowardice' 
( B e i X f a )  (Ale. 1, 115 d); 'beautiful' ( t o  K a X o v )  and 'ugly' ( t o  a i y p o v )  (Hp. Ma. 
289 a-d); 'honorable' ( K a X o v )  and 'dishonorable' ( a i c r y p o v )  (Tht. 186 a 8); 
'good' ( d ' y a 06v )  and 'bad' (KaKOv)  (Tht. 186 a 8); o v  and p q  d v  (Sph. 254 b-259 
d).
15 When we 8 i a K p { v € i v  the y e v q  of e i S q ,  these e i 8 q  are spoken (Xë'yecr0cn) 
KCC0 ' ccuToi, not TTpdC d X X a  (Sph. 255 c 12-3); that is, they are 'revealed' as what 
they are in themselves.
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16 As regarding this characteristic I agree with Cornford 1950, 203, who says: " I 
have not been able to understand how Plato's businesslike account of the 
instant ( t o  e ^ a C c ^ v q C )  [from the Parmenides 156 c-157 b] at which the various 
species of change occur can be connected with the 'sudden' vision of the 
Beautiful (Wahl, p. 171 [; cf. also Beierwaltes 1966, 275]) and the doctrine of 
Anamnesis (Speiser, p. 47). The only link appears to the use of the word 
é^aicjjvqç in its normal sense of 'suddenly' at Smp. 210 e, and Pp. vii, 341 d."
The one who discloses something through the act' of voeiv, however, 
is very well aware of what he has disclosed. This is perhaps not a totally 
unim portant characteristic, for Plato speaks many times about hum an 'acts' 
that happen e^aicjjvqC (cf. Smp. 212 c 6, 223 b 2, Lg. 866 d 7, 867 a 3, b 6, 944 b 
2), i.e. 'acts' from which it is absent any 'premeditation' (ciripouXq, irpogSouXq 
— cf. Lg. 867 b). But also he speaks about human 'acts' which, although they 
do happen suddenly, do not lack any 'premeditation' — like, for instance, the 
acts of prophesying (Cra. 396 d 3; cf. also Ap. 22 c 1-2) or of reciting poetry (Ion 
535 b; cf. also Ap. 22 b 8 ff.). Yet those who perform these 'prepared' yet 
sudden 'acts', he claims, are ev0oucriujvTeC (cf. Cra. 396 c 7), i.e. men who — 
because they are out of their senses' (Ion 535 b 7) and, as it were, 'suspended' 
from the Muse (Ion 536 a; cf. also Phdr. 241 e) — do not know in the least 
what their words mean (Ap. 22 c 3; cf. also Tht. 180 c). But the one w ho 
discloses something through the act' of voeXv is, it seems, very well aware of 
that which has been disclosed by him.
17 A similar 'experience' seems to be soul's first knowing the e i8 q  (cf. Phdr. 
249 e ff.; cf. also Men. 81 c and Phd. 83 b), that is: before it is (first) embodied. 
(Cf., inter alios, Ackrill 1994, 27: "It is obvious that this 'theory' of noesis is in  
an important respect like the doctrine of anamnesis [...] For it is a way of 
making a certain claim — the claim that we can grasp realities directly and 
not just through our own language and concepts".) So, one may argue, what 
the KaTOij/iC of voeiv provides is the full d vdpvqaiC  of an eXSoC. (As I said, 
in seeing something, that which is being seen is actually kept in sight; that is: 
seeing is a keeping an image present, and this keeping is performed by pvfjpq, 
memory — cf. Phlb. 39 a 1-2: 'perceiving through senses' is accompanied by 
pvfjpq. Heidegger 1992 a, 124 f. seems to suggest that in disclosing an eXSoC 
through voeXv, the disclosed eX8oC must be actually kept in the 'sight' of vouC; 
and this incessant process of keeping a disclosed eXSoC in the 'sight' of voiic 
is dvctpvqcriC; cf. p. 124: "[dvdpvqcjiC] is the incessant thinking of something, 
the pure saving into unconcealedness of what is thought.")
18 This 'noetic experience' is not, however, an exclusive Platonic license. In 
various religions the idea of an apprehension of the divine’ which is beyond 
speaking and which resembles a vision' is almost a common place (see for 
instance Eliade 1965, 19-77). The Eskimo shamans, the yogies of different 
schools, the Indian, Tibetan and Chinese Buddhists, the orthodox m onks 
influenced by the teaching of Gregory Palamas, the Moslem mystics — they 
all describe their apprehending the divine as a 'seeing of pure light', which 
occurs suddenly, like a Tightning-flash', but only after a long preparation (for 
details see cf. Eliade 1965, 23, 41-7, 61-5, 65-6). And that what this 'seeing of 
pure light' provides is a direct revealing of the presence of god (cf. Eliade,
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1965, 77) (Festugière 1950, 157-249 argues that this is how we should actually 
interpret the Platonic act of v o e i v ) .  (The 'efficiency' of such a noetic 
apprehension has been consecrated by various other European thinkers — 
such as some of the Greek and Latin Fathers of the Church, or in our time, by 
Heidegger; it is true, nevertheless, that, beginning with Descartes, Spinoza 
and Leibniz, theologia naturalis replaces almost completely theologia 
negativa, and that this issue of a noetic apprehension has started to be 
regarded with extreme suspicion.)
19 In the Sophist (cf. 233 d and 234 c) Plato determines a kind of Xéyeiv, 
namely sophistry, through the case of 'image-makmg' (i.e. through the case of 
TToieXv) (and in the Republic 595 a ff. he determines another form of X e y e i v ,  
i.e. the 'poetry',through the case of T r o i e i v ) .  Why then does he explain the act 
of X c y e i v  through that of t t o i c i v ? Or, in other words, what is the similarity 
which allows him to use the case of TTOielv  as a clearer paradigm of X e y e i v ?
As I argued, for Plato in the act of TToieiv something is 'brought into 
existence' (i.e. the product, i r o i o i j p e v o v )  in which something else (i.e. the 
'model' of that product) becomes present. In my view, Plato uses the case of 
TTOielv  as a clearer paradigm for the understanding of X e y e i v  only because he 
believed that in the act of X e y e i v ,  as in that of TroieXv,  something is brought 
into existence (that which has been said, the X e y o p e v o v ) ,  in which som ething 
else (the d v  about which the X c y o p c v o v  is about) becomes present. If so, then  
language is a sort of medium in which the e i 8 q  become present. In the act of 
v o c X v ,  however, we have a direct access to e i 8 q ,  not through the linguistic 
'm ed ium '.
Conclusions
Hypothetical dialectic and metaphysics
1 Cf. also the role of the philosophical aupTroaia in the Symposium, the 
Timaeus or the Laws (639 d 2-3). (Although only a few dialogues open as a 
real aufiT idaia— as the Symposium or the Timaeus — one may be surprised 
at finding how many passages in Plato allude to symposia or sympotic 
atmosphere — e.g. Ly. 204 a, Prt. 347 c-e, R. 354 a-b,Tf 17 a ff., Lg. 639 d-e.)
2 One can hardly exaggerate the role of dialogue in Plato. For him any inquiry 
should be undertaken within a dialogue (cf. for instance Sph. 218 c).
3 Cf. Proclus (in Tim ii, 298) commentary of Plato's claims that the soul is a 
mixture of t o  dv, t œ t j t o v  and Q dcT cp ov:  "[...] for all knowing is accomplished 
by means of likeness between the knower and the known" (translation from  
Cornford 1937, 93).
4 In the Timaeus there is I think, in connection to all this, a problem which 
Plato did not resolve. Let us first take the musical aupclajvia. As I argued, in  
the field of music, Plato uses the terms o u p c l ü j v i a  and d p p o v i a  as synonyms 
(cf. inter alia Cra. 405 d 1), meaning by them 'a tcc^iC that exists between 
sounds qua pitches' (cf. Lg. 665 a 1 f.) — viz. an interval, a mode or a melody.
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Now, what makes a particular succession of pitches to be a r d ^ i C ,  i.e. a 
'harmonic' (or 'symphonic') succession?
The swift and slow sounds, which appear to be high and low, are sometimes 
discordant [dvdpjJLOOTOI ct>ep6|iev01] on account of the dvopoiOTqC th a t  
exists between their motions and the motion they excite in us; and sometimes 
symphonic [OUIK^ WVOI] on account of the opoiOTqC that exists between their  
motions and the motion they excite in us. [...] And when two sounds are 
symphonic, they] produce a pleasure [qSovq] which even the unwise feel, and 
which to the wise becomes a higher sort of delight [cÙ(j)pOCTiJVq], being an 
imitation [[JLl|iqaiC] of divine harmony [0eia dppovia] in mortal motions 
[èv 0vqTOÏC 4)0pdïC].
This is what Plato says in the Timaeus 80 a-b. I shall not enter here the 
complicated details of Plato's 'acoustic theory' (which are excellently 
presented by Cornford 1937, 320 ff.). The points, however, that are actually at 
stake In this passage are, I think, these.
(i) At 67 b, Plato claimed that we hear with the soul through the ears, 
and that "hearing is the vibration of this blow which begins in the head [i.e. 
in the learning part of the soul — t o  X o y i o t i k o v ]  and ends in the region of 
the liver [i.e. it affects also the other two parts of the soul —  6  O u p o C  and t o  
èwiOupqTLKov]". And here, at 80 a-b, he implies that a succession of pitches is 
symphonic if a man, when it hears it, feels either q S o v q  (in case he is an 
unwise man, and hears it primarily with 6 0up6c and t o  èmOupqTiKov — for 
it is with them that man feels pleasure, cf. 69 d), or e u c j j p o a u v q  (in case he is a 
wise man, and hears it primarily with t o  X o y i o T i K o v ) .  So, a u p 4 ) ( u v i a  appears 
to be a subjective notion: a succession of pitches is 'symphonic' when it 
produces 'aesthetic pleasure' (be it of a 'lower' or a 'higher' kind) to a hearer.
(ii) But the last phrase of the passage (which says that a symphonic 
succession of pitches is a pipqoiC èv OvqToiC <f)OpdiC of a 0 e ia  appovia) 
complicates things, for it implies, on the contrary, that aupcj)üüvia is an 
objective notion: a succession of pitches is 'symphonic' when it imitates a 
0 e ia  appovia.
How are to solve this 'contradiction'? The answer seems to be 
suggested at 47 c ff. Here Plato says that the harmonic motions of the world- 
soul are mirrored' by certain phenomena which are visible (e.g. the 
revolutions of the visible heaven, TrepioSoi èv oùpavw t o u  v o u  — 47 a 1; a 
view which occurs also at 40 a ff., 90 c-d and in Lg. 822, but which seems to 
contradict an earlier passage from R. 529 b-c) and audible (e.g. the àppovia of 
the stars — R. 617 b); and that our soul can copy (cf. pipoupEVoi. — 47 c 2) them 
(its revolutions becoming thus harmonic) (and this is the reason, says Plato, 
for which the gods gave us the gifts of sight, dij/iC — 47 a 1, and hearing, ÛKoq 
— c 4) (cf. also Prt. 326 b and R. 500 c-d). That is: oupc^wvia is an objective 
notion, and something is symphonic when it imitates the 0eiai appoviai of 
the world-soul (cf. also Ti. 90 d).
But this way of putting things brings forward a serious problem. For 
the appov ia  of the universe seems to 'embodies' two different things: the 
appov ia  of its model, the TravTeXèC voqTov (gov (cf. 31 b 1) (or, to use an 
expression from R. 500 c, the KoapoC t ü ü v  eiSœv); and the appov ia  of the soul
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of the universe (which, in its turn, is a copy of the world-soul of the v o q r o v  
Cgov — cf. 30 c ff.). I think that Plato left this problem unsolved.
5 Cf. also (i) the Cratylus, where the problem of language in general seems to 
be reducible to ontological problems, as its beginning suggests, which opens 
with a confrontation between two linguistic views (i.e. 'names are simply 
conventional' and 'names have some natural correctness') and ends with a 
confrontation between two ontological doctrines (i.e. the Heraclitean flux and 
the Platonic €i8q); and (ii) the Timaeus 29 b 4-5, where the 'quality' of any 
'account', X o y o C ,  is said to derive precisely from the ontological quality of the 
d v r a  that it "describes' (because, claims Plato, any X o y o C  is ovyyev fç  with the 
dvTŒ to which it refers).
6 As I claimed, for Plato o ù a i a  was understood as whatness. One may argue 
that this is due to the fact that o u a i a  is primarily taken as o u a i a  y i y v ü ü c j K e T a i ,  
i.e. as o u a i a  that is being known (cf. Sph. 248 d 2); and that this is so because 
the stand-point from which this notion of being is reached is h um an  
knowledge, which can know only a what that remains the same. In other 
words: one may claim that whatness, as the sense of being implied by h u m an  
knowledge, passed to the theory aimed at solving the puzzle brought forward 
by the given way in which hum an knowledge works, viz. to the theory of 
ei8q. Yet Plato would not endorse such a claim; because for him, ultimately, 
human knowledge has an ontological 'condition of possibility'.
(As I argued in the Annex II, for those who think that things are 
'grounded', 'founded' or 'based' upon principles, the quest for those 
principles would be like a descent towards the profound depths of the world. 
But for Plato, who thought that our world is held from the above by an 
'intelligible world', the quest for this 'intelligible world' cannot be compared 
with a 'descent towards the profound depths of the world', but only with an 
ascent towards its heights'. In Plato's case, however, I think that the idea that 
knowledge in general was thought — metaphorically — as an ascension is a 
consequence of the idea that the object of knowledge, the intelligible realm, 
was thought as being 'above'. In other words: knowledge may be conceived as 
an ascension precisely because its 'target' was conceived as being 'above'. To 
take the case of the Cave, from the Republic: one may ascend towards the 'real 
world', precisely because this world is above the cave in which one lives. To 
claim the opposite, namely that the intelligible realm is "localized above" 
because dialectic is conceived as an "elevation", would be, I think, a mere far­
fetched and "unnatural" way of putting things. If so, then this idea — that 
knowledge qua ascension is a consequence of the idea that the 'object' of 
knowledge in general, the intelligible realm, was though as being 'above' — 
suggest, at least at the metaphorical level, that in Plato the problem of 
knowledge is determined by the way he puts the metaphysical problems, and 
not the other way around. And this 'metaphorical determination' hints that 
for Plato knowledge in general was thought as having an ontological 
'condition of possibility'.)
7 His so-called attack on the poets is, I think, one of the many m isinterpreted 
topics of the Republic. First, the censorship he has in view regards only those
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poets whose X o y o i  conceal things and so pervert the listeners (cf, 376 a ff.); and 
secondly, his attack against poetry (cf. 595 a ff.) is directed against the 
'concealing poetry' (if I may say so), not against the poetical thinking, that is, 
against philosophy as jieyicrTq pouoiKfi (cf. also, inter alios, Elias 1984, 1 ff.).
8 The idea that myth is a sui generis embodiment of a 'subject matter' is 
somehow supported by the Timaeus 29 b f., where it is suggested that any 
Xeyopevov, embodies the features of its 'subject matter', as a copy does w ith 
the features of its model. All 'accounts', claims Plato in the Timaeus, are 
'akin', (auyyevcTc) with the dvra that they describe; so, he argues, an account 
about what is only a changing c i k ü ü v  (29 b 2-3; 92 c 7) (i.e. the visible universe) 
of a 'lasting and stable' (povipov Koù pé^aïov, 29 b 6) irapaSeiypa (28 b 7; 29 b 4) 
(i.e. the 'intelligible' universe) — precisely because it is 'akin' to what is not 
[lovipov Kai pepaio V — can only be eiKoC (cf. 29 b 5-c 2, d, 30 b, 48 d, 53 d, 55 d, 
56 a, 57 d, 59 c, 68 b, 69 b, 90 e), viz. 'probable'. The word ciKüjC has, roughly 
speaking, two main meanings: like' and 'likely'. Literally, elKtuC m eans 
like', or 'similar'; something which is eiKUjC,  an c î k o j v ,  is then, in a literal 
sense, something which resembles, more or less, something else, for instance 
the copy of a model (cf. Ti. 29 b 2-4, where the visible universe is called an 
eiKCjov of a Trapd5eiy|jLa). For the Plato, however, not only a thing can be c i k o C ,  
but also an account, a Xeyopevov; that is, if a Xeyopevov about som ething 
resembles that something, the X e y o p e v o v  itself is nothing but an c I k ü j v  , i.e. 
an embodiment of that something and so it can be called e i K o C ,  i.e. 'sim ilar' 
or 'alike'. (Yet the word c I k ü j C ,  when it is applied not to an object, but to a 
X d y o C  usually denotes 'probability' not 'resemblance'. But for Plato a X o y o C  is 
'probable', or 'likely', precisely because it is 'like' the 'reality' it 'describe' — 
cf. Robinson 1953, 216: "a statement was probable, to the Greeks, because it 
resembled reality or truth".) (Thus, we may say that the sensible universe is 
an embodiment of its intelligible model, and that the cosmological account of 
the Timaues is a sui generis embodiment of the sensible universe.)
9 Yet, as Plato himself admits in R. 376 e-377, not every myth is an dXqeqC 
jjLueoC (some of his remarks on myth, however, are undoubtedly ironic, such 
as that from Sph. 242 c, where the Stranger says that "every one [of the form er 
thinkers] seems to tell us a puSoC, as if we were children" — translation from 
Fowler 1928; cf. also Phd. 61 b).
10 As to why does Plato resort so often to myths, there seems to be a hint in  
Pit. 277 d 9-10. There, he says that the use of a T r a p d S e i y p a  asks for the use of 
another T r a p d S e i y p a ;  which may be taken as supporting (indirectly) the 
following conjecture: Plato resorts so often to myths, because he believed that 
a myth, once used in philosophical discourse, asks for the use of another 
myth.
11 Cf. for instance (i) the opiapoi from the Meno: 'shape is the only thing 
which accompanies colour' (75 b); 'shape is the limit of a solid' (76 a); or 
'colour is an effluence from shapes commensurate with sight and perceptible 
by it' (76 d); and (ii) the way the yevoC of the sophist is 'divided' in the 
Sophist. (Sometimes, however, he uses various metaphorical devices in
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determining a particular cXSoC, as he does in Pit. 279 a ff., where there is an 
attempt to determine the eXSoC of statesman by an analogy with the clearer 
eXSoC of waver).
12 So far, I put the distinction between these two main fields of knowledge, 
that of TO aioeqTov and that of to  dvaiaeqTOV, in terms of 'the field of 
embodied/non-abstract e iS q ' and 'the field of non-embodied/abstract e i8 q '.  
In 8.2.1. I introduced the distinction between the 'level of ei8q' and the 'meta- 
€i8q level' (at which the theory of ei8q  functions); and I said that the theory 
of e i8q ,  since it is achieved through speaking, has itself to operate with €i8q  
(be they abstract or non-abstract). To rephrase what I said above in these 
terms, the majority of Plato's myths aim at speaking about abstract e i8 q  
through non-abstract eiSq.
13 In the Timaeus Plato calls Socrates' account about an ideal 'ToXiTcia a myth 
(26 c 9) and Critias' story about the ancient city of Athens and Atlantis an 
d X q G i v o C  X o y o C  (26 e 5-6). Yet, it is rather clear, from the whole context, that 
Socrates' account is about an abstract matter and that Critias' story is a 
mythical X e y o p e v o v  in which that matter was 'transferred' ( p e T a c [ ) € p e T a i  —  
cf. 26 c 9: TT]v i r o X i v . . .  vvv  p c T e v e y K o v T e C  ev\  T a X q e é C ) .  The reason of this 
'tranfer' is stated by Socrates at 19 b f.: "I might compare myself to a person 
who, on beholding beautiful animals either created by the painter's art, or, 
better still, alive but at rest, is seized with a desire of seeing them in m otion  
[Kivoijpeva] or engaged in some struggle or conflict to which their forms 
appear suited." Socrates' request for a motion picture of his abstract ideas (i.e. 
for the €pya  of the 'embodiment' of its 'ideal T r o X i T c i a '  —  cf. 20 e 5) makes 
one think of Aristotle's saying that a tragedy shows its characters in m otion  
(cuC T T p d T T o v T a C )  and in act (üüC è v e y o u v T a C )  (Po. 1448 a 24). To bring a 
character to life, to make him €pi|/uxoC and put him in motion, is to make 
him perceptible by senses (for motion is, primarily, seized by senses). If so, 
when Socrates asks Critias to 'transfer' his ideal and abstract TToXiTeia into the 
history of a ttoXiC, he actually asks for an aiadrjrov  embodiment of his 
abstract thoughts.
14 See for instance Aristotle Rh. 1412 a 11 ff.: "we have to choose our 
metaphors [8ei 8e peTacfjepeiv] from the things that surround us and are 
visible [dwo oIkciujv Kal c^avepmv], as in philosophy [oXov Kal ev c{)iXocto(})iq:]" 
(my translation); which suggests that in philosophy (the field of most abstract 
matters), the metaphors to be used have to be chosen from the field of 'those 
things that we see surrounding us', i.e. from the field of non-abstract things. 
(In some manuscripts there is a pq before cjjavepwv, and some editors, as 
Dufour and Wartelle, adopted it; to me, however, its emendation makes 
more sense and fits better with the examples that follows, e.g. 'an arbitrator is 
like an altar'.) The same idea (that in philosophy the metaphors are names of 
concrete things 'transferred' to abstract thoughts) was expressed by Hegel in  
Esthetics, §. 3 a: the philosophical concepts are 'sensible m eanings' 
transferred, Ubertragen, into the spiritual realm, where the concealment of 
these initial 'proper meanings' makes possible the appearance of an abstract 
eigentliches m eaning.
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15 Ricoeur, however, objects to this view and claims: "il n'est [...] pas besoin 
d'une métaphysique du propre pour justifier la différence du littéral et du 
figuré; c'est l'emploi dans le discours [...] qui spécifie la différence du littéral et 
du métaphorique" (p. 369). (And he also daim s that in Aristotle, "si une 
métaphysique est jointe à la métaphore, ce n'est pas celle de Platon, mais bien 
celle d'Aristote. [...] Montrer les choses inanimées comme animée [cf. Rh. 1411 
b32] n'est point les relier à l'invisible, mais les montrer elles-même com m e  
en acte" — p. 50; see also pp. 388 ff.)
Epilogue
1 The word 'philosophy', c j ) i \o a o c j ) ia ,  belongs, strictly speaking, to what we 
may call 'West European thinking'. When I use the word 'philosophy', 
however, I used it in this 'strict sense' (and so I confine my Xe y  o p e  v a ,  
implicitly, to the 'space' of 'West European thinking'.)
2 I know of no other passage more beautiful in its clarity, in which this idea is 
expressed, than the following lines from HegePs Phenomenology of Spirit
It is manifest that behind the so-called curtain which is supposed to conceal the interior of 
things there is nothing to be seen unless zve go behind it ourselves, as much so that we may see 
as that there be something behind there which can be seen [translation from the English 1977 
edition, p. 103].
Annex H
Hypothesis and metaphysical topography
1 Cf., inter alia, Aristotle Metaph. 985 b 15 and 19.
2 Cf. Aristotle Metaph. 1013 a 15 ff.: "[...] 'beginning' means the point from  
which a thing is first comprehensible, this too is called the 'beginning' of the 
thing; e.g. the hypotheses of demonstrations [ t ü ü v  a i T o S e i ^ e t o v  a l  T j i r o e e a e i C ] "  
(cf. also Ph. 195 a 18 ff.). See also Sextus: "We term the a p y f j  a -T T oG d^eu jv  a 
u T T o O e a iC "  (M III 4; cf. also III 5).
3 Aristotle for instance calls sometimes iJTTopevq his notion of o u a i a  (cf. 
Metaph. 1029 a 14).
4 i j T T O K € i p e v o v  — which the Greeks thought as a 'given' ontological ground 
that is 'not laid down' by a an agent, be it hum an or divine — was first 
translated into Latin as substantia, which was a more or less appropriate 
equivalent. But, starting with the modern period, substantia was used as a 
synonym for subiectum, and this hints somehow that that which lies sub, 
TJTTO-, 'under' a thing, i.e. its ultimate ontological ground, was thought as 
being the subject himself. This, however, is at the core of an endless debate.
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5 For Aristotle the ontological apyai are, apparently (for there is little textual 
evidence on this topic), situated above 'our world' (cf. for instance Metaph. 
1072 b 14 — Ô oiJpavoC Kal q (fjuaiC are 'hung', q p T q r a i ,  upon the a K iv q ro C  
dpxq); whereas the epistemological apxai appear as supporting our 
reasonings from below, not from above. But this is another problem.
6 For the Greek thinkers a ijTT606ctiC is, usually, a X e y o p e v o v ,  i.e. a posited 
statement (cf., inter alia, Plato Men. 87 c 4; Aristotle APo. 50 a 16, 18; and 
Ammonius in Int 2.31-2, who claim that the Stoics understand by hypothesis 
a kind of utterance — cf. also Barnes 1990, 91). (Yet hypotheses, as Barnes 1990, 
91 put it, "are not in any normal sense a class of propositions; for we cannot 
intelligibly ask, in the abstract, whether or not a given proposition is an 
hypothesis." That is: a proposition p becomes a hypothesis only w hen 
someone 'lays it down'. And according to the Stoics, it is this third person 
imperative — 'Let it be supposed', uTTOKCiaGo) — which is the distinctive 
mark a "hypothetical" utterance — cf. Barnes 1990, 91.) Now, there is a fierce 
debate about what is usually 'laid down' by the Greek thinkers in their 
hypotheses — the existence or the feature of an d v ?  I shall not enter here the 
complicated details of this problem (there is a short review of the status 
questionis in Robinson's 1953, 103-5). In my view, however, the Greek 
thinkers 'lay down' in their hypotheses both the existence and a. feature of an  
d v .
The geometers, according to Plato (R. 510 c), used to hypothesize "the 
odd and the even [numbers] and the various figures and three kinds of 
angles". Hare 1965, 23 believes that here, in R. 510 c "the hypotheses [...] m ust 
be things, not propositions". But this position is, I think, untenable; for w hat 
Plato claims here is that the geometers hypothesize the existence of their 
mathematical and geometrical 'entities', such as the the odd numbers, etc. 
And Plato himself states explicitly in the Parmenides 136 b 7-8 that one may 
hypothesize either "that anything whatsoever exists or does not exist or has 
any other character [d X X o  ir d O o C  i r d o x o v T o C ] . "
As regarding Aristotle, he uses the word uttoOcctiC in many ways and 
contexts. There are, however, three main meanings of this word in his works.
(i) 'The assumption of the existence of one of the primary objects of the 
science one is studying' (cf. APo. 72 a 20). (ii) 'A premiss whose truth value is 
not yet known' (cf. the usage of the expression UTToGccreujC; in this context 
T j ir o G e a iC  is synonymous with auv0qKq, cf. APo. 50 a 16,18; EN 1133 a 29, b 21) 
(a premiss being a 'part of a proposition in which one thing is predicated of 
one thing'). And (iii) 'a first truth' ( d p x q ) /  on which a science (q  0ecopqTLKq) is 
based (cf. EE 1222 b 23 ff., 1227 b 29 ff) (this last meaning is, I think, as Barnes 
1990, 93, the predominant one). These three meanings, however, allow us to 
claim that for him also one may hypothesize either the existence of' 
something or a. feature of something.
7 (i) The first meaning occurs in Men. 86 e, and its synonym, in Euclid and 
later mathematics, is Xeppa (for the notion of Xeppa see Proclus In Eucl 211).
(ii) The second meaning occurs in Archimedes, On conoids and spheroids, ed. 
Heib, 249.13, 253.1; and in Proclus, In Eucl 178. (iii) The third meaning occurs
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in Aristarchus of Samos, in On the sizes and distances of the Sun and the 
Moon.
8 Cf. Proclus, in Eucl 76.24-77.3; Sextus, M IX 2, 419; Galen, sect ingred I 93 
(the edition of C. G. Kuhn, Leipzig, 1821-33). For more references see Barnes 
1990,94.
9 Aristotle claims (Gael 308 a 17 ff.) that it is ctTOTTOv, 'strange', "to refuse to 
believe that there exist something in the universe which is 'up', and 
something else which is 'down'" (O'Brien's 1984, 187 paraphrase). A lthough 
Plato is not named, he seems to be the target of this criticism (cf. also Ph. 208 b 
8ff.)
10 The Timaeus's view of a universe which does not have absolute 'up' and 
'down', seems to be compatible, I think, with the image of the suspended 
earth that occurs in the cosmological myth of the Phaedo 108 e-109 a 
(although any comparison between the two cosmologies is hindered by m any 
controversies).
11 That the localization of the intelligible realm above the sensuous realm is 
a poetical license should not be very controversial; given all the subtleties 
that Plato says about the intelligible realm (see for instance the Parmenides), 
one cannot assume that he believed that our world is actually hung from the 
intelligible one. To paraphrase the above quotation from the Republic 529 b-c, 
one may say that, Platonically speaking, somebody who lays on his back and 
studies the stars, is only physically looking up, not metaphysically. But 'to  
look up metaphysically' is just a poetical way of putting things.
12 How are we to take his calling 'that which contains the universe' a TjTTo"  
Soyfj (Ti. 51 a 5). A •uiroSoxq is properly a reservoir, i.e. something w hich 
contains something else (e.g. a pot full of water). A reservoir, however, is, 
somehow, under that which is contained in it, for its very bottom is always 
'situated' under the contained matter. Should we assume then that the 
universe is, somehow, above its receptacle? Physically, however, this would 
be absurd, since at 62 c Plato claims that the universe, as a whole, is not parted 
into two regions, one lower and one upper. But then, how are to explain the 
use of TJTTQ-Soxfj? If the occurrence of tjtto-  is not accidental, then it could 
only be taken as suggesting that, metaphysically, the 'receptacle' is som ehow 
under the sensuous realm (which, in its turn, is, metaphysically, under the 
intelligible realm). The i juoSoxfj,  however, or x ^ p a ,  is such complicated a 
notion that one carmot construe anything reliable on it.
13 In the final myth of the Republic the universe is compared, poetically, 
with the whorl (ocjjovGuXoC) of a spindle (arpaKToC), which turns on the 
knees of Necessity; and the shaft (fjXaKCCTq) of the spindle, we are told, has a 
hook (ayKiaTpov) (for details see, inter alios, Adam's 1965 b, 447 and 
Bosanquet 1895, ad locum). (This mythological ideogram of cosmic ropes, 
chains or cords, by which the earth is fastened to the sky is also common to 
many ancient myths, from the pre-Buddhist Tibetan traditions to Homer —
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for details see Eliade 1965, 166-88. Homer's 'golden chain', by which Zeus 
could draw everything to him, ci.Iliad VIII, 17-27, is mentioned by Plato in  
Tht. 153 c-d; cf. also Lg. 644 d ff., where man is represented as a puppet hung 
by cords and strings upon the Gods.)
Now, when Plato claims that the universe is 'fastened by chains to the 
hook of a spindle', does he mean that the 'hook' belongs also to the world of 
becoming, to the sensuous realm? This, however, would contradict what he 
says in the Timaeus 62 c, namely that the sensuous universe is not parted in a 
lower and and upper region. The hook, says Plato, is, like the shaft, 'made of 
adamant [k^ aSdpavToC], whereas the whorl was partly of adamant, partly of 
other substances' (616 c 5-d 1). Adamant is a kind of stone that cannot be cut 
or broken, and so the use of the word 'adamant' here carries out the idea of 
something that will always remain as it is, i.e. of something that cannot be 
changed. Accordingly, to say that the hook (like the shaft) is made of adam ant 
and the whorl partly of adamant, partly of other substances, suggests that the 
former is something unchangeable, whereas the latter is, at least partly, 
changeable. The usage of ' d S d p a C  is, obviously, metaphorical. But if so, to 
what does it hint? To what may hint the comparison between som ething 
changeable and something unchangeable? The answer, I think, is obvious: 
one of the most important differences between the sensuous and the 
intelligible realms is that the former is changeable and the latter 
unchangeable (cf. also the Timaeus, where the intelligible realm is said to be 
del  Kard r a u r d ,  28 a 2, povipoC, and pépaioC, 29 b 6) (d8 apavTivcuC is used 
many times as a stronger word for pepaicüC — cf. also Campbell 1894 h, ad 
locum). If so, however, then this myth from the Republic implies that the 
sensuous realm is not grounded on the intelligible realm (as on a 'firm  
ground', pépaïov GepeXiov), but hung upon it (as upon a 'strong hook', 
dSapdvTivov  dyKiarpov).  (In The Book of Job, at 26:7, God also 'hangs the 
world', but he, being omnipotent, hangs it 'upon nothing, not upon a 'firm  
hook'; I am indebted for this reference to Dr. Christopher Martin.)
14 The mythological ideogram of the inverted tree is to be found in m any 
ancient myths. In the Indian tradition for instance — see Rg Veda, Katha- 
Upanisad or Bhagavad-Gita — the whole universe is represented as an 
inverted tree whose roots are in the sky and whose branches are spread over 
the earth, an image which, oddly enough, is to be found also in Dante's 
Paradiso; and in the Hebraic esoteric teaching and Islamic tradition m an  
himself is represented as an inverted tree; for references to the above 
mentioned texts see Eliade 1958, 273-76.
15 In Greek the idea of 'being dependent upon something' may be expressed 
in several ways ( u t t o  t i v i  yiyvecjea i ,  ÙTrqKoov eTvai, etc). Yet Plato, if he 
wants to express this idea, seems to prefer the verb àpracü,  'to hang one thing 
upon another'. The expression q p T q r a i  I k t i v o C  means both 'to be hung  
upon something ( t i ) '  and 'to depend upon something ( t i ) ' .  In the majority 
of English translations this expression is taken as meaning to depend upon '; 
but, nevertheless, if we accept that for Plato the 'inferior things' are, as it 
were, hung upon the 'superior ones', then we may take the expression 
q p T q T a i  ek t i v o C ,  at least in some of its occurrences, as meaning 'to hang
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upon'. Accordingly, one may say (as, inter alios, Rosenmeyer 1960, 403 does) 
that for Plato the human good things are hung upon the divine good things 
(qpTqrai S’ CK t ü ü v  eeiüüv — Lg. 631 b), or that a poet is hung (e^qpTqTai — 
Ion 533 e and 536 a) upon his Muse. (And upon the poet, says Plato at 536 a 8, 
are hung, EKKpcpapcvoi, the actors, the choric dancers, the masters of the 
chorus and the undermasters.)
16 It is perhaps worth noting that in English 'to abase' and 'to de-base' (i.e. 'to  
deprive something of its own base or foundation') have negative conotations 
(i.e. to degrade oneself and 'to reduce the value or quality of som ething' 
respectively).
17 The sacred nature of the sky — that is of what is 'up' and 'above' us — 
appears in countless myths, and the symbolism of 'height' is to be found 
almost everywhere in ancient rituals. 'That is why "everything nearer to the 
sky [i.e. mountains and high places in general — in other words, what is 
'high'] shares, with varying intensity, in its transcendence" (Eliade 1958, 101).
18 As it is the case with what I call the procedure of SiaKpiveiv the ycvoC of 
an etSoC (prominent especially in the Sophist). Here I agree w ith 
Rosenmeyer 1960, who claims that: (i) "The movement experienced in the 
transition from genus to species [in the case of division] or, in the case of 
collection, from species to genus is not in a single instance characterized as a 
descend from or an ascent to the genus" (p. 396). So, (ii) "to the extent that 
Plato conceives the diaeretic procedure as moving, it moves on one 
[horizontal] plane or level" (p. 394).
19 For a similar view on dialectic (i.e. on the process of knowledge) see also 
Plotinus' treatise On dialectic (I, 3), 1-20.
20 For 'knowledge', Plato uses mostly the word cTTiaTqiiq, and one may 
speculate that the preference for this word is due, to some extent, to its first 
compound, the preposition èiri. emaTfjiiq comes from the verb èTriaTaiiai, 
which is made out of the preposition èiri-, 'on', 'upon', and the verb 
lŒTapai, a passive form of laTqiii, which means 'to stand' (in Cra. 437 a Plato 
proposes the same etymology; cf. Hofman 1950, ad locum). eiriaTaiJLai m eans 
in general 'to know', to know how to do something', or 'to understand ', 
although in its literal sense it means 'to stand upon' (cf. ècjjiŒTaiJLai, 'to stand 
on the top', and €TTiaTaTqC, 'someone who stands over', for instance 
eTTiaTCXTqC àpjjLCXTüüv, 'the one who is mounted upon a charioter' — see LSJ; 
cf. also Heidegger 1988, 153: "èTricrTccpai means [...] 'to come to stand over 
something', 'to stand over something and thus know that something' — my 
translation). Now, this implicit literal sense of the verb ecjjiaTajiai ('to stand 
over', i.e. 'to be in a higher position') fits very well into Plato's metaphysical 
topography ('the more one knows, the higher he stands'). But when Plato's 
CTriCTTfjpq is translated into English by 'understanding', the difference 
between his metaphysical topography and ours becomes manifest, because 
€Tri(JTf|pq suggests an 'over-standing', not an 'under-standing'. For us, 
however, the English understanding' seems more natural, since for us.
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unlike for Plato, knowledge tends to be represented as a 'descent towards the 
profound depths of the world' — hence the majority of the com m on 
métaphores of 'essences'; 'foundation', 'basis', 'ground'.
21 Unlike Robinson 1953, 68 (cf. also p. 98), Rosenmeyer 1960, 397 believes that 
the primordial sense of TJiroeeaiC is not 'intellectual', but 'architectural' (or 
'physical').
22 Strangely enough, however, this Platonic comparison of iJTToGecjLC with a 
rung is to be found in Epictetus, diss I vii 22-3: "Sometimes it is necessary to 
postulate [ a i j f j a a i ]  a i J iT o e e a iC  as a sort of an e T T ijS d e p a  for the ensuing 
argument". In many myths, however, the ascension into heaven could be 
performed by means of a rope, a tree or a ladder (cf. Eliade, 1958, 103-4); Jacob, 
for instance, dreamt of a ladder linking the earth and heaven (cf. Genesis 
XXVIII, 12), and Mahomet saw a ladder connecting Jerusalem with the sky 
(and oddly enough, there is ladder rising to heaven in Dante's Paradiso XXI- 
XII).
23 Cf. for instance Robinson 1953, 98: "[here, in R. 511 b 6, Plato] is calling 
attention to something the word [iJTroGeaiC] might have been used to m ean 
but has not"; or Rosenmeyer 1960, 406: "the image [of the stepping stones is] 
probably humorous."
24 The metaphor of rung occurs also in the Symposium 211 c, but in a 
different context and with no reference to ÛTToOéaeiC. Here, speaking about 
the ascension of the soul towards t o  K a X o v ,  Plato says that the one who wants 
to perform this ascension' has, as it were, to step 'from rung to rung' (cf. 
e T T a v a p a a p o I C  y p c u p c v o v  — 211 c 3); that is the one who wants to 'know w hat 
beauty is', has to go "from one to two, and from two to every lovely body, 
from bodily beauty to the beauty of institutions [cTTiTqSeupaTa], from  
institutions to learning [paefjpaTa], and from learning in general to the 
special lore that pertains to nothing but the beautiful itself." Arguably, one 
may claim that according to this passage, the 'rungs' that the senses have to 
step are the 'perceptions' of all the 'individuals of a class' (and that this 
operation culminates with the 'apprehension of their 'common feature', 
which has to be further 'handled' through dialectic).
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